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EDITOR'S NOTE: STUDENT-WRITrEN NOTES AND
COMMENTS-WHAT VALUE?
This is second in a series of editorial notes that discuss the value of law
reviews, law review membership, student-written articles and symposiums.
Modelled after editorials published by Lowell Noteboom during the 1966-
67 academic year, the editorials are one of several special features in the
1993 Centennial Volume.
Regarding my position on law review, an old friend called me "Lou
Grant" (head of the fictional newsroom). "Hardly!" I responded, "An
average law review article contains over one hundred footnotes. And a
good one is cited in other footnotes just as often." Although she looked
at me with sympathy, much is to be gained from student research, writ-
ing, rewriting and editing experiences. However, despite the outstand-
ing research skills one inevitably obtains during the mere undertaking,
putting together those valuable footnotes in a student-written note or
comment is the worst part of publishing in a law review. Seeing your
article in print is probably the best of it. But it takes hours, days, weeks,
months, sometimes years, to get an article to that point. A law student
hoping to publish an article in a law review has a lot to learn on the way.
By writing a "note," a student surveys a specific area of the law and
often learns more about the legal field of their choice than in any law
school classroom. The student also becomes familiar with well-known
scholars in the field and may even criticize existing theories or suggest
novel ones. In a case "comment," the student analyzes a case of first
impression, which may present emerging legal issues and theories. Be-
cause case comments often present detailed debates regarding a court's
rationale, a student's case analysis may become an appellant's argument
or be used by an attorney seeking to overturn an adverse ruling.
We introduce, in each issue of the Review, a sampling of student
scholarship among that of the prominent judges, attorneys and profes-
sors that grace our pages. Thus, the Review is a showcase for new voices
as well as a vehicle for scholarly discussion and social change.
What else does all this research, writing, rewriting, editing and
more editing beget?
Good student writers make good student editors. Good student ed-
itors attract better authors. Better authors spawn better student editors.
Therefore, the scholarship published in the Notes and Comments section of
a law review often indicates the quality of the editors, and hence, the
quality of the review itself. In short, a law review may be only as good as
its law student writers, researchers and editors. In any event, today as in
1967, the Review endures as a dynamic and integral part of a law stu-
dent's legal research and writing education.

Colloquy: Racism in the Wake of
the Los Angeles Riots
FOREWORD
The video of the police beating Rodney King brought racism into
our living rooms much as the nightly news brought war and death into
our homes during the Vietnam War. But an ocean divided us from Viet-
nam. This racist attack happened on our streets and it forced us to face
the brutal hatred amongst us and within ourselves. What Americans saw
made every one of us uncomfortable for different reasons. It compelled
us to look inward to see the racism, however slight it may be, most of us
harbor in our hearts and minds. While few condoned such an outward
and cruel expression of racism, many Americans felt pangs of guilt.
Guilt for our own hidden racism. Guilt for telling or laughing at racist
remarks and jokes. Guilt for tolerating societal racism. Guilt for seeing
the racism we are confronted with every day and calling each incident an
"aberration."
Some call what followed in Los Angeles a riot. Others declared that
it was a revolution. I believe that it was a combination of both. Frus-
trated by these events, I saw no legal solutions to the myriad of
problems that the riots/revolution presented. This was especially frus-
trating for me because I am an idealist, one who believes the law can
solve problems. I sensed a similar frustration and a feeling of
powerlessness from my fellow classmates. What began as a quest for
answers grew into a critique of racism in America.
The video of the beating forced the world to witness the fact that
racism is alive and thriving in the United States. The acquittal told many
of us that the American society condones racism. The acquittal proved
to some that our judicial system is inherently racist. The riots told the
world that blacks were fed up with the societal racism. The riots showed
us that the Kerner Riot Commission's Report is still valid today, twenty-
five years after it was released, and only months before the "follow-up"
study is to be issued by The Milton S. Eisenhower Institute.
Today the world realizes that all of the rhetoric following the riots
was only talk, for today the new President and the resurgence of discord
in the Persian Gulf are the top stories in the news. Even the ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina has taken a "back page" to these
stories. While the beating of Rodney King obliged us to acknowledge
that racism still exists in America, other racial incidents seem to escape
our consciousness because they do not make national television or the
front pages of the newspapers. If they do, it is only for a single fleeting
moment.
In 1991, six Japanese youths were beaten with baseball bats by four
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young white men in Denver.' In Oneonta, New York at the State Uni-
versity of New York at Oneonta, the University vice president released a
list of the names of all black and hispanic males to the state police after a
seventy-seven-year-old woman was attacked by a "dark skinned" male.
2
During the Denver celebration of Dr. Martin Luther King's birthday in
January of 1992, the Ku Klux Klan held a rally on the steps of the State
Capital Building.3 Cross burnings are still prevalent as evidenced by the
recent Supreme Court case, R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota.
4
Pregnant women are discriminated against based on the fact that
they are pregnant.5 Institutional discrimination still exists in housing,
both in the inner cities and in the suburbs. This racism is often dis-
guised in a shroud of "legitimate" rationalizations, the most common
being the fear that property values will decrease if blacks or hispanics
move into the neighborhood. Gays and lesbians are being discriminated
on a systemic level with the passing of Colorado's Amendment Two
which prohibits local communities from including "sexual orientation"
in their anti-discrimination statutes.
6
Even the conduct of police officers was curbed only temporarily, as
exhibited by the behavior of officers in other cities. Since the riots in
Los Angeles, Detroit police officers beat a black man to death (there was
no video). 7 White Nashville police officers stopped a black undercover
fellow officer for an expired license plate, dragged him from his car and
beat him.8 It appears that when the all-white jury acquitted the officers
that beat Rodney King, the lesson to be learned from the beating and
public outrage were lost on some law enforcement officers.
The list appears endless. While the readers will recognize most of
these incidents, it is unlikely that they will look at them as a whole and
recognize a pattern of societal racism. If all of these events occurred in
one city and in a short period of time, we would be forced to view them
as a whole, and we would see the societal racism involved. But since
they are interspersed throughout the country, we are able to disaggre-
gate them, look at them one at a time and say that each was an isolated
incident.
This Colloquy strives to show the reader that these events, Los An-
geles in particular, are not isolated aberrations in our societal conscious-
ness, but part of a whole that must be confronted. How many more
1. Patt Morrison, Race Relations; Cultures Clash In Denver As 6 Students are Mugged, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990, at A5.
2. Diana Jean Schemo, College Town in Uproar Over 'Black List' Search, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1992, at 33, 40.
3. Ann Rovin, Klan Rally Sparks Violence at Denver King Celebration, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1992, at A14.
4. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
5. Barbara Presley Noble, An Increase in Bias Is Seen Against Pregnant Workers, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 2, 1993, § 1, at 1.
6. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 306.
7. 7 Officers Suspended in Fatal Detroit Beating, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1992, at A2.
8. Two White Nashville Police Used Unnecessary Force, REUTERS, Dec. 16, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
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Rodney Kings are out there who did not have an amateur video photog-
rapher present? For every incident involving racism we hear about, doz-
ens more go undocumented and unnoticed-especially in the "white"
communities where covert racism is often the rule rather than the
exception.
While these articles focus on the racism of whites against blacks,
many of the arguments and observations presented are equally applica-
ble to women, Native Americans, Gays and Lesbians or other racial and
religious minorities. As I read and re-read these articles, I noticed that
in many instances any racial or religious minority could be substituted
for the word "black." All minorities have experienced the humiliation,
the sense of powerlessness and the rage that the residents of South Cen-
tral Los Angeles felt on April 29, 1992. As the federal civil rights trial of
the four police officers begins, America once again must confront the
horror of Los Angeles.
Laird Blue

LOOKING FOR GOD AND RACISM IN ALL
THE WRONG PLACES
THE HONORABLE A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR.*
AND
ADERSON BELLEGARDE FRANCOIS**
In his legendary novel One Hundred Years of Solitude, Gabriel Garcia
Marquez writes of a mythical town called Macondo and its mythical
founding family, the Buendias. Built by the side of a river in the middle
of a jungle, Macondo remained isolated for many years-its only contact
with the rest of the world: a band of travelling gypsies who would visit
the town once a year and bring with them the wonderful inventions of
science and civilization. One day the gypsies arrive in Macondo with a
daguerreotype camera and laboratory. Jose Arcadio Buendia, the
founder of the town and a man of extravagant imagination, becomes
fascinated by the new invention and resolves to use it to obtain scientific
proof of the existence of God. He sets up the camera in different parts
of his house during different times of the day, convinced that through a
complicated process of multiple and superimposed exposures he will fi-
nally capture a scientific representation of the image of God. Why he
wants proof of God and what he intends to do with that proof should he
find it, we do not know. In any event, his experiment fails, he does not
find proof of God and, in his frustration, he goes mad and ends up
spending the rest of his life tied by the waist to the trunk of a tree, speak-
ing in tongues which only he understood.
In 1991 and 1992, America-mostly white America-watched the
videotape of the beating of Rodney King, searching its darkly-lit images
for proof of the persistence of racism and race hatred in this country,
with the same sort of mad intensity and pointless dedication that Jose
Arcadio Buendia used to search for the existence of God in the silvery
images of daguerreotype photographs. And, just as Jose Arcadio
Buendia could not find an image of God no matter how many daguerre-
otype photographs he took and no matter how many exposures he de-
vised, many white Americans, no matter how many times or how many
different ways they watched the videotape, could not seem to see that
the five white policemen beat the black motorist simply because he was
black.
In fact, the more some white Americans watched the videotape the
less they were willing to believe that the beating was the product of race-
hatred. During the first few weeks of news coverage of the beating, as
* ChiefJudge Emeritus, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Senior Fellow
University of Pennsylvania School of Law,
** J.D. 1991 New York University School of Law, Law Clerk to the Honorable A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., 1991-93.
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Rodney King's injuries were paraded on television, the popular consen-
sus was: "My god! How could something like this have happened in
America?" In the months that followed, after the tape was dissected on
endless talk shows and after the details of Rodney King's criminal past
began to surface, the popular response was downgraded to: "Well,
maybe we do not really know why this happened." Until finally, after the
tape was reconstructed frame by frame by frame in a courtroom in Simi
Valley California, and after the jury was told that Rodney King grunted
like a bear as he was being beaten, the perhaps not uncommon reaction
became: "You know, those policemen may have had a good reason to
use force after all."
One wonders about the moral cowardice-to say nothing of the in-
tellectual incoherence-it must have taken to make the journey from:
"My God! How could something like this have happened?" to: "You
know, these policemen may have a good reason to use force after all."
But it is a journey many white Americans took; and a very short journey
at that. For the original cri-de-coeur: "My God! How could something
like this have happened in America?" was not so much an expression of
outrage against an act of clear injustice as it was a fatuous reaction of
near disbelief in response to a seemingly inexplicable event. In the eyes
of many white Americans, the beating of Rodney King became an aber-
ration, rendered all the more unreal for being replayed nightly on televi-
sion. They were unable or unwilling to look at the beating through the
corridor of American history, to place it in the context of present-day
American society or to relate it to their daily American lives. In other
words, for many white Americans, the beating of Rodney King was not a
haunting sequel to the widespread lynching of blacks in the south during
the first half of this century, it was not a vivid parallel to the imprison-
ment of a third of the young black male population in America in 1992
and it was not even a cruel magnification of the brutalization of millions
of black children in inadequate schools in almost every city in this coun-
try. Instead, it was a single, isolated, disconnected and ultimately irrele-
vant event.
Derrick Bell, a law professor who brings to legal discourse the same
magical realism that Gabriel Garcia Marquez brings to Latin American
fiction, writes in Faces at the Bottom of the Well, that in America "racism lies
at the center, not the periphery; in the permanent, not in the fleeting; in
the real lives of black and white people, not in the sentimental caverns of
the mind." The beating of Rodney King could and should have led
Americans to grapple with the racism that lies at the center, in the per-
manent and in the real lives of black and white people. It did not. In-
stead, we saw the beating of Rodney King as peripheral, fleeting and
unreal. Like Jose Arcadio Buendia searching for evidence of God in da-
guerreotype photographs and finding none, we searched for evidence of
racism in the Rodney King beating and also found none.
Of course, Jose Arcadio Buendia did not have to look for God in the
images of daguerreotype photographs. One supposes that he could
[Vol. 70:2
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have found some evidence of God in the miracle of Macondo, that magi-
cal town by the side of the river in the middle of the jungle, or he could
have found evidence of God in the love of his family, who after all, took
care of him in his madness with a devotion his extravagant search for
God had not earned him. In short, he could have found evidence of
God in the reality of his own life. Similarly, Americans did not have to
look for evidence of racism in the videotape images of the beating of
Rodney King. In the words of Derrick Bell, white Americans could have
found such evidence at the center, in the permanent, and in their real
lives; for example: in the still segregated neighborhoods in which many
they live, in the still segregated schools to which many send their chil-
dren, in the still race-based manner in which many vote and in the still
racially-unbalanced places where many work, meet and worship.
That we are somehow unwilling to look for evidence of racism in
our real lives means simply this: we, as a people, are still imprisoned by
the myths we manufactured in order to evade the moral and political
dilemma we engendered when, in August 1619, John Rolfe made that
prophetic entry into the journal of Jamestown, Virginia: "about the last
of August, there came to Virginia a Dutchman of Warre that sold us
twenty negers." From that moment on, most everything white Ameri-
cans claimed to believe about black Americans represented myths to jus-
tify their enslavement, their segregation, their repression or their
inequality. We justified slavery with the myth of "the less than human
negro." We justified segregation with the myth of "the happy and con-
tented negro." We justified the repression of the civil rights movement
with the myth of "the violent and communist negro." Now we justify the
built-in injustices of American society with the myth of the "equal ne-
gro." But, of course, the myths we create never quite managed to com-
pletely suspend reality, and judging from the acquittal of the policemen
who beat Rodney King and the ensuing civil unrest in Los Angeles, the
current myth of the "equal negro" is proving equally lame.
"We are capable of bearing a great burden," James Baldwin used to
say, "once we discover that the burden is reality and arrive where reality
is." The reality of which he spoke is the reality of racism in America.
And, the burden he seemed convinced we are capable of bearing is the
burden of facing and eradicating that racism. But, if the beating of Rod-
ney King proved anything, it is that we have not yet truly discovered the
reality of racism in this country. The question then becomes how are we
to bear the burden of facing and eradicating it. This question is posed-
and this essay is offered-without bitterness and without despair, if only
because one realizes after all that as a people we have always managed to
eventually arrive where reality is. Granted, sometimes we have been
dragged to that place while kicking and screaming, and sometimes we
have merely blundered into it. But sooner or later, one way or another,
we have gotten there. So there is no reason now to suppose that we
cannot get there again.
The essays included in this collection represent in some way the
1993]
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beginning of discovering the reality of the beating of Rodney King. Re-
membering the premonitory chants of the Los Angeles civil unrest: "No
Justice! No Peace!," it is a reality which we can no longer afford to
ignore.
INTRODUCTION
HONORABLE NATHANIEL R. JONES*
George Santayana declared that those who fail to learn the lessons
of history will be condemned to relive them. This truism was again
proven in the violence and ugliness seen in the events surrounding the
arrest of Rodney King in Los Angeles. Unfortunately, the Rodney King
tragedy clearly illustrates that Americans have not learned some very
important lessons.
A review of history is necessary to place contemporary events in a
historical context. The parallels between the racial tensions of today
and those of the past are worthy to note. During the Era of Reconstruc-
tion, with the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, Congress undertook a serious effort to remedy the effects
of slavery; effects that demeaned not only the slaves and their descend-
ants, but the nation as a whole. The Freedmen's Bureau was created to
implement all remedial measures necessary to assist the freed black
slaves in their adaptation to their newly found freedom. Due to the Bu-
reau's activities and the protection afforded by the Civil Rights Act of
1866 as well as the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
blacks began to assume, on an increasing scale, the attributes of United
States citizenship.
After measurable gains were achieved, a "take back" occurred, cul-
minating in the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Plessy v. Ferguson
that the Fourteenth Amendment could abide racial discrimination
against black Americans, thus validating the separate-but-equal doc-
trine. Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote a ringing dissent:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.
Regrettably, Justice Harlan's words are inappropriately quoted to-
day by those who argue against race-based solutions to remedy past dis-
crimination. Had the Court's majority adopted Harlan's view in 1896,
there would be no present need for remedies to eradicate the present
day effects of the doctrine of separate-but-equal. The nation has not
reactivated any of the racist laws that existed prior to Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954, but the attitudes behind those laws are now gaining
respectability anew. This is evidenced by what I call the "David Duke
phenomenon." This phenomenon transcends David Duke, the individ-
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Cincinnati,
Ohio.
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ual. It is, in my view, the driving force behind the motives of some of
those who attack remedies designed to eliminate race discrimination.
To the victims of race discrimination, it does not matter whether
words of hate come from the lips of Duke himself or from the coded
phrases uttered by others. The message and the pain are the same.
What is heard in the newspapers by African Americans, Hispanic Ameri-
cans, Native Americans, women and other minorities is "turn back the
clock." Demagogic appeals to the worst instincts in Americans seem to
be the order of the day. Unbecoming racially divisive codes abound. No
wonder that some minorities act with seeming license to wreak harm
upon others.
In 1968, the National Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders (the
Kerner Commission), appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in the
wake of a series of tragic urban riots in the mid-1960s (including Los
Angeles, Detroit and Newark), addressed the underlying causes of those
riots. The historic report that grew out of the Commission's work de-
clared that each disturbance was precipitated by an encounter between
the police and the minority community. Each catalytic event was fol-
lowed by an insurrection that saw bottled-up frustration, unredressed
grievances and unmet needs explode into mindless, senseless acts of de-
struction. The report specifically recognized that the situation was pre-
cipitated by a breakdown of the legal system.
Now, some twenty-four years later, in response to what is widely
viewed as a miscarriage of justice, another series of social disruptions
occurred. The violent seizure of Rodney King and the jury's exonera-
tion of the police officers involved, led an overwhelming number of
Americans to believe that our legal system failed miserably.
The Constitution's protections against "unreasonable seizure" and
being "deprived of life and liberty without due process of law" extend to
every American-no matter how ugly that person's conduct may have
been. Nothing that preceded what we saw on the infamous video tape
entitled the police officers to suspend Rodney King's constitutional
rights and summarily administer corporal punishment.
Duly constituted authorities must respect individual rights. When
authorities violate one's constitutional guarantees, the legal system must
provide redress. When this system breaks down and no redress is af-
forded, the likely result is an unleashing of collective rage. Since that
rage is incendiary in nature, it ignites the social dynamite stacked in the
urban areas where racial minorities are warehoused. Simply put, this is
what occurred in Los Angeles. It will be repeated elsewhere unless
some fundamental problems in our society are addressed and solved.
In 1968, the Kerner Commission, in facing the issue of rage, race
and social dynamite, found: "What white Americans have never fully
understood-but what the Negro can never forget-is that white society
is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white
institutions maintain it and white society condones it."
One of the final witnesses appearing before the Kerner Commission
[Vol. 70:2
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was the distinguished social scientist, Dr. Kenneth B. Clark. In expres-
sing his concern that the Commission's recommendations would be ig-
nored, as previous warnings had been, Dr. Clark testified:
I read that report... of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if I
were reading the report of the investigating committee on the
Harlem riot of 1935, the report of the investigating committee
on the Harlem riot of 1943, the report of the McCone Commis-
sion on the (1965) Watts riot.... [I]t is a kind of Alice in Won-
derland with the same moving picture reshown over and over
again, the same analysis, the same recommendations, and the
same inaction.
Unfortunately, too many Americans, including some duly consti-
tuted authorities, continue to ignore the Commission's findings and rec-
ommendations. This nation has endured more than a decade of rhetoric
and demagoguery on the question of race and remedies for racial dis-
crimination. Courts have been castigated and lawyers who have tried to
deal with the problems have been targeted for derision by occupants of
the highest offices of the land. Moreover, ideological litmus tests have
been crafted to reduce the likelihood that persons who believe in pro-
tecting individual rights ascend to the federal bench. It now appears
that the Department of Justice is about to move away from the policies
of polarization and to again seriously enhance the system's respect for
individual rights.
Moreover, the Kerner Report is not obsolete; it can help Americans
understand how to ensure that the guarantees of equal justice under law
are extended to Americans who many consider society's "unwashed."
This beloved nation remains sorely troubled. At the core of these
troubles is the historical difficulty Americans have in dealing with the
issue of race and the absolute need to end the divisions born of race.
The Kerner Commission's challenge-yet to be meaningfully con-
fronted, is set out in these words:
Discrimination and segregation have long permeated
much of American life; now they threaten the future of every
American.... The destruction and the bitterness of racial dis-
order, the harsh polemics of black revolt and white repression
have been seen and heard before in this country .... It is time
now to end the destruction and the violence, not only in the
streets of the ghetto but in the lives of people.
Only by extending equality of opportunity and respecting the rule
of law can we save ourselves and the soul of the nation. Law schools and
lawyers must lead the way.
1993]

NOTES FROM CALIFORNIA: RODNEY KING AND
THE RACE QUESTION
JEROME MCCRISTAL CULP, JR.*
Race doesn't matter in California. I don't mean that people do
not have a race, but that it is not an important determinant of
people's lives. I
California is our future. Residents of California make up more than
ten percent of our country's population and it includes the largest seg-
ment of the people who help to structure our dreams and ambitions.
California is the liberal vision of nirvana and meritocracy where family
connections and eastern elitism have been eliminated in the caldron of
American possibilities. California's role as creator of images in the mov-
ies and television makes the culture created there a part of the future
only loosely and imperfectly connected to the past.2 This is particularly
true of changing social norms including those connected to race and
gender. Race has been deconstructed by the call of the West. California
has called so many people from other places to its shores that it is possi-
ble for it to permit people to reinvent themselves free of their past. If in
California no person is limited by one's past cultural or individual situa-
tion, it should not surprise us that California has been able to decouple
race from its Black-White divide and to broaden the notion of race to
include brown, yellow and red people. In the rest of America, people
may use concepts like "people of color" or "racial minorities" and mean
black, but in California they have indeed become terms that include
more than black people.
California seems to hold the promise of racial justice for all. During
the 1980's while the relative incomes for most regions remained con-
stant, the western region dominated by California experienced the only
sustained relative income growth. Blacks and other racial minorities
came closer to income parity with whites in the West than at any other
time for which we have statistics. However, if California is our future
with respect to racial relations and racial justice, it has failed. The most
* B.A. University of Chicago 1972, M.A. Harvard University 1974, J.D. Harvard
Law School 1978. Professor of Law and Director of the John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics at Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Walter Dellinger,
James Coleman, H. Jefferson Powell, John Payton, Patricia Williams, and Leslie Espinoza
for helpful comments and thoughts. All remaining errors are my own.
1. Statement of a former student as part of a larger conversation she had with me
about race and Duke Law School. I was about to write that this student was black, but of
course there is a certain problematic quality associated with that description in conjunc-
tion with this quotation.
2. California has played this role for a long time. See JOSEPH BOSKIN, SAMBO: THE
RISE & DEMISE OF AN AMERICAN JESTER (1986) and DONALD BOGLE, TOMS, COONS, MULAT-
TOES, MAMMIES & BUCKS (1973).
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recent example of this failure is the riots associated with the verdict of
"not guilty" on most of the charges against the four police officers who
beat Rodney King. What we ought to learn from the "Rodney King"
riots is that we cannot all get along without dealing with the race ques-
tion, i.e., how we should alter the legal and social world because of
race.3 Even though our legal and political systems deal with the race
question all the time, they consistently deny the importance of answer-
ing it.
I. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR BLACK MALES: BLACK ANGER
The Navy provides each ship commander with a set of rules defin-
ing appropriate conduct with respect to potential adversaries. 4 These
rules, called "rules of engagement," are a blueprint for ship com-
manders. Every black male above the age of five is taught directly or
indirectly the rules of engagement of black malehood. As a black male, I
learned these rules early from the concern in my mother's eyes and my
father's impatience. 5 These rules require that, at all times, we make no
quick moves, remove any possibility of danger and never ever give of-
fense to official power. Any black male who violates any part of these
elaborate rules is subject to an immediate penalty. The penalty may be
3. Rodney King, in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots asked the famous ques-
tion, "You know, can we all get along? Can we get along? Can we stop making it, making it
horrible for the older people and the kids?" See Clarence Page, Rodney King's Poignant Plea,
CHI. TRIB., May 6, 1992, at C29.
4. These military rules of engagement have been the focus of attention in recent
months. The first involved the shooting down of an Iranian airliner by the U.S.S. Vin-
cennes. See NEWSWEEK Responds, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1992, at 12.
First, was there an official cover-up of the fact, now acknowledged, that the
Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters when it shot down the plane? In the
classified version of the official report on the incident that was delivered in Au-
gust 1988, the Pentagon did notify key members of Congress that the Vincennes
had been in territorial waters. But in the version released to the public, the single
sentence acknowledging this was deleted. And at briefings on Sept. 8-9, 1988-
after delivery of the classified report-the [N]avy showed Congress a map that
made a point of locating the Vincennes in international waters. The NEWSWEEK
article displayed this map, and dated it. Crowe's former spokesman says that this
was because the Navy did not want Iran to know that its rules of engagement in
the Gulf permitted such an incursion. But it is reasonable to suppose that Iran
had already inferred the rules of engagement from its knowledge of the Vin-
cennes's position at the time the plane was downed.
Id. The second was in connection with the scope of activity of UN peacekeeping troops in
what used to be Yugoslavia. Paul Holmes, Plan Drawn Up for Bosnia Peace-Keepers, REUTERS,
Sept. 19, 1992 ("Their rules of engagement under the Security Council resolution allow
them not only to shoot in self-defence but also to open fire if any of the combatants -
Serbs and their Moslem and Croat foes - prevent the peace-keepers from carrying out
their mandate.").
5. For black males of my generation, the death of Emmett Till in 1955 symbolized
the real threat to black men if they got out of line. See STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN
THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETr TILL (1988) (Emmett Till, a thirteen year old black boy
from Chicago, was killed after an incident in a store while visiting Mississippi. Emmett Till
claimed that he had a white girlfriend in Chicago and said, "Hello, Baby" to a white wo-
man. Her husband and friends killed Emmett Till and were subsequently found not guilty
by an all whitejury.). This murder occurred in Mississippi, but all black men of my genera-
tion knew that similar or at least less drastic things could happen to you if you were per-
ceived as being out of place.
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simply embarrassment or discomfort, but it can also be our lives. About
five years ago, a large black male law student who looked uncomfortably
like myself was stopped by campus police on my campus at Duke Univer-
sity and arrested for being a large black male. He was stopped for being
a black male who looked "too black" at the wrong place on campus. He
was ultimately arrested for his anger at being stopped and for his threat
to walk to the campus police station to make a complaint. He was ar-
rested despite the fact that he presented a valid university identification
card and despite the fact that he was simply walking across campus to go
home. The officer subsequently contended that he did not look like a
student because he was too old, he was walking at night in a dark area of
the campus, and his identification card did not have a red sticker. I
know that I am subject to these same rules of engagement on this cam-
pus despite my status as a tenured member of the law faculty. I, too, am
a large black male who may appear inappropriately aged for my status.
6
I know that, as one of my white male colleagues in another department
suggested, such intrusions are thought to be the price that black males
have to pay to ensure the safety of women on campus. 7 I know, too, that
many would believe the police officer who shot me and attempted to
confirm my dangerousness by placing a gun in my hand afterwards.
"Gee, I didn't know Jerome carried a gun," some of my colleagues
would say as they shook their heads acknowledging the nature and
power of race. My colleagues are not able to separate out my blackness
from who I am. Race is only social construction, but as others have
noted, such social construction has important power.
This past spring, I had the pleasure of spending part of my sabbati-
6. This summer, one of the black guards at the university gym where I work-out
regularly asked me to inform the white guard, who was new to the job, that indeed I was a
law professor (and have been teaching for more than ten years as a law professor). She
later informed me that, not surprisingly, he had questioned her statement that I taught at
the law school.
7. The University's dilemma is that it must choose which set of victims gets pri-
ority consideration: those directly assaulted by criminal intruders or our black
students whose skin color is used as camouflage by the large majority of those
intruders.
In the end, the situation calls for forbearance from and toward all parties involved
in it. Through a terribly unfortunate but unavoidable ethical choice, our campus
police have to increase the burden on one set of victims (our black students) in
order to reduce the burden on another set, the victims of criminal assault.
Victor Strandberg, Checking Student IDs a Necessary Evil, DUKE CHRON., Feb. 17, 1987, at p.
9.
The problem I have with this formulation is that it is hard to find what sacrifice whites
make in response to these problems. What are they willing to put up with in the interest of
Black students? For my white colleague, these rules of engagement are fair. This is the
problem with the law in general: whenever the interest of Blacks are weighed against the
concerns of the majority, Black interests lose. To see this point with respect to my col-
league Victor Strandberg, read his letter on affirmative action in the DUKE DIALOGUE/
FACULTY NEWSLE-rER, Sept. 1992, at p. 1, col. 2, in which he argues that we should not pay
market wages to "affirmative action" assistant professors because their salaries are higher
than his. I question whether the latter is really true. But, assuming that it is true, why
can't the white faculty bear that burden if Black students and faculty have to bear other
burdens?
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cal at Boalt Hall at the University of California, Berkeley. During my
visit, in addition to the obligatory earthquake, I got the full California
experience when a non-black jury returned a verdict in the police mis-
conduct trial of the four police officers who were accused of beating
Rodney King. The hotel where I stayed was a staging area for the
Berkeley police when the post-Los Angeles riots spread to Northern
California, and a number of shops were destroyed two blocks away.
About a week after these riots I had dinner at a former student and
friend's house. He is Jewish and married to a Asian-American woman.
Their marriage symbolizes all that California represents in terms of ra-
cial progress and justice. He asked me what I thought about the riots. I
heard an implicit question,8 one I had heard repeated in different ways
over and over about the anger in the black community resulting in the
riots. That question was, "Why were blacks so angry?" It was clear that
I could not explain the anger. I had a hard time even expressing it when
Berkeley law students asked me to speak at a town meeting about the
aftermath of the Los Angeles riots. I tried to tell my friend that he per-
ceived being black the same as being white, except for an occasional
moment of discomfort when some insensitive bigots forget and revert to
momentary and isolated racism.9 However, for black people, particu-
larly black men, we can never stop being seen as potential violators of a
whole system of racial oppression. Being black, unlike being white, al-
ways means facing up to issues of race. White men may only think of
their race when someone questions them about it; black men and wo-
men do not have that luxury. These rules of engagement do not influ-
ence simply one or two moments, but the entire lives of black men.
I see that these rules of engagement go beyond simply the non-
black people I endure. After I returned to North Carolina from Califor-
nia, I pulled into my credit union one evening to withdraw money from
my neighborhood money machine. I entered the parking lot behind a
late model foreign car driven by a young black woman who, upon seeing
my black face, (and perhaps my ancient American-made automobile) re-
fused to get out to use the money machine until I drove off. Racism is so
deeply embedded in our society that black cab drivers in Washington
and New York will not even pick me up when I am dressed in a suit, and
black women can find me inordinately and intolerably dangerous. In
8. My friend posed a second implicit question about the state of Black and Asian
relations in the wake of apparent targeting of some stores by mostly black rioters. I de-
plored such targeting and suggested to my friend that we have to figure out how to im-
prove relations between those communities, but I am sure that was not a satisfactory
answer to a difficult question. It is easy to point out that much of the problem stemmed
from the failure of the police to adequately protect the property of Korean store owners.
Such an answer, however, ignores the real differences between the Black and Asian com-
munities, particularly the Black and Korean communities. These issues are the subject of
the inaugural issue of the Asian Law Review that is being published by students at Boalt
Hall.
9. I am sure that my friend's concern was heightened by the Californization of the
riots to include not just Black-White conflicts, but Black-Asian conflicts, particularly Black-
Korean conflicts, proving how much race indeed has and has not been transformed by
California's expansion of race concepts.
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such a world it is not possible to simply deny the importance of race.
Many of my white colleagues, however, seem to think that race is always
irrelevant to the discussion. They think that if we leave it out, race as an
important concern will go away. It is this thinking that has led us to
Rodney King. Only by denying the importance of the race question is it
possible to create a police force that would beat a black man before a
camera and despite the video record, call itjustice.10 Only by denying
the race question is it possible for twelve non-black jurors to conclude
that no crime was committed by those four officers despite the neutral
uninvolved video record.
One night several years ago, I parked in front of Duke Law School
at about 2:00 A.M. to get something from my office. I was tired and it
was late so I ran from the front door to my 1981 blue Escort and jumped
in and drove off hoping to get to bed as soon as possible. As I turned
near the law school I noticed that a campus police car was following me.
This police car sped up and followed as closely as it could as I ap-
proached the next light. After stopping at the last stoplight on this part
of campus, I proceeded through the next intersection and the policeman
turned on his overhead police lights and pulled me over. I got out of
the car and came back to the officer. I asked him why he had pulled me
over, and I showed him my driver's license. He stopped me, he said,
because I had crossed the double lines at the intersection. I pointed out
to him that that argument was just silly because the nature of the in-
terchange made it virtually impossible to cross the yellow lines. He
glanced at my driver's license and simply got back into his car and drove
off. I never knew if he noticed that my driver's license lists me as a white
male which, despite what his eyes told him, may have immunized me, or
whether- as I have always contended-the campus police are required
to remember the faces of all 35 black faculty members. II I have no
doubt, however, why I was stopped. It was the interaction of the color
of my skin, my apparent age in the dim light, and my gender that created
a mythical possible-robber, rapist or intruder who needed to be con-
trolled by our local constabulary. The problem for those of us trying to
10. But see Roger Parloff, Maybe the Jury Was Right, AM. LAw., June 1992, at 5 (White
liberal attorney makes a case that the jury's verdict was rational and based upon the whole
facts before them. He says he watched much of the trial and would have come to the same
conclusion that the jury did because criminal intent had not been proven.). I also watched
much of the trial and I thought that the jury could have failed to convict two of the police
officers, but that the evidence of racism and culpability in both Koon's and Powell's testi-
mony was substantial. It was the failure to convict anyone that led to the riots and my own
anger. That part of the verdict was, in my view, deeply infected with racism. See also
Steven Brill, In Praise of Justice in Simi Valley, AM. LAw., June 1992, at 7 (Brill praises
Parloff's article and argues that the not guilty verdicts for these officers, despite the video-
tape evidence, is proof of the strength of our criminal justice system.). Not only is this
view of that case tautological, it ultimately means that we can never criticize a system of
justice because every action is within a plausible range. Such a view requires black people
to live inside an unfair system without complaint.
11. This driver's license containing my black picture and listing me as a white male is
in my wallet. (I know that the characterization was a mistake. I do not know, however,
whether it was due to some attitude of mine, or simply the vagaries of bureaucratic
efficiency.).
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deconstruct race is that the view of me as that mythical black person is a
reflection of how society sees me, not just the police. If we are to
change the way in which race is interpreted by the police, we cannot
hope to change just the actions of police officers. When the Los Angeles
police beat Rodney King, they acted appropriately with respect to white
demands that dangerous "black men" be controlled. Compare our reac-
tion to the pictures of the police officers beating Rodney King within an
inch of his life with society's reaction to the police complaint that Rod-
ney King was dangerous, black and out on parole.
The question I wanted to pose to my friend in return was why most
white people, even many of the most sensitive and socially conscious
white people, have such a hard time understanding these rules of en-
gagement and the anger that results. I cannot be sure, but I believe that
there are two reasons why they cannot fathom the black anger that re-
sults. They see this incident as an isolated case, a random event. There-
fore, like all chance events, these incidents simply become part of the
risks imposed on all of us, like being struck by some form of "social
lightning." In addition, many do not say, but believe, that Rodney King,
twice since arrested for other things, "was dangerous" in exactly the way
the police suggest. For them, there has been no violation of the rules of
engagement. These rules have simply been enforced as both black and
white people demand them to be. Such reactions miss the point. The
problem with race is not that campus police should not be able to hassle
an enrolled black student or a tenured black professor. The real prob-
lem with race is that it can be a marker for injustice. What is ultimately
wrong is the injustice to the non-student who wanders onto campus and
is treated as a criminal, and the non-professor who happens to be on
campus and is scrutinized and injured by the deep racism of our society.
The problem is our refusal to deal with the race question, and all the
while demanding that black males adhere to rules of engagement that
are tantamount to specialized oppression.
In a talk at the Frontiers of Legal Thought conference at Duke Uni-
versity in January, 1992, I predicted that the police officers who beat
Rodney King would be acquitted, but until it happened, I did not under-
stand how I would feel about the reality of those verdicts by twelve non-
blackjurors. 12 What I had trouble describing to my white friend was the
nature of this injustice. There comes a point when the excuses made by
Los Angeles police or campus police become too much. It does not sur-
prise any black male that any police officer will be believed when he de-
scribes our actions as threatening or inappropriate. The rules of
12. The one hispanic juror subsequently broke down and described the tremendous
pressure she felt to agree with the other jurors and how racism infected part of their delib-
erations. See Nina Bernstein, Bitter Division injury Room: How 12 Ordinary Citizens Met for 7
days to Produce Verdict that Shook L.A., NEWSDAY, May 14, 1992, at 5 (Richard Kossow, hus-
band of one of the jurors, said, "They brainwashed the whole world with that little bit of
video. The whole country, they're just looking for something to boil over about." He
continued, "We have to have authority. What are police for? My wife has said many times,
she's sorry for Mr. King. But how about the police officers? Their lives were completely
ruined because Mr. King wanted to go out and have a good time.").
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engagement are that we black males have no credibility. What the vide-
otaped beating of Rodney King demonstrated was that there is no neu-
tral way of describing that racial situation, and therefore, the search for
neutrality is futile. A thousand white nuns testifying to our innocence
will not prevent a police officer from successfully claiming that he is sim-
ply enforcing that thin blue line between black males and white civiliza-
tion.13 No neutral independent observer is a check on the racism deeply
embedded in the fiber of American society. There is nothing that can be
neutral about the racism that exists in such a society. All black men are
Rodney King and all of us are subject to injustices that none deserve,
even the non-innocent Rodney Kings, who are black, on parole, and
therefore dangerous. If neutral rules will not protect even in that situa-
tion, the rules of engagement of black manhood become too onerous. It
is that truth that fuels black anger.
This unfortunately seems a truth too powerful for law and the black
community. If there is no justice, how can we belong to such a society.
Certainly, burning down Los Angeles or Berkeley is not a solution.
Likewise, burning down Simi Valley or the jurors' homes (a solution
suggested by my sweet, gray-haired, god-fearing, mother), even if effec-
tive in the short run in making any particular juror more careful, is likely
to produce a white response that limits and eventually prevents such
retribution. However, relying on the current system and its rules is not
satisfactory either. The truth is that we have not been able to deal with
the issue of race because we have been willing to accept the failure to
pose the race question. Race will not be eliminated from its pernicious
13. See e.g., Rob, Lawyers Seek an Advantage With Trial Consultants, BUSINESS RECORD,
June 29, 1992, at 1 (Trial consultants used mock juries to suggest that defense attorneys
should use the thin blue line defense.); Richard A. Serrano & Jim Newton, 3 King Case
Defendants Notified of U.S. Inquiry, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 31, 1992, at Al ("Barry Tarlow,
a criminal defense lawyer in Los Angeles [said the reason for the unwillingness ofjuries to
convict is] ... that police argue that they form the "thin blue line" protecting society and
therefore should be given wide latitude in carrying out their duties."). President Bush
vacillating between wanting to deal with the issue of race and wanting to exploit the issue
for reelection purposes went to see the riot scarred neighborhoods of Los Angeles and
promise aid, but he could not help pointing out to an audience of police that they repre-
sent the thin blue line between criminals and the body politic. See also John W. Mashek,
Bush in Pennsylvania Hears Plea for Social Programs, THE BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1992, at 8
(describing President Bush's speech at a memorial in Washington).
Bush praised law enforcement officers at a memorial in Washington honoring
those slain in the line of duty. "Yours is the priceless task of upholding good
against evil," Bush told the families of 139 police officers killed during the last
year across the country.
"All of us saw the sickening sights in Los Angeles of criminals breaking win-
dows and burning buildings and looting businesses," Bush continued. "But
even worse was the looting of something harder to replace than merchandise, the
stealing of something precious - stealing hope, promise, the future. This we can-
not allow."
Standing coatless in a light rain, Bush paid tribute to what he called the
"THIN BLUE LINE THAT SEPARATES GOOD PEOPLE FROM THE WORST INSTINCTS IN OUR
SOCIETY."
Id. (emphasis added).
It may be no accident that Bush, severely behind in the polls in California, transferred
some of the aid scheduled to go to the riot scarred neighborhoods of Los Angeles to the
hurricane impacted areas of Florida.
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place in the justice system until we are able to look the rules of engage-
ment of black manhood in the face and call them what they are-racial
oppression-and to know that oppression will only be lessened by deal-
ing with the racism involved in their implementation.
One of my friends who is black and is in charge of one of the largest
metropolitan police departments responded to an earlier version of this
article by saying, "So, what do I tell the police officer who stops you late
at night?" His real question was, "How does the racequestion help me
implement practical police policy?" Race is important. In a world so
involved with race and gender it is not possible to ask the police officers
to be totally blind to the race of particular offenders. My response is
that the police have to be required to not end up increasing the racial
oppression of black people by their actions. To me it is the distinction
between the Boston Police Department collecting every black male be-
tween the ages of 18 and 35 after the Stuart murder and a police depart-
ment that would have looked for a person who was black and fitted the
appropriate height, weight and other descriptive characteristics.' 4 Race
is not irrelevant, but the police and citizens have to figure out ways to
allow me to have rights as a black male too. Every time there is a conflict
between the rights of the majority and my rights as a stereotypical black
male, my rights cannot always be subordinate, or else I have no rights at
all.
II. How TO POSE THE RACE QUESTION
It is more difficult to face the question of race than it might appear
on the surface. All of us are influenced by the racism that exists in soci-
ety so that all of us, in our day to day lives, help to replicate the racial
oppression represented by the trial of the four officers who beat Rodney
King. We see the difficulty in the legal system's response to Rodney
King's beating. The defense attorneys successfully convinced the non-
black jurors that race was not an issue. After all, officer Powell, the of-
ficer who executed most of the blows and who joked on police tapes
about "gorillas in the mist," came from a household that worked with
children of color and has a sexual relationship with a person of color.' 5
Rodney King was beaten because he refused to stop moving and he was
always in control of the situation. 16 The defense was able to put police
experts on the stand who testified that the officers' actions were within
14. Charles Stuart is the white man who apparently murdered his pregnant wife and
blamed it on a black robber. The Boston police spent a considerable amount of time
rousting the black neighborhoods near the incident for this fictional robber. This police
activity included convincing some people to implicate a black man for this crime. After
Mr. Stuart was discovered to have killed his wife and wounded himself, he committed sui-
cide. The mayor has never apologized for the racial nature of the investigation. Some
people still seem more horrified by the prospect that a stranger, particularly a black stran-
ger, might have committed this crime than that a man would kill his wife and future child.
15. Policeman Who Beat Rodney King Apologizes for Injuries, REUrERS, May 20, 1992 ("I
want you to know that I never harbored any personal malice toward Mr. King, nor do I to
this date.").
16. See generally Parloff, supra note 10.
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the neutral standards of the Los Angeles police. 17 When these four po-
lice officers were indicted by the district attorney's office, one of the at-
torneys, who is black, was willing to accept an all white jury in Simi
Valley because he thought the videotaped evidence would be sufficient
to convince any jury of the defendants' guilt. Race was not an issue.
When the verdict came back and a number of Los Angeles' citizens
(black, white, and brown) rioted, the only reaction of the legislature and
governor was to enact into law an emergency bill to allow the legal au-
thorities to keep people in custody without being arraigned within the
statutory forty-eight hour time period.' 8 Some of those arrested were in
custody simply for sitting on their porches in violation of the curfew.
That a disproportionate number of those so arrested on these flimsy
charges were black did not make this a racial issue for the California
legislature. Race was not involved in the exclusion of the only black
judge from hearing the case involving the beating of a white motorist by
a number of black participants during the riots that followed the verdict.
The black judge was removed at the instigation of the prosecution be-
cause he was erratic and possibly overworked. 19
I found my own reaction to the Los Angeles riots and their after-
math in Northern California also problematic. The night before the
largest amount of property destruction in Berkeley, I was standing in the
lobby of my hotel when a young black male walked in the door. I had
come in from the streets a short time before and I had a feeling of antici-
pation that I had never felt before as young teenagers milled around.
When I saw that young black man come in the door, I started to enforce
the rules of engagement of black manhood against him by asking him
why he was there and whether I could help him. Fortunately, I stopped
myself, but I have in the past enforced such rules. Despite teaching and
writing about aspects of these issues, I am not, and was not, free of the
impact of race and gender in such a situation.
17. Id.
18. The state legislature subsequently passed SB 1427 that changed the criteria gov-
erning the rules for changing venue in criminal trials to include questions of the extent to
which the new venue was similar in terms of race, age, ethnicity and income. See Editorial,
Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 5, 1992. As of the date of this article, the bill has remained
unsigned on governor's desk.
19. See Danelia Wild, WhiteJudge Appointed to hear Denny Trial, UNITED PRESS INTERNA-
TIONAL, Aug. 31, 1992.
Superior Court Judge Roosevelt Dorn, the only black jurist assigned to hear
criminal cases in the Central District of the Superior Court, was the first judge
assigned to the Denny case. He was removed in a preemptory challenge filed by
District Attorney Ira Reiner.
The removal of Dorn was a controversial move, with prosecutors initially say-
ing the judge did not have room on his calendar for the extended trial and was
lacking a security courtroom.
But Reiner later said the real reason was that Dorn lacked the temperament
to hear such a highly charged case.
Mills [supervising judge] said the initial choice of Dorn was influenced by the
fact he is a black judge and that assigning the case to him "would have some
calming effect on the community."
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I am willing to concede that there may be circumstances in which
race does not matter. However, it cannot be that race is not important
and does not need to be addressed in any of these circumstances. How
does race influence the circumstances of this situation? This question
has to be addressed at some point. The law's refusal to recognize it is a
kind of color blindness that destroys black lives and makes Black Ameri-
cans people without the support of law.
I came to realize the difficulty of dealing with the race question
when my Black Legal Scholarship class this fall was discussing the case
of Colorcraft Corp. v. Jandrucko.20 This case grew out of a workmen's com-
pensation claim by Ruth Jandrucko.2 ' Ms. Jandrucko, a 65 year old
white woman, was attacked and had a vertebra in her back broken by a
assailant while working as a troubleshooter for a film processor five
years ago. She was attacked from behind and, therefore, was not able to
see her attacker's face. However, she saw his arms and concluded that
he was dark skinned and black. 2 2 She presented evidence that the attack
has left her with an uncontrollable fear of "big" black men, and since
she cannot be in a situation free of such men she is unable to work.
23
Since the injury happened while she was at work and her disability arose
from her injury, the court concluded that she was entitled to workmen's
compensation. The court accepted her evidence that she was a Mennon-
ite, had harbored no racial prejudice before this attack, and that the ra-
cial antipathy was not the result of some preexisting condition.
24
Supported by the ACLU, the company contended that such an award
based upon her fear of black men would amount to support for racial
discrimination, and, therefore, would violate the Fourteenth
20. 576 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied sub noma. Fuqua Indus., Inc.
v. Jandrucko, 111 S.Ct. 2893 (1991). There is, however, no reported opinion stating the
facts of this case. The Florida citation simply affirms a lower court opinion that also is not
reported in substance. The subsequent effort in the district court challenging the decision
on constitutional grounds is not reported.
21. See Don Williamson, Humanity, Like Stupidity, Can be Recycled, SEATrLE TiMES, Sept.
3, 1992, at A18.
22. Lynne Duke, Color Me Stressed; What If We All Sought Compensation for Our Race-Based
Noblems?, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1992, at C5 ("Jandrucko did not see her mugger's face,
but she says she knows he was black because she saw parts of his neck and arms. As a
result, black people in general-with a few exceptions (her manicurist, and CNN's Bernard
Shaw)- freak her out.").
23. Despite my argument below about this case, I want to emphasize that courts
should be extremely careful about accepting evidence of such fears. I cannot be sure that
the psychiatrist who testified to this disability was not applying a non-neutral standard
infected with issues involving the race-gender intersection. Other evidence suggests that
legal actors and social participants are infected with racist reactions. See e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair
Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817
(1991) (explaining how black car buyers appear to experience different treatment from car
dealers than white car buyers). In a slightly different area, death penalty cases, see Michael
Radelet and Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAw &
Soc'y REV. 587 (1985) (differentiating between the police classification of a case and the
prosecution classification connected to the race of victim and race of defendant. Blacks
killing whites are most likely to have their case upgraded and least likely to have their case
downgraded). We, therefore, have to make sure that this is not a situation where psychia-
try is infected with racism.




We were discussing how to do Black Legal Scholarship, and I con-
tended to the class that we had to force the courts to ask the race ques-
tion, much as feminists have required courts to ask the woman question.
I asked my class, "How do we ask that question in the context of this
case?"
Several of my students contended that this was an easy case and that
this woman should not be able to collect for such fear. They seemed to
be saying that too many black people suffer injuries, big and small, that
are bigger than this injury for which they receive no compensation.
Therefore, she should not be entitled to recovery for such fear. Descrip-
tions of her as a sweet little old lady previously free of racial animus
were ridiculed by my knowing students. They concluded that racial big-
otry was at the heart of this woman's concern and it must be stopped.
When I asked my class whether this case could be seen as a catalyst for
protecting the injuries suffered by black people from the attacks of white
people on the job, my students contended that we could never expect
the existing judges and the law to protect black interests in that way.
The law will never give real protection to black interests and, therefore,
we have to prevent them from giving protection to what amounts to ra-
cial stereotypes by this white woman.
I remain convinced that my student's response to how to raise the
race question was wrong. Unfortunately, the error that I found in their
analysis seems to me to be common to most analyses of race and the law.
They would have the law ultimately adopt a form of racial blindness in
this case. The ACLU and my students would require that the law ought
to be blind to the real injury suffered by a woman who cannot work
because it is connected to race. This seems to me to be a different ver-
sion of liberal color blindness. There are three things that militate in
this particular case in favor of this woman being able to collect her work-
men's compensation. She admits her response is irrational and ought to
be aberrational. She has proven, at least to the satisfaction of a work-
men's compensation judge that she had no prior racial animus. This
means that she does not predicate her claim on some right to dislike or
oppress black men. She is also not making a claim that she has a right to
work in an environment that is totally free of black males, and accord-
ingly she is not claiming the right to have the world changed to make it
safe for her whiteness. Forcing white plaintiffs in such cases to prove
these elements works against racial subordination. 2 6 Is this woman's re-
sponse "colored" by the racism in the world? The answer to that ques-
tion has to almost certainly be yes. But, we cannot punish such actions
25. See Lynne Duke, supra note 22, at C5.
26. Those who have read some of my previous work might be surprised that I am
defending this old white woman. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal
Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991) (I
discuss whether I should be able to say "boo" to an old white woman who is apparently
infected with racism. However, if I can say "boo," she ought to be able to stay at home
with a provable disability.).
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effectively in the long run unless we limit that punishment to situations
where vindication of the racism will not increase racial stereotypes and
or racial oppression. Ms. Jandrucko is not entitled to oppress black peo-
ple, but she does not have to live in some mythical world free of racism.
Such a world does not exist. Would we deny Ms. Jandrucko a disability
claim from a private insurer because her injury is infected with racial
stereotypes and concerns at some level? Workman's compensation is
supposed to be the public version of this private insurance situation.
The employer owes this to her through workmen's compensation, and
to his black employees and customers he owes the enforcement of rules
that reduce racial subordination.
The same company arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment pre-
vents this action would argue, perhaps successfully, that black men
could not do certain jobs because of "business necessity," (i.e., having
black males around in certain situations is a danger to others and eco-
nomic pressures require that they be excluded) just as similar employers
have argued that it is alright to impose a rule that would exclude black
women who are pregnant from such jobs because of their status as role
models.2 7 I suspect my students are right. Most courts will not be will-
ing to extend these arguments to protect black people from the kind of
injuries suffered by them due to racial hostility. I have seen black stu-
dents and black employees driven literally mad by the racism they had to
face, and it is difficult to get those real injuries considered by the courts.
This Supreme Court is very likely to treat such claims in the way that it
treated the claims of black people in McCleskey v. Kemp.28 The Court will
acknowledge their existence, but contend that they are so pervasive that
any effort to ameliorate them would destroy other interests or the public
27. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (Employer
contended that its role model policy that prohibited the employment of unmarried preg-
nant women was a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification. Therefore, the subsequent fir-
ing of a pregnant black woman was consistent with Title VII because she worked with
teenage girls and served as a role model.). See also Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989
Wis. L. REV. 539; Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 372-76.
28. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (McCleskey was sentenced to death for killing a white police
officer during an armed robbery. In his habeas corpus action, McCleskey claimed that his
race and the race of the victim unconstitutionally tainted the sentencing.). The Court held
that:
[11f we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted
the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to
other types of penalty. Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests on the irrele-
vant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to claims based on unex-
plained discrepancies that correlate to membership in other minority groups, and
even to gender. Similarly, since McCleskey's claim relates to the race of his vic-
tim, other claims could apply with equally logical force to statistical disparities
that correlate with the race or sex of other actors in the criminal justice system,
such as defense attorneys or judges .... As these examples illustrate, there is no
limiting principle to the type of challenge brought by McCleskey. The Constitu-
tion does not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that corre-
lates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice
system that includes capital punishment.
Id. at 314-19 (footnotes omitted). This argument ignores the history of race relations in
this country. See also Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward A Black Legal Scholarship: Race and
Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 85-87.
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fisc. The courts are always denying the race question, but it does not
help us to join them. To support the company's position in this case is
ultimately to conclude that race should not be used when it will cost
them resources. Such a rule not only does not eliminate racial subordi-
nation, it is likely to increase the income and class subordination that
exists in our society.
If my students have such a difficult time appropriately asking the
race question, how can we expect mainly white male judges to figure out
how to pose the question in their deliberations. The answer is ulti-
mately that the legal participants have to be forced to look racial subor-
dination in the face and to discuss how that subordination will increase
or decrease with how we treat race.
If I could adopt a general rule, it would be that not looking at issues
of race, claiming to be racially blind, is likely to increase racial subordi-
nation, and therefore should not be adopted. If the courts had been
willing to look at the racial facts of Rodney King's experience, they
would not have permitted the case to be moved to a jurisdiction where
the racial circumstances were so unfair to his interests. If the racial facts
were examined, then the black prosecuting attorney would have permit-
ted Rodney King to testify about his experiences with these four police
officers before a jury that had some number of jurors who could under-
stand them. The truth is that we have to reorient our approach to race
and the law and appreciate how important it is to take account of the
racial truth that exists. If we fail to do so, we ultimately fail justice.
III. SINGIN' THE BLUES IS A POLITICAL ACT: BEING WISE AND SAYING
SOMETHING
In my schoolboy days I had no aversion to slavery. I was not
aware that there was anything wrong about it. No one ar-
raigned it in my hearing; the local papers said nothing against
it; the local pulpit taught us that God approved it, that it was a
holy thing, and that the doubter need only look in the Bible if
he wished to settle his mind-and then the texts were read
aloud to us to make the matter sure; if the slaves themselves
had an aversion to slavery, they were wise and said nothing. 
29
I want to be a realist about the racial circumstances that Rodney
King leaves us in the law. Much of the legal response to race is to deny
the importance of race and to seek a form of racial blindness that ulti-
mately reinforces racial oppression. Black people do not have the power
to unilaterally alter this situation. It is not likely that any short run polit-
ical change will alter this fact.30 Black people and those who would join
29. SAMUEL CLEMENS, MARK TWAIN's AUTOBIOGRAPHY 101 (1924) (emphasis added).
30. Some might argue that simply electing a president who is opposed, at least in
some situations to racial oppression, would be enough, or that we might ally ourselves
with a progressive coalition who could pass legislation. Unfortunately, unless the adminis-
trators appointed by such a president and the judges and lawyers who enforce these laws
understand how to deal with the race question, the interpretation of any new legislation or
regulation will not be sufficient to eliminate important aspects of these concerns. This of
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us in fighting racial oppression have to understand that we have power,
but limited power. Derrick Bell has asked all of us to rethink the poten-
tial for law to be redemptive; in his book, And We Are Not Saved,3 1 he
repeatedly makes the point that law has not "saved" black people and is
unlikely to do so. In more recent work, Bell fleshed out this point by
contending that there can be no salvation, i.e., that race and racism are
so deeply embedded in the fiber of our society that it cannot be eradi-
cated by law, or other simple means; and that all we can do, in the words
of one of Bell's former black Mississippi clients, is to "harass the white
folks." 3 2 I interpret that argument to be a different way of saying that if
we are not harassing the white folks we are acquiescing in the racism
that exists in our society; or, as my colleague put it, "We may not be able
to change the world, but we do not have to take it." The point is that
either we harass by our actions, or we are wise like the free blacks and
black slaves in Mark Twain's time and we acquiesce in the racism. Part
of this harassment is our requirement that judges, lawyers and law stu-
dents face the race question. Such efforts will not be magical. Simply
posing the race question will not make all white (or black) judges see the
truth of our racial present, but it is a start on the road to change in
California and the rest of America.
There is a potential for change nascent in that failure to acquiesce
and part of the change in our status as black people is that we are no
longer wise by continuing to be silent. Certainly, as my colleague Jim
Coleman points out, the status of black people in the 80's was at least
partially impacted by the acquiescence of the black community in some
of the actions of the Reagan Administration and the Supreme Court that
helped to increase the power of white supremacy. Black art (jazz and
the blues), black literature (slave narratives, novels, and autobiogra-
phies), and black religion have all been about ways around the required
silencing of black voices. Black Legal Scholarship and Critical Race
Theory have to be about altering that history by adding our voices to the
singin', writing and arguing of other black voices.
course does not mean that we can stop trying to make such efforts, but that they are un-
likely to prevail in the long or short run when the enforcers and interpreters of those laws
do not know how to deal with the race question.
31. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987).
32. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 379 (1992).
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THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THE Los ANGELES RIOTS
HENRY J. RICHARDSON, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
By now much has been written, preached, propagandized, analyzed
and moralized about the Los Angeles riots. We need not rehearse here
either the facts of the trial and acquittal of the police officers who beat
Rodney King, the subsequent fire and destruction or the resulting fed-
eral and state trials of the officers and riot participants. This Article will
discuss the international reactions to the acquittals and the riot while
exploring several crucial issues with implications for United States pol-
icy, international law and Afro-America in the world community. The
Article will also explore comparative claims regarding causation for the
riots and the responses of the Vatican and the southern tier of the world
community to these claims. Some initial consideration will be given to
recent United States. policy trends in order to place the international
community's response to Los Angeles in context. Finally, the author
will offer some reflections on the patterns of reactions from overseas,
the policy and international legal issues they raise, and the divergent
expectations about, for example, American racism they may represent.
II. BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles riots necessarily raise value considerations in the
American and international communities concerning power, wealth,
human rights, loyalty patterns, intellectual skills, patterns of knowledge,
well being and control in these communities of decisions about as-
signing labels of "right" and "wrong."' Through these value considera-
tions we can project in a provisional way the implications of future
international reactions. This is particularly important regarding diver-
gent expectations about race and the multi-cultural group and class
dominance realities of the United States. International reactions to the
Los Angeles riots arose not in a vacuum, but in the presence of perti-
nent principles - law goals and objectives already part of the constitutive
structure of the world community and its tightly knit fabric of global
interdependence. 2 The rising authority of international human rights
* Professor of Law, Temple University. I am greatly indebted to Kwame Anthony
Gyan, L.L.M., Temple University, 1992, and Marcelle Benjamin, J.D., Temple University,
1993, for superb research assistance. All errors of course remain my own.
1. These value considerations are integral to the "New Haven school" jurisprudence
of Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell and Associates. See, e.g., MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3-93 (1980).
2. Articles 1 & 2 of Chapter I, Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter
set forth the pertinent principles and goals.
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law has been driven by a global pattern of demands for representative
government plus a recent consistent focus on the protection of personal
rights against abuse, such as torture. s To this must be added a continu-
ing focus on second-generation human rights found in Somalia and
other disaster situations, e.g., the right to food.
4
Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of the other two
legs of the "triad" (the European Economic Community and Japan) the
"rules-of-the-game" evaluation of the current status of the United States
as the sole great power has energetically begun. Whatever conclusions
The purposes of the United Nations are:
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles ofjustice and international law, adjustment or settlement of inter-
national disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
(3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
(4) To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment
of these common ends.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
Article 2. The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in
Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
(1) The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members.
(2) All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights, and benefits
resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed
by them in accordance with the present Charter.
(3) All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
(5) All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action
it takes in accordance with the present Charters and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive
of enforcement action.
(6) The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be nec-
essary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
(7) Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the applica-
tion or enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
3. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also U.N. DRAFr
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND THEIR CRUEL INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, G.A. Res. 39/46 Annex, 39 U.N. GSOR, Supp. (No. 51) 197, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1984/72, Annex (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
4. See Philip Alston, The International Monetary Fund and the Right to Food, 30 How. L.J.
473 (1987); HenryJ. Richardson, The International Human Rights Response, 30 How. L.J. 233
(1987). See generally Symposium, 1986 World Food Day Food and Law Conference: The Legal
Faces of the Hunger Problem, 30 How. L.J. 193 (1987).
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are drawn from this question throughout the international community
will have both public order and constitutive implications with global ef-
fects. 5 This is particularly the case since the United Nations' enforce-
ment action in the Gulf in early 1991 was accompanied by the
proclamation-perhaps premature in the form stated, and clearly an un-
formed concept at the moment-by George Bush of a "new world or-
der."'6 What the President failed to include in the scope of the
proclamation were questions of equitable and non-discriminatory treat-
ment of Afro-Americans and our empowerment in America-long an in-
ternational issue. 7 Also not included was the question of the political
will to break the destructive cycle of America's inner cities and the rela-
tion of that cycle to Afro-America's youth and the future of both Afro-
America and the country as a whole. Yet these questions are integral
elements of any understanding of world order, new or old. American
policy objectives concerning these questions, whether negative or posi-
tive, containment-driven or remedy-driven, coercion-driven or equity-
driven, have their ready analogies regarding dozens offavelas, bidonvilles,
barrios, districts and ghettos around the world. These questions likewise
connect directly to those of welcome, empowerment and equity for re-
cent immigrants to a national community. For instance, the maltreat-
ment of immigrants is increasingly considered to be a new malicious
form of racism on an international basis.
8
One cannot be aware of the demographics of the Los Angeles area
without realizing that it comprises interlocking frontiers among several
crucial political, economic, racial and cultural goals and categories of
human policymaking. Los Angeles features frontiers between the First
and Third Worlds, development and underdevelopment, economic aspi-
rations and institutionalized economic achievement, poverty and fanta-
sies of material success, powerlessness and expected comfortable
empowerment, Black, Hispanic and Asian persons and communities and
white Anglos or other persons, immigrants and citizens. 9 But these
demographics do not accurately describe the patterns of authority and
empowerment governing these issues among those peoples. Power, es-
pecially economic power, and authority remain white-dominated in ways
little touched by existing racial integration. The Los Angeles police de-
partment and its chief were notorious for harshly prejudicial treatment
of citizens and non-citizens of color.10 The control of jobs for persons
5. Jacques Attali has written a provocative future projection of the international com-
munity, raising issues which will be further considered. See JACQUES ATrALI, MILLENNIUM:
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE COMING WORLD ORDER (1991).
6. George Bush, Bush:'Out of These Troubled Times . . . a New World Order,'
Speech Before Joint Session Congress (Sept. 11, 1990), in WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1990, at
A34.
7. See infra notes 9-18 accompanying text.
8. Germany Looks at Itself and Winces, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28-Dec. 4, 1992, at 55.
9. DAVID REIFF, Los ANGLES: CAPITAL OF THE THIRD WORLD 31 (1991).
10. See Jane R. Fitsch & Frederick M. Muir, COUNCIL MAJORITY BACKS POLICE PANEL
REFORM PACKAGE; COMMISSION: THEY SEEK FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF CHRISTOPHER RE-
PORT, INCLUDING ITS CALL FOR A NEW CHIEF. FORMER CHIEF DAVIS ALSO URGES GATES TO
STEP ASIDE, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1991 at Al.
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of color never lay in their home neighborhoods and the situs of those
jobs increasingly fled the same neighborhoods." South Central Los
Angeles offers little systemic hope of escape from poverty or from a con-
stant struggle among its youth and their families for non-gang-related
sources of personal dignity and respect.
In such a context, crime, "disturbances," racial and other riots,
looting and other even momentary public order breakdowns cannot es-
cape evaluation along a range of comparative international questions.
These significantly include judicious considerations of histories, paral-
lels and trends in various colonial territories prior to the formal dissolu-
tion of the former European empires. For our purposes here, a
convenient benchmark for such comparisons is the year 1955: the year
of the Bandung Conference that gave the third world its first infusion of
global self-consciousness. 12 The general history of colonial territories is
one of dominating European minority groups with cultures influential
on but separate from those of majority indigenous populations. Yet this
minority controlled the legal, military, economic, administrative, trans-
port and financial resources and systems in the territories.' 3 Neverthe-
less, ideas about self determination, freedom, an equitable share of the
territory's economic resources and control of their own lives for their
own ends was long discussed by, made coherent in and increasingly
served as the focus of committed organization among active groups of
these indigenous peoples.14
From the purview of the colonial elite an accurate understanding of
any breakdown in public order along the axis of "disturbance" to
"crime" to "insurrection" to "revolution" was crucial to maintaining
their rule. Although understanding the facts of such incidents and draft-
ing the press-release-public-reactions to them were sometimes different
for colony and metropolitan capital consumption, they were most often
part of the domination of the majority by the ruling minority. 15 The
most frequent colonial-elite response was to resolutely drain such inci-
dents of all political content or pleas for economic empowerment.
These responses asserted the criminality of the acts, their lack of local
roots and their aberrational character and contrasted that to the alleg-
edly known contentment of the "natives" with the status quo political ar-
rangements, i.e., minimal local governmental positions under co-optive
and watchful metropolitan eyes.
Wrapped in an envelope of racism, this response stemmed from
various combinations of sheer ignorance of "native politics" and willful
blindness to clear signs that self-determination, nationhood and ridding
11. Id. at 64-78.
12. See, e.g., 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA - AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NA-
TIONS 124, 210 (1968).
13. For example see, BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN-AFRICA AND THE
CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE 118-91 (1992).
14. Id. at 162-96.
15. See id. at 68-85. No colonial perception of changes towards independence in the
colonies; no planning done, e.g. for handover at an upcoming independence.
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the territory of foreign occupiers in the search for a better life were
ideas of concrete and intensifying currency. 16 A further basis was the
colonial elite's fear of being removed from comfortable lifestyles. Thus
any substantial change in dignity, wealth and power relations between
colonizers and the colonized was an anathema and demands for the
same were beyond the pale of rationality. If such demands became too
strident more suppressing military force was applied and the perpetra-
tors' actions were further scrubbed of political, economic or racial
meaning. This was done in substantial part through law and legal char-
acterization by labeling, prosecuting, convicting, imprisoning, exiling
and sometimes executing the violators as "criminals." Such persons
were seen as wrongdoers who were detrimental to good society and
their actions required a restoration of the status quo social fabric, cer-
tainly not a radical remaking or a replacement of it.
Los Angeles cannot escape the issues raised by this history, even
though the outcomes will differ in important ways from colonial/libera-
tion precedents. It is beyond this article to pronounce on the final reso-
lution of such questions. But those decision makers with authority to
shape, assess and enforce legal and community policy responses to the
Los Angeles riots now face the validity of those issues.
III. BRIEF REFLECTIONS ON PAST TRENDS
Notwithstanding other important contributing factors to the Los
Angeles riots, race and the consequences of racism are critical for any
understanding of what occurred. Racism against Afro-Americans in the
United States has been an international question in varying postures
since before the American Revolution. 17 While the United States prior
to the Civil war struggled to retain the profits and benefits of the slave
trade, the growing international illegality of slavery intensified the moral
and legal questions regarding the personhood of, and equity towards,
Afro-Americans. 18 The actions of dominant American white classes and
decision-makers were measured not only by emerging global anti-slav-
ery norms, themselves inconsistent in those historical circumstances, but
equally by American ideals of liberty, equality and justice. These ideals
in turn further influenced the rise of analogous international legal
principles. 19
16. Id.
17. See generally JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY To FREE-
DoM-A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS (6th ed. 1988).
18. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MArTER OF COLOR, RACE, & THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
19. For example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims,
"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." The Universal Declara-
tion grants two categories of rights; civil and political rights, 1st generation rights; and
economic, social and cultural rights, 2nd generation rights.
The first generation rights include the right to life, liberty and security of person; the
right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; right to presumption of inno-
cence. See THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 2 1 7 A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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A century later one outcome of this clash of expectations was the
confirmed international and national criminality of slavery evidenced by
the strong leadership of the United States in drafting into the United
Nations Charter clear legal prohibitions against racism.20 Despite the
hope and advocacy of Afro-America, however, the United States subse-
quently moved to downgrade these provisions to no more than "moral
principles," ensuring that they were not construed within federal law as
legal rights. 2 1 Despite executive foreign policy pronouncements and
some desegregation of American armed forces during World War II that
had created a body of non-discrimination policy for oversees consump-
tion, there was no federal civil rights law in the immediate postwar
period.
22
Nevertheless, one issue raised in both federal and state courts dur-
ing this period was whether such policy pronouncements could be given
some weight by United States' courts in considering claims by Afro-
Americans, and other persons of color, of a right to be free of racial
discrimination. 23 In other words, did United States propaganda in-
tended as either boilerplate or for overseas consumption, though not
dispositive in se on the existence of legal rights, have legal consequences
that courts were bound to take notice of as "federal public policy?" In
Oyama v. California 24 the Supreme Court said "yes" in strong dicta.2 5 A
20. The Purposes of the United Nations are:
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace.
U.N CHARTER art. 1, 2.
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Na-
tions shall promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and. conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
U.N CHARTER art. 55.
"All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." U.N. CHARTER
art. 56.
21. President Harry S. Truman, United Nations Conference on International Organi-
zation, Address During Final Plenary Session (June 26, 1945), in 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. 3
(1945).
22. The first Civil Rights Act passed after World War II was not passed until 1957.
Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1958).
23. See generally RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY ch. 2 (1979).
24. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
25. Id. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring).
There are additional reasons now why that law stands as an obstacle to the free
accomplishment of our policy in the international field. One of these reasons is
that we have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to
"promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."
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few other courts followed, but the most either denied the right 26 or
found (or invented) safe domestic constitutional grounds to grant it.
27
This points to the long-existing tension between the international legal
rights of Afro-Americans and other minorities, plus international expec-
tations opposing that particular form of racism and the generally more
limited Afro-American rights stated in American law. It is also a neces-
sary element for understanding the international reactions to the Los
Angeles riots.
Since the formation of the United Nations, the United States, as a
matter of unadmitted executive policy, has labored to prevent United
Nations consideration of any racial conflict arising within America. 28
For instance, periodically during the years of South African "grand
apartheid" black (and other) members of the United States' United Na-
tion's delegations were ordered to aver both how well American race
relations were being played out and how little concrete action was
needed by the United Nations against South Africa. 29 The hypocrisy was
notable, unforgettable and bitter for the Black persons involved. It also
illustrated simultaneously the racist elements in United States foreign
policy and the co-optive strategies of American racism.
In this connection, we must consider the rise of the United States as
a great power since the end of World War II. Considerable interna-
tional expectations were generated across the entire value spectrum by
United States power globally projected during both the Cold War rivalry
with the Soviet Union and in this still-young post-Cold War period. A
pertinent slice of such expectations of a great power is that the mainte-
nance of public order within the United States is presumed to be more
effective, efficient and stable overall than is generally the case in devel-
oping countries. Its Constitution is the world's most long-lived; its gov-
ernmental institutions are influential and much imitated; its legal system
has exported thousands of lawyers to carry the message of constitution-
alism, separation of powers and individual rights; and its economy is the
world's richest. Equally, its corporations have helped spread consumer-
ism around the world during the 20th century °3 0 Thus it is expected
that American streets will generally be safe (although the statistics of
American crime, and its cowboy traditions are globally known); its gov-
ernmental institutions and ministers will be stable under the Constitu-
Id.
26. See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
27. See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
28. From this author's knowledge, all Afro-American human rights petitions to the
U.N. Human Rights Commission have been barred from that body's agenda. In 1978
there was consternation in the White House and executive branch when it was learned that
an Afro-American member of a United Nations Human Rights Working Group had voted
that a group of petitions from the United States presented sufficient claim of a national
pattern of gross violations of the human rights of Afro-Americans through police brutality
to qualify such claim being forwarded to the United Nations Sub-Commission for the pre-
vention of Racial and Religious Discrimination. Immediate steps were taken to block such
claim.
29. See J.C. MILLER, THE BLACK PRESENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1978).
30. ATrALI, supra note 5, at 92-113.
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tion; its political leaders will act lawfully without trying to seize military
power; and the visible economy will actually determine the movement of
prices, goods and services.
Certainly part of such expectations is that the United States cannot
be a country where traveling foreign tourists must be warned by their
home governments to be either vigilant or to stay away entirely because
of riots in the streets. Nor would it be expected that such tourists would
need to be warned of the ineffectiveness of the police and the absence of
restraints on official racism. Yet, this is basically what happened in Los
Angeles.
IV. THE REACTION TO THE RIOTS: ISSUES AND PROJECTIONS -
FRANCE AND JAPAN
The reactions to the Los Angeles riots were emblematic of a glob-
ally-interdependent post-Cold War world community. They were also
emblematic of the virtual disappearance of the insulation historically
provided the United States by two large oceans, especially when its gov-
ernment wished to invoke it, and the additional insulation provided by
the expectations of public order stability. Further, part of the domi-
nance of the United States as a great power has included the capacity to
control to its liking, the allocation of doctrine, decision-making and
world community scrutiny under international law concerning the
"proper" definition of "domestic jurisdiction" under Article 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter.3 ' Expectations that this dominance will con-
tinue have taken a beating. The United States has made stringent at-
tempts to bar from official international scrutiny, especially deliberation
by any United Nations organ, questions concerning racial justice and the
enforcement of rights of Afro-Americans and other minorities. 32 Such
attempts have been more noteworthy given the openness of the Ameri-
can press and public opinion to global view; racism in the lives of Afro-
Americans has been globally perceived in fact for many years. The ques-
tion arises whether one consequence of the Los Angeles riots will be
successful official investigations of police brutality and other detailed ac-
tions sustaining racism through the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mission, the General Assembly and other organs notwithstanding
Washington's opposition.
The actual reactions to the riots have far reaching implications for
international law and its meaning to Afro-America and otherwise. It can
first be noted that the United States, relative to the Los Angeles riots,
31. The Organization and its members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforce-
ment measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7.
32. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
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was treated like its State Department often treats developing countries,
i.e., public warnings to Americans abroad against traveling to specific
countries or particular parts therein because of "civil unrest," "hostile
attitudes towards foreigners or Americans" or even "bodies lying in the
streets." For example, there was an official expression of concern by the
Japanese Foreign Ministry for the safety of Japanese tourists in Los An-
geles.33 There were similar expressions of concern by the Korean
government.
3 4
The Japanese response must be measured against previously ex-
pressed official Japanese racially defamatory attitudes toward Afro-
Americans, which included alleging their detriment to the American
economy.3 5 In making this public expression of concern, the Japanese
government determined that the Los Angeles riot situation was, for
whatever reasons, not one which fell within the domestic jurisdiction of
the United States. Thus, it was not barred from international scrutiny.
Japan would have also necessarily determined (or assumed) that such
official statements did not constitute an illegal intervention by Japan into
the internal affairs of the United States. The Korean government appar-
ently made identical determinations before doing even more far-reach-
ing acts, namely, asking domestic American television to regulate
(suppress) scenes of Black/Korean violence connected with the riots,
supposedly for the safety of the Koreans involved.
3 6
A second category of responses revolved around assigning causality
for the riots. Some national leaders, such as President Mitterand of
France, ascribed to Washington the responsibility and drew a cause-and-
effect relationship between Reagan-Bush policies oppressing Afro-
Americans and Los Angeles.3 7 Other spokespersons warned that the
same potential for insurrection or civil breakdown existed in European
cities. 38 They pointed to the increasingly well known facts regarding
racism in London against Africans and South Asian immigrants, and in
several German cities against several classes of immigrants. 39 Not
counting Paris' 20th century history of being a principal haven of a per-
manent expatriate/exile Afro-American community, 40 the ascription of
causality by Mitterand is noteworthy for several reasons. Racism is cur-
rently closer to the political surface in France, particularly against North
Africans, and, anti-semitism, driven in part by the fulminations of the
French political right.4 1 Mitterand, now weathering visible challenges to
33. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at
A8.
34. Id.
35. Hobart Rowen, Thanks (?), Mr. Nakasone, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1986, at Fl.
36. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 20.
37. Id. at A8.
38. Arthur Brice, America Reacts: A Plea for Calm Aghast, the World Watches S. Korean Presi-
dent Urges Protection of Korean-Americans as U.S. Race Relations Are Examined Overseas in Light of
Riots, ATLANTA J. & CONSTITUTION, May 2, 1992, at A10.
39. Id.; see also Germany Looks at Itself, supra note 8, at 550.
40. For example, Chester Himes, James Baldwin and Memphis Slim.
41. Especially the fulminations of Jean-Marie LePen. See L'EFFET LE PEN: DOSSIER
(Edwy Plenel & Alain Rollat eds., 1984. For further discussion of the French right see
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his presidency, may have used such a statement to strengthen French
opinion against the rightists, while revealing his own commitment to eq-
uity and attacking a convenient target. But it is abnormal diplomatic
practice to draw such stark causal conclusions, particularly by direct pro-
nouncement by the Head of State (as opposed to a more junior official)
regarding a major ally. Normally, events such as the Los Angeles riots
would be merely commented on by an Ambassador expressing regret
for their occurrence, with perhaps obliquely-expressed hopes that mat-
ters will move in the just and equitable direction, of course under the
wise guidance of the national capital. For whatever reasons, President
Mitterand, a ranking intellectual and Resistance hero in his own right,
felt that racism against Afro-America was not only a fit subject for inter-
national scrutiny, but that the causes of the riots were sufficiently clear
to assign policy responsibility to the conservative Washington regime.
I emphasize this because of the freedom Mitterand apparently felt
in moving from the particulars of Los Angeles to the more general
objectives and consequences of federal policies. Perhaps he had in mind
cuts in those categories of aid to cities that most benefit poor Afro-
Americans,4 2 the establishing of public images of mean-spiritedness, en-
couragement of racial stereotypes 43 and the fostering of racially co-op-
tive strategies. 4 4 Such freedom is generally lacking in the American
news and intellectual media, in part because it is blocked by the concept
of an "issue" needing to rest on nothing more substantive than an op-
posing public contention, irrespective of the content, plausibility or
truth of the contention. To the media it is the existence of the conten-
tion that governs, not the accuracy of the depiction. Over time this can
lead to a silent assumption in American public discourse that no plausi-
ble broad generalities exist. Such an assumption can especially arise
concerning the appraisal of important national policies, particularly con-
cerning the presence and causal responsibility for the existence of ra-
cism and actions with racist consequences. In this respect, if Mitterand's
observations were taken seriously enough to be incorporated into the
national public discourse 4 5 they would have at least momentarily raised
the tone of such discourse about race in America, whether he was right
(as this author believes, in the main) or wrong.
From the 1920's through recent years many Europeans, including
the French, often had stark, direct and harsh images of how the United
MAXIM SILVERMAN, DECONSTRUCTING THE NATION: EMIGRATION, RACISM AND CITIZENSHIP
IN MODERN FRANCE (1992).
42. For example, cuts in food stamps, and arguing in support of the tax exempt status
of Bob Jones University. See A COMMON DESTINY - BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY ch. 6
(Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds. 1989).
43. For example, the use of Willie Horton during the 1988 Presidential campaign.
44. For example, the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings.
45. Not only does there appear to be no evidence that his observations were taken
seriously, but in apparent reaction to the least suspicion of administration responsibilities,
the Bush administration assigned the blame for Los Angeles to the 1960's programs of the
war on poverty presumably fostered by Democrats. See Ann Devroy, White House Blames
Liberal Programs for Unrest; 'Great Society 'Initiatives Started in 1960s are at Root of Many Problems,
Fitzwater Says, WASH. POST, May 5, 1992, at A8.
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States treated Black people. The directness of those images, from per-
sonal experience, was sometimes ajolt even to Afro-Americans traveling
or living in Europe at the time. A generalized pattern of national racism
was freely drawn, including for example, the confirmations of lynchings
and chaingangs in the South and race riots and widely-deprived political
and economic rights in the North. The jolt was not that such conclu-
sions were false-they were, upon reflection, often more true than not.
Rather the jolt came because they were pulled together and drawn on
that scale and national official responsibility assigned, rather than being mod-
erated in the soup of myriads of softening issues such as private discre-
tion versus official action.
One can argue that those conclusions rested in part on the compar-
ative absence of racism in Europe, confirmed by both expatriate Afro-
American literature and exiles voting with their feet (even though some,
after suitable recuperation, did return to the United States). 46 It might
also be observed that contributing to such conclusions were French aca-
demic tendencies to view racism in a psychological framework, with
some focus on blacks' reaction to oppression and exclusion and the
structures contained in culture that support racism. 47 The sharpness of
views about American life had its points of accuracy and points of omis-
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The references to racism in this Article
are to the racism of color, the racism that is directed toward peoples of African heritage.
Clearly, the comparative (to the United States) strains-both historically and in the 20th
century-of anti-semitism in France, Nazi Germany and elsewhere in Europe. A discus-
sion of anti-semitism as racism is beyond the scope of this article. However, cf infra note
47.
47. JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PsycHo-ANALYSIS (Norton
Paper 1981). Lacan rejects an explanation rooted in history to account for the rise of
Nazism and the holocaust. He instead would find a psychoanalytic explanation in (1) the
difficulty of even confronting ("turning a courageous gaze toward the phenomenon") the
subject, and (2) such difficulty being rooted in the reluctance to move beyond "the fascina-
tion of the sacrifice in itself" that Nazism and the holocaust represent and the attempt to
ascribe our own desires in this regard to the presence of an Other whom Lacan calls "the
dark God." Id. at 274-75.
Similarly, Henri Lefebvre finds an explanation for the "Hitlerian mystique" in "the
rejection of everyday life - of work, of happiness - a mass phenomenon, a malady of the
decaying middle classes, a collective neurosis (where in France it was merely an individual
phenomenon) .... " See Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life 130-31, 242, 245 (Moore
trans., 1992). He finds the struggle for the meaning of Auschwitz to rest on the efforts of
its survivors "to go back in time, back to . . . the suffering which killed their feelings and
their power to remember, in order to recapture the things the 'objective' reports have
been unable to grasp." Id. at 242. Lefebvre, in arguing that the meaning of everyday life
is found in the dialectic between reason and absurdity, concludes by then extracting, from
a host of other possible meanings, including that of Hitler's sadism, a "dominant, essential
meaning" for those concentration camps: "if racism represents the most extreme form of
capitalism, the concentration camp is the most extreme and paroxysmal form of a modern
housing estate, or of an industrial town." Id. at 245.
Further, in a rich interpretation of Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington cites Derrida as
showing a synthesis between Freud and Moses in their both being lawgivers and both
needing the other to be fully understood. Bennington finds these perceptions applicable
to the work of Martin Bernal in the United States as Bernal argues against "the systematic
repression of the Afroasiatic and more especially Egyptian roots of Ancient Greece." He
finds an identity between Bernal's work and Bernal's uncertainty as to whether he may be
"an academic outsider," and links that uncertainty to the creative substance of Bernal's
work. See Mosaic Fragment: ifDerrida were an Egyptian... 'in DERRIDA: A CRITICAL READER,
97-119, 114-15 (David Wood, ed., 1992).
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sion and distortion (e.g., Capone gangsterism in Chicago). These views
were perhaps somewhat moderated over the years when the news of the
successes of the civil rights movement and the consequent federal legis-
lation was digested in French public attitudes. However, again from
personal experience, such digestion occurred in the early 1960's in the
context of racism against Algerians by large sections of conservative
French people concerning the Algerian war.
It is in this context that President Mitterand offered his conclusions
of the causal responsibility of national American policy for the racism at
the heart of the civil breakdown in Los Angeles. In so doing, he directly
connected Los Angeles to the question of whether there is a general
national American condition of widespread oppression of Afro-Ameri-
cans (and implicitly other peoples of color) by whites and the white-
dominated official establishment. It is a valuable, bracing and invigo-
rating question with an obvious answer to most Afro-Americans. Unfor-
tunately, its reception in American public discourse would feature
massive resources deployed to attack the validity of the question to es-
cape answering it on its own terms. In fact, the Bush Administration's
substantive response was to blame Los Angeles on the Democrats' social
programs of the 1960's!48 Mitterand's action represents a valuable pub-
lic policy opportunity for the United States created from the ashes of
Los Angeles; it is rapidly being lost.
But Mitterand's, and the more general historical French, conclu-
sions also represent a strongly implied conclusion of legitimacy and mo-
rality, and thus of international law. The determination that Afro-
Americans have internationally perceptible human rights permits
outside scrutiny for protection of those rights. That protection implies
at least drawing conclusions of legally-cognizable wrongdoing and as-
signing public responsibility to the United States government and other
elites as the violators.4 9 This is important because Afro-America is a
completely encapsulated group within the only remaining great power,
with the presumed competence to regulate its own internal affairs as an
incidence of its great power status. Absent perhaps Holocaust-like ge-
nocide, or organized racial slavery, traditional international law tends to
screen from international view the treatment by the United States gov-
ernment (and theoretically, any government) of its constituent peoples.
Minorities are assigned only such international standing as the national
government consents to allow them 5 ° . Mitterand's statement is thus yet
another harbinger of the continuing erosion of the traditional Westpha-
lian model of international law. It is a harbinger of evolution toward
some future model where constituent peoples have international rights
against maltreatment by their national governments, rights that foreign
actors have some obligation to help protect and enforce.
48. See supra note 45.
49. Cf AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT-A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD 268-71 (1992).
50. See generally James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: 'Peoples'or 'Governments'?, in THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES at 60-61 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
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V. COMPARATIVE CLAIMS AND CAUSALITY - SOUTH KOREA
The President of South Korea expressed his country's concern on
somewhat different grounds than President Mitterand. He officially con-
veyed his concern to the United States government for (1) attacks by
Afro-Americans on Korean citizens and immigrants; (2) the inability of
the Los Angeles police to protect Koreans in those circumstances; (3)
the assertion of a legal duty of the United States to protect the South
Korean Consulate from attack, and implied fault for its inability to do so;
and (4) the lack of effective state remedies for Koreans harmed or dam-
aged in these circumstances.
5 1
Those claims by the Korean government raise two questions of pos-
sible United States responsibility under international law. The first is
whether the United States might be liable for a denial ofjustice to Korea
or its citizens or kinfolk. The second is whether the United States might
be liable through some other breach under the doctrine of state respon-
sibility. Both of these delicts can only be made out by a close examina-
tion of the facts surrounding any lack of protection in the riot regarding
any or all Koreans. A charge of denial of justice would generally be
founded on either the lack or the inadequacy ofjudicial or other reme-
dies at law to compensate the victims, provided their harm was of a sort
perceptible under international law. 52 Otherwise a violation of United
States' obligations towards Korea could be based on the lack or inade-
quacy of police protection available to Koreans either in reasonable an-
ticipation of the riot or during its course. 53
The United States thus faces potential liability under international
law from at least two directions. It faces possible liability to Korea and is
also potentially liable to the majority of residents of South Central Los
Angeles, and to Rodney King, for continuing violations of a list of their
international human rights. The latter include rights to due process, to
be treated fairly during an arrest and to be free of state-administered
arbitrary physical abuse. 54 Residents of the barrios and ghettos of Los
Angeles can well argue that their rights to equal protection, to work, to
an education, to adequate food and health care, to adequate housing, to
essential social services and other rights under both international cus-
tomary and treaty law were, and are, violated on a continuing basis. 5 5
However, the application and enforcement of United States liability and
the benefits of these rights to their holders may present different issues.
51. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 33, at A8.
52. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (4th ed. 1990); D. P.
O'CONNELL, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1025-29 (1965).
53. O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 1028.
54. These and other first generation rights have passed into customary law and can
therefore be argued as binding on the United States. They are codified in the CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISH-
MENT, supra note 3.
55. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
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The President of South Korea stopped short of a full invocation of
United States' liability under doctrines of state responsibility regarding
harm to South Korean persons or property during the riots.5 6 In so
doing he practiced what was, relative to his country's interests, probably
wise diplomacy. Additionally he at least implicitly accepted the premise
that under international law the riots (as they produced harm to South
Koreans) were beyond the immediate control of any reasonable action
by Washington (or pertinent local California government). He also im-
plicitly accepted the premise that during the riots, the police in Los An-
geles at crucial moments were overwhelmed rather than derelict in their
duties. Thus, South Korea did not invoke Mitterand's internal policy
causal responsibility between Washington and aggrieved American citi-
zens. Rather, South Korea laid the basis for the legal responsibility of
the United States as a nation vis-a-vis Korea and other states whose na-
tionals in Los Angeles were harmed during the riots. The latter is the
more traditional claim under both diplomatic practice and international
law. 57 But again, that claim is one which historically has been made
against events and public order breakdowns in non-industrialized devel-
oping countries by the United States or European governments.
In President Bush's speech of May 1, 1992, his first after the riot,
there was no reference to any international concerns, consequences or
expectations about the events in Los Angeles. 58 However, at about the
same time, a British newspaper article directly linked Los Angeles to an
American "conspiracy of silence" on race, and the use of "codewords"
about Afro-Americans, 59 concepts not touched by the great majority of
American media. The article coupled a discussion of the notion of a
"conspiracy of silence" with an open judgment that the remedies sug-
gested by President Bush for Los Angeles were "characteristically use-
less." 60 Similar vocabulary is not often used by the American press
about any president. The article closed with a discussion of the in-
grained nature of racism in American politics. The latter is to be con-
trasted with President Bush's limited acknowledgment in the same
speech that some racial discrimination just might exist in the United
States. 6 1 The British article, like President Mitterand, was inclined to
assess the entire American process and to draw conclusions of general
applicability, specifically on matters of race. The article went further,
however, to analyze part of America's causal responsibility for Los An-
geles as being fostered by a national silence in public discourse (read,
among white elites) about any meaningful discussion about racism.
56. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 33, at A8.
57. O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 1024-41.
58. Text of Bush Speech on the Los Angeles Riots, Reuters, May 1, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, WIRES file.
59. USA: Andrew Stephens America - Bush Plays The Prince of Wails - Reaction to Los Angeles






The Vatican also responded to the Los Angeles riots. Pope John
Paul II issued a statement wherein he called for civil harmony, and for
sympathy and prayers for those hurt during the disturbances. 6 2 How-
ever, within the past several years, the Pope through papal letters and
encyclicals has apparently sought to bring pervasive global economic,
social and political problems and allocations of resources under the
scrutiny of moral criteria. This has included the defining of injustice and
assigning blame to particular states.
63
In light of this demonstrated asserted competence to analyze and
exercise moral authority, the Pope's response to Los Angeles is in-
tensely interesting when compared with that of President Mitterand. By
calling only for civil harmony, the Pope gave authority to United States
political officials to resolve the situation under current American law
and policy. He provided neither moral criteria for doing so nor for any
normative assessment of United States law and policy. Unlike that of
Mitterand, the statement comprised a de facto refusal to look into the
details of the riots or their policy context. It also refused to identify and
raise questions about domination and exploitation of peoples of color as
a contributing factor, or to assess any questions of injustice raised by
such details and patterns. One must ask whether such reticence
stemmed from simply the low priority assigned by the Vatican to Los
Angeles, a fearful respect for the possible retaliatory power of the
United States or a subtle conclusion that more central discipline by na-
tional governments is needed to confront social problems irrespective of
issues of domination and exploitation. The conclusion that, in response
to Los Angeles, President Mitterand exercised greater moral interna-
tional leadership than did the Pope is difficult to escape.
VII. REACTION FROM THE SOUTHERN TIER
6 4
A. Iraq
In light of Iraq's defeat by a United States-led coalition operating
under United Nations authority in 1991, and its subsequent testing of
the limits under both international law and practical competence of Se-
curity Council enforcement options under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, Baghdad's response to Los Angeles deserves some ex-
ploration. Iraq's strategy was to characterize Los Angeles as a massive
violation of international human rights by the United States which
threatened international peace and security. In this regard it sought an
emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Acting
62. Pope, Saddened by L.A. Riots, Urges Halt, Reuters, May 1, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, WIRES file.
63. See, e.g., CENTESIMUS ANNUS, Chapter 4, May 2, 1991, reprinted in 21 ORIGINS, May
16, 1991, at 1.
64. The Southern Tier refers to the fact that the majority of developing countries lie
in the Southern Hemispheres of the global community. See, e.g., BARBARA WARD, THE RICH
NATIONS AND THE POOR NATIONS 40 (1962); see also ATTALI, supra note 5, at 12-17.
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through an informal but known consensus among the five Permanent
Members plus others, the Council refused to call such a meeting. 6 5 The
consensus was so sweeping that the President of the Council did not feel
obliged, in response to inquiries, to state reasons for the Council's re-
fusal to meet.66 Thus whether the decision rested on a belief that under
these circumstances Los Angeles lay too deeply within the domestic ju-
risdiction of the United States to be within the competence of the Coun-
cil, that Los Angeles produced insufficiently concrete international
consequences to attract the Council's jurisdiction or was insufficient in
some other way that cannot be ascertained. In any case, the width and
strength of the informal Council consensus obviated any Council vote to
even decide against such an emergency meeting.
6 7
The Bush administration cannot have been displeased about one
immediate defacto consequence of this effective bar to Security Council
consideration: it upheld the previously-noted United States unstated
policy objective of shielding racial discrimination involving Black Ameri-
cans and Black America by official or private agencies from official
United Nations scrutiny and action.68 Mobilizing the power to bar such
questions from the agenda of key international organizations is one of
the signatures of a "superpower."
But in light of other parallels with "third world" countries to the
emerging global posture of the United States, one wonders how long
this superpower perquisite can remain effective. Furthermore, condi-
tions of massive human despair and deprivation with clear and substan-
tial human rights violations exist not only in Los Angeles but in many
cities around the world. It would indeed be desirable policy for the na-
tional governments of those cities to be the continuing subject of official
international scrutiny in the United Nations, the International Monetary
Fund and other organizations that promise effective leverage and law-
making authority to remedy such human deprivation.
It must be noted that it was easier for the United States to protect
its exclusionary interests in the Security Council simply because Iraq was
the adversary. Iraq was a current wrongdoer under international law,
particularly under Security Council resolutions enacted under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter.69 Further, regarding the aftermath
65. Anthony Goodman, U.N. Spurns Iraqi Bid for Meeting on L.A. Riots, Reuters, May 5,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES file.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See supra text accompanying footnotes 20 to 30.
69. U.N. S.C. Res. 664, 35th Sess., 2937th mtg., (Aug. 18, 1990) (requires Iraq to
permit third country nationals to depart from Iraq and Kuwait and to rescind orders re-
quiring closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait); U.N. S.C. Res. 665, 35th
Sess., 2938th mtg., (Aug. 25, 1990) (endorses naval blockade of Iraq and Kuwait); U.N.
S.C. Res. 666, 35th Sess., 2939th mtg., (Sep. 13, 1990) (asks Secretary General to obtain
information regarding humanitarian needs created by sanctions); U.N. S.C. Res. 667, 35th
Sess., 2940th mtg., (Sep. 16, 1990) (condemns aggressive acts by Iraq against diplomatic
premises and personnel in Kuwait; demands release of foreign nationals); U.N. S.C. Res.
674, 35th Sess., 2951st mtg., (Oct. 29, 1990) (deals with hostage protection); U.N. S.C.
Res. 677, 35th Sess., 2962d mtg., (Nov. 28, 1990) (condemns Iraq for attempting to
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of its military defeat, Iraq was waging an open campaign counterattack-
ing the United States, the United Nations and the imposition of United
Nations' sanctions through the Security Council. 70 In its request for a
Security Council meeting, Iraq arguably did not sufficiently connect Los
Angeles, as a United States violation of international human rights, to a
particular threat such violation posed to international peace and secur-
ity. The United Nations Charter only provides for Security Council ac-
tion when such threat exists. 7 1 Moreover, Iraq obviously did not come
to the table with clean hands in light of its documented and often egre-
gious human rights violations against the Kurds in the northern part of
its territory and the Sh'ites in the south. 7 2 Another factor was the in-
creased influence enjoyed by the United States in the Security Council
since the demise of the Soviet Union and the success of Desert Storm
built around United States military resources and leadership.
On the other hand, deprivations of Afro-Americans, as grounds for
legal claims against the United States by Iraq and others previously
would not have been remotely credible. Now, however, such claims are
based on a wellspring of international expectations that Afro-Americans
do have internationally-protectable rights that are appropriate subjects
of international scrutiny. 73 As such these rights should be protected as
against the United States government and even against private discrimi-
natory action. 74 These expectations are widespread notwithstanding
Iraq's invocation for propaganda use. In this connection, it is interest-
ing that Iraq inverted the conventional wisdom that over time the for-
eign policy of a state generally mirrors that state's domestic policy.
Baghdad asserted that America's aggressive foreign policy caused the Los
Angeles riots. 75 That assertion was clearly made for propaganda pur-
poses. But its availability, even for those purposes, is yet another indica-
tion of the rapidly intensifying global interdependence of the
international community and the dissolution of traditional distinctions
change demographic composition of Kuwait and to destroy civil sector); U.N. S.C. Res.
678, 35th Sess., 2963rd mtg., (Nov. 29, 1990) (sets out allied coalition terms for lifting
economic sanctions).
70. For example, the Iraqi government purposely slowed down nuclear inspections
which U.N. officials were attempting to conduct in Iraq following the end of the war.
71. See Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, which states:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
72. AFTER THE WAR; Unrest in Iraq Reported to Have Spread From Basra to Three Other
Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1991, at Al.
73. See YussuF KLY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BLACK MINORITY IN THE U.S. (1985);
Henry Richardson, The Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests Under International Law, 87
AM. J. Irr'L L. -, at n.3 (forthcoming 1993); see also, the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 19, 1966, art. 2, 4, 5, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, reprinted in, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966).
74. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, Jan. 19, 1966, art. 2,4,5, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966).
75. Iraq asks Security Council to Meet on Los Angeles Riots, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE,
May 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
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between domestic and foreign policymaking in any state. Further, this
idea is not a new one regarding the relationship of peoples of color to
the United States. It recalls the claim by Afro-Americans in World War I
that United States imperialism in the Spanish-American War, the Philip-
pines and other American outreaches in Haiti and Europe helped pro-
duce the "scientization" of American racism by importing, codifying and




Libya, another consistent and public third world opponent of the
United States, also issued a public statement on Los Angeles, though
somewhat different in content than those from Iraq. Libya analogized
the actions of Afro-Americans in the riots to the Palestinian liberation
struggle against Israel and characterized them as the "black intifada. ' ' 77
This translates into the claim under international law that Afro-America
comprises a "people," as do the Palestinians. That status serves as the
basis for international legal rights of self determination and protection
from official national reprisal for actions connected to their struggle for
liberation.78 Note that Libya also made this claim with less than clean
hands regarding its mixed record of aiding liberation movements and
supporting groups whose aims and activities can only be called terrorist.
Also recall that in the recent past it has been the subject of military re-
prisals by the United States. Thus Khaddafi's objectives here were un-
doubtedly propagandistic.
This understood, we note that Libya's characterization of Afro-
America as a people under international law with a right of self determi-
nation strikes a resonant chord in Afro-American history. Some of its
leaders and their followers have made identical claims through the pres-
ent day. 79 Simultaneously, such a characterization would be taken by
numbers of Afro-Americans as expressing a greater degree of alienation
from dominant American society than is comfortable, and they would
not push Afro-American identity so far in that direction.8 0 This division
76. Francis M. Beal & Ty dePass, African-American Opposition to War - Past and Present,
CROSSROADS, Feb. 19, 1991, at 5-6.
77. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 33, at A8.
78. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. 2, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/4494
(1960) (contains the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples which encompasses the principle of self-determination through the free and genu-
ine expression of the will of the people as a territory).
79. See generally, MALCOLM X SPEAKS (George Breitman, ed., 1965); E. U. ESSIEN-
UDOM, BLACK NATIONALISM, A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY IN AMERICA (1962); PAUL ROBESON,
HERE I STAND (1958). The current resurgence of admiration for Malcolm X in the Black
community can be safely taken as some evidence of admiration for his ideas in this regard.
See also MALCOLM X: SPEECHES AT HARVARD 161-82, (Archie Epps ed., 1968); MALCOLM X:
THE LAST SPEECHES 111-81, (Bruce Perry ed., 1989).
80. Afro-American peoplehood implies that black Americans may in their authentic
decisions about their own political destiny, where necessary, depart from or at least se-
verely question basic principles of United States' foreign policy and domestic policy.
Where U.S. policy principles diverge from Afro-America's sense of its own welfare, there
have long been competing views in the black community around such questions. An im-
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of interpretation in the Afro-American international tradition is an inte-
gral part of Black History.8 1
Neither the Libyan nor the Iraqi reactions to Los Angeles, nor that
from European commentators, can be solely understood through the no-
tion that America must be held under international expectations to the
obligation of living up to its own principles and ideals. Under another
body of expectations, the justice involved, constitutionally and other-
wise, in the economic, political and cultural representation of the peo-
ples of each country vis-a-vis its central government must be assessed by
the international community for the continuation of that government's
authority. There has also appeared in international law a right to repre-
sentative government,8 2 which right, like any other, may be invoked by
any international actor in a position to do so for a range of purposes,
desirable or otherwise. Clearly this new right claims part of its legal
provenance from American ideals and constitutionalism as they have
spread globally. This right is now being invoked by peoples beyond
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.8 3 It places a burden on those
who would deny its application to encapsulated peoples within estab-
lished states, such as Afro-Americans and other peoples of color within
the United States. They must explain why it remains supremely impor-
tant that such expectations continue to be barred by territorial borders
as a matter of law, notwithstanding an intensifying global interdepen-
dence that percolates through all national states across the full value
spectrum of human aims and resources. In response to Los Angeles,
one Spanish commentator crystallized at least part of this burden by
stating that Los Angeles is a frank recognition of a global trend where
"white minorities are getting richer and masses of dark and yellow skin
peoples every day are worse off, poorer and pushed toward despair."'8 4
C. Africa
It was left to African commentators to explicitly hold America up to
the obligation to obey its own ideals ofjustice, and to strongly character-
ize Los Angeles as having violated that obligation. This was the view in
Cameroon. 85 It was also the view in Benin,8 6 but in a wider context of
portant competing viewpoint is that Afro-American liberation will occur through their sup-
porting U.S. foreign and military policy and even the broad outline of domestic policy in
order to perfect claims for the maximum enforcement of their civil rights under the United
States Constitution.
Personal decisions by individual Afro-Americans in the American political process
bear on their comfort-level regarding both challenges and loyalties to either of these inter-
pretations. See Richardson, supra note 73.
81. Id.
82. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46 (1992).
83. Military Resists Political Change in Togo, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 26, 1992, at
4; Pope Urges Leader to Uphold Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1985, § 1, at 13.
84. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 33, at A8.
85. Tsheko Lopala, Injustice Amiricaine, JEUNE AFRIQUE, May 28-June 3, 1992, at 61.
86. Nassirou Malam Issa, Los Angeles: Et si la Victime Avait Ete un Blanc... ?, JEUNE
AFRIQUE, May 28 -June 3, 1992, at 61.
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criticizing the United States for doing so by adopting inconsistent stan-
dards for judging and punishing Libya and Iraq while refusing to act
against Israel for violating Resolution 242.87 The Benin reaction fur-
ther found these inconsistencies all of a piece with the racism in the Los
Angeles acquittals. 88 This reaction represents the assertion of a further
obligation on the United States, and perhaps on other, or perhaps only
on other major states as well: that domestic and foreign policy must be
conducted with consistency under principles of justice.
Such an obligation would be particularly applied to the United
States for holding itself out (especially during the last two Presidential
administrations) to be the global repository of standards of democracy
and justice. Throughout most of the 20th century, this American claim
has been one strategy through which it projected influence and postures
of moral grace around the world, particularly regarding the character of
national governments in countries where identified United States inter-
ests came to the fore. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the
convenient foil for this strategy. Now that foil has disappeared, and it
remains to be seen whether the United States as the sole purported
great power may successfully project the same claims as keeper of the
standards of justice, when the international community is now free to
more closely examine their content free from comparative Cold War
baggage. The new international legal right to representative govern-
ment may well be defined by the democracy of the international commu-
nity and not the democracy of the United States.
But just as the black slaves, cooks, maids and handymen have always
had special insights about the politics of the "big house" of the planta-
tion owner, one may expect African peoples and peoples of African de-
scent to have special insights into and relationships to American claims
about projecting global standards of justice, particularly as those stan-
dards are applied to themselves. Thus a Nigerian commentator noted
starkly that Los Angeles demonstrates that decades of civil rights activity
by the black community in the United States have yielded little fruit.8 9
A second Nigerian commentator put Los Angeles within a spectrum
of legal events in the United States from the Noriega trial through the
Mike Tyson trial and the Clarence Thomas hearings. He concluded that
"American justice is being replaced by legal gymnastics." 9 0 He also
noted that the United States used to be the model and refuge of those
escaping injustice, but the treatment of Rodney King was just another
example in a global phenomenon of denying the humanity of black
men.9 1 The appearance of European racism, he continued, represents
not a new phenomenon but merely a lowering of barriers to enable the
87. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 1382d mtg., at 42, U.N. Doc. S/8289 (1967) (sets out
principles for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-israeli conflict).
88. Issa, supra note 86, at 61.
89. Obie Chukwumba, March of Fury, AFRICAN CONCORD, May 11, 1992, at 42.




world to see the underlying truth.9 2 The comment then ended with an
approximation-though wider in reference-of the Iraq claim before the
United Nations Security Council: "the injustice being dispensed
through racial prejudice is dangerous for world peace."'9 3 One thread
of linkage and commonality may be noted: W.E.B. DuBois' prediction
that the global problem of the 20th century will be the color line, pro-
vides at least part-a necessary part-of understanding the intellectual
and policy structure of international reactions to Los Angeles.
9 4
VIII. PROJECTION OF TRENDS INTO THE FUTURE
We have seen that international reactions to Los Angeles ranged
from ascribing direct policy causality to Washington for the riots to
more ambiguous calls for undefined civil harmony on some unspecified
foundation of American power, wealth and other value and legal ar-
rangements. They include attempted enforcement of the American obli-
gation to follow its own principles of justice and a designation of Los
Angeles as part of a global phenomenon of racism threatening world
peace. It should also be recalled that Los Angeles and its progeny are
happening during a decade of resurgent conservative political aggres-
sion, inter alia, pushing business and financial ideology, supporting lan-
guage usage, legal protection, social privileges and respectability and
the devolution of social responsibility from government to corporate
decisionmakers under the guise of "individual responsibility. ' 9 5 This
has occurred not only in the United States but throughout much of the
international community under heavy Euro-influence, including the
decisionmaking of key international financial institutions such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.9 6 The impact can be
registered, for example, in a clear decade-long trend of many develop-
ing countries, under international inducement or economic coercion, re-
vising their investment codes to make them more hospitable to
incoming multinational corporations as a primary development strat-
egy.9 7 When this is added to similar trends in Britain, Japan and Ger-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See II THE SEVENTH SON: THE THOUGHTS AND WRITINGS OF W.E.B. DUBoIs 72 (J.
Leslor ed., 1971).
95. The insertion of the "bottom line" and "sole responsibility" for the problems of
the third world countries' concepts are examples. No "bottom line" as a wide analytical
concept translates into business and commercial terms which cause damage to many third
world countries. The "sole responsibility" concept places the blame for the distress of the
third world countries on their own governments. This concept is inaccurate but borrows
the American ideals of the frontier individual and translates it into an international system
in order to give Western developed countries more leverage in aid negotiations and debt
relief negotiations.
96. ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE MONEY LENDERS 126-32 (1981).
97. See, e.g., Algeria Taking Steps to Attract Foreign Money, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER,
Sept. 23, 1991, at 3; Jeff Hawkins, Cameroon Puts Out Welcome Mat for Foreign Investment with
New Code, U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, March 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
MAGS file; David Housego, India May Ease Investment Laws, FIN. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at 4;
Greg Hutchison, Philippines Moves to Attract Foreign Investors, FIN. TIMES, April 26, 1991, at
36; Kelly S. Nelson, Resume Normal Relations with Vietnam, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
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many and to the rise of notions of free enterprise economies as the sole
route and condition for protecting basic human rights, the responsibility
of corporate-oriented public policy and its decisionmakers for Los An-
geles becomes more apparent. Shrill assertions of individual criminal or
other personal responsibility as sole explanations for destruction of
property, rebellion against existing authority and loss of life acquire
more than a taint of fraud.
Thus the question arises of how to understand the Los Angeles ri-
ots in the context of the mighty struggle by international capitalism.
This struggle is not only to externalize the profits and expansive ar-
rangements of international capital through international legal and na-
tional policy systems, but also to internalize within the human mind its
privileges through a push to, inter alia, modify the moral imperatives per-
tinent to peoples of color. Such peoples are thus to be made the un-
grateful aggressors against a beneficent national and international
system, which in its beneficence can assume no responsibility for their
systemic or individual oppression. The "kind and gentle" system seeks
to enforce false premises by not only attempting to subvert notions of
justice, but through equal subversion of usages of language and regula-
tion of standards of legitimate reasoning and knowledge.
The question for Afro-Americans and other peoples of color encap-
sulated in the United States may be the nature of the signal Los Angeles
sends about, in the formulation ofJacques Attali, 9 8 America's role in the
emerging Japanese-America-European Economic Community triad:
whether these globally influential core societies will emerge as equal
partners or even viable economies without resolving fundamental ques-
tions of racism and sexism towards their encapsulated peoples, injustice
towards outsiders and other systemic oppression in each of their com-
munities. This question cannot be separated from the relationship in
the international community of these core states to their peripheries:
Latin America for the United States, Africa for Europe and South Asia
for Japan. The question is whether Attali's depressing Hobbesian vision
of this relationship as nasty, brutish in its exploitation (except for fa-
vored and nomadic elites in periphery countries), and without much
hope that the peoples of the periphery can equitably share, or be al-
lowed to share in global development and resources equal to those of
the core states, will accurately explain the transition to the 21 st century.
But the periphery is not merely something "foreign, out there."
Global interdependence brings periphery demands, resources, impera-
tives and moral and legal expectations into the triad, not least the
United States. Los Angeles, notwithstanding its territorial location, is
the periphery. Its demand for a massive reallocation of economic op-
portunities, infrastructure, respect for peoples of color, new approaches
May 14, 1992, at 18; see also Paul Peters, Investment Risk and Trust: The Role of International
Law, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 131-54 (Paul De Waart et al. eds.,
1988).
98. See ATrALI, supra note 5, ch. 3.
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to knowledge and reasoning and supporting rights and legal principles,
comprise a demand from the periphery only slightly removed.9 9 If the
American response to Los Angeles decisively moves towards such real-
locations and perceives that America has become a truly plural society,
whether its elites so wish it or not, then a beacon might be lit in Attali's
sea of gloom for justice in triad policies towards the peripheries.
The more immediate issue concerns the international legal system's
current struggle to accommodate the push of international capital,' 0 0
and still address with justice the political, economic, developmental, eq-
uitable and environmental needs of all peoples in the international com-
munity. Can law play a role in relieving Attali's pessimism about the
slim chances for the equitable development of peoples in the periphery
states? The issue, regarding law and the constitutive structure of the
international community in the emergence of any new world order, may
revolve in part around the current wave of proposed revisions of the
United Nations Charter and reforms of the United Nations system.
These proposals tend towards more stable funding and provision of mil-
itary forces available for peacekeeping, enlargement of the Security
Council to add more Permanent Members, reform of the Secretariat for
economy and efficiency, a United Nations Development Security Council
to address with higher priority international development needs and re-
examination of the authority of the Secretary-General.101
Will such reforms, to the extent they are authoritatively enacted
into law, create or help create rights and obligations to serve in relieving
the plight of inner city residents in Los Angeles, London, Rio de
Janeiro, Lagos or Mexico City, to name but a few? Will new foundations
be laid for enforcing the full range of these peoples' international
human rights as against their national governments, for attracting jobs
and investment into those communities, for providing better safeguards
against racist and other discriminatory law enforcement and national
governmental resource allocation? Or will Charter reforms be blocked
from such "domestic" application by the fearful Westphalian response
of governments still reluctant to attain the competence to fairly repre-
sent all the peoples within their territorial boundaries? So far, there is
little reason to believe that international corporate culture is equipped
to realize how profoundly it must change to avoid a perpetual series of
wars and attacks, of which Los Angeles was only one.
99. See, e.g., DAVID RIEFF, supra note 7, at 31.
100. See Walter Russell Mead, Bushism, Found A Second-Term Agenda Hidden In Trade Agree-
ments, HARPER'S, Sept. 1992, at 37 (presents a recent projection of trade related issues).




RACE, RIOTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
DEBORAH WAIRE POST*
I cried when I heard the decision in the Rodney King case. I cried
because I am the mother of a black youth who is on the threshold of
manhood. Christopher, my son, recently experienced a surge of testos-
terone. He grew several inches and developed a thin dark line of hair
above his lip. His voice startles me because it is so unfamiliar, so unlike
the sweet voice of the little boy I have lived with for fourteen years.
I cried when I heard the verdict in the Rodney King case because I
am a lawyer and I know the power of presumptions.2 This particular
* Associate Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
B.A., 1971, Hofstra University; J.D., 1978, Harvard University. I would like to thank
members of my writers group: Paulette Caldwell, Dwight Greene, Louise Harmon, Ellen
Mosen James, Berta Hernandez, Beryl Jones, Twila Perry and Patricia Williams who got
me started and who keep me going and a special thanks to my research assistant, Carolyn
Green whose enthusiasm for the subject and the research enhanced my own interest and
understanding of the material.
1. People v. Powell, No. BA-035498 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1992).
2. See generally the discussion of presumptions as legal fictions in LON FULLER,
LEGAL FICrIONS (1967). Presumptions are legal fictions, generalizations drawn from real
life that are applied in situations where the state of facts assumed in the generalization
does not exist. Id. at 41. In the case of Rodney King, the presumption that black men are
dangerous was imbedded in the defense's arguments that: the police were justified in be-
lieving that (1) Rodney King was guilty of some crime because they had to engage in a high
speed chase to apprehend him and (2) Rodney King was on PCP, a drug which would have
endowed him with super-strength and made him oblivious to pain. Both assumptions
proved to be false. Yet the jury used them to justify the response of the police.
Fuller distinguishes between expository and emotive legal fictions. Id at 53-56. Emo-
tive fictions are persuasive because they make us feel that a particular result is "just and
proper." Id. at 54. It is an epistomological freeway. By-passing reason and self-conscious
consideration, emotive fictions are directly knowable. They attach themselves to ideas
which are a matter of faith; values and beliefs to which we are committed emotionally. An
older woman from the town where I live with my son expressed the presumption the fol-
lowing way: "I think we see a black man as a destructive thing. That's my opinion as a
white person. They're the ones that are usually apprehended as criminals." Alvin E. Bes-
sent, L. 's Great Divide: Poll on Race Relations Finds Pessimism, and a Chasm, NEWSDAY, May 17,
1992, at 51.
We could treat this idea that black men are dangerous as a rebuttable presumption
and arguably, that is what the jury did in the Rodney King case. As Fuller points out, the
acceptance of someone else's inference without putting that person to the task of proving
the facts has an effect on the administration ofjustice. Procedure can affect the outcome;
the result in the case is often determined by the assignment of the burden of proof to one
side or the other. Id. at 45.
We could test the basic premise of the presumption, examining the data or facts which
are the basis for the generalization. Certainly, there is a perception that Blacks commit
more crimes than whites and that Blacks are disproportionately represented in the crimi-
nal justice system and the prisons in this country. The reasonableness of a fear based on
this data can be questioned if there is evidence, which is unrelated to their predisposition
toward violence, to explain the disproportionate representation of Blacks in the criminal
justice system. See generally Candace Kruttschnitt, Criminal Justice System: Social Determinants,
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 470-76 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); Charles
V. Willie & Ozzie L. Edwards, Race and Crime in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1347-50 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (a bibliography and summary discussion of the
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presumption puts my son's life at risk, even more than before. This jury
sociological work done in the area of criminal law, the relationship between race and class
and the effect of both at various points in the criminal justice system). See also the follow-
ing articles that deal with racial bias and the effect it has on the criminal justice system:
Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race and Class Discretion and the Prosecution of
Drug Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737 (1991); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and
the White Jury, 83 MicH. L. REV. 1611 (1985); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflec-
tions on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749
(1992) ("gang profiling" as a means of identifying and labeling dangerous men and the
impact on Black, Latino and Asian men).
The statistical data on the number of black men who are arrested, prosecuted and
convicted of crimes is suspect because racism is pervasive throughout the criminal justice
system. The presence and effect of racism makes the use of "neutral" statistics misleading
and makes the efficacy of any presumption questionable. Even if the data were conclusive,
it would not justify the use of a presumption, which operates as an excuse in any confron-
tation between a white police officer and a black man, placing the burden on the black man
to show that the presumption did not apply in a particular case. For an example of such a
presumption in operation, see a discussion of the experiences of black men on the campus
of Duke University in Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Notes from California: Rodney King and the
Race Question, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 199 (1993). See also Diana Jean Schemo, Singling Out
Blacks Where Few Are To Be Found, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1992, at BI (describing the incident
at Oneonta College where college officials gave the names of 125 black male students to
police investigating an attempted rape).
It is important to consider why we use presumptions. Concerns with efficiency, stabil-
ity and superior access to proof underlie presumptions. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343
(John William Strong ed., 4th ed. i992). At the heart of each rationale is some calculation
of the effect on or cost to society and the injustices which might result because of the use
of a presumption. In a criminal case, concerns with due process protect the defendant
from presumptions which might lower the state's standard of proof. Defendants can offer
an affirmative defense; but, I know of no instance where a presumption, a fact inferred
from the existence of other facts, operates to exonerate a defendant from a crime. See
generally MCCORMICK §§ 346-48. Arguably, any presumption supported by these particu-
lar facts, for example the ugly empirically verifiable reality of racism, would serve to per-
petuate the advantage and the power, including the power of life and death, that police
already have. The existence of such a presumption would invite physical abuse of any
subordinated group.
Guido Calabresi has discussed the relationship between the reasonable person stan-
dard and racism in tort law. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrrrUDES, AND THE LAW
(1985). He concludes that the pull of Constitutional norms leads us to protect those be-
liefs which would usually seem idiosyncratic and that such norms are a significant factor in
determining what is reasonable. Id. at 60. In an earlier section of the book that discusses
insurance rates, Calabresi cites surrogate classifications for race (in the criminal law, these
surrogates might focus on clothing or age or geographic location). Calabresi points out
that:
[W]e are unwilling to admit openly that some groups in our flawed society may
have attributes which are undesirable and even dangerous. However, because we are
in a deep sense responsible for the existence of these attitudes, we would like
both to deny their existence and to avoid hindering or excluding further those
who have such attitudes. We would like to do this without in any way suggesting
that the attitudes themselves are to be tolerated, let alone encouraged. It is this
ambivalence that so often pushes us into subterfuges and wishful thinking.
Id. at 42-43.
I think that the problem in criminal law is similar. The law makes discrimination ille-
gal and racism unconstitutional. If the law has no effect, the resentment, hostility and
maybe even violence of black groups, may be both unreasonable and predictable. Black
men are no more dangerous than any other human being. Some feel the problem stems
from deprivation and anger. The black community, in particular, black men, currently
bear the burden of racism, even though the illegal and immoral behavior of the white
community is responsible for breeding the violence. It is a burden that is imposed
through the use of presumptions like the one that labels all black men dangerous. Even if
more black men than white men commit crimes; even if the proportion of black men com-
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verdict, this acquittal, legitimizes the presumption that black men are
dangerous.
When Christopher was in sixth grade, I had a parent/teacher con-
ference with his homeroom/social studies teacher. I remember how sur-
prised he was at what he called Chris' emotional development. In his
words, Chris had "a very good sense of the human condition." He elab-
orated further, "Chris knows that people are not perfect; that the world
is not perfect. He has great sympathy and understanding for people."
It was not long after that meeting that Christopher came home from
school, sat down at our kitchen table and confessed to me that he had
thrown a classmate up against a locker. He did this when he heard his
white classmate call a black girl, who was also in their class, a "nigger."
The student did not understand Christopher's violent reaction. "Why
are you angry?" he asked, "I didn't call you nigger?"
Chris had taken matters into his own hands. He administered a
punishment that he thought appropriate; one that was likely to deter
future transgressions. Chris never considered approaching the school
authorities to report the incident that made him angry. Most children
adhere to an unwritten code that discourages reporting such incidents
to adults. As a parent, though, I felt I should have been able to say,
"You should have reported it to the principal. There was no need to
take matters into your own hands." I honestly could not tell him that.
We both knew that students get detention for running in the halls, or for
throwing food in the cafeteria, but there is no detention for engaging in
hate speech.3 We both knew that the response of the principal would
have been similar to that of the student. Arguably, my son experienced
no harm. However, if his assault on his classmate had been reported to
the principal, Chris would have had no defense.
4
mitting crimes is greater than the proportion of white men committing crimes; even if
black men are more dangerous than white men, young black men should be able to walk
the streets and drive through neighborhoods without fear of the police. It is part of their
right to what Calabresi calls the "unfettered participation" in the activities which are "es-
sential to being a part of our society." Id. at 34.
3. The middle school in my school district has several kinds of sanctions available:
(1) detention, which is the punishment imposed for the least serious delicts and (2) in-
house suspension, a punishment, which is reserved for major transgressions. Detention
occurs before or after school. In house suspension means the student spends the day in
the "time out" room. Detention is used for relatively minor transgressions like food fights
in the cafeteria or rude or disrespectful behavior (usually towards attendants and teachers'
aides). Sometimes teachers and administrators are creative in making detention unpleas-
ant. See, e.g., Frank Sinatra: He's Still Crooning, But 90's Teens Sure Don't Swoon, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 22, 1992, 519 (teacher plays Frank Sinatra records during detention).
4. After I heard about an incident at an adjacent school district with a much more
ethnically diverse student body, where a student was suspended for calling an Asian class-
mate a derogatory name, I felt it was only fair to test my assumption. I called the principal
at my son's middle school, Mr. Nadler, and interviewed him. I told him what had hap-
pened to Chris and asked what he would have done. He said that the student who used the
racial epithet would have been placed in the "time out" room. This would be viewed as an
opportunity to re-educate the student, give him an opportunity to grow from the experi-
ence and talk about the impact of his actions on other people and the alternative choices
available to him. Chris would have received the same punishment for the inappropriate
use of force. I am not sure what effect my status as a law professor had on Mr. Nadler, but
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Around commencement time last year, Chris and I listened to the
remarks of President Bush in which he dismissed the need for regula-
tions which would give us a remedy for racist remarks like the one ut-
tered by Chris' white classmate. George Bush explained to us, and to all
America, that the norms of civility are sufficient to control such behav-
ior. People with "good breeding" do not call other people names.5 The
President, the man who would defend America and the ideal of patriot-
ism from political dissidents who burn the American flag, condemned
hate speech regulations and reminded us that free speech is what de-
mocracy is all about.
6
he commented that he would treat the behavior of the student who used the word "nig-
ger" as a violation of the law. I did not correct him.
5. I found President Bush's remarks on free speech confusing and contradictory. He
managed somehow to acknowledge, and then deny, the danger of racism in the same
speech.
Ironically, on the 200th anniversary of our Bill of Rights, we find free speech
under assault throughout the United States, including on some college campuses.
... What began as a crusade for civility has soured into a cause of conflict and
even censorship .... [Plolitical extremists roam the land, abusing the privilege of
free speech .... Such bullying is outrageous. It's not worthy of a great nation
grounded in the values of tolerance and respect. So, let us fight back against the
boring politics of division and derision. Let's trust our friends and colleagues to
respond to reason. As Americans we must use our persuasive powers to conquer
bigotry once and for all. We must conquer the temptation to assign bad motives
to people who disagree with Us.
Remarks at the University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony in Ann Arbor, May 4,
1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 563, 565 (May 13, 1991).
6. President Bush was reacting to Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), a Supreme
Court decision which classified flag-burning as protected speech. A political brouhaha
followed, punctuated by calls for a Constitutional Amendment to prevent such unpatriotic
acts. There are other policies that I think reflect the ambivalence (or hypocrisy) of the past
administration on speech-related matters. The Bush Administration supported the gag
order that would deny federal funding to family planning centers that offer abortion coun-
seling. The regulations adopted by the Health and Human Resources Administration, 42
C.F.R. § 59 (1991), withstood a constitutional challenge based on the First Amendment in
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) and also a Congressional attempt to overturn them
that President Bush vetoed. A concern for free speech (of doctors) was offered as a ration-
ale for a memorandum issued by the President to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, which proposed four principles to govern the implementation of the regulations.
Ultimately, these four principles, which were adopted by HHS, were the basis for declara-
tory relief from the gag order granted in a recent federal court decision. National Family
Planning and Reproductive Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (failure
to comply with the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act).
Vice President Quayle was not concerned that his support for the police organizations
advocating a boycott of Warner Records might chill the free speech of rappers like Ice-T,
whose heavy metal band performs the song "Cop Killer." ICE-T AND BODY COUNT, Cop
Killer, on BODY CouNT (Time-Warner Bros. 1992). See generally John Leland, Rap and Race,
NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1992, at 47 (discussing the controversy).
I do not pretend to have expertise in the First Amendment arena. Certainly, I cannot
engage in the kind of critique that has been offered by others who are much more knowl-
edgeable on the subject. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 810 n.5 (Wis.), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1992) (No. 92-515) (citing articles on the First
Amendment);Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational Institutions: A Proposed
Policy, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345 (1991) (summarizing the literature on the subject);
Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1991); see also
Leslie Epstein, Civility and Its Discontents: Offensive Speech on Campus, AM. PROSPECT, Summer
1991, at 23; Franklyn S. Haiman, The Remedy is More Speech, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1991,
at 30; Cass R. Sunstein, Ideas, Yes; Assaults, No, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1991, at 35 (debate
among and between these three authors concerning the First Amendment).
I have observed the debate with a certain fascination, wondering why lawyers and law
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If a balance must be struck between the competing values of equal-
ity and liberty, I personally think we ought to err in the direction of
equality. 7 But then, I think of prejudice as an infectious disease. There
professors never feel comfortable unless they have a classificatory system on which to rely
to explain the choices that are made with respect to the government control over forms of
speech. Why must we try to fit speech that we find pathological and socially dangerous
within some pre-existing category devised by a court which may or may not choose to
discuss the social values the categories are meant to promote or preserve. "In a sense, the
entire jurisprudence of free speech reflects a general categorization, composed of assump-
tions about which kinds of communicative acts are inside the first amendment and which
are outside." LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAw 940 (2d ed. 1988) (citing
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265 (1981)). Obviously, the attempt to tailor a statute to fit within a doctrine does not
guarantee success. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (city ordi-
nance drafted with the assistance of Catherine MacKinnon to fit hate speech within the
'fighting words' category violated the Constitution).
First Amendment doctrine reveals much about the value choices we make as a nation
and the commitment to traditional concepts of what is good and what is bad for the body
politic. I have noted with some amazement the willingness of the Court to contemplate
the possibility of valuelessness when speech involves human sexuality. The Court takes a
two-track approach to obscenity-one that involves it in a discussion of the value of the
speech and the harm that the speech can cause, while the other appears neutral, but is not.
Even speech that might be protected can be regulated with zoning ordinances designed to
protect the moral sensibilities of the community. TRIBE, supra at 934. The government
need not tolerate speech that one might assume is political, and protected, if the Court
chooses to focus on where the speech occurs, rather than what is being said or if it invokes
the false dichotomy between speech and conduct. Compare Young v. New York City
Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990) (municipality could
regulate beggars to protect the public from the threatening and annoying conduct of the
beggars, since begging was not protected speech) with Loper v. New York City Police De-
partment, 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (loitering ordinance unconstitutional be-
cause beggars were using the public streets. The court explicitly discusses the message
communicated by the act of begging).
Courts almost universally reject the need for hate speech regulations even when they
acknowledge the fact that such speech was traditionally or historically intended to intimi-
date and threaten particular communities within our society. R.A. V.. 112 S. Ct. at 2539-50;
UMW Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis.
1991); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Hate speech will
never be unprotected as long as the Supreme Court thinks that the harm caused by the
speech is offset by some positive value it places on that speech. Hate speech will continue
to have value as long as it is considered "political" speech.
I suppose my disagreement with First Amendment absolutists is born of cynicism.
Not all "political" dissidents deserve the protection of the First Amendment. True polit-
ical dissidents seldom receive the protection they deserve. If exceptions exist, and clearly
they do under a variety of doctrines, why not adopt an approach which brings the discus-
sion of values out into the open. Antipathy towards the ideas contained in speech may be
appropriate. President Bush supported a constitutional amendment which would have si-
lenced one form of expression of dissatisfaction with the government. He, and others like
him, believed unpatriotic behavior should be punished because it is more harmful than the
speech of extremists who advocate genocide. Perhaps we should debate the values re-
flected in this choice.
7. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Judge Cohn
noted in his introduction that "[i]t is an unfortunate fact of our constitutional system that
the ideals of freedom and equality are often in conflict." Id. at 853.
If constitutional lawyers are unable to see equality as the more compelling interest in
these cases, at the very least there should be a recognition that the hatred contained in
such speech poses a significant danger to the survival of our nation. Hatred is the solvent
that dissolves the bonds of a community; it causes death and destruction. Anyone who has
any doubts on this subject need only to look at the tragedy that continues in what used to
be Yugoslavia.
Justice Robert H. Jackson, perhaps because of the role he played in the Nuremberg
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is no reasoning with hate. It is irrational. Racism and prejudice of every
kind are forms of psychosis; flaws in the human psyche, which make
those who suffer from them dangerous.
From my perspective as a member of a group threatened by the
resurgence and growing violence of white supremacy groups, the threat
to my liberty and my safety justifies a minor limitation on the freedom of
a Skinhead or member of the Aryan Brotherhood to engage in hate
speech. I would like to prevent, not avenge, the death of my son at the
hands of some adolescent misfit who could be recruited and then per-
suaded to kick my son to death.8
The Republican administrations of Reagan and Bush, as well as the
Justice Department and the judiciary they have transformed with their
appointments, do not share my views. The invalidation of hate speech
regulations is justified by denying the reality of my experience and the
reality of racism. There is no official recognition of either the immediate
harm done by such speech or the direct connection between such speech
and violence against Blacks, Jews, women or homosexuals, to name
others who are the object of hate speech and bias crimes.
It is hardly surprising that those who are at risk resort to self-help.
After exhausting every legal argument available to block the march
through Skokie, Illinois, the survivors of the holocaust resorted to self-
help. They threw rocks at the Nazis whose free speech rights had been
defended by the American Civil Liberties Union and vindicated by the
federal courts. 9 In 1992, the peaceful march in Denver on Martin Lu-
Trials, understood better than most the danger of hatred and the power of speech. He did
not focus on the harm to the individual; rather he was concerned that if such speech went
unchecked it would harm democratic institutions. Dissenting in Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1948), he wrote:
[W]e must bear in mind also that no serious outbreak of mob violence, race riot-
ing, lynching or public disorder is likely to get going without help of some
speech-making to some mass of people. A street may be filled with men and wo-
men and the crowd still not be a mob. Unity of purpose, passion and hatred,
which merges the many minds of a crowd into the mindlessness of a mob, almost
invariably is supplied by speeches. It is naive, or worse, to teach that oratory with
this object or effect is a service to liberty. No mob has ever protected any liberty,
even its own, but if not put down it always winds up in an orgy of lawlessness
which respects no liberties.
Id. at 32. Justice Jackson alluded to the misuse of liberty by those, like Goebbels, who had
only disdain for the democracy, and continued:
In the long run, maintenance of free speech will be more endangered if the popu-
lation can have no protection from the abuses which lead to violence. No liberty
is made more secure by holding that its abuses are inseparable from its enjoy-
ment .... The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with
order and anarchy without either.
Id. at 37.
8. The two most celebrated civil suits against white supremecists were brought after
a young black man, Michael Donald, was lynched in Alabama, and an Ethiopian student,
Mulugeta Seraw, was kicked to death in Portland, Washington. In both cases, Morris Dees,
of the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought damages which were designed to "compen-
sate" the victims' parents and to drive the hate groups involved out of business. See, e.g.,
Don Duncan, $12 Million Bill for Metzger-White Supremacist Must Pay Murder Victim"s Family,
SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at BI; FrankJudge, Slaying the Dragon, AM. LAw., Sept. 1987,
at 83;Jesse Kornbluth, The Woman Who Beat the Klan, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 1, 1987, at 23;
Richard E. Meyer, The Long Crusade, L.A. TIMES MAG., Dec. 3, 1989, at 14.
9. See ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE AND
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ther King's Birthday erupted into violence as young people reacted to
the presence of the Klan.' 0 Most recently, on the eve of the verdict in
the Rodney King case, street gangs in Los Angeles shouted, "No justice,
no peace."" Two years before the riots, my son threw a classmate up
THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979) (describing the lawsuit and the events leading up to the day
when the march occurred). When the march was eventually held, members of the Na-
tional Socialist Party in America, led by Frank Collin, were pelted with rocks and eggs.
10. On a day when more than 15,000 people turned out to honor the memory of
Martin Luther King, the Klan planned a rally which was attended by 125 Klan members.
The speeches by Klan leaders were heard by the faithful, the news media and counter-
demonstrators who were on hand to protest the Klan rally. The leaders were spirited
away, the Klan faithful fled through sub-basement tunnels under city buildings to a waiting
bus. They were protected by the police as they entered the van and the protestors began
throwing bottles and snowballs. Twenty-one of the protestors, six of whom were
juveniles, were arrested by the police. It was reported that one protestor made the follow-
ing comment about the racism of the police: "Those (expletive deleted) don't protect
black people in their own neighborhood," but "[t]hey come out in record numbers to
protect the KKK." John C. Ensslin & Mark Brown, King Day Observance Explodes into a Riot,
Confrontation is Worst in U.S. as Nation Honors Civil Rights Leader Who Preached Non-violence,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,Jan. 21, 1991, at 6, 20 (the author of this article did not delete the
expletive nor did the editors of the Denver University Law Review. It was deleted from the
newspaper account of the disturbance). The newspaper report also described the protes-
ters as "a ragtag collection of several hundred gang members, drunks and thugs" that
went after the Klan and then the police. Id. at 6. Other reports referred to them as young
people who did not understand Martin Luther King's message. Brian Weber, King's Legacy
Lost on Youth, Webb Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 22, 1992, at 8. Many of the "activ-
ists" blamed federal judge, U.S. District Court Judge Richard P. Matsch, for granting a
permit to the Klan. Robert Jackson, Violence Came as 'No Surprise', ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Jan. 22, 1992, at 23.
11. The phrase, "No Justice, No Peace," was chanted by many of the residents of
South Central Los Angeles. Arguably, the looting, burning and destruction of property
was attributable to both the lack of justice in the trial and the absence of "economic jus-
tice" within the community. Jonathan Peterson & Hector Tobar, South L.A. Burns and
Grieves, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at Al.
When I first saw the films of the riot and heard the chant, "No Justice, No Peace," it
seemed appropriate. I never stopped to think about the source of the phrase. "NoJustice,
No Peace" has been labeled the "activist mantra." Jonathan Rieder, Crown of Thorns: The
Roots of the Black Jewish Feud, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 14, 1991, at 26. I was surprised, I sup-
pose, by the level of political consciousness it revealed. Somehow I did not expect that
from young people living in poverty. I expected passivity, lethargy, hedonism and hope-
lessness; I expected something that looked like the "culture of poverty" academics and
politicians decry. See, e.g., FRANK LEVY, DOLLARS AND DREAMS: THE CHANGING AMERICAN
INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1987) (Discussing the culture of poverty and the attributes associ-
ated with this "culture," as lifted from the preface to Oscar Lewis', LA VIDA). Levy also
explores the intergenerational transmission of poverty; a theory which has currency in the
1990s and which relies heavily on the rhetoric of pop psychology, exhorting the welfare
system for creating dependency. See also LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCY, THE MOYNI-
HAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY (1987) (discussing the work of Daniel
Patrick Moynihan). I saw John Singleton's BoYz IN THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991),
but I too should have been listening to rap music. See, e.g., Havelock Nelson, Hip-Hop
Offered Tip-Off on Urban Unrest, BILLBOARD, May 23, 1992, at 22 ("[R]ap acts like Public
Enemy, X-Clan, Too Short, 2Pac, N.W.A., Intelligent Hoodlum, Sister Souljah, Ice-T, and
Ice Cube have been pairing the pain and frustrations of black life with bleak, bristling
soundscapes that scream 'No justice, no peace!'-aural visions of burning buildings and
smashed glass, boiling protests and 'smoked pork' (violence against the police).").
I tried to trace the phrase, "No Justice, No Peace" back to its origins. It was in use
when Gavin Cato died in Crown Heights and was written on a sign at the sidewalk shrine
to him. There are reports that the mob that killed Yenkel Rosenbaum shouted both "Kill
the Jew " and "No Justice, No Peace." This disturbs me. There is no real understanding
of oppression if the phrase is used so inappropriately; one oppressed group shouting ra-
cial epithets at another. See David Evanier, Invisible Man: The Lynching of Yankel Rosenbaum,
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against a locker for calling someone a nigger.
Each of these responses to prejudice varies in terms of the violence
involved and in the damage done to other human beings, but each was a
violation of the law. I am a lawyer, charged with the responsibility of
defending and upholding the rule of law. Yet I cannot, in good con-
science, commend my son, or any member of those groups affected by
the virulent message of the hate epidemic in our society, to the protec-
tion of the ethic of "civility." Civility means nothing more or less than
unequal justice. Civility means you have no legal recourse. Civility is
just another way of saying that justice in America is not only not color
blind, it is color conscious in the worst possible way.
12
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 14, 1991, at 21. If the reports of the behavior of the Hassidic commu-
nity in Crown Heights are true; if their patrols assumed the role of the white police; if, as it
is alleged, the Hassidic patrols interrogated "[B]lacks they deem[ed] out of place;" if "they
detained a black youth merely because he was racing for the subway;" or beat another
black youth "to a pulp" because he "allegedly grabbed a man's yarmulke," then the hostil-
ity and the use of the phrase makes more sense. Jonathan Rieder, supra at 30.
Before the Crown Heights incident, there was the incident in Bensonhurst where
Yusef Hawkins was murdered. The banner "No Justice, No Peace" was carried by a crowd
of demonstrators after Keith Modello was acquitted of the murder. It was part of the litany
the crowd chanted after the trial. See Lorrin Anderson, Cracks in the Mosaic, NAT'L REV.,
June 25, 1990, at 36 (An absurd article on "black racism." The "racism" the writer decries
is the hatred of whites. To call that hatred racism is a perversion of the meaning of the
term.). Perhaps the phrase began here at Bensonhurst, an invention of activist Al
Sharpton.
12. It is our consciousness of color that makes us pretend that color does not matter.
Lawyers often play a significant role in challenging this assumption. The summation in a
famous case, the prosecution of eleven Blacks for the murder of a white man serves as an
example. The Sweet trial, as it came to be called, took place in Detroit in 1926. The prose-
cutor argued that race and color had nothing to do with the trial although the man killed
had been part of a mob of white men outside the Sweet home. Clarence Darrow insisted
that race had everything to do with it, and brought that point home over and over again in
his summation. Darrow asked:
Suppose you were colored. Did any of you ever dream that you were colored?
Did you ever wake up out of a nightmare when you dreamed that you were
colored? Would you be willing to have my clients' skin? Why? Just because
somebody is prejudiced! Imagine yourselves colored, gentlemen. Imagine your-
selves back in the Sweet house on that fatal night.
Clarence Darrow, Summation in the Sweet Case, in LAw As LITERATURE 346, 358 (Ephraim
London ed., 1960). He returns to the theme again:
Here were eleven colored men, penned up in the house. Put yourselves in their
place. Make yourself colored for a while. It won't hurt, you can wash it off. They
can't, but you can; just make yourself black for a little while; long enough, gentle-
men, to judge them and before any of you would want to be judged, you would
want your juror to put himself in your place. That is all I ask in this case. They
were black, they knew the history of the black.
Id. at 366. Once again, Darrow reiterates:
I should imagine that the only thing that two or three colored people talk of when
they get together is race. I imagine that they can't rub color off their faces or rub
it out of their minds. I imagine that it is with them always. I imagine that stories
of lynching, the stories of murders, the stories of oppression are a topic of con-
stant conversation .... Suppose you were black. Do you think you would forget
it even in your dreams? Or would you have black dreams?
Id.
When we avoid the issue of color, it is because we know racism is dangerous and
wrong. But ignoring the prejudice that exists in society is one way of insuring its contin-
ued vitality. For that reason, neutral principles are insidious and dangerous. When the
doctrines or legal rules applied are "neutral," the result in a case seems legitimate and,
even more importantly, it seems "principled," a characteristic which is highly valued in our
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Sometime after his confrontation with this classmate, Chris began
having nightmares. In one, he recognized a building as his school, but
there were gurneys in the hallways. The patient on the nearest gurney
had no head. A big schoolbus was parked outside the building and it
had a sign across the front which read "DETENTION." Christopher
told me that he was frightened. He was afraid that the bus was there to
take him away.
I never taught my son to be afraid. When he experienced racism, he
learned to be afraid. Racism is experienced as fear. The touch and the
taste of it, manifested in the sweat on your palms, the dry feeling in your
mouth, the apprehension that makes your stomach go sour, is fear.'
3
These sensations are grounded in a visceral understanding of the nature
of racism. Racism is expressed through violence, or in its less extreme
forms, in actions which are designed to humiliate.14 One escapes from
legal system. Most of us think that equal justice under the law means that those who have
wealth and privilege are not immune from attack. In reality, inequality is embedded in the
law, and the only result achieved by neutrality in the application of the law, is the preserva-
tion of that inequality. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Mar. 9, 1969, at 26. One of the themes which can be found in Critical Race Theory
is the criticism of the idea of a 'colorblind' or neutral law. See, e.g., Anthony E. Cook, The
Temptation and Fall of Original Understanding, 1990 DUKE L. J. 1163 (1990) (reviewing ROB-
ERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1989));
Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988). For an interesting discussion of
race as culture and the unwillingness of the courts to confront that issue see Neil Gotanda,
A Critique of Our Constitution is Color-Blind, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991-92) and Paulette Cald-
well, A Hair Piece." Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991)
(white aesthetics are involved in employer regulation of hair styles, and a decision which
found this rule to be neutral overlooked the physical and cultural differences between men
and women, Blacks and Whites, and the intersection of two forms of hegemony in the
treatment of black women).
The myth of neutrality is particularly dangerous in areas of the law where the effects
of racism are not immediately apparent. I teach partnership law and I have always been
bothered by the absence of race in cases. I can find cases which reveal attitudes about class
and gender, but I cannot find cases which mention race. I could speculate that courts
would not classify a black person as a partner, but without a case in which a court discussed
the race of the participants in a business, how could I prove it? Then I found Butler v.
State, 111 S.W. 146 (Ct. Crim. App. 1908), a criminal case involving a charge of embezzle-
ment. The defendant offered partnership as a defense. He lost this argument because
neither the court nor the defendant himself was willing to say that a white man and a black
man could be partners. I would never have known the reason for the holding in the case; I
would never have understood the failure by the court to follow a line of precedent which
would have dictated a different result, if not for a dissent which adopted verbatim the brief
of defense counsel, James H. Hart, which discussed honestly and openly the effect of race
and racism on everyone involved in the case, including the defendant. Butler, 111 S.W. at
148 (Davidson, P. J. dissenting).
13. The same physical sensations are described in Charles R. Lawrence, III, A Dream:
On Discovering the Significance of Fear, 10 NOVA L. REV. 627 (1986). Professor Lawrence,
through his response to a question by a character in his dream, discovers that the fear
black people learned in slavery and have carried with them since emancipation is a fear of
physical violence or deprivation, as well as a fear of humiliation, which he calls the fear of
rejection. The fear of the oppressor (mythical and real), created through the act of op-
pression, is both rational and irrational.
14. Racism has as its basic premise the right of one people to dominate another-
predicated on the assumption that the dominant group is superior to the subordinate
group. So racism is always about putting black people in their place, teaching them not to
be "uppity." This is often accomplished through humiliation. I remember how humili-
ated I felt, how incredibly angry I was, to pick up the New York Times and see black men in
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the fear only to discover the meaning of anger.
A few years ago while I was collecting oral histories in Houston, an
elderly black woman described her memories of Jim Crow to me: "Our
parents never told us not to ride in the front of the bus. They didn't tell
us to stay away from the water fountains that were marked 'White.' We
just knew." 1 5 Black children sensed the presence of danger; they knew
enough to be afraid. She also described the "riot" by the black soldiers
from Fort Logan in the summer of 1917.16 She remembered black
soldiers marching through the streets of the Fourth Ward in disciplined
fashion-in military formation. She told me that the riot began when a
bus driver insisted that one of the soldiers sit in the back of the bus.
17
their shorts with their hands up against a wall, their clothing apparently in a pile off to one
side. The photographers and the news media had been invited to a raid of three Black
Panther centers by the Philadelphia police. If the purpose had been to show that the
Panthers were dangerous; if the search for concealed weapons was prudent, why did it all
take place in the street and in full view of the cameras? Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo
wanted to humiliate these men and he succeeded. Donald Janson, Panthers Raided in Phila-
delphia, N.Y. TIMES , 25 Sept. 1, 1970, at Al, A25.
When I try to make people understand what racism is all about, I often resort to a
speech which was given by Ms. Edith King, President of the Coalition of 100 Black Wo-
men, in Houston, Texas at the opening of the Women of Courage Exhibit. Ms. King intro-
duced Rosa Parks, the guest of honor at the opening. The photographs from the Exhibit
can be found in ARTHUR AND ELIZABETH SCHLESSINGER LIBRARY ON THE HISTORY OF WO-
MEN IN AMERICA, RADCLIFFE COLLEGE, WOMEN OF COURAGE: A CATALOG OF AN EXHIBITION
OF PHOTOGRAPHS, (Radcliffe College 1984) (based on the Black Women Oral History Pro-
ject sponsored by the Arthur and Elizabeth Schlessinger Library on the History of Women
in America, Radcliffe College. The exhibit was of photographs of Judith Sedwick). Ms.
King had this to say about Mrs. Rosa Parks:
Perhaps now her act seems a small thing. But to those of us who rode in the back
of the bus, who stood silently while others sat; to those of us who remember the
indignation of no public restrooms and other facilities; to those of us who remem-
ber carrying just a little fear with us always; for all the missed carnivals, plays,
concerts and trips to the library and all the other small things that demeaned us
daily-this act was and is the height of courage. For Mrs. Rosa Parks quietly did
what each of us wished we had the courage to do.
Edith King, Sept. 5, 1985, given at Julia Ideson Public Library, Houston, Texas. (on file
with author).
Humiliation was institutionalized in the South. However, the absence of segregation
in the North did not mean that we who were raised in the North were free from the effects
of racism or the techniques of racists.
15. In connection with the Women of Courage Project, I interviewed several black
women and prepared their biographies for the opening night ceremonies honoring their
contributions to the community. Among them was Mrs. Martha Countee White, the
granddaughter of Jack Yates, founder of the Antioch Baptist Church and community
leader before and after Emancipation. I cannot be sure that Ms. White told me this story;
it could have been any of the number of women or men I interviewed for the project.
16. There are many parallels which can be drawn between the riots in Los Angeles
and the riots in Houston. See generally ROBERT V. HAYNES, A NIGHT OF VIOLENCE: THE
HOUSTON RIOT OF 1917 (1976); JOHN M. LINDLEY, A SOLDIER IS ALSO A CITIZEN: THE
CoNTROVERSY OVER MILITARY JUSTICE 1917-1920 (1990) (an account of the effect of the
court martials which followed on military justice). Camp Logan is also a play by Celeste
Bedford Walker which has been presented at Wellesley College and at the Terrace Thea-
tre in Washington, D.C. See Matthew Gilbert, Camp Logan Filled with Ensemble Power, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1991, at 75 (reviewing the production); Pamela Sommers, The
Character of Racism, WASH. POST, June 21, 1991, at B2. After the "riot" in Houston, 156
black soldiers were tried for mutiny, murder and riot. JOHN M. LINDLEY, supra at 8.
17. See HAYNES, supra note 16, at 90-114; LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 13-15 (describing
the events of the day of the riot). Most Whites and Blacks would be surprised to learn that
long before the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, Blacks had engaged in boycotts to
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History reports other reasons for the riot. Some say that it began when
a black soldier was beaten by a white police officer. 18
It does not really matter to me which of the two incidents precipi-
tated the incident. What does matter is the reaction of the young black
men to the injustice ofJim Crow; and the reaction of the white commu-
nity to the rebellion of those young black men. 19 Seventeen whites were
killed, four of them police officers. Twenty-three young black men were
executed, thirteen of them hung and buried in secret, unmarked graves
and many more were imprisoned.
20
protest the segregated seating on street cars. See HAYNES, supra note 16, at 28 & n.43
(citing August Meier & Elliot Rudwick, The Boycott Movement AgainstJim Crow Street Cars in the
South, 1900-1906, J. AM. HISTORY, Mar. 1969, LX & 756-75).
18. See generally HAYNES, supra note 16, at 30-31 (discussing the use of force by police
and the disparate treatment accorded black citizens in a moral crusade designed to rid
Houston of prostitutes and bootleggers). The account which appears in the official re-
ports issued after the investigation of the events that day describe not one, but two occa-
sions when two Houston policemen beat, and then arrested, black soldiers. The first was
an unarmed solder, Private Edwards. The police later detained Corporal Baltimore. A
great many of the police apparently made it a practice to call the black soldiers "nigger."
LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 13. The reports were unanimous in assigning much blame to
the police for what happened that day. See id. at 7-36, discussing the three reports on the
Houston riots: COL. GEORGE 0. CRESS, INVESTIGATION OF THE TROUBLE AT HOUSTON,
TEXAS BETWEEN THIRD BATrALION, 24TH INFANTRY AND CITIZENS OF HOUSTON, AUG. 23,
1917 (1917) (available at Old Military Records Division, Records of United States Army
Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393, File 370.61, National Archives
Building, Washington, D.C.); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE in CRISIS 15 (Nov. 15, 1917); MAJ. KNEELAND S. SNOW, REPORT ON THE CIRCUM-
STANCES A-TrENDING THE MUTINY (1917).
Sixty years later, in 1977, the Houston police murdered a Mexican-American, Joe
Campos Torres. In the words of one of the police, they beat him up and threw him into
Buffalo Bayou "to see if the wetback could swim." Bill Curry, 4 Ex-Policemen Indicted in
Death of Tex. Prisoner, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1977, at A13. When the state trial resulted in a
one-year sentence and a $2000 fine for each of the defendants, the Carter administration
reversed a ban on federal prosecutions for civil rights violations on which state action had
been taken, a policy that had existed from the time of the Eisenhower Administration. Id.
The federal prosecutors did not fare much better. The defendants in the federal trial were
convicted, but Judge Ross Sterling gave them a ten-year suspended sentence for depriving
Torres of his civil rights and a one-year jail term for a separate misdemeanor. Jerrold K.
Footlick, Houston Justice, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 17, 1978, at 122. In 1985, the predominantly
white police force in Houston vowed to embarrass and humiliate Police Chief Lee Brown,
who is black, at a meeting of the International Association of Police Chiefs in Houston.
Wayne King, Police Union Vows to "Humiliate" Houston's Chief at World Meeting, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1985, at A13.
19. Six months after the riot, Ted Koppel interviewed the people who live in South
Central Los Angeles. Once again, I was surprised at the level of political awareness among
the general population, young and old, women and men. This awareness manifested itself
in young men who characterized the events of April 26, 1992, as a rebellion, not a riot. All
agreed that they would like to rebuild their community, but they could not rebuild without
resources; they could not survive without jobs; and the inaction on the part of the govern-
ment (which is a stand-in for the white majority) would result, ultimately, in even more
violence. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 21, 1992). See also After the Riots: The
Search for Answers; Tucker Says the Status Quo Must Change, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1992, at A6
(Assemblyman from Los Angeles issues prediction that if the status quo remained the
same, "we'll burn this state down.").
20. The army separated the soldiers who were to be tried into three groups. The first
group consisted of 63 men. Thirteen were tried and hung; only five were acquitted. Forty-
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Things have not changed much since 1917.21 A fear of black men
still dwells in the collective unconscious of America. The verdict in the
Rodney King case legitimized that fear. The videotape of the violent
attack on a white truck driver will, no doubt, lead to the conviction of the
young gang members who are alleged to have participated in that at-
tack.2 2 The swiftness with which justice will be meted out in their case is
also an expression of that fear. In a way, this fear, the very vehemence
of the condemnation of the riots, is an admission that young black men
have reason to be angry. The condemnation is a warning that rebellion
will not be tolerated.
My son was willing to take responsibility for defending his dignity
and the dignity of the only other black student in his class. He knew
without my telling him, that his actions, which we both considered justi-
fied, would put him at risk of punishment. The decision in the Rodney
King case, and the events that followed, only confirmed what we both
knew: penalties are exacted for acts of defiance, when pride makes sub-
mission impossible. The soldiers from Camp Logan were hung, and
Rodney King was beaten because he refused to submit. I would wager
that the gang members will receive harsh prison sentences. In his
dream, Chris was afraid of the punishment for the crime that he felt he
committed. After all, someone lay headless and mute. Who but Chris-
topher could be responsible for this? But what would his dream have
been if he had done otherwise; if he stood by without defending himself
or others from racist attacks?
Last summer, a friend told me about a young black child, a ten year-
old, who struggled with his own passivity in a situation where a black
classmate was beaten by white boys in their class. The image of all of
one received life sentences, and four received shorter terms of imprisonment. LINDLEY,
supra note 16, at 18.
Eventually, the life sentences were commuted after public outcry over the secrecy sur-
rounding the first court martial and the lack of appeal from the sentences. A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 1910-1932 332 (Herbert
Aptheker, ed., 1990). The NAACP worked to obtain the parole of those men who were
sentenced to prison; and finally in 1938, the last of them was released. One account of the
struggle of the NAACP on their behalf describes the events of September 28, 1921 when
James Weldon Johnson, then Secretary of the NAACP, had an audience with President
Harding and presented a petition signed by 50,000 persons asking for the pardon of 61
soldiers confined in Levinworth as a result of the 1917 riot. Id. at 334.
21. See, Nathaniel Jones, Introduction, 70 DENv. U. L. REV. 195 (1993).
22. The Messenger, a monthly magazine published by A. Philip Randolph and Chandler
Owen published an editorial in January, 1918 concerning the administration of justice in
the case of the black soldiers from Camp Logan. APTHEKER, supra note 20, at 195. The
editorial in The Messenger compared the treatment received by white soldiers who shot and
wounded Blacks in East St. Louis to the treatment given the men of the 24th Regiment in
Houston. In the former case, no soldiers were apprehended or tried; in the latter, thirteen
of the black soldiers were tried, denied the right of appeal, executed in secret and buried
in unmarked graves. Id. at 196-97.
It seems that vengeance and justice are the right of only the white majority. We shall
see whether justice tempers the punishment in the case of the young black men in Los
Angeles, or whether, in the words ofJames Weldon Johnson, their trials bear the "aspect
of visitation upon their color rather than upon their crime." James Weldon Johnson,
Speech Delivered to President Harding (1921), reprinted in ArHEKER, supra note 20, at 334.
The occasion for the speech is discussed supra note 20.
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these young white boys in a circle around a black youngster on the
ground, kicking him and yelling racial epithets, made my blood run cold.
I found it incredibly sad that a young black boy could find himself stand-
ing on the periphery, witnessing a brutal attack, unsure of how he
should respond. There was a punishment imposed in that case after the
parents of the black child called the police and had them investigate the
incident. The school suspended two or three of the white boys who
were thought to have goaded the mob of boys into violence. It also sus-
pended the black student who had been beaten. It all began, you see,
because he pushed another boy on the playground.
2 3
Both Chris, who chose to act, and his young friend, who chose not
to act, understood intuitively that defending who they were would put
them at risk. The risk exists because racism distorts the perception of
right and wrong; it realigns responsibility and blame, shifting both from
those who hate to those who are hated. 2 4 In the Rodney King case, spe-
cious arguments about control shifted responsibility from the mob that
attacked the man to the man who was attacked.2 5 Actually, the shift was
23. I heard of the incident from a child and from several parents whose children at-
tended an elementary school in Rolling Hills, California, a suburb of Los Angeles. In an
unrelated incident that same month, the older child in this same family described a flier
shown to him by a "friend" which compared the head of an ape to the head of a black man
and in pseudo-scientific form presented statistics which proved the biological connection
between the two.
24. Defense attorney John Barnett explained that the strategy in the Rodney King
case was to make the jury "feel" something, to "put the jury in the shoes of the police
officer and make them feel what they felt, what it's like to be an officer at 11:45 p.m. on
Foothill Avenue." John Riley, Inside the King Case, Part I: What the Jury Heard That the Public
Didn't, NEWSDAY, May 13, 1992, at 17. For another startling example of misplaced, but
natural, empathy, see THE TIMES OF HARVEY MILK (Pacific Arts Video 1986) (copy on file
with author). A voice-over describes the reaction of the jury that watched the videotaped
confession of the man who killed Mayor George Moscone and Harvey Milk, a gay rights
activist and city official. The jury cried as Dan White broke down and explained that he
had been under pressure. He killed Harvey Milk after killing the Mayor because Harvey
Milk "smirked" when Dan White showed up at his office.
25. See Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENv. U. L. REV.
283 (1993) (discussing disaggregated narrative). It is hard to say which was more perni-
cious, the strong pull of the identity between the defendant and the jury, or willingness to
assign fault to the victim. The defense emphasized the fact that Rodney King rose after
the first attack and lunged toward one of the police officers. A juror on The Today Show
(NBC television broadcast, Apr. 31, 1992) stated that Rodney King was "directing the
action." According to the juror, "even during the handcuffing, he was still fighting. Dur-
ing the process he was laughing and uttering sounds. No, he was in complete control."
Lee A. Daniels, Riots in Los Angeles: The Jury; Some Identified as Jurors Aren't in Accord on TV,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A23. Retta Kossow, ajuror who was interviewed on CBS News
(CBS television broadcast, Apr. 30, 1992) repeated that argument: "I am thoroughly con-
vinced, as were the others, I believe, that Mr. King was in full control of the whole situa-
tion at all times. He was not writhing in pain. He was moving to get away from the officers
and he gave every indication he was on PCP." Nina Bernstein, Bitter Dispute injury Room;
How 12 Ordinary Citizens Met For 7 Days to Produce the Verdict that Shook L.A., NEWSDAY, May
14, 1992, at 5. Her husband added in another interview that his wife felt sorry for Mr.
King, "[b]ut how about the police officers? Their lives were completely ruined because
Mr. King wanted to go out and have a good time." Id. Despite Ms. Kossow's protesta-
tions, not all the jurors agreed. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra (report of juror who called the
Donahue show sobbing).
The control theory offered by the defense was about as preposterous as the theory
used by the defense in the Milk case: Dan White had been suffering from a depression
brought on by eating junk food. In the King case, the defense sought to make the victim
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more subtle than that. It was a shift to the idea of what Rodney King
represents, the potential for violence which lies dormant in all who are
oppressed. Do not expect symmetry in the law where gang members are
concerned. There will be no shift of guilt from the mob we witnessed
attacking a white victim to the idea that white victims represented, the
group that discriminates against Blacks and refused to convict even the
police officer who rained fifty-six blows on Rodney King.2
6
The morning after the riots began, there was a picture of a black
minister on the morning news. 2 7 It showed him as the verdict was an-
nounced. A single tear rolled down his face. He epitomized the disillu-
sionment that Blacks feel. The Civil Rights Movement and the legal
strategies devised by Charles Hamilton Houston,2 8 pursued by Justice
Thurgood Marshall and Judge Constance Baker Motley, and legal victo-
ries like Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka 29 and the Civil Rights Act of
1964,30 led us to believe that the law could be the instrument of reform;
a means of achieving real equality, or at least freedom from discrimina-
tion. Now, we know better. We hear the voice of racism in the decisions
of a Supreme Court that refuse to provide a remedy when defendants
say "We are not racist," even when their conduct can reasonably be
responsible for what happened to him. In the Milk case, the defense succeeded in convinc-
ing the jury that sugar was responsible for what happened. Sugar was the official culprit,
but Dan White's confession blamed Harvey Milk for his own death. Perhaps they were
persuaded that Harvey Milk was the source of Dan White's fall from political grace and
that he was so arrogant that he literally asked (with that now infamous smirk) for his own
death.
The strategy employed so successfully in both cases is part of a larger phenomenon,
which is the criticism of the "victim" mentality or ideology. See, e.g., SHELBY STEELE, CON-
TENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA (1990). Professor Steele
seems to have the corner on the market when it comes to articles on race that appear in
Harpers Magazine. His most recent effort, written after the riots in Los Angeles, is a further
attack on what he calls the orthodoxy of the diversity movement. He dismisses those who
continue to fight injustice in this society as the work of those who are interested in self-
aggrandizement; as "the narcissism of victims," power purchased at the "exorbitant price
of continued victimhood." Shelby Steele, The New Sovereignty: Grievance Groups Have Become
Nations Unto Themselves, HARPERS, July 1992, at 47-54. See generally the discussion of the
use of the "rhetoric of poverty," the persistence over time of the practice of blaming the
victims of poverty for their condition, particularly the use of this rhetoric in Supreme
Court decisions in Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79
GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
26. I think it was probably a Freudian slip by the black prosecutor when he described
the jurors as people who "believe there is a thin blue line separating law-abiding citizens
from the jungle-the criminal element." Nina Bernstein, supra note 25, at 31. Although
the District Attorney did not call the jurors racist, his metaphor certainly calls up the lan-
guage of racism: the classification of Blacks as animals, one step removed from their sim-
ian relatives. Perhaps he was still thinking about Officer Powell's description of a domestic
dispute as "something right out of Gorillas in the Mist." Riley, supra note 24, at 17.
27. The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 29, 1992).
28. Judge Leon Higginbotham refers to Charles Hamilton Houston as "the chief engi-
neer and the first major architect on the twentieth century civil rights legal scene." Judge
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Foreword, in GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES
HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS at XV (1983). Judge Higginbot-
ham turns the jungle metaphor on its head when he refers to the "jungle of racism toler-
ated by the American Legal Process." Id.
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1981 & Supp. 1992).
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viewed as racist;3 ' which is philosophically opposed to remedial legisla-
tion based on race;3 2 whose neutrality protects those who threaten to
31. See generally TRIBE, supra note 6, § § 16-20 (discussing the discriminatory purpose
requirement). Professor Tribe has entitled one section "The Problem of Discriminatory
Purpose: When Reservations About Remedies Masquerade as Questions About the Exist-
ence of Constitutional Violations." Id. at 1502. While I would not presume to dispute the
point with Professor Tribe, I have to confess that I would not be so charitable in ascribing
motive. When now Chief Justice Rehnquist first described his judicial philosophy as
"majoritarian," I read that as a statement of his political philosophy; a description of his
allegiance and his commitment to hold the line in a political struggle. John A. Jenkins, The
Partisan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1986, § 6 (magazine), at 28, 32.
The rejection of a "disparate impact" test for one which looks for fault on the part of
the state, the "perpetrator perspective," is another example of the aversion to the idea of
collective guilt. See TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1509 (citing Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Laws: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
trine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-54 (1978). See also the discussion of collective guilt
infra note 50 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause so that it is a deter-
rent not to racism, but to the overt expression of that racism. In a society where people
have learned that it is important to deny their racism it is virtually impossible to prove
discriminatory intent.
Although the Court has held that discriminatory intent can be shown by circumstantial
evidence, that burden is very difficult to meet. See Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 25. Com-
pare Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (no discrimi-
natory purpose in zoning ordinance) with Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)
(provision in Alabama Constitution which disenfranchised those convicted of crimes of
moral turpitude was unconstitutional). As my colleague Professor Martin A. Schwartz
pointed out, if the Court really wanted to find discriminatory intent based on circumstan-
tial evidence, it could have done so in death penalty cases. See Susan Waite Crump, Lock-
hart v. McCree: The "Biased but Unbiased Juror, " What Are the States' Legitimate Interests, 65
DENY. U. L. REV. 1 (1988); Regina M. Harris, Note, McCleskey v. Kemp: The Shadow of Racism
on the Capital Sentencing Process, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 173 (1987); Randall L. Kennedy, McCles-
key v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988);
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death Pen-
alty, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991); RonaldJ. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in
Death Sentencing Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentenc-
ing, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 777 (1990-91); Mary Elizabeth Holland, Note, Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp: Racism and the Death Penalty, 20 CONN. L. REV. 1029 (1988);
The more recent cases distinguish between private and public discrimination; which
relieves the state of responsibility for segregation when it reflects the "natural" preference
of private individuals. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). Racism becomes a part
of our human condition, a cultural artifact which is indistinguishable from other less harm-
ful preferences-for example, the preference of living in a brownstone or rowhouse or co-
op, or in a Georgian, ranch style or tudor home, or living in a neighborhood with Blacks or
without Blacks. Racism is something which we cannot remedy as a society because the
state cannot be blamed for the preferences of individuals. The state is not a person, it is a
collection of institutions acting through people for the benefit of people, it is the means of
expressing and implementing our collective will. Properly viewed, it should be seen as an
appropriate resting place for our collective guilt. The burden then falls on the state, as the
representative of our entire community to discourage prejudice and to act affirmatively to
remedy the harm which has been caused in the aggregate by individual actions.
32. The use of the shibboleth "Our Constitution is Color Blind," has been used to
attack minority set-aside programs and other affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting the scope of federal civil rights
legislation, the Court found no remedy under § 1981 for discrimination which was alleged
to have occurred after the contract was formed); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (minority set-aside program for Richmond, Virginia was unconstitutional).
There may be a different standard applied when Congress specifically endorses a pol-
icy of affirmative action. See Metromedia Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990)
(Congress responded to an executive decision to curtail the affirmative action policy of the
FCC by adding a provision to an appropriation bill which prevented the change in policy).
For a discussion of the ideological divide between the majority and the dissent see Patricia
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harm us;3 3 and that has a Black man who has so identified with the op-
pressor that he would allow a white prison guard to beat someone who
is the image of himself.3 4 The minister's tears and mine were a measure
of the depth of our mutual despair; our grief when we both realized, he,
the layman and me, the lawyer, that the law has no power against racism.
I cried when I heard the decision in the Rodney King case. I was
angry at the perversion of the rule of law; at the immoral shifting of
responsibility and realignment of right and wrong. The jury was asked
to determine whether the police used "excessive force."'3 5 Ultimately,
that determination involved some assessment of whether the police be-
haved reasonably. 3 6 The "reasonable person" test is an article of faith
among lawyers and lay people. "Reasonableness" is an idea that is at
Williams, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.- Regrouping the Singular Times, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 525 (1990).
33. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating ordinance
which criminalized behavior that threatened minorities).
34. Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992). See Linda Greenhouse, High Court
Defines New Limit on Force By a Prison Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at AI; Ruth Marcus,
High Court Extends Curb Against Beating Prisoners; Ruling Represents a Rare Victory for Inmates,
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1992, at A4; Ira Mickenberg, Court Clarifies Indefinite Issues In Criminal
Law Cases, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at S6 (discussing the incongruity between Thomas'
dissent in Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) and his
testimony at confirmation hearings at which he noted his identification with the prisoners
who passed by his office in the court of appeals); Martin A. Schwartz, The Prisoner Beating
Case, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 1992, at 3. See also Dale E. Butler, Comment, Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Takes One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 393 (1993).
35. The jury instructions in People v. Powell are seventeen pages long. See People v.
Powell, Jury Instructions, available in LEXIS, California Library, L.A.P.D. File. The four
counts on which the defendants were tried were explained in some detail. Count I
charged Officers Powell, Wind and Briseno (who argued that his use of force was in de-
fense of another, namely, Rodney King) with violation of California Penal Code
§ 245(A)(1). CAL. CODE § 245(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp 1993) (Assault with deadly
weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury; punishment). Count II alleged a
violation of California Penal Code § 149, CAL. CODE § 149 (West 1988) (Officer unneces-
sarily assaulting or beating any person) making it unlawful for any public officer who,
under cover of authority and without lawful necessity, to assault or beat any person.
Count III charged Powell with filing a false police report. CAL. CODE § 118.1 (West Supp.
1993) (Peace officer's false report). Count IV charged Officer Stacey C. Koon with filing a
false police report. CAL. CODE § 118.1. Count V charged Officer Koon with being an
accessory in the commission of a felony in violation of California Penal Code § 32. CAL.
CODE § 32 (West 1988) (Accessories defined). The indictment is available in LEXIS, Cal.
Library, LAPD file.
36. With respect Count II (officer unnecessarily assaulting or beating another per-
son), the judge stated:
In making an arrest the officer may subject the person being arrested to such
restraint as is reasonable for the arrest and detention. A peace officer who is
making an arrest may use reasonable force to make such arrest or to prevent
escape or to overcome resistance.
Where a peace officer is making an arrest, the person being arrested-and
the person being arrested has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care,
should have knowledge that he is being arrested by a peace officer and such peace
officer is making an arrest, it is the duty of the person to refrain from using force
or other means to resist such arrest unless unreasonable or excessive force is
being used to make the arrest.
However, a peace officer is not permitted to use unreasonable or excessive
force in making an otherwise lawful arrest. If an officer does use unreasonable or
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the heart of our legal system.3 7 It is central to the belief in the morality
of the law itself.38 The verdict is immoral because racism has been legit-
excessive force in making or attempting to make an arrest, the person being ar-
rested may use reasonable force to protect himself against such excessive force.
As I have stated, a peace officer who is making a lawful arrest may use reason-
able force to make such arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance.
It is lawful for a peace officer to use force in the arrest if a reasonable peace
officer in the same or similar circumstances would believe that such force is neces-
sary to make the arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance. In doing
so, such peace officer may use that force and means that a reasonable peace of-
ficer, in the same or similar circumstances, would believe to be necessary to make
such arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance.
The right of a peace officer to use reasonable force exists only so long as it
would appear to a reasonable peace officer, in the same or similar circumstances,
that that force is necessary to make such arrest or to prevent escape or to over-
come resistance.
When that force would no longer appear to a reasonable peace officer, in the
same or similar circumstances, to be necessary, the right to use reasonable force
no longer exists and the use of such force is not reasonable. The use of force that
is not reasonable is unlawful and without lawful necessity.
The people have the burden to prove that the force used was not lawful and
without lawful necessity. If you have a reasonable doubt that the use of force was
unlawful and without lawful necessity, you must find the defendant not guilty.
The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer under the same or similar circumstances. The
test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical applica-
tion. It is - its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others and whether he is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
The question is whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort
of force.
People v. Powell, Jury Instructions, supra note 35.
37. The notion of reasonableness, and its use as a standard, cuts across the legal
boundary lines. In contract law, we interpret behavior, including words and expressions,
to determine whether a reasonable person would perceive a communication as an offer:
"[T]he 'objective' test affords the courts an opportunity to control or regulate individual
exchange behavior through the use of that great 'collectivist,' the 'reasonable' person."
EDWARDJ. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 261 (4th ed. 1991).
The Uniform Commercial Code fills the gaps in contracts with reasonable terms: a reason-
able price, § 2-305; delivery is due within a reasonable time, § 2-309; and the parties, if
they are merchants, have a duty to act with commercial reasonableness, § 2-104, cmt. 2.
AMERICAN LAW INST., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, SELECTED
COMMERCIAL STATUES (12th ed. 1991). Reasonableness is also a benchmark for corporate
directors; the officer or director has to behave in a way which he or she "reasonably"
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and make the appropriate inquiries
in any situation which would alert a "reasonable" director. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCI-
PLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT § 4.01(a) (1992). We have seen how often reasonableness was invoked in the Peo-
ple v. Powell jury instructions on only one of the many counts. See People v. Powell, Jury
Instructions, supra note 35. And, of course, the judge did instruct the jury on the standard
of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
38. See generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (revised ed. 1969) (discussing
"[t]he morality that makes law possible"). He also argues that the law must be clear. Id. at
63. I am sure that the reasonable person standard would satisfy his requirements, because
it is, to use his own words, one of a species of "common sense standards ofjudgment that
have grown up in the ordinary life outside legislative halls." Id. at 64. This great collectiv-
ist, the reasonable person, is the standard which dispenses with difference and assumes
assimilation into the dominant culture. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 28 (discussing the
reasonable person standard and the effect on diversity). It is unfair and dishonest to ask
people to abide by your rules and then to change the rules because they do not work to
your advantage. I discussed this problem of manipulable standards in an earlier article.
See Deborah Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity and Morality, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 136
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imated as reasonable, rational human behavior.
I have read about the protests of the jurors who are hurt by the
allegations that they are racist. They claim that the evidence was not so
clear cut. The defense offered an explanation of the beating which was
credible: the police were justified in continuing to use force as long as
Rodney King resisted. His shouts of obscenities, his continued attempts
to stand, his struggle, proved that he was "in control of the action."'3 9 I
have trouble explaining this reasoning to my son. It does not accord
with my understanding of American values: Americans believe that
human beings are rational and should behave accordingly; Americans
have great faith in science and in empirical evidence; and Americans be-
lieve in the efficacy of the law in discerning the truth.
The reasonable person is the connecting tissue that links these vi-
sions. It is one way in which we translate our aspirations for humankind
into a system of ethics. This objective standard, I learned as a law stu-
dent, is a moral yardstick by which we measure our fellow citizens. The
reasonable person is a standard which determines the scope of our re-
sponsibilities to one another. You don't have to be a lawyer to under-
stand the idea that we are responsible for what we know and what we
should know. Purposeful ignorance is no defense. Even Christopher
knows the futility of the "I didn't mean it" defense. Invariably that de-
fense elicits the "You should have known better" judgment.
The jurors could have asked whether the police officers should have
known better. The answer would have been that no reasonable person
in the position of those police officers could have believed that Rodney
King was in control of the situation. For that matter, no reasonable per-
son in the position of those jurors could have exonerated the police af-
ter viewing that videotape. No rational human being could have
disregarded the evidence that jury had before it. Some new and unu-
sual meaning must have been assigned to the images which were cap-
tured on that videotape.
40
(1990-91). Fuller indicated that the most difficult questions arise when the law involves
questions of interpretation. He was discussing the interpretation of the law by courts, but
what he said is equally true when promotion and tenure committees in legal institutions
interpret what "quality" means, or when a jury decides what is "reasonable." When one
interprets behavior or conduct in a way that is contrary to the ordinary understanding of
that behavior, it is a lie. Call that cheating, or a shell game. It is fraud and it is immoral.
Perhaps I should offer you Fuller's version which is more elegant and certainly more po-
lite. He stated that there must be congruence between official action and declared rule,
and noted that one of the dangers to that congruence was the effect of prejudice. FULLER,
supra, at 81.
39. See Bernstein, supra note 25 (discussing the jurors' comments after the verdict).
40. The jury received the following instructions with respect to the expert testimony
which was offered in the case:
[1n rendering an opinion as to the use of force in this case, one or more expert
witnesses expressed an opinion on what physical acts are shown on exhibit 2, the
so called Holliday videotape. Such experts have no more skill than a lay person in
viewing the videotape and determining what it shows in this regard. To the ex-
tent that you find that the videotape is important to you in your deliberations and
decision in this case, you are the sole judges of what physical acts are shown on
this tape.
Jury Instructions, supra note 35. I would say that the judge went pretty far in telling the jury
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In fact, the interpretation the defense offered and the jury em-
braced was based on a novel use of the term "reasonable." It was a
standard of reasonableness that takes race into account unilaterally. The
standard of reasonableness they employed was one which does not ac-
knowledge the reasonableness of the attempt by a black man to escape
the police when they give chase, 4 1 but does acknowledge the justifiabil-
ity of the fear that white cops have of black men. The reasonableness of
the police was measured by something which approaches a subjective
standard; one which attempts to understand and place the actions of the
police in context and to understand the emotions they experienced. 42 It
is a standard of reasonableness that ignores the relative positions of the
two parties, or the superior force, numerical and technological, that the
police enjoyed. 43 It is a standard which presents the police as victims.
to take the expert testimony with a grain of salt. To the extent that the jury (or the eight
people who dominated the jury) interpreted the pictures they saw in a new way, I would
conclude that they wanted to see what was described to them. This is not a case where a
group of people was manipulated by a narrative which grabbed their emotions; a tech-
nique which can be used effectively to create empathy and communicate information about
a reality which is unknown to the person who hears the narrative. This is an example of
people seizing on an explanation which allowed them to reach the result they wanted. But
see Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 25.
41. See Culp, supra note 2 (discussing how to address the "race question" in the court-
room and the "rules of engagement").
42. See a discussion of the defense strategy supra note 24. Most recently, a call was
made for sympathy and understanding in another case of police misconduct. Mr. Rudolph
Giuliani, former and future mayoral candidate in the City of New York, accused Mayor
Dinkins of a double standard when he did not forgive and forget the rampage of police
officers in front of City Hall, police officers who carried signs which referred to Mayor
David Dinkins as a "washroom attendant." Again, this is racism as degradation and humil-
iation. See George James, Police Dept. Report Assails Officers in New York Rally: Disciplining of 42
Is Sought for 'Unruly' Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at AI. Mr. Giuliani contrasted
Mayor Dinkins' behavior towards the police officers as unwarranted in light of his lack of
"zealousness" with regard to "rioting, looting and murder". Some say it was Mr.
Guiliani's intemperate remarks which provoked the lawless behavior by the police. As de-
scribed in one report, Mr. Giuliani "listed a number of Dinkin's policies and after each
one, used a profanity to dismiss them." Todd S. Purdum, Slurs from Police Are Not New to
Dinkins, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1992, at 22. Others attribute the "washroom attendant"
signs to Bob Grant, a talk show host whose venomous attacks on Blacks and gays is legen-
dary. See, e.g., Paul Vitello, What Did He Do To Deserve This? Just Ask Him, Pal, NEWSDAY, May
24, 1992, at 6 (one columnist's comments on the Bob Grant show, sentiments which I
share).
43. Police do not need sympathy. They have power over people's lives. The power of
the police cannot be overstated. Certainly minorities and the mayors of Los Angeles and
New York City, in particular, have learned that lesson from former Los Angeles Police
Chief Daryl F. Gates and the head of the Police Benevolent Association, Phil Caruso. It is
akin to having the power of the armed forces in the hands of someone hostile to the chief
executive. Two solutions have been suggested. One is the recruitment of more of the
groups who have often been the victims of police brutality, Blacks or gays for instance.
The other is the establishment of civilian review boards. Neither avenue is a panacea. See,
e.g., Lindsey Gruson, Syracuse Grapples with Debate Over Civilian Review of Police, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1992, at B 1 (information about the renewed popularity of the civilian review
board, an idea that has been in existence for more than a generation).
The sympathy for police and the affinity of the residents of Simi Valley was discussed
extensively after the verdict. The sympathy is rooted in the perception that the police have
a dangerous job, an idea that is communicated daily in one or more of the endless list of
police shows on prime-time television: Cops (Fox television broadcast), Law and Order
(NBC television broadcast), Commish (ABC television broadcast) and Secret Service (NBC
television broadcast). The list seems endless. I guess we could even count the seemingly
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But the police were not the victims in this case.
The approach to reasonableness used by the defense is one which
should only be used to understand the harm which is experienced by a
victim. It serves an important function in creating empathy, an under-
standing of the harm that is experienced by victims. The defense took a
test which was relevant to the harm experienced by Rodney King, and
turned it into something which could be used to exonerate the police
officers .44
Race should have been considered in this case. The jury should
have considered the fact that we live in a society in which racism is per-
vasive; where there are myths and stereotypes which perpetuate racism;
where symbols and symbolic action announce the superiority of one
group and the inferiority of another as a claim of power and a demand
for submission. The "control" theory that the defense offered and the
jury accepted is as much a legalization of racial hatred as the Jim Crow
laws of the prior generation. It commands black men to submit. 45 All
my son will have to do to avoid a beating like the one Rodney King
received is to remain prostrate at the feet of any white man with a badge
of authority who stuns him with an electric prod and then beats him with
innocuous shows, like Picket Fences (CBS television broadcast) which has police officers as
its main protagonists, although the show attempts to introduce issues of prejudice and
individual rights as something more than an inconvenience that prevents the police from
locking up heinous criminals.
44. There is a great deal of confusion about the need for empathy and understanding.
Most of it arises from the unwillingness to use terms like oppressor or oppressed. It makes
us seem too Marxist, too far to the left. The fact is that majority group members may be
victims of particular crimes, but they are not victims of systematic discrimination or dis-
advantagement. A police officer's job may be dangerous. A black, homosexual or wo-
man's life is dangerous, not because of what they have chosen to do for a living, but
because of who they are.
I have a very good, and extremely well intentioned friend, Louise Harmon, whose
confusion is illustrative of the problem. The other day she asked me whether I thought
she had been insensitive in a class when she described the market targeted by a developer
for Sun Valley, a retirement community. "What did you say?" I asked. She said she re-
marked on the ingenuity of those who brought "elderly, arthritic, sinus suffering, middle
class white people into the middle of the desert." I was confused. Was it the reference to
age that was insensitive, or the fact that she described the old people as arthritic and sinus
suffering that concerned her? No, she was concerned about the fact that she used the
term "white" to describe them. My immediate response was, "When has the term white
been used to someone's disadvantage?" She continued to explain what it was that both-
ered her about the class: Would minority students be upset because she left them out?
She didn't leave them out, I reminded her-the developer did; a point which she made
when she described the group to whom these homes were offered. The real question here
was whether she needed to tell these students that the exclusion of people of color was
wrong, something which might not occur to them on their own.
One of the best attempts I have seen to parse through the problem of providing a
remedy which explicitly recognizes the illegitimacy of a claim by those who are part of the
dominant culture can be found in Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (May 1989). See also Randall Kennedy, The Political
Correctness Scare, The Sixth Annual Brendan Brown Lecture, April 15, 1991, 37 Loy. L. REv. 231
(1991) (discussing the use of rhetoric by a conservative faculty member "inappropriately"
describing as rape, the public criticism he received for alleged racially insensitive com-
ments; see also the discussion of Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the use of
"lynching" symbols, infra note 57.
45. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the "control" theory.
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a club. Any resistance on his part will not be seen as heroic. The at-
tempt to stay on his feet while being beaten will not be perceived as an
example of his indomitable spirit. The reality we face, he and I, is one
where black men who resist are not heroes. They are something to be
feared.
46
I cried as I watched the violence erupt on the streets of Los Ange-
les. I cried as I watched and cringed as the foot of one young black man
hit the head of a man we now know by name, Reginald Denny, who was
lying prone on the street. The rioting was condemned. The violence
and the brutality, the property damage, the arson and random destruc-
tion, the anarchy and lawlessness appalled millions of Americans and
our President.
4 7
I cried because I recognized the rage of the rioters. 48 I have felt
that anger. I know how deep it runs, how hot it bums and I am afraid.
The last time I felt that anger, I was at home in the town where I grew
up; in the town where my father was born and raised; where my grand-
mother was born; and where my great grandfather settled after he es-
caped from slavery. I brought my son home to see the town where I was
born, to learn something about his family and his history.
One rainy day, I took my son and three young cousins, two boys and
a girl, to the new art museum. Our first stop was the museum shop. My
son, Chris, and my cousin, Marcus, were disappointed at the lack of se-
lection. The museum shop in Auburn, New York suffered in compari-
son to the shops in the Metropolitan Museum of Art which we had
visited just days earlier. As we turned to leave, Marcus was stopped by
the attendant who had been hovering in the background while we ex-
46. One of the police officers referred to the "hulk-like" strength of King and the fact
that after he had been forced to his knees, King rose to his full height of 6' 3"; even with
one arm behind him about to be cuffed, and a foot on his neck, the "expert" witness called
by the defense argued that there was subtle aggressive body language on King's part.
Riley, supra note 24, at 17. See also discussion of the impression that he had abnormal
strength, supra note 2.
47. "The wanton destruction of life and property is not a legitimate expression of
outrage with injustice. It is itself injustice. And no rationalization, no matter how heart-
felt, no matter how eloquent, can make it otherwise." President Bush 's Reaction to L.A. Riots,
CNN, Apr. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script file. Bruno Bettleheim dis-
cusses what it means to be civilized, an idea which he finds in the Oresteia by Aeschylus.
That part of what we call "civilized" behavior is our willingness to give up violence as a
means of enforcing a moral code. We accept as a replacement a process which involves
communal justice. What happens if the communal process fails, ifa part of the community
feels that it is excluded from the process? It may be that with a break-down in communal
justice, societies revert to the more basic methods of obtaining justice. Even if we cannot
prove such a grand theory, there is support for the idea that individuals who are deprived
of alternative means of achieving their aspirations will resort to violence. See BRUNO BET-
TELHEIM, SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS 186, 193 (1980).
48. In the Milk documentary, there is a point where one man relates his experience
walking in the candlelight march that took place after Milk and Mayor Moscone were mur-
dered. The narrator describes a black man he saw standing at the curb, shaking his fist at
the marchers and asking the crowd, "Where is your anger?" The city saw that anger when
a jury rejected a murder verdict and convicted White of voluntary manslaughter. The
scenes of the riot in San Francisco, a city where gay men had been brutalized by the police,
showed violent confrontations between the police and the rioters, the destruction of prop-
erty and arson. See THE TIMES OF HARVEY MILK, supra note 24.
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amined postcards and trinkets. She accused him of stealing some small
toy. Marcus looked bewildered. She didn't ask for anything; she merely
accused him. He didn't know what to do.
Finally, I asked him to take his hands out of his pockets and show
her that he did not have anything in them. Meekly he emptied his pock-
ets. I am not sure that would have been enough if I hadn't looked
around and located the toy. It was in plain view although it might not
have been returned to the position it had occupied before we entered
the shop. I assured the attendant in the my most professional tone of
voice that if they wanted something, I would buy it for them. Of course,
that wasn't true. What parent would buy her child anything he wanted?
I just wanted to make it clear that they did not need to steal.
Kasha, the only girl among all those boys, followed me as I entered
the museum. We moved directly into the room where the work of
female artists was displayed. The boys went to the room with the sculp-
tures. Kasha and I had about five minutes peace before Chris was back
at my side. "Mom," he whispered, "that guard is following us every-
where we go." My first reaction was annoyance. I snapped at him, and
told him and the other boys to sit down on some chairs that were set up
before a television and VCR. It was irrelevant that the screen was blank.
They would only have to sit a moment or two while I read the display
that explained a Judy Chicago exhibit. I turned around to read and
before I finished a sentence, Chris was at my elbow. The attendant had
yelled at them for moving the chairs (which were on casters). I gave up
all hope of seeing the exhibit and told the children to go out to the car.
I complained to the museum director's assistant because the direc-
tor was not there. I was so angry; I had to work to keep my voice steady.
In a virtual whisper, I explained my anger and disappointment. My chil-
dren and I had been humiliated. We had been accused of theft and
treated like potential vandals. It was intolerable. It was racist. In the
background I saw another mother with two blond daughters in tow wan-
dering around the museum. No one was bothering her or her children.
The Assistant to the Director murmured a response. Her words were
meant to soothe me. She explained that the attendant who had been
hounding us was not concerned with race, she was concerned with age.
Teenagers had caused problems in the museum in the past. Of course, it
was all a misunderstanding. Apparently both the vigilant attendant and
the guard had not been sufficiently discriminating. They should be con-
cerned only when the teenagers are unaccompanied. She assured me
that she would talk to them both about their failure to distinguish be-
tween the two situations.
Her words did not soothe me; they made me angrier. Chris was
hovering in the background, watching how I handled this situation.
There were tears in my eyes-tears of anger and frustration. I was not
handling it well. As we left the museum, Chris muttered under his
breath, "I would like to punch that lady in the mouth." Even as I told
him no, that violence is not the right response, my whole being ached to
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do the same. I was no different than the gang members rioting in Los
Angeles. I wanted to cause that woman some pain. I wanted her to hurt
as much as I hurt, as much as those children hurt. I was in pain and it
was a pain that equaled or exceeded any physical pain I have ever exper-
ienced. I was angry at myself because I knew that my father would have
caused a scene. He would have yelled and screamed at the injustice of
the situation, and made so much noise that everyone in the museum
would have known what was happening. My problem is my commitment
to civility.
Most Americans were shocked by the brutal attack on innocent mo-
torists during the most recent riots in Los Angeles; attacks on individu-
als who blundered into the wrong intersection at the wrong time.
4 9
White Americans are always shocked at the idea of collective guilt. It is
an anathema to them.
50
49. The whites who were killed in Houston in 1917 were also people who blundered
into a black neighborhood, the Fourth Ward, as the soldiers marched down San Felipe
Street from Camp Logan. See Program from the Exhibit, The Houston Riots and Courts-
Martial of 1917, Carver Community Cultural Center, San Antonio, at 3 (on file with au-
thor). Although the soldiers marched with the intention of avenging the deaths of their
comrades caused by the Houston police, they also fired on a number of persons who inad-
vertently surprised them. Perhaps because they were soldiers and they did, in fact, engage
the enemy, the police and armed deputies, this is the one racial "riot" in U.S. history that
resulted in more Whites dead than Blacks. Id.
50. See generally Jude P. Dougherty, Collective Guilt, 35 AM.J.JuRIS. I (1990) (critique of
collective guilt and a discussion of the history of the idea of collective guilt). The criticism
is often leveled specifically at laws which are designed to remedy past discrimination. See,
e.g., Mike Barnicle,Justice Now Topsy-turvy, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 1990, at 33 (scathing
indictment of the criminal justice system and lack of regard for issues of law and order
which the author attributes to the abandonment of the principle of individual responsibil-
ity for something called "collective guilt."); Charles Bremner, The Thought Police Closing Off
the American Mind, THE TIMES, Dec. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Major News-
papers File (an indictment of the diversity movement and reference to George Will's the-
ory that the movement as a "function of the collective guilt generated in the 1960s and
from which Americans still suffer, despite a decade of Reagonism"); Reparations for African-
Americans, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1990, at B6 ("we had all better think carefully if we want to
abandon the principle of individual responsibility in favor of collective guilt"); Edwin
YoderJr., Reynolds Deserves to Be Heard, WASH. POST, May 17, 1983, at A19 ("The preferen-
tial theory of law carries the dubious corollary of hereditary or collective guilt.").
Justice Scalia takes the position that "ethnic whites" were not here during the period
of slavery. He uses this historical fact to support his conclusion that "ethnic whites" are
not responsible for the harm Blacks experienced as victims of slavery. Antonin Scalia,
Commentary: The Disease As Cure: In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of
Race, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 151-52. He completely ignores the reality of assimilation;
the fact that all immigrants quickly learn the lessons of their new homeland. Racism is a
lesson learned along with the Pledge of Allegiance and the Bill of Rights. See Dwight
Green et al., Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance and the Myths of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v.
Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).
When I was a teenager, I accompanied my half-sister when she went to look for apart-
ments. We visited one house where an elderly woman who, if I was any judge of accents,
had recently immigrated from Italy, showed us an apartment. She let us look, but she
quickly advised us that she could not rent the apartment to us. "I only rent to Americans"
she told us. I found it ironic that someone who had just arrived in this nation would
question my right to be called an American. I had been born in that town; so had my
father and my grandmother. This idea that somehow I was not a "real" American was
something that just wouldn't go away. It happened to me again when I was an exchange
student in Panama. I visited that country shortly after the riots in the Canal Zone in the
1960's. As we discussed who had a right to possess and control the Canal Zone, I sided
with the Panamanian family (I was not sympathetic to a Southern command that forced
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What is the idea of collective guilt if it is not a generalization? Here
we find one more example of the logic that is peculiar to prejudice.
Prejudice is supported by axioms; generalizations about the moral char-
acter and intellectual ability of groups of people who are different.
Americans have no problem with generalizations which sustain inequal-
ity, only with the generalizations which assign blame for it. White-
Americans do not want to believe that the result in the Rodney King
decision was the result of racism. 5 1 This is an example of the politics of
denial. Denial is essential to the perpetuation of the myth of innocence.
The politics of denial facilitate the use of terror and oppression by those
who are overtly racist, anti-Semitic, sexist or homophobic. 52 If you are
the victim of prejudice and racism, some claims of innocence are incred-
ible. I, for one, would not consider the police officers who watched the
beating of Rodney King innocent. In fact, I believe that those who deny
the reality of racism are as culpable as those who put it into practice.
The idea of collective guilt is not one which was invented by Blacks
to justify the riots in Houston in 1917, Watts in 1965 or Los Angeles in
1992. The idea is one which is recurrent in the history of Western Eu-
rope. Those who profess a high regard for the literary canon might con-
sider the lessons that can be learned there. In an effort to wean Chris
from his addiction to the literary genre commonly known as fantasy sci-
Panamanians to comply with the Jim Crow laws they carried with them to the Zone). The
other American who lived with the same family discredited my opinion by telling the fam-
ily members that I was not a "real American."
The Daughters of the American Revolution and the descendants of the Southern
planters are not the sole heirs of the legacy of slavery. We all share responsibility for the
problem of racism. Though it might have its roots in the past, it is nourished and sustained
in the present. Those who live with it, who fail to expose its ugliness and reveal the harm
it causes and who tolerate its continued existence, are all guilty. See, e.g., Charles
Krauthammer, Collective Guilt, Collective Responsibility, WASH. POST, May 3, 1985, at A5 (dis-
tinguishing the ideas of collective guilt and collective responsibility).
51. In Long Island, many Blacks blamed the verdict on racism, while whites blamed it
on poor prosecution. Bessent, supra note 2, at 51.
52. Bruno Bettelheim has explored the phenomenon of denial in connection with the
Holocaust and the behavior of both survivors of the camps and the German citizens who
claimed not to have known about the concentration camps.
Denial is the earliest, most primitive, most inappropriate and ineffective of all
psychological defenses used by man. When the event is potentially destructive, it
is the most pernicious psychological defense, because it does not permit taking
appropriate action which might safeguard against the real dangers. Denial there-
fore leaves the individual most vulnerable to the perils against which he has tried
to defend himself.
BETrELHEIM, supra note 47, at 84.
Racism is dangerous to our society, and the response of both Blacks and Whites is
often denial. Shelby Steele is a study in black denial. See generally STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR
CHARACTER, supra note 25. The vitality and the persistence of racism is becoming harder
and harder to deny. On my most recent visit to my home town, I learned that chapters of
white extremist organizations had chosen that town as the location for their headquarters.
Things had gotten so bad that a local newspaper editorial announced that they would no
longer print the messages of hate contained in letters to the editor written by the most
rabid member of one of these groups. See No Hatred Allowed, CITIZEN ADVERTISER, Oct. 11,
1992, at A4 ("We simply won't turn over our page to people who fail to express basic
respect."). Bruno Bettelheim's point warned us that it is when the message is the strong-
est, when the threat is the most obvious, when the danger is the greatest that we chose to
deny its very existence.
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ence fiction, I asked him to read A Tale of Two Cities.53 The second book
on my list was the Autobiography of Malcolm X.54 My choices might have
been fortuitous, or there might have been some unconscious recogni-
tion on my part of the extent to which these same stories were being
played out once again. As it turns out, the decision in the Rodney King
case and the reaction in South Central Los Angeles made their relevance
clear.
As Chris mentioned to me, the members of the street gangs in Los
Angeles might have been called "Jacques" during the French Revolu-
tion. What Dickens described, we have witnessed first hand. We have
seen the anger of people who have nothing to lose, people who have
been so degraded and so dehumanized that they no longer value human
life, their own or anyone else's. If Dickens were alive today, how would
he regard the riots in Los Angeles and the reaction to them? Perhaps he
would have recognized a similarity between the failure of the English to
acknowledge that the seeds of the revolution were sewn by the French
aristocracy and the assertion here that the abject poverty experienced in
the inner cities does not justify the riots. 5 5 This is not a matter ofjustifi-
cation. What is being offered is an explanation. It is a case of cause and
effect. Or, in the words of Malcolm X, it is a case of chickens coming
home to roost.
5 6
53. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITEs (Bantam 1984) (1842). In his interpre-
tive afterword, Stephen Koch analyzes Dickens' attitude towards revolution and the "lucid
blindness that sees nothing but the oppression they need to sustain their rage-and their
new found omnipotence." Stephen Koch, Afterword to CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two
CITIES 359 (Bantam 1984) (1842). In his opinion, "The dominating political innovation of
our time has been Terror's fully organized expression of totalitarianism, whose primary
moral innovation has been to fully institutionalize Terror's rationale: collective guilt." Id.
at 360.
I find it difficult to accept his premise that the collective guilt argument which has
been applied to Germany since World War II and any version of "collective guilt" that
might have been used by the Nazis to justify the program of genocide as one in the same.
In my opinion that the idea of collective guilt is appropriate in the former case and not in
the latter. While collective guilt may provide a rationale for purges and putsches by "revo-
lutionary" regimes in Russia and China, including the "cultural" revolution in China. If
oppression sustains rage, then it seems clear to me that an end to oppression would mean
an end to the "dreams of vengeance" that sustain revolutionaries.
54. MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (Ballentine 1983) (1964) (with
the assistance of Alex Haley).
55. I have always liked Dickens, perhaps because he evidences class consciousness
that appeals to me as a daughter of the working class. Only recently I learned that he was
also a critic of slavery. Charles Dickens, AMERICAN NOTES (St. Martin's Press 1985)
(1842). My research assistant, Caroline Green, who must receive credit for finding this
book for me, was excited by the technique Dickens used to criticize the institution of slav-
ery. He printed advertisements that appeared in public papers offering rewards for news
of runaway slaves. Dickens used these ads to ridicule the institution of slavery and to
destroy the myths that supported it. Id. at 273. The ads described men, women and chil-
dren marked with iron collars, scars from lashings, marks from a hot iron on a face, a piece
cut out of an ear or a brand marking him or her as property. Id. at 274-76. It is interesting
to note that while we no longer suffer the mark of a brand that might be found on cattle
rather than humans, we might still be stunned by 50,000-volt stun guns. See Riley, supra
note 24, at 16.
56. Malcolm X later explained the statement which caused so much controversy: "I
said what I honestly felt-that it was, as I saw it, a case of 'the chickens coming home to
roost.' I said that the hate in white men had not stopped with the killing of defenseless
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I could not have done what the gang members in Los Angeles did. I
am a lawyer, and I respect the law. I have been taught to act with civility
and human decency. That is the way I try to live my life. That is what I
try to teach Chris. I have not acted on my anger because, unlike the
young people in Los Angeles, I have something to lose. Human life
means something to me because my life has meaning. The policies of
the Great Society provided me with a good place to live, at one point in
public housing, and a means of acquiring an education. I have a profes-
sion which I might not have but for the interest in diversity and the as-
signment of a positive value to race, in other words, affirmative action. I
am raising my son in a radically different environment. Affirmative ac-
tion is under attack, not by those truly committed to some concept of a
meritocracy but by those who employ a system of political patronage.
5 7
The political ideology of the right panders to racial fears. Much of the
progress I witnessed has been reversed during the Reagan/Bush years.
In my short lifetime, I have witnessed the best and the worst of the
human spirit respectively in the attempts to eliminate, and later to pre-
serve, social and economic inequality.
There is a chill in the air, and I pull my blanket of optimism closer
around me. I continue to believe that most human beings are decent
and kind and that they can change. I believe that most people are capa-
ble of generosity of spirit and a genuine concern for those who are less
fortunate, and that these are values which are part of the fabric of our
society. I know that there are people who are actively working to change
the world and eliminate unfairness, injustice and inequality. Yet it is
harder and harder to keep out the cold wind that has begun to blow, and
in moments of reverie, my mind turns to Madam Defarge. I have begun
to understand this most unsympathetic and unappealing character. I
understand the source of her bitterness and her anger. I almost begin to
understand her insatiable desire for revenge. 58 I wonder whether ulti-
mately the fear of young black men is misplaced. Perhaps the person to
black people, but that hate, allowed to spread unchecked, finally had struck down this
country's Chief of State." MALCOLM X, supra note 54, at 301.
57. Anyone who thought that this was a fight about meritocracy learned otherwise
when Clarence Thomas was nominated for the Supreme Court. President Bush described
Thomas as the best qualified candidate for the job. Most of us suspected that the qualifica-
tions to which he referred were something other than the credentials as a jurist or as a
scholar in the field of constitutional law. If for no other reason, the Senate should have
had some reservations about confirming a man who could not keep up with the develop-
ments in an area of law enforced by an agency which he headed. How knowledgeable
could he be if he delegated all responsibility for reading federal court decisions in the area
of civil rights, including a circuit court decision discussing sexual harassment, to a
subordinate? See Reuters, The Supreme Court: Excerpts From News Conference Announcing Court
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A14.
58. Dickens' feminization of the guillotine reinforced his image of woman as a venge-
ful spirit and animates his creation, Madam DeFarge. Stephen Koch, supra note 53, at 360-
61. Lucie Manet is a stereotype of the Victorian concept of womanhood, all gentility and
perfect loyalty to father, husband and children. Madam DeFarge may be a stereotype as
well, but by the time Dickens finishes telling us about the atrocities which occurred at the
hands of the French aristocracy, of the horrible death of the members of Madam DeFarge's
family, her strength seems all the more admirable, and her desire for retribution is
understandable.
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fear is the mother of the young black man. 59
59. I would like to point out, for those who might not have thought about this possi-
bility, that some of the mothers of young black men are white women. My anger at the
treatment Marcus received at the museum gift shop was shared by my cousin through
marriage, M'Lynn Kenny, who is white.
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ONE YEAR LATER: THE Los ANGELES RIOTS
AND A NEW NATIONAL POLICY
DR. LYNN A. CURTIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Rodney King beating and the subsequent riots in Los An-
geles last summer, a leading Spanish newspaper warned that the Ameri-
can experience-of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer-
is common across many established democracies of Europe.' In the
United States over the last decade taxes were increased on the poor and
decreased on the rich, 2 (Figure 1) resulting in a ten percent income de-
cline for the poor and over a 120 percent income increase for the richest
one percent of the American population.3 (Figure 2). This disparity be-
tween the rich and the poor evidences the failure of trickle-down eco-
nomics, as does the continuing recession.
In the late 1960's, after major American urban riots, the Kerner
Riot Commission predicted that America would become two societies,
increasingly separate and less equal. 4 That prophecy has come to pass.
As Robert Reich of Harvard wrote, the American professional class com-
municates far more easily, by facsimile and fiber optics, with its counter-
parts in Europe and Japan than with the poor in south central Los
* President, The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, Washington, D.C. The Foun-
dation is the continuation, in the private sector, of the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence (of 1968-69) and the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (Kerner Riot Commission of 1967-68). Dr. Eisenhower chaired the Violence
Commission.
From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Curtis was Urban Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development, Executive Director of the President's Urban and Regional policy
Group and Administrator of the forty-three million dollars federal Urban Initiatives Anti-
Crime Program targeted at public housing. Earlier, he was Co-Director of the Crimes of
Violence Task Force of the National Violence Commission. Ph.D. in Urban Studies and
Criminology, University of Pennsylvania; M.Sc. in Economics, University of London; A.B.
in Economics, Harvard University. Special thanks to Eisenhower Foundation Director
Vesta Kimble for her assistance with this Article.
1. Glen Frankel, Foreign Officials, Press Criticize U.S. Over Rioting: Mitterand Blames Rea-
gan-Bush Social Policies; Protection for Korean Americans Urged, WASH. POST, May 2, 1991, at
All.
2. Enterprise Zones: Hearings on H. R. 11 & 3 Before the Sucomm. on Select Revenue Measures
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 254 (1991) (statement of Dr.
Lynn A. Curtis, President, The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation) (referring to KEVIN
PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR (1990)) [hereinafter Enterprise Zones: statement
of Curtis]. See also ISAAC SHAPIRO & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, SELECTIVE PROSPERITY: INCREAS-
ING ECONOMIC DISPARITIES SINCE 1977 (1977).
3. Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting PHILLIPS, supra note
2).
4. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
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Angeles or the south Bronx. 5 According to sociolinguist William Labov,
the English spoken by the inner-city African-Americans is becoming in-
creasingly different than that spoken by white Americans.
6
One exception to the federal government's disinvestment in the
poor over the last decade has been prison building. The United States
doubled the number of prison cells over the 1980's. 7 (Figure 3). At the
same time, the federal government cut by more than half its spending on
housing for the poor.8 In some ways, then, prison building became
America's national low income housing policy. 9 It is now the case that,
at any one point in time, one out of every four young African-American
males between the age of twenty and twenty-nine would be in prison, on
probation or on parole.' 0 This is an astounding statistic. In addition,
violent crime increased substantially over the time when we were adding
so many minority youth to the prison population. I Internationally, the
United States has the highest rates of incarceration in the industrialized
world, along with the highest rates of violence. 12 (Figures 4 and 5).
Building prisons, and keeping young people in them, is extremely
expensive. It costs more to go to jail than to Yale.' 3 And the continuing
high violent crime rates suggest that the policy of putting young people
in prison was not cost effective for the middle class taxpayer seeking
security for' her or his family. Still, one need not necessarily despair
about the noble experiment in democracy that de Tocqueville described
so eloquently. 14 We already know which policies work in the American
inner-city-policies that are cheaper and far more productive invest-
ments, both economically and in terms of human capital, than trickle-
down economics and prison building. The policy that works can be
characterized as child and youth investment and community
reconstruction.
5. Robert Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES,Jan 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at
16.
6. Malcolm Gladwell, Some Hear Black and White in Divergence of Spoken Word; Reversing a
Trend, Dialects Are Taking On Greater Racial Dimension, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1991, at A3.
7. LYNN A. CURTIS, LORD, How DARE WE CELEBRATE? PRACTICAL POLICY REFORM IN
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AND YOUTH INVESTMENT 4 (1992) (edited version of Reauthoriza-
tion Hearings for The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Before the Subcomm. on
Human Resources of the House Comm. of Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
(statement of Dr. Lynn A. Curtis, President of The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation)).
8. CURTIS, supra note 7, at 4.
9. CURTIS, supra note 7, at 4.
10. Bill McAllister, Study: 1 in 4 Young Black Men Is in Jail or Court-supervised; Author
Warns of Risk of Losing 'Entire Generation', WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1990, at A3. Compare this
to one in ten Latino men and one in sixteen Caucasion men in the same age group. Id.
11. THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION, YOUTH INVESTMENT AND COMMUNITY
RECONSTRUCTION: STREET LESSONS ON DRUGS AND CRIME FOR THE NINETIES 9 (1990)
[hereinafter YOUTH INVESTMENT].
12. SeeJAN VAN DIJK, ET AL., EXPERIENCES OF CRIME ACROSS THE WORK: KEY FINDINGS
OF THE 1989 INTERNATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (2d ed. 1991).
13. THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION, No Quick Fix, NEWS CONFERENCE -
UNITED STATES SENATE, May 19, 1992, at 4.
14. ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., 1969)
(1900).
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II. CHILD AND YOUTH INVESTMENT
A. Head Start
France possesses the world's most comprehensive system of pre-
school education and child care for high-risk populations. 1 5 So it is no
surprise to the French that Head Start preschool for inner-city children
is the most successful across-the-board American prevention program
ever created. 16 As the conservative corporate presidents, who are mem-
15. Jill Smolowe, Where Children Come First, TIME, Nov. 9, 1992, at 58.
16. Id.
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bers of the Committee for Economic Development in New York City,
concluded, every dollar invested in inner-city preschool in the United
States, creates five dollars in benefits-in terms of less crime, less drugs,
less school dropouts, less welfare dependency and less
unemployment. 17
B. Job Corps 18
When it comes to'high-risk inner-city youth, Head Start preschool is
at one end of the age spectrum. At the other end is Job Corps, also
begun in the late 1960's. The Job Corps may rank as the second most
successful across-the-board American prevention program ever created.
Job Corps, an intensive program, takes seriously the need to provide a
supportive, structured environment for the youth it seeks to assist. Job
Corps features classroom courses, which can lead to high school
equivalency degrees, counseling and hands-on job training for very
high-risk youth. Corps programs are located in rural and urban set-
tings. 19 Some of the urban settings are campus-like.20 Others essen-
tially are "on the street. ' '2 1 In the original design, a residential setting
provided sanctuary away from one's home. 2 2 Today, nonresidential var-
iations are being tried, and it will be important to compare their cost-
effectiveness to the live-in design. Yet, even for the non-residential pro-
grams, the notion of an extended-family environment has been
maintained.
23
According to United States Department of Labor statistics, during
the first year after the experience, Job Corps members are one-third less
likely to be arrested than nonparticipants. 24 Every dollar' spent the on
Job Corps resulted in one dollar and forty-five cents in benefits-includ-
ing reduced crime and substance abuse (which account for forty-two
cents in benefits alone), reduced welfare dependency, increased job pro-
ductivity and higher income. 2 5 Evaluations conducted during the Rea-
gan Administration (which tried to eliminate Job Corps) 2 6 found that
seventy-five percent ofJob Corps enrollees move on to a job or to full-
time study.27 Graduates retain jobs longer and earn about fifteen per-
17. See COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEV. CHILDREN IN NEED, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR
THE EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGED (1987).
18. For more information on job corps programs see, Steven Greenhouse, Lessons
Across Six Decades As Clinton Tries to Make Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al; Spencer
Rich, Job- Training Program Is Paying Off-for Some, WASH. POST, May 23, 1992, at All;
Morton B. Sklar, ProposedJTPA Reforms Miss the Mark, 11/7 YOUTH POLICY 36 (Sept./Oct.
1989).





24. Id. at 13.
25. Id
26. Id.
27. YOUTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 13.
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cent more than if they had not participated in the program. 28 Along the
same lines, a United States General Accounting Office study concluded
that Job Corps members are far more likely to receive a high school
diploma or equivalency degree than comparison group members and
that the positive impact on their earnings continues after training. 29
Robert Taggart, a strong supporter ofJob Corps, asserts that those who
doubt that labor market problems are real and serious, that social inter-
ventions can make a difference or that the effectiveness of public pro-
grams can be improved will find little to support their preconceptions in
the experience of programs like Job Corps. 30 In contrast to Job Corps,
the present federal job training system, the Job Training Partnership
Act, has failed for high-risk youth. Evaluations have shown that youth in
the program actually did worse than comparable youths not in the
program.31
C. Kids In-between
In-between the very young children who need to receive Head Start
and older teens and young adults who can benefit from Job Corps-type
remedial education, training and placement, there already exist success-
fully evaluated, model inner-city programs for high-risk children and
youth aged roughly seven to fifteen. 3 2 The Argus Community in the
Bronx and Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, in Puerto Rico, illustrate these
positively evaluated, indigenous, community-based initiatives.
The Argus Community: The Argus Community, on East 160th Street
in the Bronx, was founded in 1968, by Elizabeth Sturz, a poet and for-
mer probation officer.3 3 Argus is a community-based center for high-
risk youth, mainly African-American and Puerto Rican. It provides "an
alternative life program for adolescents and adults who have been on
the treadmill of unemployment, under-employment, street hustling,
welfare, substance abuse, crime and prison who saw no way out for
themselves."
'3 4
Through residential and nonresidential programs, Argus seeks to
offer some fundamentals too often lacking in the families and communi-
ties from which these youths come.3 5 The goal is to create an extended
family of responsible adults and peers that offer "warmth, nurturance,
communication, and structure," and that model and teach productive
values.3 6 Within that "extended family" setting, the program offers pre-
28. Id.
29. Rich, supra note 18, at All.
30. See ROBERT TAGGART, A FISHERMAN'S GUIDE: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING AND
REMEDIATION STRATEGIES (The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ed.,
1981).
31. Rich, supra note 18, at All.
32. See, e.g., YOUTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 15.
33. Id. at 15. For a more in-depth account of The Argus Community, see ELIZABETH
LYTTLETON STURZ, WIDENING CIRCLES (1983).
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vocational, vocational and academic training, and works to link those
who have been trained with employers in the city.
3 7
Over time, Argus added day care, family planning, health care and
early education, which not only provided parenting assistance for the
children of teen mothers in the program but also sought to "teach the
young mothers-and fathers-how to be good parents. ' '3 8 Founders of
Argus believed that "angry, alienated teenagers can be pulled in, can be
brought to the point where they not only do not steal and assault, but
have something to give to the society."
'3 9
The nonresidential program, the Learning for Living Center, is
mostly for teenagers who are at risk but not yet in serious trouble. It is
designed to provide alternative life training to prevent the youth from
ending up in the residential program, which is for those somewhat older
with more serious problems-today, especially drugs.40 So a full range
of intervention has evolved, from early prevention to treatment.
4 '
Some clients are referred to Argus from throughout New York City,
but most come from the neighborhood. Argus youth are at higher risk
than the clients of most other community-based youth agencies in New
York City.4 2 Despite this extremely troubled clientele, the program has
had encouraging successes.
43
The Eisenhower Foundation evaluated a cycle of the Argus day
time, nonresidential Learning for Living Center. Youth were assessed
over twenty weeks of training and then over a follow-up period. Meas-
ures were taken before and after, nine months apart, with one-hundred
high-risk Argus youth and one-hundred comparable youth who did not
receive training. Argus youth had higher salaries, and received more job
benefits than the comparison youth. 44 To complement these findings,
federal studies show that sixty-seven percent of the Argus Community's
enrollees attained non-subsidized job placement in nineteen eighty.
45
This is a much higherjob-placement rate than for similar high-risk youth
who are not involved in the program. 46 These studies also demon-
strated lower crime recidivism rates for Argus graduates than for gradu-
ates from almost any other program in New York City that works with
such high-risk youth.
47
An evaluation was conducted of Argus' Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA)48 program for high-risk inner-city youths by Professor La-
Rue Jones under the auspices of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation in
37. Id.










48. Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1791 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
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1987. 49 The study concluded that Argus enrollees (1) showed increased
scores on conduct and morality, (2) received higher salaries, (3) paid
more taxes and (4) received morejob benefits than a comparable group
of trainees who did not receive the support services offered by the Argus
Community.5 0
Centro Sister Isolina Ferre: Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, in the La Playa
neighborhood of Ponce, Puerto Rico, was started in 1968 by a Catholic
nun, Sister Isolina Ferre, who had spent the past several years working
on New York City's toughest streets. 5 l Playa de Ponce was a community
"where 16,000 people lived neglected by government and private agen-
cies" with delinquency rates more than twice that of the rest of the city
of Ponce, high unemployment, poor health conditions, no basic health
care services, and "few, if any, resources." 52 Centro began on the prem-
ise, "If family and community could be strengthened, and meaningful
employment made available," it might be possible to "make substantial
progress in the struggle against neighborhood crime and violence."1
5 3
With this vision, Sister Isolina, began to put into place several pro-
grams designed to develop the competence of community youth.5 4 One
example stands out especially: the system of youth advocates or "inter-
cessors." These were young, streetwise community people who became
all-around advocates and mentors for young people brought before the
juvenile court. 55 The advocates would "get to know the youth and his
or her peers and family, and would look into the schoolwork, family situ-
ation, and day-to-day behavior of the youth."' 56 They would involve the
youth in a range of developmental programs Centro created, including
job training, recreation and tutoring. 5 7 Their role went well beyond
simple individual counseling; the advocate was to "become familiar with
the whole living experience of the youth," to work with "the family, the
peers, the school, the staff, the police and the court." In short, "to help
the community become aware of the resources it had that should help
the youth develop into a healthy adult." 58 After some initial mistrust,
the police began to work closely with the intercessors, often calling them
first before taking a youth to court.
59
Centro also developed innovative educational alternatives for youth
at risk of dropping out of school, and a program of family supports
through "advocate families" who took the lead in helping their neigh-
49. Larue Jones, Minority Inner-City Youth Employment Crime Reduction Evaluation, final
report grad # 0091403 (Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation ed., 1987).
50. Id.







58. Id. at 13-14.
59. Id. at 14.
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bors with family problems. 60 They created an extensive job-training
program, on the premise that "building a community without jobs for
youth is like trying to build a brick wall without cement."
'6 1
Charles Silberman called Centro "the best example of youth and
community regeneration I found anywhere in the United States." 62 La
Playa is considered the toughest neighborhood in Ponce. Yet over the
period of initial operations of Centro, from 1970 to 1977, the rate of
reported juvenile offenses was fairly constant in Ponce, while it showed a
decline of eighty-five percent in La Playa.
6 3
Centro and the Eisenhower Foundation now replicate and evaluate
the program in San Juan. The replication embraces all the original edu-
cation, mediation and employment initiatives begun in Ponce, but adds
community-based policing. A police mini-station was built at the en-
trance to the "campus" where the other initiatives are located. A police
officer lives with his wife and three children above the mini-station. For
the most part, the officer does not make arrests. He works on preven-
tion, accompanied by other officers not in residence. Preliminary assess-
ments show the number of crimes reported decreased in the Centro
precinct as compared to other San Juan precincts.
64
D. Multiple Solutions to Multiple Problems
Such programs for children and youth of middle ages seem to have
some common underlying principles. There is always some kind of
sanctuary-a place to go off the streets. The sanctuary provides an ex-
tended-family-like setting where both social support and discipline exist.
Adult role models and mentors act as big brothers and big sisters. This
extended family environment encourages young people to stay in school
or begin innovative community-based remedial education, sometimes
using novel computer-based software.6 5 In the successful programs, re-
medial education is linked to specific job training or to college educa-
tion. 66 In turn, job training is linked to job placement. 67 This is
important, because the JTPA, which is the failed American federal youth
job training program, unlike the excellent German system, 68 does not




62. CHARLES SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 434-35 (1978).
63. Id.
64. See THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION, JUNTA DE COLABORACION POLICIA Y
COMMUNIDAD (unpublished evaluation reports, on file with The Milton S. Eisenhower
Foundation).
65. These are computer-assisted learning programs that allow youth to progress at
their own speed unhindered by the stigma or embarrassment of being "behind" other
students in the classroom situation. An example of such a program is a program devel-
oped by USA Basics. See generally TAGGART, supra note 30.
66. YOUTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 55.
67. Id.
68. Marc Fisher, German Job Training: A Modelfor America? U.S. Experts Examining Govern-
ment-Industiy Apprenticeship Program, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1992, at Al.
69. Rich, supra note 18, at A 1l.
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In spite of the inadequacies of the JTPA, some local community or-
ganizations supplement it with better training placement operations. 7
0
Job placements can economically develop the neighborhood. One ex-
ample is in the rehabilitation of housing.7 ' In some of these successfully
evaluated programs, community-based and problem-oriented policing
assists the economic development process, as is the case with the Centro
San Juan mini-station. 72 Such community policing does not usually re-
duce crime in inner city neighborhoods, based on careful evaluations,
but it can reduce fear in urban middle class neighborhoods.7 3 The fear
reduction can help encourage businesses and the public sector to build
in the inner city. If this economic development is planned correctly, it
provides jobs for high-risk youth. The youth qualify for the jobs by pos-
sessing adequate job training and then completing high school, which is
made possible by the mentoring, social support and discipline created in
extended family sanctuaries.
Accordingly, the most successful programs seem to provide multi-
ple solutions to multiple problems in the American inner city. The im-
plication is that we do not necessarily need more experiments or more
demonstrations. We need to replicate to scale what already works-for
preschoolers, for middle school children and for youth who require job
training and placement. This means (1) Head Start for three years for
all poor children; (2) a new job training and placement system with a
more Job Corps-type investment for all who qualify; and (3) a National
Corporation for Youth Investment in the private, non-profit sector that
replicates the principles underlying successful inner city community
based initiatives, like Argus and Centro. In the words of David
Hamburg, President of the Carnegie Corporation in New York, "We
know enough to act, and we can't afford not to act. "74
II. COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION
Part One described the child and youth investment side of a prag-
matic new policy, but what about the community reconstruction side?
Again, there already exist several models of success. Over more than a
decade, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation 75 and the Enterprise
Foundation, have financed and built over 35,000 units of low-income
housing for the poor and millions of square feet of commercial space
70. YOUTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 71.
71. Id. at 74.
72. The Centro San Juan mini-station is a nonresidential program that prepares high-
risk teenagers and young adults from the neighborhood for grammar school and high
school equivalency examinations. In addition to the focus on education, the program at-
tempts to develop supportive social skills and values that will mitigate against delinquency,
drug abuse and unemployment. Id. at 57.
73. Id. at 42.
74. David A. Hamburg, Fundamental Building Blocks of Early Life, in THE CARNEGIE COR-
PORATION OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT (1987).
75. The Local Initiatives Support Corporation is a private-sector corporation created
in the early 1970's by the Ford Foundation. Its purpose is to generate neighborhood-
based economic development in the private sector--operating through nonprofit commu-
nity development organizations. YOUT INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 67.
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through community development corporations ("CDC"s). The CDCs
are now the biggest developers of low-income housing in the United
States, larger than the American federal government.76 These organiza-
tions make loans and grants directly to local community-based, inner-
city non-profit organizations.
7 7
The number of such local non-profit organizations, which can pro-
vide "bubble up" economic development, rather than trickle down de-
velopment that has failed, needs to be greatly expanded in the United
States. To better facilitate this development, the federal government
needs to capitalize inner-city, minority-owned banks, like the model
South Shore Bank in Chicago, which made investments in its neighbor-
hood to revive economically depressed black neighborhoods and re-
verse the process of urban decay. 78 Beyond housing rehabilitation,
inner-city non-profit development corporations need to lead the way in
the repair of the urban infrastructure, including new roads, highways
and rapid rail systems. The generated employment needs to be for
high-risk youth, as well as for lower, working and middle class Ameri-
cans-as part of an urban reinvestment agenda that moves the country
from recession.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Doing What Works
This policy of child investment, youth investment and community
reconstruction is simply common sense. It takes those programs already
working in the public sector and combines them with those programs
that have already worked in the private sector. It builds on the experi-
ence that private sector human and economic development, is, for the
most part, better led by non-profits than by for-profits in the inner city
because non-profits are better able to bubble up ideas from indigenous
leaders in inner-city communities. The idea, based on careful evalua-
tions, is to replicate to scale those public and private non-profit pro-
grams that already have succeeded, based on careful evaluations.
Such a policy needs to be funded for a minimum period of ten
years, at a level of ten billion dollars per year in new spending on child
and youth investment and twenty billion dollars per year in new budget
authority on community reconstruction. 79 The cost of the community
reconstruction would simply bring some federal housing and urban de-
76. Private Cures for Public Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at A24.
77. Id.
78. Michael Quint, This Bank Can Turn a Profit And Follow a Social Agenda, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 1992, at Al.
79. THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION, INVESTING IN CHILDREN AND YOUTH, RE-
CONSTRUCTING OUR CITIES: DOING WHAT WORKS TO REVERSE THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (forthcoming 1993) (document published in commemoration of the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The Kerner
Riot Commission) of which the Eisenhower Foundation is the continuation thereof) (on
file with the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation) [hereinafter INVESTING IN CHILDREN].
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velopment budget authority up to where it was before 1980.80
B. Beware of Fool's Gold
It is equally important to advocate against what does not work, based
on scientific evaluations and years of experience. A recent theater in
London revived the play, "The Alchemist,"' about people duped by
the promise of fool's gold. Over the last ten years, the American federal
government tried to sell a lot of fool's gold to the American public, in-
cluding the false promises of enterprise zones, volunteerism, self-suffi-
ciency, partnerships and employment.
1. Enterprise Zones
Enterprise zones, currently the most fashionable false promise
among many Republicans and Democrats,8 2 represent still more failed
trickle-down economics. The basic notion is that, through tax incentives
to entrepreneurs, we can create new businesses in the inner city. Over
the last decade enterprise zones have been tried in nearly forty states.
Yet, evaluations have not found significant employment or economic de-
velopment benefits.8 3 For example, in Louisville, Kentucky, there was
little evidence that tax breaks induced anyone to invest in an enterprise
zone who would not otherwise have done so.8 4 Only fourteen percent
of the jobs created in the zone went to persons unemployed or on wel-
fare who lived in the zone.8 5 And the United States General Accounting
Office's evaluation concluded that the Maryland enterprise zone pro-
gram "did not stimulate economic growth as measured by employment
or strongly influence most employers' decisions about business
location."
8 6
Enterprise zone-like tax breaks and related benefits have also led to
scandals in the inner-city, such as the money misspent by the Wedtech
Corporation in the Bronx.8 7 As recent studies in the United States and
in Great Britain show, the hidden costs of enterprise zone strategies in
lost tax revenues actually render them prohibitively expensive, in terms
of costs per job created.8 8 The conservative economist concluded that
enterprise zones are often wasteful and tend to displace rather than cre-
80. Id.
81. Ben Johnson, The Alchemist, in PLAYs AND POEMS 9 (London, George Routlegde
and Son, 2d ed. 1886).
82. Not so EZ, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1989, at 16.
83. Enterprise Zones: Hearings on JR. 11 & 23 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Meas-
ures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 247 (1991) (Statement of
William J. Cunningham, Legislative Representative, American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations) [hereinafter Enterprise Zones: statement of Cunning-
ham]. See also Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 261-62.
84. Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 262.
85. Id.
86. Enterprise Zones: statement of Cunningham, supra note 83, at 247.
87. Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 262.
88. Not so EZ, supra note 82, at 16. A recent study in Great Britain found that the one-
time cost for each extra job created was approximately fifty thousand dollars. Id.
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ate business activity. 89
Regardless of what enterprise zone experiment one chooses from
among the many proposed, it is hard to find any plan that recognizes
that the formula for success is multiple solutions to multiple problems,
and that social development must be integrated with economic develop-
ment in a very comprehensive way. 90 For example, if entrepreneurs
were given trickle-down benefits in the inner-city, what provision is
there for them to hire high-risk youths and ex-offenders given that their
business already is, by definition, risky? What provision is there for re-
medial education, linked to Jobs Corps-type training and continued
counselling via mentors during job placement by the ex-offenders in the
businesses created by the entrepreneurs? 9 1 Few schemes show clearly
how there will be sufficient educational and employment investments in
high-risk youth over a sustained period of time with sufficient mentor-
ing.9 2 Nor, typically, in enterprise zone experiments are indigenous
community leaders given true leadership roles.93 For example, corpo-
rate and business leaders are given a stake in running Private Industry
Councils as part of the present ineffective job training program for high-
risk youth.
94
What we need instead is bubble-up social and economic develop-
ment that creates real infrastructure in devastated communities. For-
profits can help in the development of that infrastructure, as long as the
process is led by non-profits. 95 Once the infrastructure is in place, more
for-profit institutions will find it more attractive to invest in these com-
munities. It is at this stage of development of the inner-city, and not
before, that we should return to the potential role of for-profit enter-
prise zones.
2. Volunteerism
We have been told that vast sums are needed for paid professionals
in the military,9 6 but that volunteerism is one of the answers to inner-
city dilemmas. However, neighborhood block watches, composed of
volunteers, do not work to reduce crime in the inner-city. 9 7 Mentoring
as a form of volunteerism has even more potential. But, based on avail-
able evaluations, even mentoring fails unless the volunteers possess the
right motivation, have appropriate experience and sufficient re-
89. Enterprise Zones: statement of Curtis, supra note 2, at 262; see also Not so EZ, supra
note 82, at 16.




94. Rich, supra note 18, at All.
95. YoUTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 36 & 75.
96. Patrick E. Tyler, Halving Defense Budget in Decade Suggested, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
1989, at Al; Where To Find It: $ 150 Billion a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1990, at A24.
97. YoUTm INVESTMENT, supra note I I at 44-50.
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sources. 9 8 So let us be a bit cautious about those thousand points of
light.
3. Self-Sufficiency
Grantees often are told by funders that, after a two- or three-year
federal government grant, an inner-city program should become self-
sufficient. 99 In some instances we are able to create for-profit businesses
that allow federal programs to continue.'0 0 But, when it comes to ut-
terly devastated communities like south central Los Angeles, the south
side of Chicago, the south Bronx or southeast Washington, D.C., where
there is little infrastructure in place, 1 1 it is naive to assume that pro-
grams will become self-sufficient.' 0 2 We need long-term commitments
with comprehensive solutions.
4. Partnerships
The federal government sometimes uses the word partnership as
fool's gold as well, encouraging coalitions of programs and organiza-
tions, with the promise that there is strength in numbers.' 0 3 But if, for
example, one coordinates an unsuccessful inner-city program like block
watches with an unsuccessful inner-city program like enterprise zones,
the result will be a coordinated but still unsuccessful partnership. We
must be sure, then, that individual interventions are partnered with
other programs that actually work.
5. Empowerment
Finally, beware of the word empowerment, often used in the con-
text of public housing in the United States. 1° 4 Public housing tenants
are encouraged to empower themselves by managing their own estates.
But this is done in only a very few places, where, of course, visiting dig-
nitaries are taken. 0 5 These are nonetheless, the exception. Most hous-
ing projects in the United States are not managed by residents, and the
federal government has neglected to provide funding to train residents
or for physical maintenance of their buildings. 10 6 Similarly, there is
rhetoric about home ownership for the poor, but little follow through
on the promises. 10 7 There is not much talk about empowerment
through education and employment, which are the real answers. As a
result, American psychologists invented a new term "post-empower-
98. See generally MARC FREEDMAN, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: REFLECTIONS ON THE
MENTORING MOVEMENT (1992).
99. See YouTH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 38-39.
100. Id at 75.
101. INVESTING IN CHILDREN, supra note 79.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. YourH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 77.
105. Even the Queen of England was taken to one such housing estate when visiting
Washington, D.C.
106. YoUrH INVESTMENT, supra note 11, at 77.
107. Id
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ment syndrome."' 108 This refers to programs for the poor, that are
funded for a few years, then encouraged to become self-sufficient.
When the program fails, participants realize they are not empowered,
the poor become even more frustrated and angry. 10 9
6. Resources
Enterprise zones, volunteerism, self-sufficiency, partnerships and
empowerment. Fool's gold has been for sale because the federal gov-
ernment has been unable and unwilling to invest the substantial re-
sources needed to replicate enough programs sufficient to make a
national impact. Europe and Japan have been more responsible, mor-
ally and economically, than the United States over the last decade in
investing in children, youth and urban infrastructure. Only the federal
government has enough resources to generate change that will have a
significant national impact to leverage the additional private and local
public funds needed.
Long-term comprehensive policy should be financed through a
number of well discussed, bi-partisan plans-like breaking down the
budgetary "Berlin Wall" that now proscribes reallocating defense and
foreign aid funds into domestic investment, increasing taxes on the rich-
est one percent (who had their taxes reduced and incomes increased by
120 percent over the 1960's)"10 and redirecting some pension fund in-
vestments in ways that benefit our children, youth and cities. America
found the money to fight the Persian Gulf War and it found the hun-
dreds of billions of dollars needed to bail out the failed, deregulated
savings and loan industry. The United States can find the money for a
true strategy of child and youth investment and community reconstruc-
tion. All we need is the leadership at the very top. We now have that
leadership.
IV. CONCLUSION
If we are to reverse the betrayal of the American democracy, wise
national leaders also need to embrace wise citizens. In the words of Wil-
liam Greider, "Rehabilitating democracy will require citizens to devote
themselves first to challenging the status quo, disrupting the existing
contours of power and opening the way to renewal.""' Common peo-
ple must engage their surrounding reality and "question the conflict be-
tween what they are told and what they see and experience." '" 2 In the
United States, this means old fashion grassroots political lobbying to
gain full funding for preschools modeled after the French experience
and job training modeled after the German experience. It means mas-
108. INVESTING IN CHILDREN, supra note 79.
109. Id
110. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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sive voter registration of the poor. It means tight controls on special
interest group lobbyists in Washington, D.C., the people who walk down
K Street in thousand dollar suits and alligator shoes. It means public
financing of elections, elimination of contribution loopholes and far
shorter campaigns that limit both the use of money and the use of televi-
sion, as is the case in the United Kingdom.
We need not continue pushing the rock up-hill. There is hope. We
know what works. We no longer need to defer the American dream for
substantial portions of the American population.
"What happens to a dream deferred," asked the honored African-
American poet, Langston Hughes:
Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like sore-
And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over-
like a syrupy sweet?
Maybe it just sags
like a heavy load.
Or does it explode? 
1 13
113. LANGSTON HUGHES, Lennox Avenue Mural: Harlem, in MONTAGE OF A DREAM DE-




KIMBERLE CRENSHAW* AND GARY PELLER**
Like the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings a few months before,
the Rodney King beating, the acquittal of the Los Angeles police officers
who "restrained" him and the subsequent civil unrest in Los Angeles
flashed Race across the national consciousness and the gaze of American
culture momentarily froze there. Pieces of everyday racial dynamics
briefly seemed clear, then faded from view, replaced by presidential
politics and natural disasters.
This Essay examines in more depth what was exposed during the
momentary national focus on Rodney King. Two main events-the ac-
quittal of the police officers who beat King and the civil unrest in Los
Angeles following the verdict-serve as starting points for an analysis of
the ideological and symbolic intertwining of race and power in American
culture. This Essay explicates the 'outlines of a critical race theory, ' focus-
ing not solely on the Rodney King incident, but considering more
broadly how racial power generally is produced, mediated and legiti-
mated-an approach that seeks to connect developments in diverse are-
nas in which race and power are contested.
A deep connection between the various ideological conflicts became
apparent in the way the Rodney King events played in national con-
sciousness. The techniques utilized to convince the Simi Valley jury of
the reasonableness of the force used on Rodney King are linked to the
struggle-in a quite different legal arena- over whether to permit race-
conscious affirmative action programs. Both arenas in turn relate to the
conflict over whether to see the events in South Central L.A. as an "in-
surrection," as Representative Maxine Waters characterized it, or as a
"riot" of the "mob," the official version presented in dominant media
and by the President of the United States. At stake at each axis of con-
flict is a contest over which narrative structure will prevail in the inter-
pretation of events in the social world. Exposed in each conflict is the
inability of concepts, like "the rule of law," or "reason," or even the
technology of video, to mediate these conflicts in a neutral aracial way.
The realm of interpretation, ideology and narrative is a critical site
* Kimberle Crenshaw is a Professor of Law at the University of California School of
Law, a 1992 Samuel Rubin Fellow at Columbia University School of Law, and one of the
founders of Critical Race Theory, a movement bringing together progressive scholars of
race. See infra note 1.
** Gary Peller is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and a co-
chair of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies.
1. "Critical Race Theorists" is the name of an informally organized group of schol-
ars writing in the area of race law and theory. The group held its first conference in
Madison, Wisconsin in July, 1989. For a brief overview of the group's goals and perspec-
tives, see Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in
THE POLrrmCS OF LAw 195 (D. Kairys 2d ed. 1990).
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in the production of American racial domination. The Rodney King epi-
sode is particularly challenging for our approach because it seems so
easily assimilable to more conventional models of the way that power
works. Rather than imagine racial power being produced in the soft
space of ideological "superstructure," the world saw it exercised at an-
other point of production-at the material "base" where the nightstick
met the skull. Unlike the 1980s and 1990s racial controversies over af-
firmative action, ethnocentrism and multiculturalism, the Rodney King
beating bore the familiar markings of the 1950s and 1960s-rather than
being carefully encased in definitions of merit and neutrality. Instead,
old-time white supremacy was boldly and crudely inscribed on the body
of King. No fancy theory is needed to figure out what went on between
the Los Angeles police and Rodney King. But the Rodney King events
are also particularly illuminating for an approach that focuses on the
ideological. Part of what was revealed in the Rodney King saga was the
need for an account of how racial power continues to work, decades after
outlawed as a matter of formal decree, cultural convention and elite
preference.
To get a picture of how various structures of interpretation played
out after the verdict, first remember the reaction in most sectors of
American culture when the famous videotape of Los Angeles police of-
ficers beating King was initially broadcast on network television. Broad
national outrage shared by African Americans and most whites and mi-
norities followed, with the only visible exception being the fringe (but
becoming stronger) white proto-fascists of the Patrick Buchanan/David
Duke camps. An easy event for the entire mainstream of American cul-
ture to abhor, it did not present any of the hard questions of nineties'
controversies over race-like the so-called "dilemma" of affirmative ac-
tion, for example. The videotape lent objectivity to the charge of police
brutality. There was no question of interpretation and subjective bias
clouding the issue.
This initial wide consensus was actually based on the congruence of
various ideological positions around the use of the videotape as
"proof." Most people, including most political conservatives, had no
difficulty seeing what the tape represented: old-style, garden-variety ra-
cist power exemplified by the Bull Connor/Pretoria-like images of heav-
ily armed white security officers beating a defenseless black man
senseless. Part of the progress African Americans achieved in formal
legal equality and its cultural analogues manifested itself in the fact that,
unlike the fifties and sixties, no voice anywhere near the mainstream of
American life called this kind of police practice legitimate. In the nine-
ties, the moderate white Right defines itself in terms of the repudiation
of the backward doctrines of white supremacy. Within the broad social
consensus, how one understood the King videotape was not linked to
how one understood the so-called "murkier" issues of contemporary ra-
cial conflict. In political terms, the King videotape gave the moderate
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Right the opportunity to oppose clear-cut racism and thus to demon-
strate that its opposition to affirmative action is not linked to interests in
racial supremacy.
But this broad consensus was misleading to the extent that the
video appeared to mean the same thing to everyone. Subsequent events
would reveal the deep cleavages in how the tape was understood. The
differentiation underlaying the consensus around the King tape-be-
tween supposedly "old" ideologies of racial supremacy and contempo-
rary "dilemmas" of race-was too quick. It obscured the ways the
acquittal of the Los Angeles police officers were intertwined with narra-
tive structures that prevail in debates about affirmative action. Part of
understanding the failure of the formal legal equality achieved by Afri-
can Americans to protect Rodney King means understanding how for-
mal prohibitions, like those against police brutality and racial
discrimination, are necessarily mediated through narrative structures.
The Simi Valley jury's verdict is a particularly striking example of such a
structure, but not different in kind from the more rarified ideologies of
"moderate" Supreme Court justices. When the cultural consensus over
the meaning of the videotape blew apart in the violence of South Central
L.A., the limits of formal legal equality also became apparent.
Pause here to consider how the initial, common sense consensus
about what the King video showed was confronted by defense attorneys
in the courtroom. Frame-by-frame stills of the video were mounted on
clean white illustration boards and then used as the basis for questions
to "experts" on prisoner restraint. Each micro-moment of the beating
of King was broken down into a series of frozen images. As to each one,
the defense attorneys asked the experts whether King assumed a compli-
ant posture, or might a police officer reasonably conclude that King still
posed a threat to resist. Once the defense broke the video into frames,
each still could then be re-weaved into a different narrative about the
restraint of King. Each blow to King represented, not beating one of the
"gorillas in the mist," but a police approved technique of restraint com-
plete with technical names for each baton strike (or "stroke"). The
videotape images were physically mediated by the illustration boards
upon which the still pictures were mounted, and in the same moment of
disaggregation 2 they were symbolically mediated by the new narrative back-
2. We borrow the term "disaggregation" from Justice Marshall's dissent in Richmond
v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
[T]he majority's critique [of the evidence of racial exclusion] shows an unwilling-
ness to come to grips with why construction-contracting in Richmond is essen-
tially a whites-only enterprise. The majority... takes the disingenuous approach
of disagreggating Richmond's local evidence, attacking it piecemeal, and thereby
concluding that no single piece of evidence adduced by the city, 'standing
alone,'.., suffices to prove past discrimination. But items of evidence do not, of
course, 'stand alone,' or exist in alien juxtaposition ....
Id. at 542 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For a more extended discussion of the manner in which the Court disaggregated
causal factors in Croson, see Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the
Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1761-66 (1989).
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drops of institutional security's technical discourse and the refraining of
King as a threat rather than as a victim.
The eighty-one second video was, in short, broken into scores of
individual still pictures, each of which were then subject to endless rein-
terpretation. Since no single picture taken by itself could constitute ex-
cessive force, the video tape as a whole said something different-not
incredibly clear evidence of racist police brutality, but instead ambigu-
ous slices of time in a tense moment that Rodney King created for the
police.
There are many explanations for the King verdict. Most center
around the image ofjury lawlessness-the idea that the jury's result was
corrupted because they ignored the clear evidence of brutality to acquit
the police. Along these lines, some claimed to have expected the ver-
dict, because justice cannot be reached in a "system" controlled by
"them." Others located the pivotal turning point as the granting of the
defense motion for a change of venue-resulting in a trial location dom-
inated by law-and-order white conservatives, and, ironically, an area dis-
proportionately the home of L.A.P.D. officers and retirees. Others
placed responsibility on an inept (or worse) prosecution that failed to
humanize Rodney King to counter the defense continually objectifying
him.
There is some truth in each of these explanations. The problem,
however, is that each view binds its explanation of the King verdict too
tightly to one or another sites for the production and exercise of Ameri-
can racial power. One view suggests that, but for these quirks of the
case and the irrationality of the jurors, the legal system could neutrally
respond to an event like the beating of Rodney King. At the opposite
pole, the particular manner by which the King judgment was reached is
too quickly linked to an overly instrumental view of how law and other
mediating ideologies serve power.
Law in general and the courtroom in particular are arenas where
narratives are contested and the power of interpretation exercised. In
that sense the legal realm is a political realm. But it would be a mistake
to see narratives simply as some after-the-fact stories about events con-
cocted after the real power has already been exercised. The story lines
developed in law mediate power in the sense that power is translated to
appear as non-power-the beating of King becomes the "reasonable ex-
ercise of force necessary to restrain a prisoner." The story lines also
constitute power in the sense that the narrative lines shape what and how
events are perceived in the first place. Understanding these relation-
ships between law, power and ideology is necessary to comprehend how,
in many ways, the King verdict was typical, not extraordinary.
To develop this idea, it is helpful to turn from the King verdict to a
very different legal arena, the issuance of Supreme Court opinions. The
point is to draw connections between the narrative structure presented
by the defense attorneys in the police brutality trial-breaking the video-
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tape up into scores of single, still images-and the narrative structure
utilized in the more academic and "rational" atmosphere of the
Supreme Court.
In Richmond v. Croson3 , a Supreme Court majority struck down as
unconstitutional Richmond's municipal policy of awarding construction
contracts on a race conscious, affirmative action basis. Under Rich-
mond's program, prime contractors were required to set-aside thirty
percent of their work to be performed by minority subcontractors.4 As
matter of legal doctrine, Croson is an important refinement of the mean-
ing of "equal protection" in the Fourteenth Amendment because the
majority applied the "strict scrutiny" standard, 5 the traditional test for
"malign" racial classifications burdening Blacks, to a "benign" affirma-
tive-action plan burdening whites. This doctrinal development
presented a symbolic message that the problem of racism is a symmetri-
cal one-both Blacks and whites can suffer when racial classifications are
utilized, and therefore the same level of scrutiny is warranted whether a
racial classification benefits Blacks or whites. From this vantage point,
racism consists of the failure to treat people on an individual basis ac-
cording to terms that are neutral to race. In the Croson context, this em-
brace of "colorblindness" in equal protection meant the Court could
plausibly equate the legal significance of the City of Richmond, which
benefitted white contractors through a contracting system that excluded
blacks, with the legal consequences of a decision to benefit black con-
tractors by requiring set-asides.
6
In this doctrinal setting, the legal issue in Croson was whether the
Richmond affirmative action policy was constitutional as a policy that
served the compelling aim of remedying past discrimination against
blacks. According to the Court, such an aim was in fact compelling, but
only as the remedy for particular discrimination, lest the remedy consti-
tute a new instance of racial discrimination. 7 The problem in Croson-no
"proof" of significant racial discrimination in the Richmond construc-
tion industry that required a remedy-allowed the Court to hold against
the set-asides. 8
The analog to the videotape of Rodney King's beating that failed to
3. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
4. Id. at 477-48.
5. Id. at 493. Loosely, "strict scrutiny" heightens the requirements of a policy's im-
portance and fit.
6. The critique of this general norm of colorblindness has been one of the central
projects of "Critical Race Theory" scholars, a group of writers informally organized in
1989 to pursue progressive-oriented studies of race, culture and law. For a description of
the group's aims, see Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 195. For citations to the group's work to
date, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography,
78 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992). For examples of criticisms of colorblindness from
within the critical race theory genre, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 'Our Constitution is Color-
Blind', 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L. REV. 758;
Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Legal Equality, 87 Mich. L.
REV. 2128 (1989).
7. Crosen, 488 U.S. at 505-06.
8. Id. at 506.
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"prove" unreasonable and excessive force was the formal record before
the Supreme Court in Croson, which expressed the familiar picture of
black economic exclusion. The record included (1) Congressional find-
ings of massive discrimination in the construction industry across the
country, (2) a fifty percent black population in Richmond, (3) less than
one percent of the Richmond's prime contracting dollars went to minor-
ity-owned businesses, and (4) the testimony of the mayor, the city man-
ager and two councilmen as to Richmond's long and thorough history of
racial discrimination, officially sanctioned and practiced in education,
voting and housing.9
Like the Simi Valley jury, the Supreme Court was confronted with a
picture-the near-total dominance of white firms in the contracting busi-
ness of Richmond, Virginia-and asked to determine if illegitimate
power had been exercised. And like the attorneys for the Los Angeles
police officers, the Court utilized the process of disaggregation to con-
clude that racial discrimination was the proven cause of the huge dispar-
ity between the racial composition of Richmond's population and the
racial composition of recipients of prime construction contracts. 10 Just
as the defense attorneys directed the jury's consideration from the reel-
time of the video to the disaggregated stills of the L.A. police and Rod-
ney King, the Court freeze-framed each element of the Richmond set-
ting and isolated them from their meaning-giving context-the history
of racial subordination in Richmond, Virginia, the former capital of the
Confederacy and one of the central sites of "massive resistance" to de-
segregation orders in the 1960s. The Court's opinion considered each
piece of evidence individually, determining that by itself each was not
sufficient to conclude there had been discrimination, and therefore rul-
ing that there was no "proof" the Richmond construction industry was
the site of racial discrimination which could now legally be remedied by
affirmative action set asides. "1
Once the Court disaggregated each factor from its context in the full
picture of the racial history of Richmond, it was still left with the glaring
statistical evidence that blacks had been shut out of the construction
contracting business. And, like the Los Angeles policemen's defense at
trial, once meaning was divorced from context, it was possible to weave
the disaggregated images together with new, alternative narratives. In
the Rodney King brutality case, the stills were reconnected through a
story of King's power and agency-his body could become "cocked"
and could appear "in a trigger position." In the Croson affirmative action
case, a new narrative was also created, one which implicitly explained
the lack of minority contractors in terms of the (lack of) skill, initiative
and choice blacks rather than the exclusionary power exercised by
whites.
9. Id. at 484-85
10. Id. at 542 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 506.
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Part of the great appeal of what has been earlier termed "formal
legal equality"-the blanket legal prohibitions against racial discrimina-
tion that were achieved in the 1960s-is the belief that the identification
of the grossest forms of racial discrimination is straightforward and ob-
jective. Rather than leave protection to the whim of politics or the dis-
cretion of power, the imagery of the "rule of law" suggests that the
prohibition against racial discrimination is clear and determinate. It
does not depend on subjective evaluation, hat is so enraging about the
King verdict is it seems to show that even such clear, objective prohibi-
tions can be subverted by racial power, like that embodied in the all-
white Simi Valley jury.
Our first point in drawing out the structural similarities between the
construction of narratives in the Rodney King trial and the Supreme
Court's Croson opinion is to question this kind of thinking about the pro-
tections of "formal equality." We are not saying that the Supreme
Court is like the Rodney King jury, acting lawlessly or corruptly by vio-
lating some objectively identifiable "reality" about race in America, or in
Richmond. Rather, our point is to examine critically how ideological
narratives work as a form of social power, to show how a belief in formal
legal equality-in the objectivity of "the rule of law"-can help obscure
the everyday character of racial power.
An important image underlying the initial consensus in American
culture about the videotape and ultimate acquittal of the Los Angeles
police officers who beat Rodney King was that the videotape exemplified
an old-style mode of racial domination which, today, virtually the entire
American culture opposes. The videotape reverberated with the skele-
tons of American apartheid. On issues of basic civil rights, a wide spec-
trum has embraced the morality of 1960s race reforms ensuring formal
equality "regardless of race." On the other hand, the perceived "dis-
agreements" over affirmative action or multiculturalism seem less
clearly focused, less objective and more political.
But this way of perceiving these two arenas of race is already a prod-
uct of a particular narrative, a particular way of articulating the meaning
of race. The granting of legal rights to formal equality-to be treated
the same as everyone else regardless of race-is taken as an intrinsically
meaningful and comprehensible goal separate from the murkiness that's
supposed to be involved in the morally "tougher" race issues of the
1990s. The prohibition of explicit racial discrimination is seen as a for-
mally realizable goal, in the sense that it can be applied without any
more elaboration of controversial value choices. That is why we can be
so sure the Simi Valley jury acted "lawlessly," or "fraudulently," in a
way that seems at first so different from the careful, reasoned, philo-
sophical arguments of Supreme Court opinions. There appears a quali-
tative difference between what the Simi Valley jury did and what the
Supreme Court does. In the cultural imagination, it's like the difference
between rednecks and the gentry.
This contrast between arenas of racial controversy is ideologically
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constructed. From the perspective of "narrative" and "disaggregation,"
the sharp difference between issues of "formal equality" as opposed to
"special treatment" fades as the identification of each is seen to ulti-
mately depend upon which pictures of the world are believed, and which
are disbelieved. The sharp distinction usually drawn between them sug-
gests that equality can be achieved outside the realm of power and inter-
pretation because it can be objectively identified by law. But what the
King verdict represents is not the corrupt subversion of the rule of law's
values, but rather the ideological power of belief in rule of law itself.
Through the description of "disaggregation," features of the domi-
nant form of contemporary race ideology appear, linking the Simi Valley
jury's acquittal of the police with the race narratives of moderate, main-
stream legal culture. Through the typical process of "disaggregation," a
narrative is created within which racial power has been mediated out, like
the anesthetic effect of mounting stills on clinically-white illustration
board. In both the Simi Valley police brutality trial and the Croson case,
a narrative mediates the representation of the world by divorcing the
effects of racial power-the number of black contractors in Richmond,
the curled body of Rodney King-from their social context and from
their historic meaning. In the compulsive legal search for the clearly-
defined, objectively verifiable, perpetrating act of illegitimate power-
the single, particular offending blow in the frame-by-frame presentation
of the Los Angeles police; the particular acts of discrimination that di-
rectly caused white economic hegemony in Richmond, Virginia-social
events are de-contextualized in both space-where things happened, and
between whom-and time-what larger forces operated to give events
their meaning.
Hence the symmetry of the idea of "racism" in mainstream Ameri-
can culture appears. Once race is divorced from its social meaning in
schools, work places, streets, homes, prisons and paychecks and from its
historic meaning in terms of the repeated American embrace of white
privilege, then all that is left, really, is a hollow, analytic norm of "color-
blind"-an image of racial power as embodied in abstract classifications
by race that could run either way, against whites as easily as against
blacks. Finally, this kind of disaggregation, oddly, seems like the very
definition of what is neutral and objective-a narrative that does not de-
pend on point of view, that is a tape of the social world with the images
so enlarged and slowed down that it could say anything.
Rather than see the jury acquittal as an aberration by some low-
down Simi Valley redneck consciousness, consider it the reigning ideo-
logical paradigm of how to identify illegitimate racial power. The para-
digm is vivid precisely because of the extremity of the conclusion that
only "reasonable force" had been used on Rodney King. The virtue of
"formal equality" is that there is something important in the fact that
power wielders can no longer justify conditions in the social world based
on the supposed natural inferiority of Blacks. But the problem of formal
equality is that it is appealing precisely because it seems to be able to do
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what it cannot do-resolve issues of social power, racial power, once and
for all, according to some sort of neutral and objective rules.
Rodney King did, in a sense, get the fruits of formal equality. But
the terms that guarantee the rule of law-terms like "reasonable force"
or "equal protection"-are necessarily indeterminate. Their meaning
must be socially constructed through narratives of place and time for
there to be any meaning to them at all. The Simi Valley jury's delibera-
tions are not so different from those of the Supreme Court. In neither
realm is the rule of law subverted. The "law" and the "facts" of the
social world do not exist in any objective, ready-made form. They must
always be interpreted according to politics, ideology and power.
The belief in what we have called "formal equality" resulted in one
particularly intense set of reactions to the verdict. Many (particularly
integrationist-oriented) blacks who invested more than symbolic mean-
ing in the guarantees of objectivity presented by law in particular and
the wider cultural rhetoric in general felt extreme disillusionment. Like
the white cultural mainstream, many Blacks believed that the baton
against the Rodney King's skull would speak for itself, just as many be-
lieved that principles of colorblindness and other varieties of formal
equality provide a clear, almost self-generating protection against racial
discrimination. What many people did not comprehend was that police
brutality, just like discrimination, does not speak for itself. This very
struggle over meaning is precisely what the intense contestations about
race in the law are really about. Rather than providing some kind of firm
ground to challenge racist institutional practices, notions of "formal
equality," "objectivity," "neutrality" and the like tend to obscure the
way that race is experienced by the vast majority of African Americans in
this society.
We have described "disaggregation" as a narrative technique that
narrows the perception of the range of illegitimate racial power by di-
vorcing particular episodes from their larger social context. Implicitly
this kind of distortion is contrasted with "real" time. Considering things
as they "are" is contrasted with freeze-framing space and time into iso-
lated stills that can be reinterpreted through a benign narrative ofjustifi-
cation. The identification of "disaggregation" as part of conservative
ideology is made easier by the image we all share of Rodney King being
beaten, and the confident sense we have that we see the meaning of the
videotape. By implicit reference to this "real" time, the disaggregation
technique looks like a distortion.
But the concept of "real" time, which up to this point has been as-
sumed, should also be questioned in order to consider the implications
of thinking that we can identify the corruption of the Simi Valley jury by
contrasting its verdict with the reality depicted on the videotape. Con-
sider the possibilities that even the videotape itself has no special, objec-
tive status. What we progressives "see" in the images is the product of
mediating narratives in much the same way as what the Simi Valley jury
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"saw" depended on the technique of disaggregation previously
discussed.
People invested very different meanings in the Rodney King video-
tape. For many, the existence of the videotape was a source of excite-
ment that technology was finally utilized in service of the masses, so that
"they" (the authorities) could not say that people were just making up
charges of police brutality. The underlying assumption for many people
was that such conduct is a more or less regular feature of many police
encounters with blacks, particularly in Los Angeles. The underlying
frustration has been the inability to stop these practices through crea-
tion of formal legal prohibitions because of the inability to "prove" what
happened. When the tape was first broadcast, in addition to the pain of
seeing such brutality, there was also exhilaration that the videotape
would solve the problem of "proof" so that the police would finally be
disciplined. Simply put, the significance of the video was not that it
proved to masses of Blacks and others that the Los Angeles police are
brutally racist, but rather that it was projected as what would satisfy "the
law" that brutality against blacks occurred.
But also within the initial national outrage at the King videotape
were many who saw the brutality depicted in the videotape as awful but
exceptional, part of another era exposed occasionally and rarely caught
on videotape. The videotape "proved" brutality, but the brutality and
the fortuity that was recorded were viewed as equally random partners.
In short, a gulf of comprehension existed underneath the broad Ameri-
can consensus that the videotape depicted outrageous police behavior.
For some, the existence of the videotape was critical to comprehending
that this kind of racist brutality still occurs in American society, because
the videotape presented "objective" proof. In other words, without the
videotape, they would have had no outrage, indeed no consciousness of
the conditions of police and community relations in Los Angeles. For
others, the videotape didn't serve to establish this kind of police behavior,
but rather simply to document it and thus hopefully satisfy the powers
that be.
Questioning the centrality that the videotape had for so many peo-
ple exposes is a deep connection between the ideological need for "ob-
jective" proof and the more general ways race is understood in
American culture. The special status accorded the King videotape as
"objective proof" was a social construct, just as the particular interpre-
tation of the tape embraced by the Simi Valley jury was constructed.
Both the perception of the tape as showing a "reasonable exercise of
force" and the perception of the tape as showing "racist brutality" de-
pend, not simply on the physiology of visual perception, but rather on
interpretation, on the mediation of perception with background narratives
that give visual images meaning.
Valorizing the so-called "objective proof" of the videotape is prob-
lematic, because, to the extent that the videotape was understood to
"prove" the racist brutality of the L.A.P.D., such a conclusion implicitly
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rested on the idea that, but for the tape, no "objective" proof was avail-
able. Yet an important piece of the background context to the Rodney
King events was the availability of witnesses and the testimony of hun-
dreds of thousands of victims of police brutality. They can attest to the
practices of the Los Angeles police, as well as those of many other de-
partments. Typically, such victims are arrested for "disorderly conduct"
after they have been beaten. So deep is the street-level understanding
of the uselessness of the processes of the "rule of law" that, in the over-
whelming run of cases, no complaint is ever made. The emphasis on the
video tape's "objective proof," in short, marginalizes as merely subjec-
tive. All those whose reality is devalued because there was no tape, only
their word and the longstanding community's experience of the
L.A.P.D.
Underlying the elevation of the videotape as "objective proof" of
the racist brutality of the L.A.P.D. is a hierarchy of evidence and mean-
ing. This hierarchy distinguishes between objective proof and subjec-
tive assertion, fact and opinion, disinterest and bias. These categories
are neither natural nor independent criteria with which to evaluate vari-
ous narratives about the world. They, themselves, form the vocabulary
for a particular narrative, one that assumes the possibility of a vantage
point of "objectivity" that could exist outside of any particular vision or
interpretation. This vantage point is seductive because it seems to tran-
scend the partialities of history and geography, of time and space. But
the images of objectivity and impersonality, like the allied distinctions
between fact and opinion, between colorblindness and discrimination-
and between law and politics-are, in our social context, the terms of a
particular discourse of power. Here that power is manifest in the inabil-
ity of L.A.'s Black people to get redress when the police beat them un-
less they have what will satisfy others as "proof."
To see how the hierarchies of objectivity and subjectivity work as a
discourse of power to marginalize the victims of these racist police prac-
tices, consider that it is not the videotape-the disinterestedness of tech-
nology-that makes us "see" what happened to Rodney King. The
videotape images of the Los Angeles police officers and Rodney King do
not mean what they mean for us as a matter of objectivity, but rather as a
matter of social construction. We must, necessarily, weave narratives
into the images to give them a life in some time and space. Just as the
legal concepts of "formal equality" are indeterminate and only acquire
meaning in a social struggle over describing the world, as Croson re-
vealed, so the video images are clear to us because we bring our own
narratives to them. We see in them the images of Bull Connor and
Soweto and various episodes of the long story of racial apartheid being
brutally enforced, images and narrative lines that we carry around in our
collective memory. In this sense, our judgment, like that of the Simi
Valley jury and the Supreme Court in Croson, is mediated by background
narratives that tie together what otherwise would be a random set of
images.
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The different images underlying peoples' first impressions of the
King videotape help make sense of the various reactions to the verdict.
Of course, the sharpest contrast was between those who responded to
the verdict by taking to the streets in Pico and South Central and, at the
opposite pole, the police department personnel who cheered the news.
But most across the spectrum of mainstream culture who deplored the
"rioting" did not do so because they agreed with the verdict or with the
cheering police. To the contrary, for the most part they sought to pre-
serve the very value they thought the Simi Valley jury had impugned-
the value of the "rule of law." The public discourse of the "L.A. riots"
quickly became articulated as an opposition between those urging re-
straint and advocating respect for the "rule of law" and those articulat-
ing an alternative first principle of "no justice, no peace." The contrast
between the rhetoric of "rule of law" and "no justice, no peace" was
soon translated by the dominant culture into a contest between an ob-
jective, reasoned, responsible reaction and an emotional, passionate, ir-
responsible one. These strands of narrative culminated in the symbolic
conflict between whether the people out in the streets should be seen as
a "mob" "rioting" or as part of an "insurrection."
It did not seem ironic that many people who deplored the Simi Val-
ley verdict also deplored the "rioting." In fact, from within the dis-
course of objectivity and respect for "the rule of law," it seemed obvious
that there was a deep link between the jurors who acquitted the police
who "restrained" Rodney King and the rioters on the street. In the
dominant cultural narrative, both embodied a form of irrationality, of
emotion-driven distortion. In the case of the jurors, their irrationality
with respect to the videotape was seen in terms of white racism and fear
of black crime. The people on the streets looked simply like a chaotic,
emotional reaction, one without "reason" in the burning of neighbor-
hoods, stores and the like.
The language of an "insurrection" suggests, however, a counter-
narrative, one which implicitly rejects the various rhetorical clusters that
came to define the way the Rodney King events were incorporated in
mainstream discourse-including the reference points of objectivity, ra-
tionality, colorblindness and legalism. The narrative of "insurrection"
suggests a competing view of the whole Rodney King episode. Rather
than view the beating of King as an aberration from a legal norm of the
"reasonable" use of force, the "insurrection" narrative implies a focus
on the power relations and dynamics existing between the "rioters" and
the police. While the image of the "riot" suggests a kind of instantane-
ous, emotional reaction to the verdict, the image of an "insurrection"
directs attention from the shock of the verdict to the day-to-day subordi-
nation of the Los Angeles African American community. Rather than
seeing King's beating as an outrageous deviation from the norm of po-
lice objectivity, the image of community subordination comprehends a
systematic set of social dynamics-including a geographic context in
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which a largely Anglo police force with enforcement responsibility for
the sprawling metropolis of Los Angeles speeds through Black neigh-
borhoods in fortified, heavily armed, cruisers dispatched from some re-
mote location, and a historical context in which police brutality to Blacks
has been common and repeatedly the subject of investigation, expert
commission report and inaction. In contrast to the image of the upris-
ing as an explosive reaction to a disappointing verdict, the language of
"insurrection" conceives the uprising as a communal response to a
much larger set of social power issues. The image of "insurrection," in
short, is part of a narrative that sees the relations of police and Blacks in
Los Angeles, not as the disaggregated diad of state officials and private
citizens, mediated by neutral legal norms of reasonableness and nondis-
crimination, but instead in terms of the power-laden relationship of
communities defined by race, within which whites, through the police,
exercise a kind of occupying power and within which Black neighbor-
hoods appear as something like colonies. In these terms, an "insurrec-
tion" is not the blindly irrational acts of "rioters" (who, in the dominant
narrative, should be expected to peacefully protest), but the concerted
action of a community determined to raise the cost of peace to the colo-
nizers, and thereby to increase its leverage on the continuing power
relations.
Following the widespread urban unrest of the 1960s, the Kerner
Commission concluded that the "riots" expressed an angry frustration
with the slow pace of racial integration. 12 The dominant reaction to the
recent disorder in L.A. evidences the same kind of ideological framing
of the issue. But the narrative of "insurrection" challenges the vision of
race and racial power implicit in the conventional idea that racial justice
means the end of "discrimination" and the achievement of formal equal-
ity and integration into the dominant community. Instead, the imagery
of occupation and subordination points to a wholly different compre-
hension of race relations, one which looks to the power relations be-
tween historically defined racial communities, rather than away from
race and towards colorblindness. Accordingly, rather than see justice in
terms of achieving police colorblindness, a race-conscious focus on
power between communities focuses attention on the legitimacy of the
dominant community administering the "colony" in the first place.
Most who deplored the L.A. riots assumed a legalist model of racial jus-
tice in which the norms of objectivity and neutrality are central to the
achievement of racial integration. From within that kind of ideology,
there is simply no place for ideas like community control over police,
education and other public services, because the Black community is no
longer even perceived as separate or unique. There are just people who
"happen to be black." Power as the constituting factor of inter-commu-
12. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DIS-
ORDERS 205-238 (Bantam ed. 1968).
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nity relations becomes invisible as it is imagined that law, objectivity and
neutrality have some transcendent ground.
Rejecting the proposed "grounds" for determining the "real" in
"objective" and "impartial" fashion, relations between communities
cannot be mediated in a neutral fashion through the recognition of for-
mal legal rights. Accordingly, the problem in the Simi Valley verdict
acquitting the L.A. police was not that it corruptly deviated from some
objective norm of legality or objectivity. Instead, those "norms" them-
selves constitute a narrative, an ideology for understanding race that ex-
cludes from its vision the political and power-laden terms of race
relations.
But believing that issues-like the meaning of the Rodney King
videotape or the racial composition of Richmond's construction contrac-
tors-are necessarily and always subject to interpretation rather than
"objective" proof does not mean that we are any less outraged by the
verdict. The identification and enforcement of legal rights requires acts
of meaning-attribution-of narration-as does comprehending the
"meaning" of a videotape. But such a conclusion does not mean that
everything is therefore relative, or that anything goes since it is all power
anyway. To the contrary, once the narratives become so disparate be-
tween a community and the police or the legal system, we realize that it
is time to recognize that, in a deep sense, Blacks in Los Angeles live in a
different world from whites-something like a different nation. The po-
lice and the people are like foreigners to each other. Understanding this
distance means comprehending relations, not according to norms of
universal equality and equal treatment, but as the rule of one community
over another.
From this counter-narrative, what is needed is not colorblindness
on the part of the police force, but the redistribution of power so that
the police force is not an outside occupier, but rather a part of the com-
munity itself, subject to regulation by the Black community in Los Ange-
les. The community does not need formal equality from the police, but
actual control over the police-as well as other public institutions.
[Vol. 70:2
CULTURAL RACISM AND THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY
IN THE SAGA OF RODNEY KING
ANTHONY COOK*
This Essay develops a multidimensional understanding of racism
necessitated by Rodney King's beating, the trial of his assailants and the
acquittal of the defendants by an all-white Simi Valley jury. Many saw
the episode as a blatant act of racism akin to the dark period of Ameri-
can history in which public mobs routinely lynched blacks. It also pro-
vided a birds-eye view of the complex development and intricate
configuration of American racism.
This Essay argues that racism results from a complex process of ac-
culturation in which individuals come to see and interpret the world
through lenses carefully crafted by a history of racism. Racism manifests
itself on three interrelated levels of human interaction: individual, insti-
tutional and cultural. All three of these levels of racism were present in
the Rodney King saga. This Essay examines this multi-faceted under-
standing of racism and offers an explanation of how a jury could look at
the tape of such a vicious beating and convince themselves that the de-
fendants did not use excessive force.
I. BACKGROUND: THE RATIONALIST CONCEPT OF RACISM
As racism moves from the individual to the cultural level, it is more
difficult to establish that a perceived racist effect, such as the acquittal,
can be attributed to an individual or group. The problem lies princi-
pally in the rationalist conception of racism, an understanding largely
embraced by our judicial system's race jurisprudence.l A rationalist un-
derstanding of racism links racism to deviant consciousness, bad inten-
tions and mental culpability. Since minds cannot be read, however, the
difficulty lies in identifying racism. The rationalist answer evinces a de-
pendence on certain signs or outward manifestations, representative of
the subject's conscious state. The rationalist depends largely, though
not exclusively, on language as representative of consciousness. Thus,
intentions are discovered through the words used to describe those in-
tentions. Explicit racial classifications are reviewed with strict scrutiny,
since it is presumed that they reflect an illicit purpose and unacceptable
state of mind. While in the area of race jurisprudence our legal system
$ Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. B.A., 1982, Princeton; J.D., 1986,
Yale.
1. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring a showing of discrimina-
tory purpose under equal protection analysis); see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960) (inferring a discriminatory purpose from discriminatory effects). For the ground-
breaking work on the importance of unconscious racism see Charles Lawrence, The Id, and
The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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will sometimes infer a state of consciousness from the subject's behav-
ior, under the rationalist model, discriminatory impact is but the flipside
of discriminatory purpose. Both are part of a rationalist model that vas-
cilates between what it considers the appropriate measure of mental
state or consciousness.
The correspondence between language and thought is troubling.
First, racist beliefs are not always conveyed through verbal expression.
The rationalist model, therefore, punishes only those racists who are
careless and do not attend to the proper window dressing required in a
day where racism is publicly condemned. Second, it is often possible to
interpret the expression of racist consciousness in a non-racist way.
Thus, the expressions used by the Los Angeles police officers in refer-
ence to the beating of Rodney King like "gorillas in the midst," "raging
bull" and "thin blue line separating us from the jungle," are given refer-
ents that diminish the possibilities of racist motivation. Finally, the link
between words and consciousness is problematic because it is the con-
scious and not the subconscious that is important to the rationalist
model. When focused on the conscious, words of intentionality imply
the subject's culpability. When focused on the subconscious, on the
other hand, the histories that shaped the subconsciousness and the be-
havior that proceeds from it became of paramount importance.
II. INDIVIDUAL RACISM AND THE MODEL OF RATIONALITY
Individual racism is a consciously held belief in the genetic, intellec-
tual and/or anatomical inferiority of another group. While its manifes-
tation is both overt and covert, it is solidly within the rationalist model
described above. The individual or group is conscious of its racist be-
liefs and is prepared to act on those beliefs. This article illustrates how
the public discourse on race shifted over time, altering the ways in which
conscious racism might express itself in public. Realizing this shift, the
jurors' racism need not be proved by reference to a framework of racist
expression no longer tolerated in public life. Instead, evidence of ra-
cism must be gathered from a different framework that acknowledges
the role and influence of institutional consciousness and cultural history.
Overt individual racism is the most easily discerned and vehemently
condemned form of racism. It occurs when individuals publicize and/or
act out their racist beliefs in an effort to dominate a group deemed infer-
ior. Overt individual racists consist of such diverse figures as Thomas
Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Senator Bo Bilbo, Dr. Shockley and Al
Campanis.2 Both Jefferson and Lincoln present interesting cases be-
cause in the prevailing folklore, they are seldom thought of as racists.
While Jefferson authored the Declaration of Independence pro-
claiming all men equal and endowed with inalienable rights of life, lib-
erty and the pursuit of happiness, and, while he championed an
antislavery clause that was ultimately negotiated out of the document by
2. See infra notes 3 - 7 and accompanying text.
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Southern slaveholding interests, his views of Blacks were those of an
overt racist.3 In his comparison of blacks and whites, Jefferson noted
that:
The first difference which strikes us is that of colour. Whether
the black of the negro resides in the reticular membrane be-
tween the skin and scarf-skin, or in the scarf-skin itself; whether
it proceeds from the colour of the blood, the colour of the bile,
or from that of some other secretion, the difference is fixed in
nature, and is as real as if its seat and cause were better known
to us. And is this difference of no importance? Is it not the
foundation of a greater or less share of beauty in the two races?
Are not the fine mixtures of red and white, the expressions of
every passion by greater or less suffusions of colour in the one,
preferable to that eternal monotony, which reigns in the coun-
tenances, that immoveable veil of black which covers all the
emotions of the other race? Add to these, flowing hair, a more
elegant symmetry of form, their own judgment in favour of the
whites, declared by their preference of them, as uniformly as is
the preference of the Oran-ootan for the black women over
those of his own species. The circumstance of superior beauty,
is thought worthy attention in the propagation of our horses,
dogs, and other domestic animals; why not in that of man?
4
Similarly, Lincoln is warmly remembered in history as the Great
Emancipator of black people, as if his decision to free black slaves dur-
ing the Civil War in 1863 indicated his willingness to see them as
equals. Lincoln made it clear that he did not.
I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any
way the social and political equality of the white and black races
... I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or
jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office... I will
say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between
the white and black races which will ever forbid the two races
living together on terms of social and political equality. And
inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together,
there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I, as
much as any other man, am in favor of having the superior po-
sition assigned to the white race. 5
It is almost inconceivable that individuals of the stature ofJefferson
or Lincoln could get away with such overt racism today. This is not to
say that such beliefs are not widely held. To the contrary, covert racists
hold similar beliefs about the natural inferiority of blacks, but simply
respond in ways that elicit greater approbation than overt racists.
Covert individual racism is an aversion to members of a group
deemed inferior that manifests itself in efforts to avoid contact with the
3. See generally THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (William Peden
ed., 1972).
4. Id. at 138.
5. 1 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, COMPLETE WORKS 457 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds.,
1907).
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group in employment, residential and educational arrangements. 6
Domination of the group results from the use of non-racial criteria.
Covert racists are not likely to base their unwillingness to live in the
same neighborhood as blacks on a belief that blacks are inferior. They
veil their racism with an ostensibly race-neutral justification such as the
fear of declining property values. Similarly, it is not that whites attain
greater positions of authority and status because blacks are intellectually
inferior, as suggested by Al Campanis, 7 but rather that blacks are simply
not qualified by some ostensibly objective and race-neutral criterion.
While invisible to many, this form of racism is often visible to the domi-
nated group that, in order to survive, learns to interpret the meaning of
the complicated maze of unspoken but clearly communicated language.
Mental culpability is common to both overt and covert racism. Both
the overt and covert racist predicate their behavior on the assumption
that race makes their victims inferior and justifies the racist actions.
Covert racists refuse to take responsibility for their racism and thus care-
fully manufacture alibis that deflect any attempts to blame them for the
consequences of their actions. In this sense, individual overt and covert
racism both involve forms of intentional racism and fall squarely within
the rationalist model. Since there is little correspondence between the
language and thought of the covert racist, however, the latter provides a
more difficult case for legal prosecution and moral condemnation.
III. INSTITUTIONAL RACISM
Perhaps the verdict of the Simi Valley jury was not racist in the
traditional rationalist sense. The jurors were not, it seems, consciously
predicating their decisions on the supposed inferiority of blacks. The
decision, however, may have been racist in an institutional sense. Insti-
tutions, like individuals, engage in both overt and covert racism. This is
a part of our history, as the institutions of slavery and de jure segrega-
tion testify. Here the term is intended to characterize something differ-
ent from this history. The term institutions reaches the problem of
bureaucratic group think, the ways in which institutions develop their
own sense of identity, consciousness, rules of operation and expecta-
tions, and their own normative universe that requires the loyalty of its
constituent members in a way that supersedes their own personal loyal-
ties. The Skolnick Report to the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence summarized the problem in this way:
Because of the influence of historical circumstances, it is theo-
retically possible to have a racist society in which most of the
individual members of that society do not express racist atti-
6. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (black applicants for positions
as Washington, D.C. police officers brought suit alleging a disproportionate racial impact
of the police department testing procedure); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (white
homeowners sued to enforce a racially restrictive covenant prohibiting blacks from occu-
pying homes in their neighborhood); Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Sam McManis, Campanis Says He Apologizes for Comments; Aaron and Dodger Players are
Among Those Angered, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1987, part 3, at 1.
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tudes. A society in which most of the good jobs are held by one
race, and the dirty jobs by people of another color, is a society
in which racism is institutionalized, no matter what the beliefs
of its members are.
8
Institutional racism occurs by defining an individual's actions ac-
cording to institutional norms. These norms are not always racist on
.their face nor necessarily administered by individuals with racist mo-
tives, but they may have racist effects nevertheless. 9 For example, a pre-
vailing norm in American institutional life is the norm of meritocracy,
the assumption that membership and mobility within institutions are
contingent on individual qualification and merit. Membership or mobil-
ity even partially contingent on race is deemed an undesirable deviation
from this central norm. While liberals justify the affirmative action
deviation given the history of institutional exclusion of blacks, conserva-
tives tolerate deviations only in the most egregious and unmistakable
instances of intentional exclusion.' 0 Both groups view the remedial in-
clusion of blacks as a deviation from an unquestionably acceptable
norm.
Institutional racism never questions the legitimacy of the norm it-
self. This is the central problem of cultural racism. Institutional racism
denies the relationship between the exclusion of certain groups by the
institutional norm and the history of overt institutional racism and dep-
rivation that resulted in the absence of qualities now deemed fundamen-
tal to meritocratic consideration. It is in this manner that institutions
willingly participate in the perpetuation of racist perceptions and domi-
nation that find their genesis in forms of conscious racism.
From the perspective of the institution, however, concerns of so-
called societal discrimination stand beyond the pale of institutional con-
sideration. Institutional administrators cannot redress every social im-
balance and inequity supported by history and social science. They owe
their fiduciary duties to the institutions they govern. The institution is
best served by hiring and promoting the most qualified individuals to do
the job.
The problem necessitating a theory of institutional racism is two-
fold. First, the institutional norms may be the by-product of covert rac-
ists who subordinated the disfavored group by ostensibly neutral criteria
and deflected criticism of the consequences resulting from the norm's
application. Second, even if the institutional norms are developed and
applied in good faith, institutional racism recognizes the interrelation-
ship among various spheres of social organization. It appreciates the
8. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLmCS OF PROTEST 180 (1969).
9. "Racist effect" means that the effect of applying the institutional norm is to per-
petuate an existing distribution of benefits and burdens that sustains perceptions of racial
inferiority and realities of racial domination.
10. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (describing the psychody-
namics of integrationist philosophy); see also Richmond v.J. A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (race-based affirmative action plans are subject to strict scrutiny and must be neces-
sary to achieve a compelling interest).
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ways and extent to which a history of individual and institutional overt
racism reinforces and perpetuates itself by ostensibly neutral norms that
build on the uneven playing field created by that history.
Both the difficulty of assessing present state of mind and/or histori-
cal intent, as well as an awareness of the role ostensibly neutral norms
play in a context of past and present racism, necessitates a way of think-
ing about racism that avoids the dilemma of feeling bad about the past
while denying responsibility for the present. The concept of institu-
tional racism responds to this dilemma by focusing on the effects as well
as the intent of institutional practices.
IV. CULTURAL RACISM
Cultural racism is a process of social comparison that results in the
subordination of an "out group" by an "in group" that uses its own
group as the positive point of reference to measure the worth or merit of
out group members. Cultural racism is the true foundation of racism in
our society. On it rest the histories of institutional and individual ra-
cism, and because of it, the pervasive problems of black subordination
remain intractable. Cultural racism socializes and conditions the indi-
viduals comprising the institutions whose norms, though neutral on
their face, contain the countless assumptions of white superiority that
countenance an insensitivity to the plight of the oppressed.
The following is an account of how a racist discourse of white
supremacy infuses a culture's thinking and transmits from one genera-
tion to the next. After centuries of life predicated on the assumptions of
white supremacy, society finally reaches a point at which the assump-
tions no longer need stating. They provide the backdrop for conversa-
tions, interactions and encounters that never utter a racist word, but yet
reproduce the imagery of supremacy and inferiority that perpetuates the
subordination of blacks in the society.
A. Historical Cultural Racism - English Explorers
The problem of cultural racism in American race relations finds its
genesis in the earliest contacts between English explorers and the Afri-
can peoples they encountered on their voyages. I I The values that
emerged were conditioned by a European cultural orientation that glori-
fied whiteness, the Greco-Roman aesthetic and the life styles and behav-
ior of the familiar. As long as it remained quartered within the mental
constructs of prejudicial reflection, it was guilty of no more than an ex-
treme ethnocentricism.
When extreme ethnocentricism linked itself to the domination of
African peoples through the slave trade, it became cultural racism-the
support system for institutional and individual racism. The English ac-
11. English explorers did not first land on the African west coast until after 1550.
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO,
1550-1812 3 (1969). See Id. at 3-43, for further discussion of English exploration of Africa.
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counted for a number of differences and assured superiority for their
people and culture in all such social encounters and comparisons.' 2
These accounts of difference provided the basis for what Winthrop Jor-
dan perspicaciously called the history of white over black.'
3
The impact of African color on the English mind cannot be under-
stated. Before the first substantive contacts by England with West Africa
in the middle of the 16th century, there was little actual knowledge of
the people that inhabited these lands. By contrast, both the Spanish and
Portuguese made contact with North Africa centuries earlier. Indeed,
both countries experienced invasion by "people both darker and more
highly civilized than themselves."' 4 Thus, the voyages of British ships
to West Africa brought some of the palest and darkest shades of the
human color spectrum face to face. Given the limited nature of prior
English contact with people of color, the shock was probably greater for
the English. "Travelers rarely failed to comment upon it; indeed when
describing Negroes they frequently began with complexion and then
moved on to dress ... and manners." 15
Initial shock does not account, however, for the contempt and dis-
dain accompanying the reality of difference. Jordan noted the impor-
tance that the "English discovery of black Africans came at a time when
the accepted standard of ideal beauty was a fair complexion of rose and
white. Negroes not only failed to fit this ideal but seemed the very pic-
ture of perverse negation."1 6 The general disdain for the appearance of
Africans was not limited to pigmentation but encompassed the entire
African physiology. In contrast to the white ideal, blacks were deemed
inferior by reason of their "color ... [their] 'horrid Curles' and 'disfig-
ured' lips and nose[s]."'
17
African sexuality was another source of English fascination and ulti-
mate disdain, further proof of African inferiority. Jordan observed that
12. These differences consisted of a physiological and cultural differences that related
to the size of nose, lip and texture of hair as well as forms of political, cultural and familial
organizations.
13. JORDAN, supra note 11.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id. at 9. Jordan explores the meaning and significance of the English encounter
with Black people in greater detail.
In England perhaps more than in southern Europe, the concept of blackness was
loaded with intense meaning. Long before they found that some men were black,
Englishmen found in the idea of blackness a way of expressing some of their most
ingrained values. No other color except white conveyed so much emotional im-
pact. As described by the Oxford English Dictionary, the meaning of black before the
sixteenth century included, "Deeply stained with dirt; soiled, dirty, foul.... Hav-
ing dark or deadly purposes, malignant; pertaining to or involving death, deadly;
baneful, disastrous, sinister.... Indicating disgrace, censure, liability to punish-
ment, etc." Black was an emotionally partisan color, the handmaid and symbol of
baseness and evil, a sign of danger and repulsion.
Id. at 7.
17. Id. at 8 (quoting ROBERT R. CAWLEY, THE VOYAGERS AND ELIZABETHAN DRAMA 86
(1938)). See WALTER CLYDE CURRY, THE MIDDLE ENGLISH IDEAL OF PERSONAL BEArrY; As
FOUND IN THE METRICAL ROMANCES, CHRONICLES, AND LEGENDS OF THE XIII, XIV, AND XV
CENTURIES 64-67 & 310 (Baltimore 1916) (indirectly makes clear how very far African wo-
men were from matching prevalent English ideals of beautiful noses and lips).
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"[d]epiction of the Negro as a lustful creature was not radically new...
when Englishmen first met Negroes face to face. Seizing upon and re-
confirming... long-standing and apparently common notions about Af-
rica, Elizabethan travelers and literati spoke very explicitly of Negroes as
being especially sexual."' 8 As early as 1566, Jean Bodin studied the
writings of the ancients on Africa and concluded that "heat and lust
went hand in hand and that 'in Ethiopia... the race of men is very keen
and lustful.' "19 The obsession over male African genitalia provided a
constant source of condescension. African men, reported a seven-
teenth-century traveler, "sported 'large Propagators' "20 and the "Man-
dingo men were 'furnisht with such members as are after a sort
burthensome unto them.' "21
It was common in the commentary of the day to compare African
sexuality to that of apes and thus to always perceive the African male as
a beastly threat to the norms of white purity and chastity. 22 During the
same period, however, African women were cast as " 'hot constitution'd
Ladies' 23 possessed of a 'temper hot and lascivious, making no scruple
to prostitute themselves to the Europeans for a very slender profit, so
great [was] their inclination to white men.' "24 Even in these early en-
counters, the sexual jealousies and obsessions that manifested them-
selves and resulted in the domination of black males and the subjugation
of black females.
In addition to reckoning with the differences of black physiology
and sexuality, the entire cultural ethos of West Africa around the middle
of the 16th century was strikingly different from Elizabethan England.
James Jones catalogued many of these differences in an attempt to illus-
trate the many points on which the English felt compelled to assert their
cultural superiority and thereby justify their domination of Africans.
2 5
According to Jones, African culture differed significantly from English
culture on matters of religion, social organization, the role of property,
education, the sense of time, nature of music and view of the world.
26
The meaning attributed to these cultural differences by white
18. Id. at 34.
19. Id. (quoting JEAN BODIN, METHOD FOR EASY COMPREHENSION OF HISTORY 103-06,
143 (Beatrice Reynolds trans., 1945)).
20. Id. (quoting JOHN OGILBY, AFRICA: BEING AN ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF THE RE-
GIONS OF AEGYPT, BARBARY, LYBIA, AND BILLEDULGERID, THE LAND OF NEGROES, GUINEE,
AETHIOPIA, AND THE ABYSSINES . . .COLLECTED AND TRANSLATED FROM MOST AUTHENTICK
AUTHORS, AND AUGMENTED WITH LATER OBSERVATIONS 451 (London, 1670)).
21. Id. (citing RICHARD JOBSON, GOLDEN TRADE: OR, A DISCOVERY OF THE RIVER GAM-
BRA, AND THE GOLDEN TRADE OF THE AETHIOPIANS 65-67 (Charles G. Kingsley ed., 1904)).
22. See Id. at 29 (citing H. W. JANSON, APES AND APE LORE IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND
THE RENAISSANCE chap. 11 (1952); ROBERT M. & EDA W. YERKES, THE GREAT APES: A
STUDY OF ANTHROPOID LIFE 1-26 (1929)).
23. Id. at 35 (quoting WILLIAM SMITH, A NEW VOYAGE TO GUINEA ... 146 (London,
1744)).
24. Id. (quotingJohn Barbot, A Description of the Coasts of North and South-Guinea, in V A
COLLECTION OF VOYAGES AND TRAVELS 100 (John & Awsham Churchill compilers, London,
1704-32)).
25. JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM (1972).
26. Id. at 150.
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Europeans and the high value associated with Eurocentric norms, left no
doubt about the superiority of white culture. Few saw the question of
biological and cultural difference between Africans and Europeans as
did Captain Thomas Phillips, a master of a 1694 slave vessel. He wrote
of the difference of color:
'I can't think there is any intrinsick value in one colour more
than another, nor that white is better than black, only we think
it so because we are so, and are prone to judge favourably in
our own case, as well as the blacks, who in odium of the colour,
say, the devil is white, and so paint him.'
2 7
As is clear from the subsequent history of slavery and racism, most re-
jected Phillips' biological relativism and were quite prepared to hold, as
they were in the sphere of cultural differences generally, that the differ-
ence was profoundly important. Religious, scientific and quasi-scientific
justifications were marshalled in support of their prejudices and racism.
B. Religious and Scientific Influences on Cultural Racism
The religious and scientific discourses help legitimize practices of
racial domination. Common sense is no more than the way a given cul-
ture organizes its understanding of the world. That organization is pro-
foundly shaped, among other things, by religious and scientific stories
that give its members a sense of identity and purpose. Thus, when life
and the realities of domination are explained and tacitly sanctioned by
religion and science, socially constructed oppression takes on a mys-
tique of naturalness and inevitability, an appearance that things were
always meant to be just so. The transformation of the socially con-
structed into the naturally constituted is facilitated, then, by religious
and scientific discourses that tap into the common sense notions of
those expected to acquiesce in the practices of racist domination. Many
sought to explain the inferiority of Africans and their culture in terms of
religious and scientific discourses.
1. Religious Influences
The Judeo-Christian account of Black inferiority begins with the
Old Testament story of Noah, who in his drunkenness, unclothed him-
self and fell asleep in his tent. 28 One son, Ham, looked upon his father's
nakedness, while the other sons, Shem andJapheth, covered their father
without looking.29 Noah later awoke and cursed one of Ham's sons, Ca-
naan, denouncing him as a "servant of servants" unto his brothers.30
Distorted scriptural exegesis over the years somehow managed to turn
27. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 11 (quoting Thomas Phillips, A Journal of a Voyage Made in
the Hannibal of London, Ann. 1693, 1694,from England to Cape Monseradoe, in Africa; and Thence
Along the Coast of Guiney to Whidaw, the Island of St. Thomas, and So Forward to Barbadoes. With a
Cursory Account of the Country, the People, Their Manners, Forts, Trade, etc., in VI A COLLECTION
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this curse into an explanation of African skin color and a justification for
their domination by the supposed progeny of Shem and Japheth.
One could see the old testament story as motivated by the same
concerns that have motivated many of the myths of Christianity, the
need to show that one's power and status comes from God, thus author-
ized by one higher than those who threaten to take it away.3 ' In this
case, God approved of the Hebrew conquest of Canaan, a land
predestined for conquest by a 'convenient' curse upon its inhabitants.
That this story survived so many centuries as a plausible account of why
black people have been subjected to such oppression is a testimony of
the power of religious ideology. While the curse quite clearly envisions
the servitude of Canaan, there is no mention of skin color. Thus, the
curse may have just as logically or illogically condemned the nation of
Canaan to a skin color lighter than the already dark Noah. Only social
convention and European ethnocentrism assumed the curse involved
color and that darkness rather than paleness constituted the distortion
of purity. Second, the curse was put on only one of Ham's children,
Canaan. If one follows biblical genealogy and geography, most of Africa
and all of West Africa were peopled by Ham's remaining children on
whom no curse befell.
3 2
Much of the tolerance of inconsistency may be attributed to the will-
ingness of racists to rely on inconsistent and speculative accounts tojus-
tify their practices. A good deal of the tolerance may also be attributed
to an oral and written tradition that explicitly altered scriptural text and
meaning. For instance, Talmudic and Midrashic sources suggested that
"'Ham was smitten in his skin,' that Noah told Ham 'your seed will be
ugly and dark-skinned,' and that Ham was father 'of Canaan who
brought curses into the world, of Canaan who was cursed, of Canaan
who darkened the faces of mankind,' of Canaan 'the notorious world-
darkener.' -33 The authority of historic Hebrew sources provided a ve-
neer of authenticity to subsequent Christian interpretations in the 17th
century that the enslavement and subjugation of Africans was scriptur-
ally predestined. Christian nations combined this with the New Testa-
ment's seeming approval of slavery and concluded that the Black people
of the earth were predestined to serve the superior white race through
the institution of slavery.
The story of Ham played a dual role in the subjugation of Africans.
Not only did it explain the quandary of color in a way that privileged the
status of whiteness, but it also explained the strange sexuality of African
peoples. The infraction that resulted in the curse was one of sexual im-
propriety. Black men were thus accursed or 'burdened' with large pe-
nis', and, because of their size, could not, as Adam did in the Garden of
31. See EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1972)
(discussing the legitimation and delegitimation function of Christianity in the era of Amer-
ican slavery).
32. Genesis 10:6-20.
33. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 18 (quoting THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD (I. Epstein et al.
trans., 1935-60) (The TALMUD consists of 35 volumes)).
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Eden, conceal their shame.3 4 The curse eternally subjected black men
to the invasion of privacy inflicted upon Noah. In addition, African men
and women were cursed with an animal-like, lascivious and promiscuous
sexuality, lacking the capacity for shame and constraint, qualities found
among the more civilized races. Taken together, the myths manifested
themselves throughout history in countless acts of white sexual jealousy,
insecurity and aggressiveness that often resulted in the aversion to and
punishment by castration of black males and the desire for and exploita-
tion of "hot constitution'd" black females.
3 5
2. Scientific Influences
If religious discourse played an important role in the transmission
of cultural racism, the discourse of science figured prominently as well.
Although anthropology and psychology are younger disciplines than
theology and history, their impact on the study of race has been monu-
mental. Both disciplines developed on the coattails of a sweeping Euro-
pean cultural secularization that heralded the powers of Man and
Reason and embraced an ever growing skepticism toward religious and
theological accounts of natural phenomena. Newtonian science and the
Enlightenment nurtured an insatiable appetite for exploration, explana-
tion and the domination of mind over matter. The study of man and the
consternation over physiological and cultural human diversity provided
an irresistible forum for empirical research, measurement and classifica-
tion of natural phenomena. It was anthropology that first directed its
Enlightenment-inspired energies toward the study of race and the per-
petuation of mythologies of racial inferiority.
While Johann Friedrich Blumenbach is credited as the founder of
anthropology,3 6 Carolus Linnaeus, the 18th century Swedish Botanist,
was the first to attempt a comprehensive classification of humans accord-
ing to physiognomy, temperament and culture. Thus, Linnaeus' Systema
Naturae3 7 provided an imprimatur of objectivity and truth to the casual
comparisons and speculations that were by that time commonplace in
European and American cultures. Blumenbach advanced the work of
Linnaeus and purported to prove that the original type of man was
34. According to the Old Testament account of Genesis, when Adam and Eve dis-
obeyed God's commandment and became aware of their nakedness and sexuality, they
covered themselves with the leaves of fig trees. Genesis 3:7.
35. Jordan notes that castration was a legislated punishment in many colonies, and in
some, the punishment applied to both free and slave Black men.
Castration of Negroes clearly indicated a desperate, generalized need in
white men to persuade themselves that they were really masters and in all ways
masterful, and it illustrated dramatically the ease with which white men slipped
over into treating their Negroes like their bulls and stallions whose "spirit" could
be subdued by emasculation. In some colonies, moreover, the specifically sexual
aspect of castration was so obvious as to underline how much of the white man's
insecurity vis-a-vis the Negro was fundamentally sexual.
JORDAN, supra note 11, at 156.
36. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 222.
37. Carolus Linnnaeus, Systema Naturae, reprinted in Thomas Bendyshe, The Histoy of Anthro-
pology, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON, 1 MEMOIRS (1863-64)).
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Caucasian.38
The studies implied the supposed superiority of white Europeans,
even though neither system of classification explicitly ranked humans in
terms of superior and inferior races. 39 For instance, while Linnaeus de-
scribed the European as gentle, acute, inventive, covered with vestments
and governed by customs, he described the African as crafty, indolent,
negligent, covered with grease and governed by caprice. 40 Similarly,
Blumenbach situated the Caucasian type at the center of his horizontal
scale of comparison and situated the Ethiopian and Mongolian types at
opposite ends of the spectrum. 4' The clear implication was that value,
beauty and worth were a function of ones' proximity to the white norm,
thought to represent the point of perfection.
The implicit hierarchy of supposedly value-free scientific observa-
tion and classification developed into explicit hierarchical rankings by
race. These scientific studies always situated whites at the very top of
the Chain of Being and blacks at the very bottom. Physiognomy, Crani-
ology, Cultural Anthropology and Evolutionary Biology were all used
between the 18th and 19th centuries intentionally and unintentionally to
justify the increasing pillage and domination of Africa, its people and
descendants.
In 1883, Francis Galton, Charles Darwin's cousin, founded the sci-
ence of eugenics as " 'the study of the agencies under social control that
may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either
physically or mentally.' "42 Galton suggested that " 'it would be quite
practical to produce a highly gifted race of men by judicious marriages
during several consecutive generations.' ,,43 The science of eugenics re-
ceived a devastating blow during WWII when used by Hitler and the
Nazi regime to justify the barbaric treatment and extermination of Jews
in death camps. It proved resilient, however, as the more recent work of
William Shockley, suggesting the genetic inferiority of blacks, attests.44
Psychology gained acceptance as a field of science in 1883, around
the same time as eugenics appeared on the scene. The former immedi-
ately charted a course purporting to measure mental processes or intelli-
gence. It was not long before tests purporting to measure a so-called
38. Id. at 223.
39. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 220-21 (citing Caroluv Linnnaeus, Systema Naturae, reprinted
in Thomas Bendyshe, The History of Anthropology, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON, 1
MEMOIRS 424-26 (1863-64)).
40. Id.
41. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 223 (citing to ANTHROPOLOGICAL TREATISES OF JOHANN
FRIEDERICH BLUMENBACH 265-65 (THOMAS BENDYSHE TRANS. & ED., LONDON 1865)).
42. ROBERT V. GUTHRIE, EVEN THE RAT WAS WHITE: A HISTORICAL VIEW OF PSYCHOL-
OGY 78 (1976) (quoting A. H. Hersh, Eugenics, in 10 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 567
(1969)).
43. Id. (quoting FRANCIS GALTON, HEREDITARY GENIUS: ITS LAWS AND CONSEQUENCES
(1869).
44. See, e.g., Joseph Berger, Professors' Theories on Race Stir Turmoil at City College, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1990, at Bl; Milestones, TIME, Aug. 28, 1989, at 61; Missing Circuits, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 24, 1989, at 17; see also Charlotte Allen, Gray Matter, Black-and-White,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at 4.
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intelligence quotient provided its contribution to the science of racism,
conclusive proof that, as had been conjectured for centuries, blacks were
mentally inferior to whites.
V. ANALYSIS: RODNEY KING
Institutional and cultural racism provide ways of breaking out of the
narrowly constructed understanding of the rationalist model. The ju-
rors in Simi Valley may have consciously desired to acquit the white po-
lice officers because they believed the race of the latter entitled them to
absolution for beating a black man. Such an explanation, however, ap-
pears too simplistic. Although it is unlikely that the jurors consciously
held racist beliefs as individuals or a group, their common sense frame
for viewing the tape, hearing the arguments and understanding the
world was shaped by racist forces. If the jurors were covert racists in the
Rodney King trial, society will never know. Institutional ideology often
provides a convenient window dressing for covert racists, but its difficul-
ties are even more profound for it often serves to diminish the responsi-
bility of non-racist individuals for what might be called racist effects.
The jurors in Simi Valley operated within an institutional and legal
culture that urged them to put aside all personal biases and feelings in
order to render an objective and fair verdict. Defense lawyers showed a
film over and over again so that it urged the separation of law from mo-
rality and passion. Cloaked in a dispassionate and quasi-scientific detail-
ing of frame by frame blows, accounting for and justifying each by
reference to police department policies and the "threat" of King type
scenarios, the jurors were desensitized and eventually internalized the
positivist dichotomies that separated their consideration of "the law"
from their "visceral feeling" of injustice and inhumanity.
Institutional racism is difficult because it requires individuals to dis-
card personal subjectivity and cloak themselves with institutional objec-
tivity. Through this process, the jurors believe that their institutional
duty requires a verdict very different from their own subjective feelings
and beliefs. Thus, by diminishing individual responsibility for the deci-
sion, the institutional process might, ironically, encourage the very ra-
cism its impartiality was designed to overcome. The racist beliefs delve
further into the subconscious because one has a task to complete, gov-
erned by procedural guidelines which provide that if such procedures
are followed, no one can call you racist or challenge your personal integ-
rity. Excessive force was not found because the defense attorneys suc-
ceeded in convincing the jurors that the visual images of abuse were
other than they appeared. The attorneys referenced the minds of white
defendants that were not consciously racist, hateful or inhumane, but
minds that believed they were reasonably endangered by King's
behavior.
Deeply socialized into the myths of white supremacy, the Simi Val-
ley jurors were predisposed to embrace their institutional role and to
view the officers' brutality as a reasonable response to the threat posed
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by King. Neither the change of venue nor the detailed instructions on
the institutional role and duty ofjurors could neutralize this process of
acculturation. Even in the absence of conscious racist beliefs, this social-
ization provided a common sense frame through which discrete facts like
the frame by frame analysis of the film took on new meaning and the
language comparing King to "a raging bull" and the police to "the thin
blue line standing between us and the jungle" was decoded and acted
upon.
Both the theological and scientific paradigms embrace a process of
social comparison resulting in the subordination of an "out group" by
an "in group" using its own group as the positive point of reference in
measuring the worth or merit of out group members. In the story of
Ham, therefore, blackness represents a curse and deviation from the un-
questionable purity of whiteness. In science, the curse and norm are
disguised by the detailed descriptions of natural phenomena that pass as
objective study. Cultural racism is the unreflective acceptance of the
norm and its consequential curse on black people. It is a failure to un-
derstand that norms and curses are socially constructed meanings, and
that in a social context characterized by pervasive racism, they are likely
to perpetuate the domination of blacks.
In many ways the Simi Valley jurors inherited this cultural tradition.
History conditioned them as it conditions us all. The way they view the
world is unquestionably influenced by the way racism shaped the world.
When an officer testified that King appeared as a "raging bull," the im-
agery of animal-like appearance and behavior connected with a long his-
tory supported by religious and scientific doctrine that black men were
more like animals than men. The dehumanization of King diminished
the empathy that one human being feels for another suffering unjustifi-
ably. Viewed not as human but as standing somewhere between human
and beast, Rodney King was a threat and deserved his suffering. If he
could not hear and heed the call of human reason to "not move" and
"stay down," perhaps he could not feel the human pain inflicted by over
ninety blows of the club and shoe heels stomped forcefully into his neck
and head.
The defense attorneys' plea to the jury that policemen must receive
the benefit of the doubt because they constituted the "thin blue line sep-
arating us from the jungle," connected with centuries of racist imagery
that pictured black life as mysterious, uncivilized and ghastly. The de-
fense attorneys' plea connected with a place where reason succumbs to
passion and, if unleashed, destroys life as we know it. These influences
had to be contained, at all costs, lest they infiltrated the pristine suburbs
of Simi Valley in which many, perhaps like the jurors, seek refuge from
the evils of the inner-city jungle. The thin blue line transformed in this
imagery to both hero and victim. How could a criminal justice system
victimize these heroes who daily put their lives on the line to make the
community safe from the forces of darkness that lurked in the asphalt
jungles of the inner city?
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American culture teaches these lessons in countless ways and the
morals are neatly tucked away into the subconscious and retrieved when
needed. They vent themselves in a myriad of ways that span the gamut
between conscious overt racism and unconscious subtle covert racism,
convincing the mind of the juror that its eyes see something other than a
prone, unarmed man, writhing in pain as he is beaten unmercifully by
three police officers while twelve other officers looked on and did noth-
ing.4 5 The socialized and acculturated mind convinces the juror, in-
stead, that the eyes view a threat, one that justifies this reasonable use of
force by heroes now victimized by a criminal justice system that does not
appreciate what is really at stake.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The rationalist understanding of racism views it as deviant con-
sciousness. It fails to realize that racism manifests itself on three interre-
lated levels, and may be neither deviant nor conscious in its operation.
Both institutional and cultural racism operate at the unconscious level,
and given the pervasiveness of cultural racism and its influence on how
society views and understands the world, racism is as American as cherry
pie.
The implications of such a view of racism fall beyond the scope of
this article. Needless to say, however, it calls for a ar reaching plan
geared toward the transformation of a society whose educational, eco-
nomic and political systems all perpetuate the reproduction of socio-
psychological frameworks that continue to produce the kind of brutality,
inhumanity and injustice depicted in the saga of Rodney King.
45. William Raspberry, L.A. COps, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1991, at All.
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SAVING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: THE CASE
FOR A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF MCCOLLUM
DEBORAH ZALESNE* AND KINNEY ZALESNE**
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky,' peremp-
tory challenges have received a flurry of scholarly attention. 2 This re-
sponse is understandable. Peremptory challenges, a method by which
litigants strike jurors from the jury venire for any reason or for no rea-
son at all, 3 were used for centuries without restriction in the Anglo-
American criminal justice system. 4 In Batson, however, the Court held
that the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause 5 could limit the
prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges. Thus, two seemingly
mutually exclusive concepts were merged. Peremptory challenges,
designed to give unfettered expression to parties' subjective impres-
sions, were now reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause, which
required the parties to exercise those challenges in a non-discriminatory
way. This marriage spawned a persistent conflict.
Since Batson, scholars and judges have struggled to reconcile the
rationality of equal protection with the subjectivity of peremptory chal-
lenges. Emphasizing litigants' use of race in their exercise of the per-
emptory challenge, commentators have argued over whether and how
parties might retain their privilege to exercise peremptory challenges, in
light of the race-neutral principles of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court's current balance, which preserves peremptory chal-
* J.D., 1992, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1988, Williams College.
** J.D., 1991, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1987, Yale University. Law Clerk, The
Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr., Senior Judge, District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
The authors thank Kevin Downey, Judge J. William Ditter, Jr., Cynthia Farina, Steven
Bihbak and Karen McDonnell for their assistance.
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); RaymondJ. Broder-
ick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 369 (1992); Douglas
L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use
of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1990); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race
Discrimination injury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992).
3. A peremptory challenge is defined as:
[t]he right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a
reason for the challenge. In most jurisdictions, each party to an action, both civil
and criminal, has a specified number of such challenges and after using all his
peremptory challenges he is required to furnish a reason for subsequent
challenges.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 136 (6th ed. 1990). The use of a peremptory challenge to ex-
clude a juror is often called "striking" a juror.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 43-63.
5. The Equal Protection Clause provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
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lenges but regulates them to eliminate the most extreme violations of
equal protection, is well-struck. The Court's latest peremptory chal-
lenge decision, however, Georgia v. McCollum,6 which subjects a criminal
defendant's exercise of the peremptory challenge to Equal Protection
review, may be susceptible to overbroad interpretation. Although the
holding of the case technically applies only to situations where white
criminal defendants strike black jurors, the decision might be read as
applying to the obverse situation, where black criminal defendants chal-
lenge white jurors. We believe such a reading of McCollum would be
unwise.
This Article analyzes the historical, doctrinal and philosophical rea-
sons for preserving but regulating the peremptory challenge, and argues
for a narrow reading of McCollum. Part I traces the history and develop-
ment of peremptory challenges in the Anglo-American jury system,
pointing out the advantages peremptory challenges were intended to
give both criminal defendants and the justice system generally. Our sur-
vey of the history of peremptory challenges shows that many of the orig-
inal justifications for the peremptory challenge still apply.
Part II examines the major Supreme Court cases on peremptory
challenges since 1965, presenting the spectrum of solutions proposed
by Supreme Court Justices for resolving the tension between equal pro-
tection values and the subjective peremptory challenge. A majority of
the Court endorses a compromise regulating the use of peremptory
challenges. To justify and extend this solution, the Court has shifted its
focus from the equal protection rights of criminal defendants to the
equal protection rights of potential jurors. This change in focus reflects
a philosophical shift from liberalism, which emphasizes the rights of the
opposing parties, to communitarianism, which focuses on the public in-
terest and extends beyond any parties' immediate dispute. Since the
Court's emerging priority has been to legitimate the criminal justice sys-
tem in the eyes of the community, legitimation, rather than mechanical
application of the rules adopted in Batson and its progeny, should gov-
ern the Court's decisions in future cases.
In part III we urge a narrow interpretation of McCollum. This argu-
ment is based on the three principal concerns expressed in these
Supreme Court cases: preserving the peremptory challenge, securing
equal protection and promoting community respect for and compliance
with the criminal justice system. In the near future, courts may be called
upon to decide whether the rules announced in the Supreme Court's
post-Batson line of cases apply in the situation where white jurors are the
subject of the peremptory challenge. An extension of the jurors' rights
expressed in McCollum to excluded white jurors would undermine these
principal concerns. If every peremptory challenge with a racial compo-
nent is subject to equal protection review, the peremptory challenge will
lose its power. This might well lead to the abolition of peremptory chal-
lenges, undermining the purposes the peremptory challenge has tradi-
6. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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tionally served. Extension of equal protection rights to white jurors is
also doctrinally unnecessary. As long as challenges of black jurors cre-
ate all-white juries, but challenges of white jurors do not create the re-
verse, the exclusion of white jurors will not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
Finally, the Court's philosophical shift from liberalism to communi-
tarianism, evidenced by its increasing concern for public perception of
court justice, also calls for a narrow reading of McCollum: if black de-
fendants are unable to strike white jurors they "know in their hearts" to
be racist, their regard for the system, arguably more precarious than that
of whites, will only diminish.
I. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. Origins and Development of the Peremptory Challenge in England
Peremptory challenges originated early in the life of the jury system
in England. 7 Historians have not precisely identified the extent to which
7. Commentators and courts, in discussing the peremptory challenge, generally fo-
cus on its treatment by later commentators rather than on its actual origins. See, e.g., Hol-
land v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481-82(1990) (relying on nineteenth century commentator);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-14 (1965)(relying on commentators' analyses from
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); Broderick, supra note 2, at 371-74 (analyzing
development of prosecutorial right to peremptory challenge beginning in the fourteenth
century rather than on actual origins of the peremptory challenge).
The ancient English system administered law through the "popular courts," relying
on the parties themselves to bring forward knowledgeable witnesses and to resolve dis-
putes without input from community members. See James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Devel-
opment, 5 HARV. L. REV. 249, 251 (1892). The practice of trying cases by jury replaced the
"popular courts." The history ofjuries, amply detailed elsewhere, is beyond the scope of
this article. See, e.g., 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 614-31 (2d ed. 1911) (discussing origins and
development of the jury system).
The Crown gradually began to rely on an inquisition system wherein jurors, knowl-
edgeable about the events that were the subject matter of dispute, were selected by the
Crown. See id. at 250-54 (detailing the rise of trial by inquisition as the forerunner of the
modem jury system). In the criminal system, these jurors functioned in a manner akin to
today's grand jury. See Charles L. Wells, Early Opposition to Petty Juries in Criminal Cases, 30
LAw Q. REV. 97, 102 (1914). They accused defendants of crimes, and then, through a
variety of measures that changed over time, the royal courts decided the truth of the inqui-
sition's accusation. The methods for determining whether an accusation made by the in-
quisition in a criminal case was true were primitive by today's standards. Primarily, there
were two methods. The first, trial by battle, involved an actual physical battle between
litigants to determine who was being truthful. The second, trial by ordeal, required a
criminal defendant to suffer a series of ordeals, such as submission to heated irons, to
determine the truth of his story. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR
UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 3 (1977). Henry II moved to insti-
tutionalize this evolving practice of bringing criminal suits by inquisition in the Assize of
Clarendon in 1166, which mandated that:
inquiry shall be made in every county in every hundred by the twelve most lawful
men of the hundred and by the four most lawful men of the vill, upon oath that
they shall speak the truth, whether in their hundred or vill there be any man who
is accused or believed to be a robber, murderer, thief, or a receiver of robbers,
murderers, or thieves since the King's accession.
Reprinted in THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 112-13
(1956). Henry had begun the process of institutionalizing the inquisition system. The
Constitution of Clarendon in 1164 created jury trials in certain cases and provided: "The
sheriff shall cause 12 legal men of the neighborhood, or of the fill, to take an oath in the
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defendants enjoyed a right to peremptory challenge during the twelfth
and early thirteenth centuries, although most state that criminal defend-
ants enjoyed such a right "at common law." 8 Rather than serving as a
device to protect criminal defendants, however, the challenge appears to
have originated as a mechanism for the Crown to maintain control over
the jury. Because the early juries served the Crown's purposes - by
indicting and subjecting to ordeal those individuals who violated Eng-
land's laws - the Crown wished to ensure that its jury members would
be sympathetic to the Crown's interests. 9 Hence, the Crown gave itself
the right to challenge an unlimited number of potential jurors peremp-
torily. 10 Jurors whom the Crown perceived as uncooperative would be
promptly removed. The Crown also accorded criminal defendants the
right to challenge jurors peremptorily in capital cases, although the ra-
tionale for doing so at that time is not clear from the historical record."
The structure of and rationalizations for the jury continued to
evolve throughout the fourteenth century. The primary development of
this period was that the jury changed from serving merely as accuser to
serving as the mechanism for determining whether the Crown's accusa-
tions were true. Initially, members of the accusing jury served on the
fact finding jury as well, but by the 1340's the two functions had clearly
separated. 12 Hence, the jury increasingly became the body which de-
cided whether a defendant had actually committed a crime; its legitimacy
derived in part from its role as the arbiter of truth and falsity.
13
As the jury became more impartial and less a tool of the Crown,
Parliament grew increasingly uncomfortable with the Crown's right to
challenge jurors peremptorily without limit. Fearing that the practice of
peremptory challenge made verdicts appear engineered by the Crown,
in 1305 Parliament eliminated the Crown's right to challenge jurors pe-
remptorily. 14 It preserved, however, the right of the criminal defendant
presence of the bishop that they will declare the truth about [the case]." See LLOYD E.
MOORE, THE JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALADIUM OF LIBERTY 35-36 (1973).
Throughout the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the jury continued to serve an
accusatorial function rather than acting as the arbiter of the truth. MOORE, supra, at 35-36;
see also Wells, infra note 12, at 102.
8. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 7, at 55 ("At common law ... the defendant was per-
mitted to challenge 35 jurors."); CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 155
(1962).
9. See VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 147.
10. Id.
11. Id. Numerous commentators have stated that criminal defendants enjoyed the
right to challenge thirty-five jurors peremptorily in criminal cases, a number that is sup-
ported by the fact that Parliament later granted criminal defendants in capital the right to
thirty-five challenges. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 55; See also SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 1
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 325-26 (1903).
12. See Charles L. Wells, The Origin of the Petty Jury, 27 LAw Q. REV. 347, 351 (1911).
13. This development was certainly not complete in the fourteenth century, as the
jury still was largely bound to follow the instructions of the Court in reaching its judgment.
Nevertheless, the process that would ultimately separate the grand and petit jury (and the
court and the jury) were set in motion in the fourteenth century. See MOORE, supra note 7,
at 49-63.
14. An Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1 Stat. 4 (1305) provided:
He that challenges a Jury or Juror for the King shall shew his cause .... [B]ut if
they that sue for the King will challenge any of those Jurors, they shall assign of
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to do so.
Although the jury continued to develop in its role as neutral
factfinder,15 the English courts' treatment of the peremptory challenge
remained for centuries as Parliament had fashioned it in 1305. Only
criminal defendants could challenge without cause, although the
number of such challenges afforded to defendants decreased over the
years. 16 Thus, as the jury system underwent numerous changes from
the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the criminal defendant
retained the right to the peremptory challenge.
B. Historical Reasons for the Survival of the Peremptory Challenge in England
The retention of the peremptory challenge throughout these devel-
opments appears, at first, anomalous. After all, the practice originated
as a device for allowing the Crown to control the makeup of the jury.
Why then did the English system preserve the right of defendants to
challenge jurors long after the Crown had lost its right? Apparently the
defendant's right survived because English courts and commentators ra-
tionalized the practice subsequently and infused it with new meaning.
Two general rationales developed for preserving the criminal defend-
ant's right to strike jurors without cause.
First, commentators recognized the Crown's inherent advantages in
criminal proceedings and saw the peremptory challenge as a way to
equalize the defendant's position. Most notable among the Crown's ad-
vantages was that its agents still controlled the selection of the larger
panel from which a petit jury was chosen.' 7 Therefore, as a matter of
their Challenge a Cause Certain, and the truth of same Challenge shall be en-
quired of according to the Custom of the Court ....
15. Not until the late seventeenth century were juries generally free to arrive at ver-
dicts without instruction from or outright coercion by the courts. See MOORE, supra note 7,
at 67-89.
The single most important development in the establishment of the jury as a neutral
factfinder was the decision of the appeals judges of the Court of Common Pleas in Bushell's
Case (1670), V State Trials 999 (T.B. Howell, ed. 1810), where the court considered the
habeas petition of jurors who had been imprisoned for finding defendants not guilty de-
spite the insistence of the trying magistrate that the defendants were guilty. After being
imprisoned, the jurors filed a habeas petition, which the Court of Common Pleas granted
because, it reasoned, the purpose of the jury was to evaluate the evidence itself and reach
its own conclusion. See VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 5.
16. Parliament initially provided defendants with the right to challenge thirty-five ju-
rors peremptorily. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 67-89. The number was decreased to
twenty by 1530, and eventually to three in modem times. SeeJames Gobert, The Peremptory
Challenge - An Obituary, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 528, 529. In 1988, Parliament abolished the
criminal defendant's right to peremptory challenge. See id. Some commentators have
made much of Parliament's ultimate decision to abolish peremptories completely. See, e.g.,
Broderick, supra note 2, at 372-73. The claims of these commentators that the peremptory
challenge is merely a historical anomaly are overstated, however, for they fail to account
for the challenge's survival through a host of changes in English legal system for more
than seven centuries. Rather than treating the peremptory challenge as anomalous, the
better approach is to understand why the challenge survived for such a long period and
what purposes its users believed it served.
17. See Holdsworth, supra note 11, at 325 ("In spite of the statute of 1351-52 the
crown still retained means of influencing the petty jury which it only gradually relin-
quished. The jury was selected by [the Crown's] officers").
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fairness, English courts thought it proper to allow defendants to elimi-
nate at least some of the members of the Crown-selected panel without
explanation.' 8 In an oft-quoted but seldom analyzed comment, Black-
stone opined that allowance of the peremptory challenge for defendants
was "a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners for
which our English laws are justly famous."' 19
Blackstone was referring, at least in part, to the English system's
effort to conduct proceedings that appeared fair. Since the Crown's selec-
tion of the larger jury panel might make the trial appear hopelessly bi-
ased, and certain to end in conviction, the defendant's right to eliminate
jurors whom he suspected of bias helped assuage public concerns.
Hence the English system encouraged the general impression that its
trials were fair, and that they merited community trust.
The second rationale for preserving the defendant's peremptory
challenge was that a jury verdict appeared more legitimate and worthy
of respect if both sides had implicitly consented to it.20 If the criminal
defendant could not strike jurors without cause, he would undoubtedly
confront a jury comprised of some individuals whom he felt were biased
against him.2 1 Allowing the defendant to strike potential jurors without
cause became a mechanism for ensuring that the process of trial by jury
appeared fair, so that both litigants and the observing community would
accept jury verdicts more readily.
By the time the peremptory challenge was adopted as a privilege of
criminal defendants in America, therefore, it had already been justified
on grounds quite different from its original roots. Nevertheless, it had
become an important part of the jury system, both because it enhanced
the truth-seeking character of trials and because it legitimated the jury
system in the eyes of both the litigants and the community.
C. The Peremptory Challenge in America
The American colonies retained the defendant's right to perempto-
rily challenge jurors as part of the inherited common law, 2 2 and after
independence, Congress codified the defendant's right to challenge ju-
18. See id. at 324.
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, * 353 (1859).
20. Id. ("[A] prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his
jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him, the law wills not that he should be
tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able
to assign a reason for such his dislike.").
21. See Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 552 (1975) (noting that, in many cases, defendants want to strike jurors that they feel
are biased against them but against whom they cannot demonstrate cause to strike). Black-
stone noted that the voir dire itself might bias a juror against a criminal defendant
[U]pon challenges for cause shown, if the reasons assigned prove insufficient to
set aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes
provoke a resentment; to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is
still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at * 353.
22. See VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 148.
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rors peremptorily in federal court. 23 During the nineteenth century,
American prosecutors also acquired the right to exercise such chal-
lenges, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, the prosecution's
right to challenge peremptorily was well established.
24
Two aspects of the use of the peremptory challenge in America
merit special mention. First, for much of the twentieth century, the use
of the peremptory challenge, particularly by the prosecution, served to
manifest racial discrimination and irrational prejudice rather than to bal-
ance the scales between the state and the accused. Literature detailing
the use of the peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner
is legion.2 5 Because the number of potential black jurors on any partic-
ular venire was generally small, the prosecution typically had enough
peremptory challenges to strike all the eligible blacks from the jury.2 6
Thus, with its peremptory challenges, the state could often guarantee an
all-white jury, which it believed was more favorable to the prosecution
than one which was racially-mixed. In cases involving black criminal de-
fendants, the peremptory challenge thus became an instrument of the
very evil it was designed to protect against: the state could engineer the
selection of a jury which was, on balance, thought to favor the state.
Second, although the use of the peremptory challenge was com-
monplace, the Supreme Court held that criminal defendants did not
have a constitutional right to exercise the peremptory challenge.
2 7
Hence, the doctrinal rationale for the peremptory challenge in the crimi-
nal system was precarious. Nevertheless, the peremptory challenge, as a
matter of history and philosophy, was well entrenched. The practice not
only survived in the Anglo-American system of justice for more than
seven centuries, but it continued to serve a legitimating function in the
criminal justice system by sustaining the appearance that both the prose-
cution and defense accepted a given jury as fair and impartial.
Ultimately, abuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black ju-
rors led to the questioning of the philosophical premises that justified its
existence. In recent years, courts and commentators have tried to find
new doctrinal and philosophical explanations for preserving, abolishing
or regulating the use of the peremptory challenge.
23. See 1 Stats. 119, ch. 9 (1790).
24. See VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 150 (tracing the development of the prosecutorial
right to peremptory challenge in various American jurisdictions throughout the nine-
teenth century).
25. See, e.g., Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in
Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 192, 206-09 (1978); Toni M.
Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures,
64 N.C.L. REV. 501, 509 (1986).
26. See Colbert, supra note 2, at 88-93.
27. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("There is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory chal-
lenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured.").
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II. MODERN APPROACHES TO PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. Supreme Court Case Law Since 1965
The Supreme Court first considered the application of the Equal
Protection Clause to peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama.2 8 In
Swain, a black defendant was accused and subsequently convicted of rap-
ing a white woman. Following voir dire, the prosecution used its per-
emptory challenges to strike all six eligible black venire members.
29
Swain argued that this violated his right to equal protection of the laws.
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Swain had failed to prove
the prosecution struck those venire members solely on the basis of race.
The Court held that in order to demonstrate an equal protection viola-
tion based on the state's racially discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges, a petitioner must show that the prosecutor systematically used
race discrimination over a significant period of time.5 0 Because Swain
had, at best, merely demonstrated that such racially motivated chal-
lenges occurred in his case, he had not demonstrated an equal protec-
tion violation. Although the Swain Court technically applied the Equal
Protection Clause to peremptory challenges, the evidentiary require-
ment for demonstrating an equal protection violation was so high that
Swain effectively precluded equal protection challenges to peremptory
challenges.
Despite much criticism,3 1 Swain's framework for evaluating equal
protection claims in a peremptory challenge context remained the law
for twenty years. In 1986, however, the Supreme Court overruled
Swain. In Batson v. Kentucky 3 2 , a black defendant challenged the prosecu-
tion's use of its peremptory challenges to strike all the potential black
jurors as violative of equal protection principles. The Court agreed,
holding that purposeful race discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause could be established in a particular case provided that
the defendant demonstrate that: 1) he is a member of a cognizable ra-
cial group; 2) the prosecutor struck venire members of that group; and
3) the facts or other circumstances in the case raise an inference of the
prosecutor's intent to exclude those members on the basis of race.
3 3
28. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
29. Id. at 205.
30. The Court reasoned:
Unlike the selection process, which is wholly in the hands of state officers, defense
counsel participate in the peremptory challenge system, and indeed generally
have a far greater role than any officers of the State. It is for this reason that a
showing that Negroes have not served during a specified period of time does not,
absent a sufficient showing of the prosecutor's participation, give rise to the infer-
ence of systematic discrimination on the part of the State .... [T]he defendant
must, to pose the issue, show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory chal-
lenges against Negroes over a period of time.
Id. at 227.
31. See, e.g., Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of
the All-WhiteJury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966); Constitutional Law, The Supreme Court, 1964
Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 135 (1965); Comment, FairJury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J.
322 (1965).
32. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
33. Id.
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Upon the defense meeting these requirements, the burden shifts to the
state to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for its exercise of
the peremptory challenge. 34 The Court's decision made clear that it was
equal protection, and not concerns about a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights to a fair trial and impartial jury, that required regulation and
limitation of the state's right to peremptory challenges.
3 5
Batson, however, left unanswered the question of how far the Equal
Protection Clause extended its prohibition of racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges. In Powers v. Ohio,36 the Court began to define
the extent of the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of racially biased
peremptory challenges. In Powers, a white criminal defendant objected
to the prosecution's exclusion of black jurors from the venire. Powers
did not claim that his own Sixth Amendment rights had been infringed
by the peremptory challenges, but rather that the Equal Protection
rights of the excluded jurors had been violated.3 7 Powers further ar-
gued that he had third-party standing to assert the juror's rights. 38 The
Court agreed and held that under Batson, a white defendant can object
to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude non-white
jurors. The Court interpreted Batson as finding an equal protection vio-
lation of both the excluded jurors' rights and those of the criminal de-
fendant. Therefore, the Court concluded that regardless of the race of
the criminal defendant, racially motivated peremptory challenges violate
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that, in addition to
the harm to the defendant, racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges also harm the excluded jurors and society. 39 Powers thus opened
34. Id. at 95.
35. Nevertheless, the Court soon confronted a challenge to the prosecution's exercise
of peremptory challenges rooted in the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment pro-
vides in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 1.
In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), a white criminal defendant challenged the
state's exclusion of the only two black jurors from the venire as violative of the Sixth
Amendment's mandate that he be tried by an impartial jury representing a fair cross-sec-
tion of the community. The Court held that while the Equal Protection clause forbids the
use of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the Sixth Amendment
does not prohibit the state from using peremptory challenges in any manner that it sees fit.
This includes a racially discriminatory use. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia reasoned
that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury, not a representative one. The
Supreme Court's decision foreclosed any chance of grounding constitutional challenges to
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges in the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 480. The
Court did hold, however, that under the Sixth Amendment a white defendant has standing
to object to the exclusion of black jurors. Id.
36. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
37. Id. at 1366-67.
38. Id. at 1370.
39. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy reasoned:
In Batson, we spoke of the harm caused when a defendant is tried by a tribunal
from which members of his own race have been excluded. But we did not limit
our discussion in Batson to that one aspect of the harm caused by the violation....
Batson recognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges harms the excluded jurors and the community at large.
111 S. Ct. at 1368 (citation omitted).
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the door to application of the Equal Protection Clause based on the
identity of the excluded jurors rather than solely on the identity of the
defendant.
The Court extended the rule prohibiting racially-biased peremptory
challenges to both plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co. ,40 largely relying on its analysis in Powers. In a final
extension of Powers, in Georgia v. McColIum41 the Court held that a white
criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors
on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause. In both Ed-
monson and Powers, the Court emphasized that the equal protection rights
of the jurors could be asserted by the litigants, and that it was the depri-
vation of those jurors' rights which was the basis for regulating peremp-
tory challenges.
Throughout each of these cases, distinct voices have emerged pro-
posing how to reconcile the seemingly arbitrary and capricious 4 2 per-
emptory challenge with the rational demands of equal protection.
These different voices articulate divergent doctrinal and philosophical
theories in dealing with the peremptory challenge.
B. Solutions to the Peremptory Challenge - Equal Protection Conflict
1. Justice Marshall and the Argument for Elimination of
Peremptory Challenges
The opinions in Batson set forth the range of possible solutions to
the peremptory challenge-equal protection dichotomy. On one end of
the spectrum is Justice Marshall, who concurred in the judgment in Bat-
son, but argued that the majority did not go far enough towards ensuring
the vindication of equal protection values. He claimed that peremptory
challenges must be abolished altogether.43 Merely permitting judicial
scrutiny of prosecutors' peremptory challenges does not, according to
Justice Marshall, end the racial discrimination which peremptory chal-
lenges inject into the jury-selection process.4 4 Therefore, in order to
redeem the "right of the defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity
with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment,"'4 5 the prosecu-
tion's peremptory challenge right should be abolished altogether.4 6
Justice Marshall concluded that because "between [the defendant] and
the state the scales are to be evenly held,"'4 7 the right of defendants to
exercise peremptory challenges must be abolished as well.
4 8
40. 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991).
41. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
42. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
43. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 107 (citation omitted).
46. Id 102-03.
47. Id. at 107 (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
48. Of course, such formal equality had not been required for the five centuries or so
between 1305 and the 1800's, when prosecutors re-acquired the right to exercise peremp-
tory challenges in this country. See supra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
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2. Chief Justice Burger and the Argument for Unfettered
Peremptory Challenges
At the other end of the spectrum, Chief Justice Burger, dissenting
in Batson, argued that peremptory challenges should be preserved with
all their prejudices, racial and otherwise, intact. 4 9 Chief Justice Burger
emphasized that prosecutors often use peremptory challenges not to ex-
ploit prejudice but to eliminate it. He asserted that the peremptory
challenge carefully permits "the covert expression of what we dare not
say but know is true more often than not."'50 The dissent further em-
phasized the inapplicability of equal protection doctrine to the peremp-
tory challenge because of the inherently unaccountable nature of the
peremptory challenge.
5 1
Justice Thomas, concurring in McColIum, 5 2 would later echo Justice
Burger's reluctance to apply equal protection doctrine to peremptory
challenges. Justice Thomas argued that the early equal protection cases
were premised on the recognition that racism plagues juries and that the
racial composition ofjuries can affect case results. 53 He stated that be-
cause racial composition continues to makes a difference in ajury's deci-
sion, some defendants exercise race-based peremptory challenges solely
to counterbalance jurors' covert but pernicious biases. 54 Subjecting de-
fendants' peremptory challenges to the Court's review, he argued, with
the lofty goal of eliminating racism from the courtroom, may actually
deprive defendants of their only tool to strike racist jurors from the jury
panels. 5 5 In any event, Justice Thomas argued, as Chief Justice Burger
had, that the advantages of subjective, unexplained peremptory chal-
lenges to the defendant outweigh "the community's" nebulous interest
in aspirational statements from the Court about racial equality.
5 6
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Marshall, at opposite ends of the
spectrum agreed that the Court's solution of regulating the peremptory
49. Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 121 (quoting Babcock, supra note 21, at 553-54).
51. ChiefJustice Burger wrote:
[In making peremptory challenges, both the prosecutor and defense attorney
necessarily act on only limited information or hunch. The process cannot be in-
dicted on the sole basis that such decisions are made on the basis of "assump-
tion" or "intuitive judgment." As a result, unadulterated equal protection
analysis is simply inapplicable to peremptory challenges exercised in any particu-
lar case. A clause that requires a minimum "rationality" in government actions
has no application to "an arbitrary and capricious right."
Id. at 123 (citations omitted).
52. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (Thomas, J, concurring).
53. Justice Thomas quoted Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the first
case to hold that dejure exclusion of blacks from jury venires violated a black defendant's
right to equal protection:
It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the com-
munity, which sway the judgment ofjurors, and which, therefore, operate in some
cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of the protection
which others enjoy.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309).
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challenge in light of the Equal Protection Clause would not solve the
problem. And, interestingly, both argued that their solutions would
strengthen the public's faith in the jury system - Justice Marshall's by
eliminating the irreparably racist practice of peremptory challenges, and
Chief Justice Burger's by preserving the one device designed to maxi-
mize public trust in jury verdicts. 57 The majority of the Court chose a
middle ground, however.
3. Justices Kennedy and Blackmun and A Regulatory
Compromise
The majority of the Batson Court adopted a regulatory compromise,
initially in the name of the criminal defendant. The Court's solution in
Batson, which rejected both Justice Marshall's and ChiefJustice Burger's
more extreme proposals, was to review the peremptory challenges of
prosecutors to eliminate the worst excesses of racial discrimination. Ini-
tially, this compromise was seen as a means of protecting the rights of
the criminal defendant. Only subsequently would the Court see the
compromise as a means of protecting the "public interest" or public
concern for the jury system.
a. Preserving Peremptory Challenges
The Court rejected Justice Marshall's proposal, to eliminate all per-
emptory challenges in the goal of racial equality, because of the perem-
tory's historical and actual benefits. Summarizing the Court's
cumulative respect for the peremptory challenge in Holland, Justice
Scalia stated that the peremptory challenge plays an important and nec-
essary role in ajury trial by striking out the partiality on both sides, thus
eliminating bias from the jury.58 Nevertheless, however, the Court has
reiterated that the peremptory challenge is not constitutionally guaran-
teed.59 Yet its resistance to the proposal to abolish all peremptory chal-
lenges survives, for many of the same reasons that have prompted
English-speaking courts to preserve peremptory challenges since the
fourteenth century. Peremptory challenges both make juries fairer and
give the appearance of making juries fairer. 60 Only abuse of peremptory
challenges subverts the intent to make juries more fair. As a result, the
Court concluded peremptory challenges need to be regulated. Total
elimination of peremptory challenges would leave open the risk of los-
ing their original advantages. Without any peremptory challenges, de-
57. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
58. Justice Scalia stated:
We have acknowledged that [the peremptory challenge] occupies "an important
position in our trial procedures," and has indeed been considered "a necessary
part of trial by jury." Peremptory challenges, by enabling each side to exclude
those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other side, are a means of
"eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides," thereby "assuring the selec-
tion of a qualified and unbiased jury.
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (citations omitted).
59. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (Marshall, J., concurring); Frazier v. United States, 335
U.S. 497, 505 n.Il (1948); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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fendants may well be judged by jurors they believe are biased against
them. 6 1 In addition, public knowledge that an individual litigant has the
right to strike a juror bolsters the public's confidence in the justice
system.
6 2
Finally, if the proposal that peremptory challenges be eliminated is
made in the name of racial equality, it must also be recognized that even
though elimination of peremptories may raise the number of minority
jurors, it may do so at the expense of minority defendants. Defendants
who suspect racism among potential jurors, but who cannot strike them
without cause, may suffer the effects of discrimination in a far more dev-
astating and final way than do jurors who are not allowed to serve on a
jury.
b. Securing Equal Protection
While insisting on preserving the peremptory challenge, the Court
since Batson has resisted with equal resolve proposals to retreat from its
equal protection rationale for regulating these challenges. Arguments
that equal protection analysis cannot be applied to peremptory chal-
lenges because of the inherently unaccountable nature of peremptory
challenges are flawed. For many years, before equal protection regula-
tion of peremptory challenges, prosecutors often rampantly abused the
peremptory challenge by exploiting and perpetuating racial stereotypes
and discrimination. 63 It is true that peremptory challenges are meant to
be unaccountable and subjective. On the other hand, they are not
meant to accommodate every hateful and prejudiced thought a litigant
may have. Thus, the Court had reasoned, regulation of peremptory
challenges is necessary to secure equal protection for everyone involved
with the trial.
c. The Majority's Solution
Finding a middle ground between the abolition of peremptory chal-
lenges and complete, laissez-faire indifference to their application, a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court in Batson accepted a regulatory solution.
This regulation is necessary to preserve the right of peremptory chal-
lenges, but to prevent that right from being exercised in a way which
violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has endorsed this solu-
tion in each subsequent peremptory challenge case, extending the reach
of restrictions-from the prosecution trying a black defendant in Batson,
a white defendant in Powers, to all civil litigants in Edmonson, to all crimi-
nal defendants in McCollum.
61. See VALERIE HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 72-73 (1986) ("Suppose that
you are involved in a legal case and you are convinced that a particular prospective juror is
biased against you, even though the judge doesn't share your insight. The option of elimi-
nating that person through a peremptory challenge may help you to accept the verdict as
reasonable even if it should not be in your favor.").
62. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992); see also BLACKSTONE, supra
note 19, at * 353.
63. See sources cited supra note 2.
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An important change took place in the Court's doctrinal analysis
from Batson to the most recent decision in McCollum. While in Batson the
Court alluded to concerns about public confidence in the judicial sys-
tem, the focus of its holding was entirely on the equal protection rights
of the defendant. Slowly, however, the Court began to focus not on the
parties' rights but on the equal protection rights of the jurors. This shift
in focus from parties to jurors, who sit as a proxy for the public gener-
ally, reflects a willingness by the Court to effectuate two goals: first, to
honor communitarian or "public interest" ideals even in criminal proce-
dure; and second, and even more striking, to honor these public interest
ideals to the detriment of a criminal defendant.
C. The Court's Underlying Doctrinal Shift
The Court's change in focus from criminal defendant to juror
evolved slowly. Both Swain and Batson based their holdings on the equal
protection rights of the defendant. In dicta, the Batson Court referred
to concerns about excluded jurors6 4 and cited the need to preserve pub-
lic confidence in the judicial system. 6 5 Its holding, however, empha-
sized that a defendant's equal protection right is denied when he is tried
by ajury from which all eligible members of his race have been purpose-
fully excluded.
66
The juror-centered approach did not reach full fruition until later
cases. Concurring in Holland, in which the Court to bolster the result in
Batson with the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy cited Batson's "estab-
lished rule" - that "exclusion of ajuror on the basis of race, whether or
not by use of a peremptory challenge, is a violation of the juror's consti-
tutional rights."' 6 7 Subsequently, the Court reaffirmed and expanded
this interpretation of Batson. Writing for the majority in Powers the fol-
lowing year, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that a juror struck on a basis
of a discriminatory peremptory challenge suffered harm. As a result the
community was harmed as well. 68 The Court held that a juror has a
64. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). ("As long ago as Strauder, therefore,
the Court recognized that by denying a person participation in jury service on account of
his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror." (citations
omitted)).
65. Id.
66. Even Justice Marshall, whose proposal to eliminate peremptory challenges took
into consideration the general, societal interest in racial equality, did not take the dispute
in Batson outside the rights of the parties. He wrote: "Justice Goldberg, dissenting in
Swain, emphasized that '[wiere it necessary to make an absolute choice between the right
of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a
choice of the former.' I believe that this case presents just such a choice." 476 U.S. at 107
(Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting).
67. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)(citation
omitted).
68. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Batson was designed to serve multiple ends, only one of which was to protect
individual defendants from discrimination in the selection ofjurors. Batson rec-
ognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms
the excluded jurors and the community at large (internal citations omitted).
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right not to be excluded from juror service because of the juror's race.
As a result, a prosecutor cannot exclude a qualified juror solely because
of the juror's race.69
Justice Kennedy emphasized both the importance of civic contribu-
tions and the value ofjury participation, stating that allowing citizens to
participate in the justice system was a main reason for the jury system.
70
Quoting Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 7 1 he noted that by participating in a jury, a
juror can prevent abuse of the judicial system, 72 and that a juror can
influence judicial decisions and the direction of society. 7" He concluded
with the observation that jury service safeguarded the law's democratic
component by protecting the litigants' rights and insuring the public's
tolerance of the law. 74 Powers, therefore, fully focused the Court on the
rights of jurors rather than on the rights of defendants.
75
Thus, by the time the Court considered the issues raised in Edmon-
son, the majority of the Court was comfortable with Kennedy's assertion
that it was the jurors' equal protection rights that were at issue. Justice
Kennedy now moved those jurors to the core of his holding, stating that
racial bias was improper in the courtroom, "race-based exclusion vio-
lates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors." 76 Edmonson
considered the rights of litigants to use race in peremptory challenges in
civil cases, which made the centrality ofjurors much easier to accept. In
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1368 (1991) (citations omitted).
69. The Court stated:
We hold that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the
State's peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased per-
sons from the petit jury solely by reason of their race, a practice that forecloses a
significant opportunity to participate in civic life. An individual juror does not
have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right
not to be excluded from one on account of race.
Id. at 1370.
70. Justice Kennedy wrote:
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration ofjus-
tice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining
the jury system.
Id. at 1368 (citations omitted).
71. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
72. Kennedy stated:
The jury system postulates a conscious duty of participation in the machinery of
justice.... One of its greatest benefits is in the security it gives the people that
they, as jurors actual or possible, being part of the judicial system of the country
can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse.
Powers, 111 S.Ct. at 1368 (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 310).
73. Justice Kennedy wrote:
The institution of the jury raises the people itself, or at least a class of citizens, to
the bench of judicial authority and invests the people, or that class of citizens,
with the direction of society.
Id. (quoting 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 334-337 (Schocker, 1st ed. 1461)).
74. Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the
rights of the parties and insures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the
people.
Id. at 1369 (citations omitted).
75. The Court's concern for minorities' participation in civic life echoes its reasoning
in Voting Rights Act cases. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Moreover,
it continues the trend of giving constitutional protection to practices which help involve
historically excluded groups in civic life.
76. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
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the civil context, the rights of non-parties have always been more readily
considered, 7 7 and the notion that litigants' rights must accommodate
jurors' rights is palatable, if not universally accepted. But in McCollum,
which subjected the criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges to review for violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
seemingly transferred the language of jurors' rights from the civil con-
text to the criminal. 78 In McCollum, the Court began its reasoning by
explaining that regardless of whether a defendant or prosecutor ex-
cluded a juror because of race, the juror was exposed to racial discrimi-
nation. 79 The Court further couched jurors' rights explicitly in the need
for public confidence in the judicial system. 80 The Court noted that this
was especially true in race-related cases.8 '
Thus the Court's focus underwent a complete transformation.
From the holding in Batson, that a black defendant's right to equal pro-
tection may be violated when all eligible black jurors are systematically
excluded, the Court has come to hold that the rights ofjurors - indeed,
the rights of the whole community - are violated when a juror is struck
on the basis of race.
The Court's shift in focus from defendant to jurors in its equal pro-
tection analysis prompted a caustic response from Justices who disap-
proved. Dissenting in Powers, which was the first case in which a majority
of the Court cited Batson as holding that a prosecutor's discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges harmed the excluded jurors and the com-
munity at large, Justice Scalia charged the majority with abandoning the
purposes of both Strauder and the Fourteenth Amendment.8 2 He argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to guarantee blacks pro-
tection of the laws equal to that of whites. The Court's new shift to
protect black jurors, Justice Scalia argued, gave white defendants the use
of a doctrine created to balance blacks' chances in a racist society. He
lamented the distortion of equal protection jurisprudence and predicted
the Court's "self-satisfying," supposed "blow against racism" 8 3 would
jeopardize peremptory challenges and equal protection analysis
77. See infra text accompanying notes 101-03.
78. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354-57 (1992).
79. Id. at 2353.
80. Citing Powers, Justice Blackmun wrote:
One of the goals of ourjury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and
the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in
accordance with the law by persons who are fair.
Id. at 2353-54 (citations omitted).
81. The need for public confidence is especially high in cases involving race-re-
lated crimes. In such cases, emotions in the affected community will inevitably be
heated and volatile. Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice sys-
tem is essential for preserving community peace in trials involving race-related
crimes.
Be it at the hands of the State or the defense, if a court allows jurors to be
excluded because of group bias, it is a willing participant in a scheme that could
only undermine the very foundation of our system ofjustice - our citizens' confi-
dence in it.
Id. at 2353-54 (citations omitted).
82. Powers v. Ohio, 11l S. Ct. 1364, 1374-75 (1991)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1382.
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altogether.84
Concurring in McCollum, Justice Thomas echoed Justice Scalia's
concern and called the Court's shift in emphasis from the criminal de-
fendant's rights to the rights of jurors "a serious misordering of our
priorities."18 5 Justice Thomas argued this shift elevated juror's rights at
the expense of the defendant's. 86 Nonetheless, a majority of Justices
have approved the shift in the focus of the equal protection analysis. As
Justices Scalia and Thomas suggested, however, the implications of "ex-
alt[ing] the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal
defendant" 87 may signal significant changes in the law of criminal
procedure.
D. The Ideological Significance of the Shift
The Court's change in focus from the defendant's rights to the ju-
rors' reflects its willingness to import communitarian principles to the
law of criminal procedure, an area traditionally reserved for liberal or
individualist principles of law. 88 Scholars have traced the developments
of both liberalism and communitarianism from the earliest of the Con-
stitutional Framers' writings89 through recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. 90 For our purposes, however, we need only recognize the
trademark principles of liberalism and communitarianism (or republi-
canism 9 1), in order to place the Court's shift in equal protection analysis
in philosophical perspective.
84. In particular, Justice Scalia predicted the standing problems the Court's decision
was likely to create. "While [Batson] refers to 'the harm' that 'discriminatory jury selection'
inflicts upon 'the excluded juror,' that is not a clear recognition, even in dictum, that the
excluded juror has his own cause of action-any more than its accompanying reference to
the harm inflicted upon 'the entire community,' suggests that the entire community has a
cause of action." Id. at 1379 (citations omitted).
85. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992)(Thomas, J., concurring).
86. Justice Thomas wrote:
In Strauder, we put the rights of defendants foremost. Today's decision, while
protecting jurors, leaves defendants with less means of protecting themselves.
Unless jurors actually admit prejudice during voir dire, defendants generally
must allow them to sit and run the risk that racial animus will affect the ver-
dict .... In effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over the
rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors,
who faces imprisonment or even death.
Id.
87. Id.
88. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); JOHN P. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE,
SELF-INTEREST AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1980); JOHN GREVILLE AGARD
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term:
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
89. See Wood, supra note 88.
90. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Republican Civic Tradition: Law's Republic, 97 YALE
LJ. 1493 (1988) (arguing traditional civic republican theory supports protection of indi-
vidual rights, in context of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
91. We call the public-centered philosophy "communitarianism," which encompasses
several community-minded critiques of liberalism, including republicanism. For an excel-
lent discussion of the recurrence of communitarian critiques, see Michael Walzer, The Com-
munitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6 (1990).
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Professor Morton Horwitz has contrasted9 2 the two philosophies
concisely:
Liberalism has stood for a subjective theory of value, a concep-
tion of individual self-interest as the only legitimate animating
force in society, a night-watchman state, and denial of any con-
ception of an autonomous public interest independent of the
sum of individual interests. Republicanism has stood for the
primacy of politics and the relative independence of ideals of
the good life from economic forces. It has emphasized the
growth and development of human personality in active polit-
ical life. It has proceeded from some objective conception of
the public interest and conceived of a state that could legiti-
mately promote virtue.
93
Stated in these terms, the Supreme Court's shift regarding peremptory
challenges reflects a profound change in philosophical emphasis. The
change in emphasis from Batson, stressing the inviolable rights of the
criminal defendant, to Powers, stressing the jurors' interests in not being
excluded from a "significant opportunity to participate in civic life,"' 94 to
McCollum, which highlighted society's interest in not "undermin[ing] the
very foundation of our system of justice--our citizens' confidence in
it"95 reflects an emergence of communitarian priorities in the Court's
treatment of peremptory challenges.
The Court's initial emphasis in Swain and Batson on the criminal de-
fendant's rights reflects the liberalist tradition. In the liberal model of
criminal justice, the state battles the accused, each armed to fight fairly
in its own self-interest. The state may prosecute zealously so long as it
respects the bounds of the defendant's inviolable rights. 96 The Court,
as night-watchman, monitors the prosecution to be sure these bounds
are respected. The criminal trial, therefore, gives each party the oppor-
tunity to vigorously argue its self-interest, that "legitimate animating
force" 9 7 from which the truth of the criminal charges is determined. It
is this contest between interested parties, ostensibly made fairer by the
exercise of peremptory challenges, from which justice will result.
Communitarian priorities, however, emphasize what Horwitz calls
the public interest, which includes the needs of people affected indi-
rectly, although perhaps profoundly, by any particular case before the
court. The opinions in Powers, Edmonson and McCollum speak the lan-
guage of communitarianism. These majority opinions emphasize the
92. Liberalism and republicanism are widely thought to be at odds with each other.
However, for a suggestion that "liberal republicanism" comprises both, see Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Republican Civic Tradition: Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1567-
1571 (1988).
93. MortonJ. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1832 (1987).
94. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991).
95. Georgia v. McCollum 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992).
96. The defendant's shields are guaranteed by the Constitution. They include the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. CONST. amend. IV; the right against
double jeopardy, U.S. CONST. amend. V; and the right to a "speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury," U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
97. Horwitz, supra note 93, at 1832.
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"growth and development of [the excluded jurors'] human personality
in active political life," beginning from an "objective conception of the
public interest." 98 That interest includes, at least for Justice Blackmun
in McCollum, the promotion of racial harmony in communities which
have suffered racially-motivated crime. 9 9
The emergence of communitarian principles in the law of peremp-
tory challenges has uncertain significance. On the one hand, it reflects
those historical justification which valued the peremptory challenge con-
tributions to the public perception that jury trials were fair.10 0 On the
other hand, however, considerations of public confidence and the ap-
pearance of impartiality had never before been used to diminish, rather
than augment, the rights of criminal defendants. Whereas the defend-
ant's right to the peremptory challenge was preserved after the Crown
had lost that right, the defendant's right was preserved because it helped
sustain public faith injuries' determinations. McCollum, in contrast, rep-
resents a willingness to nurture public confidence at the expense of the
defendant. This use of communitarian principles is a new and dramatic
shift, indeed.
In one sense, the preference for "public interest" considerations at
all in criminal procedure is unusual. Several areas of civil law explicitly
take non-parties' interests into account. For example, tort law often ex-
pressly considers long-range, communal good in determining optimal
tort liability schemes. 1 1 Domestic relations law considers the interests
of children in divorce proceedings between parents. 102 More generally,
the provisions for third party practice, class actions, and intervention
provide for complex civil litigation in which many parties with an inter-
est in a dispute can be included.'
0 3
Moreover, the substance of criminal law also regards some "objec-
tive conception of the public interest." 0 4 Statutory prohibitions against
murder, rape and robbery reflect a societal desire to outlaw and prevent
these acts. But criminal procedure has been a traditionally liberal field of
law. Perhaps because its strictures are set out in relative detail in the Bill
of Rights, the law of criminal investigation and prosecution reflects the
individualist model of state versus accused. It might be said that in crim-
inal punishment, general (as opposed to specific) deterrence projects the
"public interest," or that punishment's retributive goals satisfy the need
for communal perception that justice is being served. But for the most
98. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2348.
99. Id. at 2354.
100. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
221 (1980) (discussing trend in tort law to minimize overall social costs by imposing liabil-
ity on the "cheaper cost-avoider").
102. For example, courts are said to have inherent power to protect children, which
allows them to shape domestic remedies regardless of the desires of the parties. See HOMER
H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 238 (1987) (col-
lecting cases).
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19-24.
104. Horwitz, supra note 93, at 1832.
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part, throughout investigation and trial, any person's interests which
might compromise the defendant's are given little consideration.
Therefore, the implications of the Court's willingness in McCollum
to consider the public interest at the expense of the criminal defendant
may be profound. On the one hand, it is unlikely that the Court will
move toward a communitarian jurisprudence at every level of criminal
prosecution. While the Court did apply communitarian principles to the
peremptory challenge, that practice, unlike the shields guaranteed by
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, is not constitutionally guaran-
teed. 10 5 It is therefore more susceptible to manipulation or change
based on policy- or community-oriented considerations. On the other
hand, however, the Court's eager defense of jurors' rights at the ex-
pense of defendants' rights signals a vision into criminal jurisprudence
which may inadequately protect defendants. The crucial next step must
be to interpret McCollum very narrowly.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE BATSON LINE OF CASES
The Supreme Court has charted a course for regulating peremptory
challenges to protect the equal protection rights ofjurors. The question
remains, however, how to define the scope of these rights. Under the
Court's current holdings, the rights of black prospective jurors can be
asserted by black criminal defendants (Batson), white criminal defend-
ants (Powers), civil litigants (Edmonson) and criminal prosecutors (McCol-
lum). What remains to be decided, however, is whether, as Justice
Thomas predicted in his McCollum concurrence, the same result must
ensue when the criminal defendants are black (or members of other mi-
nority groups) and the challenged jurors are white. Must the rights of
minority jurors not to be challenged peremptorily on the basis of race,
as so far defined by the Supreme Court, extend equally to whites? 10 6 An
analysis of the doctrinal and ideological concerns surrounding peremp-
tory challenges leads to the conclusion that the rules of the post-Batson
line of cases should not apply when the challenged jurors are white.
A. Doctrinal Analysis
There are two potential doctrinal arguments that reason against ap-
plying the Batson line of cases to challenges of white jurors. First, as a
matter of basic equal protection doctrine, differential treatment of white
jurors is arguably subject to a lower level of scrutiny than differential
treatment of blacks, or members of other suspect classes. 10 7 If the ter-
minology of levels of scrutiny were applied in peremptory challenge
105. See supra note 27.
106. The Supreme Court has rigorously applied strict race neutrality in other equal
protection contexts. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down
local ordinance designed to guarantee a certain percentage of work projects for minority-
owned businesses).
107. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969) ("Because the core of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified distinctions based
on race, racial classifications are 'constitutionally suspect, subject to the 'most rigid scru-
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cases, a party asserting the interests of white jurors not to be struck from
a jury on the basis of race would be required to prove that those jurors'
exclusion is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 108 Black
jurors, on the other hand, speaking through any of the above-named
parties, would only have to show that those jurors' exclusion is not nar-
rowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.
The terminology of levels of scrutiny has never been used in the
peremptory challenge cases, however, because "purposeful racial dis-
crimination," rather than racial classification, is involved in a prosecu-
tor's racially motivated use of peremptory challenges.' 0 9 The argument
that classification of whites is treated differently for equal protection
purposes is likely irrelevant, since the exclusion of white jurors could
still involve purposeful racial discrimination. Given that any purposeful
racial discrimination is presumptively prohibited by the Batson line of
cases, the question becomes whether a black defendant's striking of
white jurors constitutes "purposeful racial discrimination."
The second doctrinal reason for not applying McCollum in cases in-
volving white jurors involves the reality surrounding a black defendant's
challenge of white jurors, which strongly suggests that no such "pur-
poseful racial discrimination" is involved."10 In every significant per-
emptory challenge case that the Supreme Court has confronted to date,
all black members of the venire eligible to sit on the jury were struck.
White parties successfully sought all-white juries, believing that their
chances of acquittal (or conviction, in the case of the government)
before a jury of their racial peers were better.' I Therefore, the striking
of black jurors led to a jury of a particular racial composition.
Because blacks frequently constitute only a tiny percentage of the
venire, 112 black defendants striking white jurors often have a different
purpose in mind. Since they can seldom use peremptory challenges to
create juries made up entirely of their own race, black defendants may
strike white jurors in order to keep some representation of members of
their own race on the jury. They are trying to assure, rather than pre-
vent, racially mixed juries. The Supreme Court's equal protection rule,
designed to prevent exclusion of a certain race from a jury, does not also
bar the exclusion ofjurors whose race is not in danger of full exclusion.
In other words, while a black criminal defendant might strike a white
juror on the basis of race, as Justice Thomas hypothesized in McCollum,
tiny.' They 'bear a far heavier burden ofjustification' than other classifications." (citations
omitted)).
108. See id.
109. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
110. Indeed, as a practical matter, prosecutors arguing for a wooden application of
McCollum could often make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination when a black
defendant uses his peremptories to strike only white jurors (or, indeed, when any litigant
uses his peremptories to strike only white jurors). Such a broad application of the rule
would not advance the purposes of equal protection because the jury would likely retain a
high degree of white representation.
111. Obviously in Powers, the white defendant from whose jury the prosecutor had
struck all eligible blacks, fared poorly anyway.
112. See Colbert, supra note 2, at 88-93.
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the Batson line of cases would not require the review of those peremp-
tory challenges that McCollum describes. The Court's equal protection
doctrine forbids not all court-approved, race-conscious jury selection,
but only that race-conscious jury selection designed to perpetuate total exclu-
sion of one race.
McCollum held that a defense attorney's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude all the black members of the venire violated those ju-
rors' equal protection rights.1 3  Given twenty peremptory
challenges,1 4 the attorney could remove all 18 blacks from the jury ve-
nire.1 1 5 But such would not be the case were the scenario reversed.
Consider ChiefJustice Burger's hypothetical scenario in his dissent
in Batson.'" 6 There he predicted the holding of McCollum (that once
prosecutors were denied race-based peremptory challenges, defendants
would be as well), and declared that peremptory challenges would
shortly disappear altogether. He predicted dire consequences for all
criminal defendants:
Assume an Asian defendant, on trial for the capital murder of a
white victim, asks prospective jury members, most of whom are
white, whether they harbor racial prejudice against Asians. The
basis for such a question is to flush out any "juror who believes
that [Asians] are violence-prone or morally inferior .... " As-
sume further that all white jurors deny harboring racial preju-
dice but that the defendant, on trial for his life, remains
unconvinced by these protestations. Instead, he continues to
harbor a hunch, an "assumption," or "intuitive judgment," that
these white jurors will be prejudiced against him, presumably
based in part on race.'
1 7
Chief Justice Burger postulated that the Asian defendant would not be
able to strike these white, prejudiced jurors, and a racially biased verdict
would result.' 1
8
Doctrinally, however, Chief Justice Burger's in terrorem argument is
simply incorrect. The rights of those white jurors, asserted by the pros-
ecutor on their behalf, do not pose the same equal protection problem
as that in either Batson or McCollum because the Asian defendant cannot
strike all the white venire members and design for himself a fully Asian
jury. Whereas white defendants can exclude minority jurors to effect a
minority-free jury, minority jurors can generally only exclude whites to
effect a jury with some non-whites on it. This difference, rooted in
mathematical proportions and the parties' underlying motives, has con-
stitutional significance.
Justice Thomas also alluded to the question of whether black de-
113. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356-57 (1992).
114. Under Georgia law, a defendant gets 20 peremptory challenges when indicted for
an offense carrying a penalty of four or more years. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-165 (1990).
115. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2351.
116. Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
118. Id.
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fendants could strike white jurors in his concurrence in McCollum." 9
The NAACP, as amicus curiae in McCollum, urged that "whether white
defendants can use peremptory challenges to purge minority jurors
presents quite different issues from whether a minority defendant can
strike majority group jurors."' 20 Justice Thomas opined that the differ-
ence was illusory, and that while the issue "technically remains open, in
his opinion, the result would be the same if black defendants struck
white jurors.121 For the reasons we have identified, we believe that issue
does remain open, and that nothing in the prior case law compels the
conclusion Justice Thomas's concurrence might suggest. The Court's
focus on jurors' rights needs. a careful definition of those rights, not a
wooden application of McCollum to jurors of every race, even in the
name of race-blind, even-handed application of the law.
B. Ideological Considerations
Not only does a doctrinal analysis lead to the conclusion that the
Batson line of cases should not extend to the challenge of white jurors,
but ideological concerns also compel that conclusion. The communitar-
ian principles that drove the Court's shift from the rights of the defend-
ant to the equal protection rights ofjurors call for a consideration of the
likely effects of the Court's decisions on public confidence and trust in
the judicial system generally.
Justice Blackmun noted that when white defendants on trial for
"white on black" crime strike every black juror, the public recognizes
not only that the jurors have suffered an injustice, but also that the court
has sanctioned it. As mentioned previously, black defendants strike
white jurors either to ensure that some black jurors sit on the jury or to
eliminate those suspected of racial bias who cannot be identified during
the cause portion of the voir dire.' 2 2 When a court permits challenges
for either of those reasons, the public is less likely to perceive the same
injustice.
First, the white jurors struck are not members of a group which has
been historically excluded from jury service either de jure or de facto. '
23
The exclusion of white jurors from the trial of a black defendant, there-
fore, does not recall the historical exclusion of one particular group
based on an earlier, pernicious system of discrimination. Second, be-
cause of their historical institutional dominance, white citizens' faith in
the judicial system is not as precarious as that of black citizens, at least
with respect to service on juries, on which whites have always partici-
pated.' 24 Whites excused from ajury venire are not as likely to suspect
that the trial will go forward with utter disregard for them as a class,
119. 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. 112 S. Ct. at 2360 n.2 (quoting Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 3-4).
121. 112 S. Ct. 2360 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring).
122. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
123. See Colbert, supra note 2, at 88-93.
124. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1611,
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since their exclusion from the jury will not likely result in an all non-
white jury.
Finally, minority defendants who are rendered unable to strike
white jurors whom they suspect to be racially prejudiced are the most
likely to lose faith in the system. The purpose of the peremptory chal-
lenge-to protect defendants against prejudice favoring the state and to
encourage public confidence in jury verdicts-will be undermined just
as ChiefJustice Burger warned in his dissent in Batson. Widespread dis-
trust of the legal system among large minority communities hardly en-
sures the kind of united, law-abiding society the Court purportedly
wants.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has shown a consistent resolve to confront the
peremptory challenge-equal protection conflict by endorsing a compro-
mise solution: preserve peremptory challenges, but cabin them within
the bounds of equal protection. Doctrinally, the Court has altered its
focus from defendant to jurors in articulating the equal protection rights
at stake. It has underscored those jurors'-as a proxy for all of soci-
ety's-trust and confidence in the judicial system.
125
In deciding how far to extend the rules it adopted in the Batson line
of cases, the Court should closely examine the doctrinal and ideological
considerations that have motivated it thus far. The Court's commitment
to preserving peremptory challenges, while advancing the communitar-
ian concerns underlying jury service, argues for a narrow definition of
those jurors' rights. While McCollum subjected the peremptory chal-
lenges of black jurors by white criminal defendants to review, it would
be inconsistent with the Court's concerns both for the peremptory chal-
lenge and for the public's faith in the system to apply this rule mechani-
cally to the reverse situation. Race-conscious peremptory challenges are
not the inherent stain on the system. What offends equal protection and
the public's regard for that system are vestiges of white exclusion of mi-
norities from meaningful participation in civic life. To the extent per-
emptory challenges serve other purposes, they should be scrupulously
protected.
1613 (1985). See also Hagan & Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Injustice in
America, 88 AM.J. Soc. 329 (1982).
125. This compromise has still not clarified how courts should weigh defendants' and
jurors rights in every circumstance, however. Compare Ramseur v. Beyer, No. 90-5333, slip
op. at 22-23 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1992) (holding a judge's singling out of black grand jurors
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause where no juror was actually excluded, and
where the judge did not countenance racial prejudice against jurors so much as seek to
create a racially-balanced jury) with id. at 56-57 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasizing the
equal protection rights of criminal defendants whose cases are presented to cross-section
grand juries as opposed to randomly selected grand juries).
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As the most-litigated disease in our nation's history,' Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus-Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV-
AIDS) frequently challenges the courts to separate reasoned arguments
from arguments based on misinformation, prejudice and hysteria. A
major national study recently concluded that society subjects people af-
fected by HIV-AIDS to discrimination in employment, 2 health care,3 in-
surance 4 and criminal law. 5 The stigma of HIV disease 6 has particularly
* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. B.A., Col-
lege of William and Mary; M.I.A., Columbia University; J.D., University of Virginia. My
thanks to the Southwestern University School of Law Faculty Development Program for
support of this article, and to James Kushner, Michael Closen, Mark Cammack, Patricia
Leary and Kyle Brodie for their encouragement and assistance. The author presented an
earlier version of this Article at the Annual Meeting of the New York State Political Science
Association, Section on Judicial Process and Law in Buffalo, New York (Apr. 25, 1992).
The author of this article assisted in the preparation of the amici curiae brief submit-
ted by the American Psychological Association et al. to the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, 1992 WL 235412 (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992), affg
No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990). The views expressed in this article are those of
the author alone.
1. See Larry 0. Gostin, AIDS Litigation Project II: A National Survey of Federal, State, &
Local Cases Before the Courts and Human Rights Commissions (1991) (available from the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National AIDS Program Of-
fice). The AIDS Litigation Project (ALP) tallied 444 AIDS-related cases by June 1, 1989.
Eighteen months later, in January, 1991, the ALP recorded 372 cases (the vast majority
were not included in the earlier study). The ALP report provides expansive detail of both
discrimination against persons with HIV-AIDS and ignorance of scientific evidence con-
cerning the disease.
2. See, e.g., Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (awarding plaintiff
$157,888.18 in damages against employer who discharged plaintiff after learning he con-
tracted AIDS).
3. See, e.g., Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs brought suit
against Missouri Medicaid officials who denied Medicaid coverage for the anti-viral drug
AZT to AIDS patients eligible for Medicaid).
4. See, e.g., William Penn Life Ins. v. Sands, 912 F.2d 1359 (11 th Cir. 1990) (insurer
refused to pay coverage on life insurance of deceased, who died of AIDS, and sought to
rescind life insurance policy of deceased's beneficiary, who also had AIDS, although
neither applicant misstated his health status at time of application).
5. See, e.g., Wiggins v. State, 602 A.2d 212 (Md. App. 1989) (homosexual defendant
of unknown HIV status was, under order of the trial judge, escorted to and from court by
guards wearing rubber gloves).
6. Many health care professionals now view the term AIDS as arbitrary and outmo-
ded. Of broader application are the terms HIV illness and HIV infection, which encom-
pass the effects of HIV on those who have tested positive for antibodies to the virus, not
just those who fall within the prevailing definition of AIDS. See Michael Closen & Scott
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harsh consequences when criminal penalties are at stake. Controversial
results abound in criminal prosecutions of HIV-positive defendants.
One state court reinstated a conviction for attempted murder based
upon the defendant's spitting and throwing of blood.7 A federal appeals
court held that the bite of an HIV positive person constituted use of a
"deadly and dangerous" weapon in an assault prosecution. 8 In other
cases, criminal defendants diagnosed or merely perceived as HIV-posi-
tive were subject to irrational and humiliating courtroom treatment. 9
Constitutional challenges to criminal sodomy laws provide a valua-
ble setting for assessing the rationality ofjudicial response to HIV-AIDS
issues. In particular, homosexuals' legal challenges to these laws' pro-
scriptions of private, noncommercial, consensual, same-sex sexual activ-
ities raise two of the most provocative issues of our time: preventing the
spread of HIV-AIDS and protecting the right to privacy in intimate acts.
Courts face difficulty in resolving these challenges when supporters and
opponents of same-sex sodomy statutes raise emotionally charged HIV-
AIDS issues linked to a variety of complex medical, social and psycho-
logical concerns.
The effect of these arguments on courts and on legislatures is
profound. As one commentator noted: "The trend towards decriminal-
ization of gay sex has been halted by AIDS .... 10 Now that the AIDS
hysteria has abated somewhat, courts may again be willing to view the
sodomy issue rationally. In Commonwealth v. Wasson," the Kentucky
Supreme Court struck down the Kentucky same-sex sodomy law on state
constitutional grounds. The decision provided a ringing affirmation of
personal privacy rights and rejected irrational arguments based on HIV-
AIDS concerns. It remains an open question whether other courts will
take a similar view or will bend to popular pressures.
Part I of this Article places constitutional challenges to sodomy laws
in their legal context by surveying major state and federal cases con-
Isaacman, HIV-AIDS and Governmental Control of Information: International Denial of Human
Rights, 4 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 107, 111-14 (1992).
7. State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing trial court deci-
sion and reinstating attempted murder conviction).
8. United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988). For a critical view of the
decision in Moore, see Carlton D. Stansbury, Comment, Deadly and Dangerous Weapons and
AIDS: The Moore Analysis is Likely to be Dangerous, 74 IowA L. REV. 951 (1989) (concluding
that, although the court did not expressly rely on the defendant's HIV status to uphold the
conviction, the issue very likely influenced the outcome).
9. See, e.g., Wiggins, 602 A.2d at 212 (trial judge ordered guards to wear rubber
gloves and ordered jury not to touch trial exhibits, even though it was unknown whether
Wiggins was HIV-positive); Beason v. Harcleroad, 805 P.2d 700 (Or. App. 1991) (prosecu-
tors discover that suspect is homosexual and fabricated a story to news media that he was
gay, had AIDS and induced others to have unprotected sex while concealing illness); State
v. Hudson, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. Lexis 773 (Nov. 8, 1989) (leaving sacks marked "CAU-
TION, AIDS" within sight ofjury is not reversible error, even though the sacks were filled
with evidence from another trial).
10. Arthur Leonard, Report from the Legal Front: Gay/Lesbian Rights, THE NATION,July 2,
1990, at 12.
11. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, 1992 WL 235412 (Ky. Sept. 24,
1992), aff'g No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990).
[Vol. 70:2
STATE INTEREST IN HIV-AIDS ISSUES
fronting the issue. Part II examines how challenges to state sodomy
laws frame HIV-AIDS issues. The Article also evaluates the merits of
arguments based on HIV-AIDS with particular focus on state sodomy
laws. In conclusion, the Article proposes a reasoned basis for the
courts' responses to those arguments.
I. CRIMINAL PROSCRIPTIONs AGAINST CONSENSUAL
SAME-SEX SEXUAL AcTIvMEs
In 1986 the United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick 12
held that there is no federal constitutional right to privacy in consensual,
same-sex sexual activities. Thus, in the years since Hardwick, challengers
to sodomy laws have shifted their efforts from federal to state courts.
These efforts produced substantial recent success, most notably the
1992 Kentucky Supreme Court decision Commonwealth v. Wasson.l 3 As in
other areas of the law, litigants now find state courts far more receptive
than federal courts to claims based upon individual constitutional
liberties. 14
To uphold the criminalization of consensual, same-sex sexual activi-
ties against constitutional challenge, the courts must find sufficient gov-
ernment justification for the challenged statutes.' 5 In this context
supporters of the same-sex sodomy statutes raise the AIDS specter by
arguing that these statues effectively deter the spread of HIV-AIDS.
A. State "Sodomy" Statutes
In 1986 the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia sodomy law in Hard-
wick, 16 a case involving oral sex between two men in a private dwelling.
Today, criminal statutes in about twenty-one states continue to forbid
private, consensual, same-sex sexual activities.' 7 Contrary to common
12. 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
13. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG; see also State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992), No. D-2393 (Tex. argued Jan. 5, 1993); Michigan Organization for Human
Rights v. Kelly, No. 88-815820 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990). Even before Hardwick, courts
in Pennsylvania and New York had invalidated sodomy laws on constitutional grounds. See
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (invalid exercise of police power and
violation of equal protection); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 987 (1981) (violation of equal protection and right to privacy).
14. This trend has been the subject of substantial recent commentary. See, e.g., Kevin
Cullen, Scales Tip to State Courts: Rights Lawyers Avoiding Federal Route, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
28, 1991, at 1; W.John Moore, In Whose Court?, 23 NATIONALJ. 2396 (1991). The trend is
particularly notable in privacy and Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Moe v. Secretary of
Admin., 417 N.E.2d 382 (Mass. 1981) (rejecting holding in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980), and upholding the right to public funding of abortions under the state constitu-
tional right to privacy); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992) (rejecting holding in
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) and finding a legitimate expectation of privacy
in land based on the Fourth Amendment).
15. The particular level of governmental justification required depends upon the con-
stitutional basis for challenging the statute. See infra notes 34-68 and accompanying text.
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW at 9-10 (Harv. L. Rev. eds., 1989) [hereinafter
SEXUAL ORIENTATION]. The study lists twenty-four statutes, three of which have since been
invalidated by courts. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. The proscribed acts gener-
ally, but not uniformly, involve anal and/or oral sex. Some of these statutes also prohibit
1993] 339
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
belief, the states continue to invoke and enforce these criminal sodomy
statutes, albeit with less frequency. In the last six years, several state
challenges have been raised in connection with arrests and/or prosecu-
tions under these statutes. The Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the
state statute,' 8 while the highest state court in Kentucky and lower state
courts in Michigan and Texas invalidated the statutes.' 9
The underlying facts of Commonwealth v. Wasson illustrate the role of
state sodomy statutes. During 1985 the Lexington, Kentucky police de-
partment engaged in an undercover operation designed to generate
prosecutions under Kentucky's sodomy law. 20 Over a period of roughly
two months undercover police officers drove to an area they believed to
be frequented by homosexuals. The officers parked their cars and en-
gaged in conversations to determine if their targets would invite them to
engage in illegal sexual conduct. The police officers secretly recorded
the conversations, including a conversation with Mr. Wasson.2 1 After
talking with an undercover officer for twenty to twenty-five minutes, Mr.
Wasson invited the officer to his home.22 Before agreeing, the officer
asked about the activities involved. At the officer's prodding, Mr. Was-
son mentioned acts that were criminal under the Kentucky statute.
23
The officer departed at that point. 24 Mr. Wasson was arrested and sub-
sequently charged him with soliciting a criminal act. Both Mr. Wasson
and the officer were over twenty-one years old. The state did not allege
that there was any offer or exchange of money, or that any public or
private sexual activities occurred. The court postponed the trials of four
other people arrested under similar circumstances pending the outcome
of Mr. Wasson's constitutional challenge to the Kentucky sodomy law.
2 5
certain private consensual sexual activities between persons of the opposite sex. Prosecu-
tions for heterosexual sodomy sometimes occur in connection with other cimes, such as
rape, but rarely are brought when sodomy is the only crime charged. For an example of
one such case, see, e.g., State v. Bateman, 540 P.2d 732 (Ariz. App. 1975), vacated, 547 P.2d
6 (Ariz. 1976) (reinstating conviction), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976).
For ease of reference, this Article refers to all laws criminalizing consensual private
sexual activities as sodomy laws. For an overview of the specifics of these laws, see SEXUAL
ORIENTATION at 9-10 nn.l-6.
18. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
19. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, 1992 WL 235412 (Ky. Sept. 24,
1992), aff'g No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990); Michigan Organization for Human
Rights v. Kelly, No. 88-815820 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d
201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
20. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.100 criminalizes "deviate sexual intercourse" between
persons of the same sex. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.010(1) defines "deviate sexual inter-
course" as "any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one (1) person and
the mouth or anus of another."
21. Wasson, No 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. This description of the events, presented to the court by defense counsel, was not
contested by the state. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 3 (Ky.
Sept. 24, 1992), aff'g No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990).
25. See infra notes 34-68 and accompanying text.
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B. The Hardwick Decision
Considering the views of the current United States Supreme Court,
state court challenges will rest primarily on state rather than federal con-
stitutional grounds. 26 In Bowers v. Hardwick the Supreme Court rejected
a federal constitutional right to privacy challenge to Georgia's sodomy
law. 2 7 Justice Lewis Powell cast the deciding vote for the majority in a
five-to-four decision. Powell later repudiated the Court's decision. 2 8 In
Hardwick, the Court framed the issue as whether the constitution pro-
vides a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. With the
issue so framed, the Court found no fundamental right at stake and re-
jected the challenge. 29 The Court sustained the law merely by finding a
rational relationship between the challenged law and a legitimate gov-
ernmental justification. 30 This legitimate governmental justification was
the state's interest in regulating morality.
3 '
Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent. Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Stevens joined justice Blackmun in rejecting the majority's characteriza-
tion of the issue. The dissenters found the right involved to be " 'the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men', namely, 'the right to be let alone.' ",32 The dissent argued there
was no distinction between the sodomy statute and other privacy inva-
sions struck down by the Court, including the right to buy and use con-
26. SeeJuli A. Morris, Note, Challenging Sodomy Statutes: State Constitutional Protections for
Sexual Privacy, 66 IND. L.J. 609 (1991) (contending that federal due process challenges to
sodomy laws are futile after Hardwick).
27. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). Michael Hardwick was arrested in
his bedroom by a police officer who was present to serve papers on Mr. Hardwick in an
unrelated matter and who saw him having sex with another adult male. The charges were
not pursued, but Hardwick and a married couple brought a federal action seeking a decla-
ration that the Georgia statute, which criminalizes both homosexual and heterosexual sod-
omy, is unconstitutional. Finding that Hardwick, but not the married couple, had standing
to challenge the statute, the Eleventh Circuit went on to hold that the statute implicated a
fundamental right to privacy, and remanded for a determination of a compelling state
interest. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204-07, 1211 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478
U.S. 186 (1986).
Much has been written on state sodomy laws; the vast of majority of these writings are
critical of Hardwick and support the invalidation or repeal of sodomy laws. See, e.g. ,John C.
Sims, Moving Towards Equal Treatment of Homosexuals, 23 PAC. L.J. 1543 (1992); Norman
Vieira, Hardwick and the Right of Privacy, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181 (1988); SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION, supra note 17, at 9-27.
28. Anand Agneshwar, Powell Concedes Error in Key Privacy Ruling; Vote to Sustain Sodomy
Law At High Court Called Mistake, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26, 1990 at 1, col. 3. A majority of the
justices who decided the Hardwick decision would therefore hold that same-sex sodomy
statutes violate the right to privacy under the federal constitution. But, given that Justice
Powell, in addition to two of the Hardwick dissenters, Justice Brenna and the late Justice
Marshall, are no longer on the Court, Hardwick is not likely to be overturned in the near
future.
29. The Court held that the Constitution does not "extend a fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
30. Had the Court found that a fundamental right was at stake, then it would have had
to find that the statute was supported by a compelling state interest-a much more difficult
burden for the state to meet. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1454-
65 (2d. ed. 1988).
31. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
32. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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traceptives and the right to obtain an abortion.3 3 The dissent also
rejected the majority's state-interest analysis and found the state's inter-
est in enforcing morality ambiguous at best, thus that interest could not
alone sustain the statute.3 4 The Hardwick majority did not explicitly ad-
dress HIV-AIDS issues, but the dissent noted that the litigants and amici
curiae presented those issues to the Court.
3 5
C. Post-Hardwick Challenges to State Sodomy Laws
After Hardwick, litigants have primarily resorted to state courts in
their fights against same-sex sodomy laws. 36 As Hardwick noted, states
remain free to derive from their state constitutions higher levels of pro-
tection for individual rights than those provided by the federal Constitu-
tion.3 7 In contrast to the implicit right to privacy found in the United
States Constitution, some eleven state constitutions explicitly provide
for such rights.3 8 Courts in a number of other states have held that their
state constitutions contain various implied rights to privacy.3 9 Equal
protection provisions-as distinct from right to privacy provisions-of
both the federal and state constitutions may provide an additional basis
for successful challenges to sodomy laws.
40
1. Right to Privacy Challenges to State Sodomy Laws
While state constitutions need not recognize any right to privacy,
those constitutions may provide rights above and beyond those guaran-
33. Id. at 199-214.
34. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It
thus appears that under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-56 (1973), the dissent would have
required the state to show both a compelling state interest in the statute and the absence
of less burdensome alternatives. See Allan Ides, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Enigmatic Fifth
Vote and the Reasonableness of Moral Certitude, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 95 (1992).
35. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 208.
36. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. The Missouri Supreme Court up-
held such a statute in State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986), while the highest state
court in Kentucky and lower courts in Michigan and Texas have invalidated the statutes on
privacy grounds. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992), aff'g
No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992); Michigan Org. for Human Rights v. Kelly, No. 88-815820 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
9, 1990).
37. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
38. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 12; HAw. CONST. art. I, §§ 6,7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. , § 5;
Miss. CONST. art. III, § 23; MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH.
CONST. art. I, 7.
39. See, e.g., Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972) (right to privacy barred reten-
tion of non-conviction arrest records); State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979) (right to
privacy invalidated restrictive zoning ordinance banning alternative families); Jacobs v.
Benedict, 301 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ohio Misc. 1973), aff'd, 316 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio Ct. App.
1973) (right to privacy invalidated school limitations on hair length); In re B., 394 A.2d
419 (Pa. 1978) (right to privacy in psychiatric records); Texas State Employees Union v.
Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987)
(right to privacy in confidential personal information violated by policy of requiring em-
ployees to take polygraph test). Implied rights to privacy do not necessarily extend to the
right to engage in consensual sexual activity; as discussed herein, those issues remain to be
litigated on a case-by-case basis
40. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
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teed by the federal Constitution. Thus the notable federal right to pri-
vacy cases provide an important context for state constitutional
challenges to sodomy laws in that they provide a basis for state rights to
privacy and act as points of departure for creating higher levels of rights
than exist at the federal level.
The Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut41 set
forth the constitutionally based "right to privacy" as a matter of substan-
tive due process. The Court based the right on the "penumbras" of
various provisions of the Bill of Rights. 42 In Griswold the Court invali-
dated a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married
couples.4 3 The majority found that the statute violated a "fundamental"
right to privacy that is inherent in marriage and that no compelling state
interest supported the violation.
4 4
The Griswold decision provided the impetus for an initially rapid ex-
pansion of the newly articulated right to privacy. Later cases invoked
the right to privacy to overturn a statute prohibiting a person's viewing
of pornography in the home, 45 a statute prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives to an unmarried couple 46 and a statute prohibiting a wo-
man from obtaining an abortion. 4 7 The Court in Hardwick, however, de-
clined to extend the constitutional right to privacy to private,
consensual, same-sex sexual activities.
48
For this analysis the important point about Hardwick is its state in-
terest discussion. For a statute to survive a right to privacy challenge the
court must find a state interest that is sufficiently compelling to override
the particular privacy interest.4 9 How the court chooses to define the
privacy interest at stake is crucial. The Hardwick court found no funda-
mental right at stake by casting the issue as whether there is a right to
engage in homosexual sodomy50 rather than whether there is a right to be
left alone in the privacy of one's bedroom. The sole state interest iden-
tified by the Court, "majority sentiments about the morality of homosex-
uality," outweighed whatever privacy interest upon which the Georgia
statute infringed.
5 1
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. Id. at 484.
43. Id. at 485-86.
44. Id. at 485-86.
45. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
46. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972). This decision determined that
unmarried couples have the same right to privacy, under the equal protection clause, that
married couples have to use contraceptives. The court narrowly limited its consideration
of privacy rights to control over matters of procreation.
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 162-66 (1973).
48. Commentators across the political spectrum have criticized the Court's interpreta-
tion of its privacy cases in Hardwick. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 346
(Harv. Univ. Pres., 1992) ("the majority and concurring opinions in Hardwick betray a lack
of knowledge about the history and character of the regulation of sexuality"); TRIBE, supra
note 30, at 1422-35.
49. For a general discussion of the state interest analysis in the context of state sod-
omy law, see Ides, supra note 34, at 95.
50. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
51. Id. at 196. Critics have questioned this analysis. Judge Posner, for example, ar-
1993] 343
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
Because it did not find a fundamental right to privacy in consensual,
same-sex sexual activities among adults, the Court was able to apply a
rational basis test for the challenged statute. The Court thus avoided
the more serious analysis necessary to support the finding of a compel-
ling state interest.5 2 The Court's majoritarian view of the morality anal-
ysis has been rejected by most state courts53 and commentators 54 as not
being sufficient state interest to sustain sodomy laws.
Despite the Hardwick outcome, some state courts have found state
constitutional privacy rights in consensual, same-sex sexual activities, as
shown by the Wasson decision. 55 Wasson traced the philosophical and
historical bases of individual liberties and relied on an implied state
right to privacy to strike down the statute.56 The court rejected
majoritarian morality as a basis for the statute5 7 concluding that "immo-
rality in private which does 'not operate to the detriment of others' is
placed beyond the reach of state action by the guarantees of liberty in
the Kentucky Constitution."
'5 8
Other courts refuse to accept the United States Supreme Court's
framing of the issue as a right to engage in homosexual sodomy.5 9 The
state interest analysis in these cases has been and will be much more
extensive than that in Hardwick because such decisions identify privacy
interests that are more than minimally significant. 60
Although the Court in Hardwick did not explicitly discuss HIV-AIDS
issues, a number of briefs submitted to the Court did raise these con-
cerns. 6 1 State courts considering challenges to sodomy laws have di-
rectly addressed these issues when both upholding and invalidating
state statutes. 62 It is highly likely that state court challenges to same-sex
gues that the Court's state interest analysis more likely reflected unarticulated religious
principles than society's views of homosexuality. POSNER, supra note 48, at 345-46. For a
similar criticism, see Ides, supra note 31, at 104 ("Faith may well be a sufficient basis for
regulating one's own life; it does not, however, provide an adequate basis for regulating
the life of another through the iron fist of the state.").
52. Cf Texas State Employees Union v. Department of Mental Health & Mental Re-
tardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987) (the implied right of privacy in the Texas
constitution "should yield only when the government can demonstrate that an intrusion is
reasonably warranted for the achievement of a compelling governmental objective that can
be achieved by no less intrusive, more reasonable means").
53. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992), aff'g
No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E. 2d 936, 940 n.3
(N.Y. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50
(Pa. 1980); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). But see State v. Walsh,
713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
54. See POSNER, supra note 48, at 344-46; Ides, supra note 34, at 104.
55. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992), aff'g No. 86-
XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990).
56. Id. at 9-25.
57. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 31-33 (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 20.
59. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
60. See Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 31-33 (finding no rational basis for de-
nying homosexuals equal protection of the law).
61. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
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sodomy statutes will increase in frequency and that those challenges will
almost certainly implicate HIV-AIDS issues with a state interest analysis.
2. Equal Protection Challenges to State Sodomy Laws
The defendant in Hardwick did not present an equal protection chal-
lenge to the state sodomy statute, under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.6 3 Thus the nation's
highest court has not resolved the validity of a federal equal protection
challenge to sodomy laws. 64 State courts remain free to find rights
under state constitutional equal protection provisions even if the federal
Constitution does not provide such rights.
65
An equal protection challenge to a law may fall into one of three
categories on a sliding scale of required governmental interests. First,
courts strictly scrutinize laws based upon a suspect classification-a cate-
gory that so far encompasses only race, national origin, alienage and
religion. To sustain such a law, the court must find that the law is neces-
sary to achieve a compelling state interest and that there are no less
discriminatory alternatives. 66 Second, laws based on a quasi-suspect
classification, such as gender and illegitimacy, must be substantially re-
lated to an important state interest. 67 Third, for other classifications not
affecting fundamental interests, the court need only find a rational basis
for the law that meets a legitimate state interest.
68
Commentators argue that laws that classify on the basis of sexual
orientation should be subject to strict scrutiny because of the history of
63. The Georgia statute at issue in Hardwick applied to both homosexual and hetero-
sexual sodomy, thereby apparently precluding a facial challenge to the statute on the
grounds that it discriminated against homosexuals. As noted supra in note 27, the Hard-
wick majority only considered the statute as applied to homosexual activities because the
heterosexual challengers to the statute had been denied standing.
64. In the context of military service, a California federal district court applied the
federal Equal Protection Clause to homosexuals. Meinhold v. Department of Defense, CV
92-6044 TJH (JRx) (C.D. Cal. Jan 29, 1993). Analyzing the asserted bases for excluding
gay men and lesbians from the military, the court found the military's policy not to be
rationally related to permissable governmental goals. Meinhold v. Dep't of Defense, CV
92-6044, slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1993) (citing Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160,
1166-67, cert. den., 113 S. Ct. (1992). Commentators have long argued that equal protec-
tion analysis should apply to homosexuality. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation
and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988) (arguing that Hardwick left the door open for an equal protection
analysis applicable to homosexuality); Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Applica-
tion of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 797 (1984). Cf Sims, supra note 27, at 1562, 1565 (arguing that Hardwick likely fore-
closes successful application of federal equal protection analysis to homosexuality).
65. See, JAMEs KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.07 (1992).
66. See, eg., City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
67. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See, e.g. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
441 (illegitimacy-based classifications); Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (gender-based classifications).
68. See generally TRIBE, supra note 27, at 1440-4 1; SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 17,
at 15-16. The Meinhold court found that the military proscription against service by homo-
sexuals failed to meet even the rational basis test. Meinhold v. Dep't of Defense, CV 92-
6044 TJH (JRx) (C.C. Cal. Jan. 29, 1993).
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discrimination against gay men and lesbians. 6 9 So far, however, the
courts have subjected claims based upon sexual orientation classifica-
tions to the rational basis test.70 The Wasson court found that the chal-
lenged state sodomy statute failed even that test.7 1 The court rejected
the argument that morality provides a rational basis for the statute in
language that goes beyond equal protection analysis of earlier gay and
lesbian' rights cases.
72
The question is whether a society that no longer criminalizes
adultery, fornication, or deviate sexual intercourse between
heterosexuals, has a rational basis to single out homosexual
acts for different treatment. Is there a rational basis for declar-
ing this one type of sexual immorality so destructive of family
values as to merit criminal punishment whereas other acts of
sexual immorality which were likewise forbidden by the same
religious and traditional heritage of Western civilization are
now decriminalized? If there is a rational basis for different
treatment it has yet to be demonstrated in this case. We need
not sympathize, agree with, or even understand the sexual pref-
erence of homosexuals in order to recognize their right to
equal treatment before the bar of criminal justice.
73
Wasson demonstrates a sound basis substantiating a state constitu-
tional right to privacy or a federal or state constitutional right to equal
69. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1166. The view that sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic is now generally accepted among psychiatrists and psychologists.
See generally A. BELL, ET AL., SEXUAL PREFERENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN
(1981). In his recent book on law and sexuality, Judge Posner engages in an extensive
review of the social and empirical evidence on the issues of the origin of homosexuality
and the possibilities either that a more tolerant society will produce greater numbers of
homosexuals or that the young are susceptible to homosexual conversion. Judge Posner
concludes, "When we consider how difficult-how well-nigh impossible-it appears to be
to convert a homosexual into a heterosexual, despite all the personal and social advan-
tages to being a heterosexual in this and perhaps any society, the issue of homosexual
seduction, recruitment, or propaganda is placed in perspective. How much more difficult it
must be for homosexuals to convert a heterosexual into one of themselves!" POSNER,
supra note 48, at 298-99. It is perhaps only a matter of time before some courts begin to
recognize that sexual orientation is a category worthy of a high level of constitutional pro-
tection.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to establish that sexual orientation is a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification deserving of strict or intermediate scrutiny for equal
protection purposes, it is important to note that should courts adopt such scrutiny, the
state same-sex sodomy statutes will be far more difficult to justify.
70. See KUSHNER, supra note 65, at § 5.12; Meinhold v. Dep't of Defense, CV 92-6044
TJH (JRx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1993).
71. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 28-34 (Ky. Sept. 24,
1992) aff'g No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990). See also Citizens for Responsible
Behavior v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 654-56 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding homosexu-
als to be entitled to equal protection of the laws under the United States and California
constitutions, and applying a rational basis test to strike down an initiative that would have
banned anti-discrimination measures protecting homosexuals and those with HIV-AIDS).
72. Courts in New York and Pennsylvania relied upon the right of unmarried persons
to equal protection of the laws to invalidate state sodomy laws that applied to all unmar-
ried persons, including both heterosexuals and homosexuals. People v. Onofre, 415
N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (violation of equal protection and
right to privacy); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (invalid exercise of
police power and violation of equal protection).
73. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 32-33 (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992).
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protection of the laws. At a minimum the government must prove that a
law forbidding consensual, same-sex sexual activities bears a rational re-
lationship to a legitimate governmental interest. 74 It is in this context
that litigants and courts will raise HIV-AIDS policy issues with even
greater frequency in the years ahead.
II. HIV-AIDS ISSUES AS A BASIS FOR ARGUING STATE INTERESTS IN
SAME-SEX SODOMY LAWS
In cases from Hardwick to Wasson, litigants and amid curiae barraged
the courts with arguments on the impact that state sodomy laws have on
transmission of HIV-AIDS. Supporters of sodomy statutes argue that
the laws act both as a legal deterrent against high-risk activities and as a
moral condemnation of a life-style fostering health risks. 7 5 These argu-
ments have a surface appeal to courts. Even when not explicitly relied
upon, the arguments may be implicit in decisions upholding these laws.
Such arguments supporting same-sex sodomy statutes have the poten-
tial to feed into the bias that pervades the legal system in connection
with HIV-AIDS issues. These arguments deserve close scrutiny from a
rational viewpoint to eliminate prejudice and hysteria-based arguments.
A. The Transmission of HIV
Reports of the first cases of HIV-AIDS illness appeared in 1981.76
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the etiologic agent of HIV-
AIDS illness, can infect and destroy the body's immune system. 7 7 Cases
of documented HIV transmission include sexual contact which involves
the exchange of bodily fluids, infection with contaminated blood or
blood products and perinatal infection from mother to child. 78
Health care experts consider HIV-AIDS illness a global pandemic
affecting every country in the world. The illness has a particularly devas-
tating impact on African countries. 79 As of April, 1991, reports show
171,865 cases of AIDS in the United States.8 0 Approximately fifty-nine
percent of these reported cases were homosexual or bisexual men who
did not use intravenous drugs.8 ' Twenty-nine percent of the cases were
intravenous drug users, seven percent of whom were gay or bisexual
males. Six percent were heterosexuals who had sex with either an in-
fected person or someone in a high-risk group.8 2 In urban areas that
have high rates of intravenous drug use, intravenous drug users account
74. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 1440-41.
75. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
76. Abe M. Macher, HIV Disease/AIDS: Medical Background, in AIDS AND THE LAW 1
(Wiley L. Publications eds., 2d ed. 1992).
77. Anthony S. Fauci, The Human Immunodeficiency Virus: Infectivity and Mechanisms of
Pathogenesis, 239 SCIENCE 617-22 (1988).
78. Id. at 617; Macher, supra note 76, at 4-5.
79. Macher, supra note 76, at 4; Fauci, supra note 77, at 617.
80. Macher, supra note 76, at 5.
81. Id.
82. Id. The remainder of the cases included hemophiliacs and recipients of infected
blood, blood products or tissue.
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for a higher rate of new AIDS cases than do gay men.8 3 The Centers for
Disease Control estimates that, by the end of 1993, there would be a
total of 390,000-480,000 cases of AIDS reported in the United States.
8 4
B. HIV-AIDS Issues in Challenges to Sodomy Laws
1. Background
Since AIDS became a matter of public concern in the early 1980s,
litigants have raised HIV-AIDS issues in challenges to sodomy laws. In
Baker v. Wade, 85 a pre-Hardwick decision, opponents of a federal chal-
lenge to the Texas sodomy law argued "the public health and safety of
all citizens of Texas will be harmed if the spread of AIDS is not
stopped," and that the sodomy law was essential "to combat the AIDS
menace." 8 6 The District Court rejected that argument and held the stat-
ute invalid. 8 7 The Fifth Circuit reversed, upholding the statute on
grounds similar to those used in Hardwick.88 While not explicit in the
Fifth Circuit's opinion, HIV-AIDS issues probably had some impact on
the court's decision.
8 9
In Hardwick, the state argued in its brief on appeal that the compel-
ling state interest in preventing the spread of HIV-AIDS favored Geor-
gia's sodomy statute.90 An amicus brief supporting the state's position
argued that the statute was necessary to deter "potentially lethal behav-
ior," that is, homosexual activities leading to the transmission of HIV. 9 '
Although the majority opinion did not directly address HIV-AIDS, the
Hardwick dissent criticized the briefs submitted in favor of the law for
making groundless arguments that the statute supported public policy
goals.
9 2
Efforts to use HIV-AIDS issues as an explicit basis for upholding
sodomy laws came to fruition in State v. Walsh, a 1986 Missouri Supreme
83. Id.
84. Id. at 17. The recent change in the definition of AIDS means that these numbers
are dramatically understated. The United States Center for Disease Control and Preven-
tion ("CDC") has included three additional diseases the appearance of which in an HIV-
positive person will result in an AIDS diagnosis, and has also added to the AIDS definition
a drop in the number of CD4 cells, or T-cells, to 200 per cubic millimeter of blood. The
CDC estimates that the new definition will produce an increase in the number of the coun-
try's new AIDS patients by seventy-five percent in 1993. Sheryl Stolberg, New AIDS Defini-
tion to Increase Tally, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1992, at 1.
85. 106 F.R.D. 526, 528-29 (N.D. Tex. 1985), rev'don other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). For a fuller analysis of the Baker decision, see
Charles Spiegel, Privacy, Sodomy, AIDS & Schools: Case Studies in Equal Protection, 1986 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 221, 241-47.
86. Baker, 106 F.R.D. at 528-29.
87. Id. at 534-35.
88. 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985). See Spiegel, supra note 85, at 246; Susan Mc-
Guigan, The AIDS Dilemma: Public Health v. Criminal Law, 4 J. L. & INEqUALrry 545, 567-68
(1986).
89. See McGuigan, supra note 88, at 568.
90. Brief for Petitioner at 37, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1985). See Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 290 n.3 (1985).
91. Brief for David Robinson, Jr., as Amicus Curiae at 5, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1985).
92. 478 U.S. at 208 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Court decision. 93 The Walsh court upheld the state's sodomy statute by
relying on the state's interests in morality and in deterring activities
leading to the spread of HIV-AIDS:
We further find that [the challenged statute] is rationally re-
lated to the State's concededly legitimate interest in protecting
the public health. The State has argued that forbidding homo-
sexual activity will inhibit the spread of [AIDS].
94
Thus, with Walsh, the HIV-AIDS rational for upholding same-sex sod-
omy statutes became explicit.
2. The Wasson Decision
Supporters of laws prohibiting same-sex sexual activities continue
to forcefully make arguments like those relied upon by the Walsh court.
Recently, litigants have also used these arguments to try to roll back
state courts' recognition of the right to privacy. In Commonwealth v. Was-
son,9 5 the litigants squarely addressed HIV-AIDS as a justification for
sodomy laws.
In Wasson, the trial court conducted an extensive hearing on the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the charges. The court heard testimony
from defense experts in cultural anthropology, theology, social history,
psychology and medicine. 96 The state offered no evidence. Initially, the
court found the Kentucky constitution's explicit right to privacy broader
than the implied federal constitutional right to privacy.9 7 The court
then invalidated the statute on the ground that it "clearly seeks to regu-
late the most profoundly private conduct and in so doing impermissably
[sic] invades the privacy of the citizens of this state." 9 8 On appeal, the
intermediate court affirmed the trial court's action striking down the
statute on privacy grounds. 9 9 In addition, the appellate court found the
law violated Kentucky's constitutional guarantee to equal protection of
the laws by criminalizing certain conduct with a person of the same sex
but not the same conduct with persons of the other sex. 10 0
The state appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court. In its brief on
appeal the state raised the AIDS-HIV specter in stark language:
The record before this Court contains undisputed testimony
that homosexuals are more promiscuous than heterosexuals,
93. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
94. Id. at 512.
95. No. 86M859 (Ky. Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1986). The defendant was charged with solic-
iting sodomy in the fourth degree, and challenged the underlying sodomy statute rather
than the solicitation statute. The Kentucky statute criminalizes "deviate sexual inter-
course" between persons of the same sex. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1990). Section 510.010(1) defines "deviate sexual intercourse" as "any act of sex-
ual gratification involving the sex organs of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of
another." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990). This statute is
typical in defining sodomy as oral or anal sex between persons of the same gender.
96. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 3-5 (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992).
97. Wasson, No. 86M859, slip op. at 2-3 (Ky. Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1986).
98. Id.
99. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990).
100. Id. at 13-14.
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that infectious diseases are more readily transmitted by anal
sodomy than by any other form of sexual copulation, that
homosexuals account for 73% of all AIDS cases in the United
States, that homosexuals enjoy the company of children, and
that homosexuals are more prone to engage in sex acts in pub-
lic than are heterosexuals.' 0 '
In one stroke the state argued that homosexuals are promiscuous, are
child-molesters and are responsible for the spread of HIV.' 0 2 The state
concluded that public health considerations alone justified the sodomy
statute. 103
The four-justice majority of the Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly
rejected this argument. The court found that the sodomy statute did not
fit the State's alleged public health goal. 10 4 Three justices dissented in
two separate opinions strongly arguing that HIV-AIDS provided a legiti-
mate basis for upholding the statute. 10 5 The dissenters adopted the
standard argument of supporters of same-sex sodomy laws: 1) same-sex
sexual activities account for a disproportionate percentage of the trans-
mission of HIV; 2) sodomy laws deter such activities and 3) this provides
a rational basis for upholding these laws. 10 6 It is important to analyze
these points carefully given judicial receptiveness to this argument.
C. HIV-AIDS as a Basis for Upholding Sodomy Statutes
If upholding a crime of consensual, same-sex sexual activity re-
quires only a rational basis, the lowest level of governmental justifica-
tion, then the goal of promoting the public health provides supporters
of sodomy statutes with a facially powerful argument.' 0 7 The Supreme
Court has long held that states may exercise their police power by pass-
ing laws designed to promote public health and safety, such as laws re-
quiring immunizations.10 8 Supporters of sodomy statutes argue that the
statutes are reasonably related to the legitimate governmental goal of
inhibiting the spread of HIV without being arbitrary and capricious in so
101. Brief of the State of Kentucky at 22, Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-
TG, 1992 WL 235412 (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992). The 73% figure was outdated at the time this
brief was submitted. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
102. In rejecting the state's state interest analysis, the Kentucky Supreme Court termed
the quoted passage as "simply outrageous." Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 31.
103. Brief of the State of Kentucky at 22, 42-43, Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG.
104. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 32. Accord, State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d
201, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
105. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 15 (Lambert, J., dissenting); id. at 19
(Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 15-16 (Lambert, J., dissenting); id. at 5-6, 19, 22-23 (Wintersheimer, J.,
dissenting).
107. At least one court has required the government to show a compelling state inter-
est to justify a state sodomy law. Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 205 (finding no compelling state
interest in same-sex sodomy statute).
108. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (finding that law requiring small-
pox immunizations does not violate due process because threat to public health outweighs
burden on individual rights). See generally Chris D. Nichols, Note, AIDS-A New Reason to
Regulate Homosexuality, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 315, 332-38 (1984) (pre-Hardwick discussion of
state interest in regulating same-sex sexual activities).
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doing. 10 9 Because the government has a legitimate goal in inhibiting
the spread of HIV, the question becomes whether the law reasonably
relates to that goal.
1. HIV-AIDS Issues in Other Contexts
The Wasson decision explicitly rejected public health arguments,
based on HIV-AIDS, made in support of the Kentucky sodomy law. Per-
haps other courts will now review those arguments in a more rational
light. Courts, legislatures and regulators show some willingness to re-
ject arguments based primarily upon HIV-AIDS hysteria in non-criminal
areas of public policy. Perhaps the most significant shift in this respect
has occurred with respect to access to educational facilities. In the early
days of the epidemic well-publicized efforts were made to keep students
with HIV disease out of the schools." l0 Irrational and ill-informed be-
liefs about the methods of HIV transmission formed the basis of such
efforts. I I I
Some courts have come to reject efforts to prevent access to educa-
tional facilities as groundless and discriminatory. For example, in Board
of Education v. Cooperman,112 the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1987 re-
jected attempts to exclude students with HIV illness from classrooms.
Two years earlier the New Jersey Commissioners of Health and Educa-
tion jointly issued guidelines for admitting HIV infected children to the
schools. The Commissioners based the policy upon "epidemiological
studies indicating 'that AIDS is not transmitted through casual contact
as would be present in the school environment.' "1113 Local school
boards challenged the policy, and sought to bar such students from
schools even though the boards had medical opinions concluding a ban
was not medically-supportable." 4 Citing regulations granting local
boards some discretion to exclude students with contagious diseases,
the school boards argued they had the power to bar students from pub-
lic schools on health grounds." t 5 The New Jersey Supreme Court up-
held the Commissioners' power to issue regulations binding on the local
boards.' 16 The court conceded that the local boards had some power to
exclude students for health reasons.1 1 7 The majority, however, went on
to state:
[That power must be exercised reasonably. Like other government
109. A true reasonableness analysis is missing from the majority opinion in Hardwick.
See, e.g., Ides, supra note 34, at 101-05.
110. The most publicized case involved Ryan White, a young AIDS patient initially de-
nied access to public schools. See Indiana Judge Allows AIDS Victim Back in School, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1986, at 14, col. 16. See also Gene Schultz, AIDS: Public Health and the
Criminal Law, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 65, n.122 (1988).
111. See Larry Gostin, A Decade of a Maturing Epidemic: An Assessment and Directions for
Future Public Policy, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. Emics & PuB. PoL'y 7 (1990).
112. 523 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1987).
113. Id at 657.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 659.
116. Id. at 660.
117. Id.
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actors, the school board cannot act in an arbitrary fashion, es-
pecially when a child's right to an education is at stake. Reason-
ableness in the present context clearly involves appropriate deference to
medical expertise .... [A]ll the medical experts and medical au-
thorities agreed that the presence of the AIDS virus in the chil-
dren did not by itself pose any danger to other children or to
the child the board wished to exclude.
118
The court upheld the Commissioners' policies and found them binding
on the local boards.119
Mandatory testing for HIV and disclosure of HIV infection provide
the courts with another context for examining the rationality of public
health arguments based on HIV-AIDS. In New York State Society of Sur-
geons v. Axelrod, 120 the New York Court of Appeals considered whether
the New York Public Health Law must list HIV infection as a communi-
cable and sexually transmittable disease. When the Commissioner of
Health would not designate the disease as such, four New York medical
societies sued to require the designation. 121 The effect of the requested
designation would have been to authorize mandatory testing and con-
tact tracing in appropriate cases. 122 The Court of Appeals rejected the
medical societies' claim by finding that the Commissioner's decision was
not arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, the court found that voluntary
testing would foster cooperation with public health officials and main-
tain confidentiality. 12 3 The court showed a strong deference to medical
and psychological evidence presented by the Commissioner concerning
public health and HIV-AIDS.
124
In civil and regulatory contexts courts have increasingly shown a
sensitivity to medical evidence about HIV-AIDS in evaluating the ration-
ality of laws, regulations and policies. Courts in these civil cases have
generally not been confined by federal constitutional analysis in reach-
ing these results. Nonetheless, in cases where the stigma of criminal
conviction and the loss of liberty are at stake, courts should be at least as
careful when examining the rationality of arguments based upon HIV-
AIDS issues.
2. HIV-AIDS Issues in the Context of Sodomy Laws
Supporters of same-sex sodomy proscriptions invoke HIV-AIDS
concerns as a legitimate basis for upholding the statutes. Because of the
potential for irrational analysis in this context, courts should question
and evaluate the arguments carefully.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 662. For a similar result, based upon equal protection analysis, see District
27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
120. 572 N.E.2d 605 (N.Y. 1991).
121. Id. at 606.
122. Id. at 608.
123. Id. at 609.
124. Id. at 610.
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a. Do same-sex sodomy statutes correlate with the stated public health
goals?
Statutes criminalizing same-sex sexual activities generally outlaw all
oral and anal sex between persons of the same sex.' 25 At least one court
went further to uphold a state sodomy statute criminalizing contact be-
tween the genitals of one person and the hand of another person of the
same sex. 12 6 These statutes thus criminalize a broad range of sexual
activities between consenting adults.
Upon close analysis such statutes bear no rational relationship to
the goal of reducing the rate of transmission of HIV. The highest rate of
HIV sexual transmission occurs during anal-genital or vaginal-genital
contact. 127 Given this scientific fact, these statutes are both under-inclu-
sive and over-inclusive. The statutes are under-inclusive because they
do not proscribe extremely high-risk activities among heterosexuals,
such as the risk of male-to-female transmission during anal or vaginal
intercourse.128 At least two courts have acknowledged the disparity be-
tween the stated public health goal and the statutes' coverage when
striking down same-sex sodomy laws.
129
When compared to the asserted public health goal, these statutes
are also blatantly over-inclusive. First, some statutes criminalize hand-
genital contact among persons of the same sex. Such activity does not
involve an exchange of bodily fluids and therefore carries minimal risk
of HIV transmission. Second, the risk of HIV transmission during anal-
genital contact depends to a substantial degree upon whether a condom
is used.13 0 The same is true for oral-genital contact, which entails a far
lower degree of risk than anal intercourse.' 3 ' Third, lesbians as a group
historically run an extremely low risk of HIV transmission. ' 3 2 In light of
current transmission patterns, outlawing sex between women does not
further any substantial public health goal.' 3 3 Therefore a significant
125. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1992) ("A person commits the offense of
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another.")
126. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986). The defendant in Walsh allegedly felt
a police officer's genitals through the officer's pants. This activity obviously bears no rela-
tionship with the stated public health goal.
127. Nancy Meuller, The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodefiency Virus Infection, 14
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 250 (1986).
128. Mary E. Guinan & Ann Hardy, Epidemiology of AIDS in Women in the United States, 257
JAMA 2039 (1987); Meuller, supra note 127.
129. After acknowledging the "superficial appeal" of the state's argument based on
HIV-AIDS, the Wasson court noted, "The only medical evidence in the record before us
rules out any distinction between male-male and male-female anal intercourse as a method
of preventing AIDS." Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 32 (Ky.
Sept. 24, 1992). Accord, State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) ("We
note that [the challenged sodomy statute] does not prohibit similar heterosexual conduct
that may carry a high risk of transmitting sexual diseases").
130. Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 17 (1986). See generally
Warren Winkelstein, Jr., et al., Reduction in Human Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission Among
Homosexual/Bisexual Men, 1982-1986, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 685 (1987).
131. Winkelstein, supra note 130.
132. Mueller, supra note 127, at 256.
133. Id.
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percentage of prohibited activity bears little or no relationship to the
stated public health goal, while unprohibited activity involves far greater
risks of HIV transmission.
In historical terms, the public health argument in support of same-
sex sodomy laws is even more dubious. As one Texas court noted, legis-
latures enacted these laws before the onset of the AIDS epidemic and
could not have intended that the statutes prevent transmission of
HIV. 134 Instead of relying on sodomy laws ill-suited to preventing the
spread of HIV-AIDS, some legislatures have considered and enacted
laws specifically criminalizing conduct that threatens the transmission of
HIV. 135 Whether such laws reflect sound public policy or not, those
legislatures did not find sodomy laws an effective deterrent mechanism.
The lawmakers more properly -sought to enact measures relating specifi-
cally to the HIV-AIDS issue.
13 6
Even assuming, contrary to the available evidence, that the sodomy
statutes only proscribe activities that constitute a public health threat,
the question remains whether same-sex sodomy laws actually deter the
criminalized activity. The premise of the deterrence rationale is that
criminal law has the inherent capacity to discourage people from acting
upon their basic sexual desires. Not surprisingly, the available evidence
shows otherwise.' 3 7 Moreover, as authorities enforce sodomy laws spo-
radically, it is doubtful that the laws have any real deterrent effect.'
3 8
The criminalized activity is largely undetectable and wide spread prose-
cution is extremely unlikely as the prohibited activity generally occurs in
the privacy of the home.'
3 9
A careful analysis of the scientific and medical evidence shows that
same-sex sodomy statutes ill-fit the stated public health goal of prevent-
ing the spread of HIV-AIDS. 140 The statutes by design do not fulfill
those goals and are ineffective in deterring the proscribed activities.
134. The district court in Baker v. Wade thus rejected the argument that the Texas
sodomy law was designed to inhibit the spread of HIV. Baker v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526,
534-35 (N.D. Tex. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986). However, the Walsh court upheld the Missouri sodomy law on pub-
lic health grounds, even though the legislative history reveals that the Missouri legislature
did not consider public health issues when enacting the state sodomy laws. State v. Walsh,
713 S.W.2d 508, 511-13 (Mo. 1986) See Schultz, upra note 110, at 73 n.43 (1988).
135. Donald Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST. Louis U.
L. REV. 351 (1990).
136. For a listing of legislatures that, as of 1990, had enacted or were considering such
statutes, see Hermann, supra note 135, at 370 n.106.
137. MARTIN S. WEINBERG & COLIN J. WILLIAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALS: THEIR
PROBLEMS AND ADAPTATIONS (1974); Gilbert Geis, Reported Consequences of Decriminalization of
Consensual Adult Homosexuality in Seven States, 1 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 419 (1976).
138. See Hermann, supra note 135, at 355.
139. See Schultz, supra note 110, at 76.
140. Cf. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct.
1986) (finding no rational relationship between policy of excluding HIV-positive children
from public school and goal of inhibiting spread of HIV).
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b. What likely effects do same-sex sodomy statutes have on HIV-
AIDS prevention and health care concerns?
There are powerful arguments that same-sex sodomy laws do not
promote, but rather undermine, public health efforts to prevent HIV-
AIDS transmission and to ensure better health care among those with
HIV-AIDS illness. 14 1 The arguments point to the statutes' effects on
education and treatment efforts, and on the psychological health of
those at risk for HIV-AIDS.
There are powerful arguments that same-sex sodomy laws interfere
with efforts to educate the public about safer sex practices. Such inter-
ference is an explicit goal of at least some supporters of laws.1 4 2 This
interference can occur in several ways. For example, closeted gay or
bisexual men most in need of education have limited contacts within the
gay community and little access to educational materials. For such peo-
ple, the stigma of acknowledging their practice of illegal activities deters
them from seeking out the information they may need to protect their
health.' 43 Another deterrence is the fear of identification and prosecu-
tion. Criminal sodomy laws could particularly deter any gay or bisexual
man living in an area without an organized gay community. Such an
individual would not likely come forward and seek information about
HIV-AIDS.
In states with criminal prohibitions of same-sex sexual activities
public health officials face a hard choice. The officials can either inform
the public about safer-sex activities that are illegal or allow ignorance
and the heightened risk of HIV transmission to prevail. The statutes
141. Many of these arguments were made to the Kentucky Supreme Court in Wasson by
amici curiae American Psychological Association, et al. Brief for American Psychological
Association, et al., as Amicus Curiae, Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG (Ky.
Sept. 24, 1992).
142. A group of amici curiae argued in Wasson that efforts to overturn same-sex state
sodomy laws are part of a "widely publicized homosexual agenda" which also includes
-[u]se [of] tax dollars to fund homoerotic AIDS/sex-education in all grades." Brief of
Citizens for Decency Through Law, Inc., et al., as Amici Curiae, at ii, Wasson, 90-SC-558-
TG.
The alleged agenda consisted of:
1) Legalize lesbian/gay marriages; 2) Give lesbians/gays parental and adoptive
rights; 3) Classify HIV-positive/AIDS carriers as disabled; 4) Enact "hate crimes"
laws to include sexual orientation; 5) Use tax dollars to fund homoerotic AIDS/
sex-education in all grades; 6) Amend laws to prohibit discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, public accommodations and public services; 7) Prohibit the mili-
tary from excluding anyone because of sexual preference; 8) Repeal all state
sodomy laws; 9) Repeal laws controlling the age of sexual consent.
Id. (citing Concerned Women for America, Concerned Women, Washington, D.C., March
1991).
143. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, How EFFEC-
TIVE Is AIDS EDUCATION? 12 (1988) (showing substantial reductions in unprotected high-
risk activities from 1985 to 1987). Recent studies have likewise reported dramatic efforts to
engage in safer-sex and reduce the risk of HIV transmission in places where there have
been effective public education efforts. See, e.g., Maria L. Ekstrand & Thomas J. Coates,
Maintenance of Safer Sexual Behaviors and Predictors of Risky Sex: The San Francisco Men's Health
Study, 80 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 973 (1990); Marshall H. Becker & Jill G. Joseph, AIDS and
Behavioral Change to Reduce Risk: A Review, 78 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 394 (1988).
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appear more likely to lead to an increase rather than a decrease in rates
of HIV transmission.
Besides chilling education efforts, the criminalization of same-sex
sexual activities could actually foster unsafe sex. 14 4 Criminal law in
states with same-sex sodomy statutes condemns homosexual expression
of affection and sexuality and casts homosexuals as social deviants. So-
cial stigmatization leads to prejudice and homophobia. Those gay peo-
ple who are unable to cope with this prejudice may internalize it and
become, in clinical terms, troubled and dysfunctional.' 4 5 The resulting
loss of self-esteem and development of self-hatred could lead to behav-
ior that is both psychologically and physically self-destructive.
14 6
Finally, prevention and treatment of HIV-AIDS depends upon con-
tinuing research and treatment. Same-sex sodomy laws deter gay men,
as a high risk group, from providing information to health officials and
researchers. The laws discourage homosexuals from seeking prompt
and adequate testing, counseling and medical care. Thus these laws un-
dermine the very public health goals upon which states rely in seeking to
sustain the laws.
Upon careful analysis the criminalization of consensual, private,
same-sex sexual activities between adults does far more harm than good.
The statutes deter those at risk from seeking essential information and
prevent public health educators from disseminating needed information
to the public to the fullest possible extent. The psychological data show
that criminalizing and stigmatizing sexual acts in which a large portion
of the population engages may promote rather than deter dangerous
activities while preventing education and treatment efforts.
III. CONCLUSION
Challenges to same-sex sodomy laws remain controversial. The
Kentucky Supreme Court in Wasson invoked an individual's right to pri-
vacy and equal protection of the laws when overturning a sodomy stat-
ute. It is, however, unclear whether Wasson signals a trend or is an
aberration in the age of HIV-AIDS. It does appear certain that state
courts will be the primary avenue of challenge so long as the United
States Supreme Court maintains its present ideological course.
As the Wasson and Morales decisions show, courts presented with
challenges to same-sex sodomy laws also appear increasingly aware of
and sensitive to the medical and scientific realities of HIV-AIDS. Cases
that deal directly or, as with challenges to sodomy laws, indirectly with
HIV-AIDS issues present several challenges to the courts. One impor-
tant challenge is to allow reason to prevail in an area fraught with the
144. See generally John Gonsiorek, Psychotherapeutic Issues with Gay and Lesbian Clients, in
INNOVATIONS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE: A SOURCEBOOK (Peter A. Keller & Lawrence C. Ritt,
eds., 1984).
145. E.g., John Gonsiorek & James Rudolph, Homosexual Identity, in HOMOSEXUALITY:
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 161-76 (John C. Gonsiorek ed., 1991).
146. Id.
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potential for irrational responses. Courts have increasingly managed to
come forward with reasoned responses in areas such as public educa-
tion, mandatory HIV testing and confidentiality.
When viewed carefully, the overwhelming weight of the evidence
now available shows that same-sex sodomy statutes do not promote
public health goals but rather are counter-productive. The issue needs
more study to determine the extent to which state sodomy laws in fact
have a detrimental effect on HIV-AIDS health care concerns. At a mini-
mum, it is certain that the "state interest" in these laws is much more
complex than the laws' supporters have acknowledged and that asser-
tions of such interest deserve careful scrutiny by the courts.

EMPLOYMENT SUITS AGAINST INDIAN TRIBES:




The proliferation of employment suits in state and federal courts is
mirrored in the courts of Indian tribes I that employ people in tribal gov-
ernment and commercial enterprises. The employment relationship
provides a fertile source of litigation in federal and state courts; not only
is it heavily regulated by statute, but numerous common law theories
have developed in response to specific adverse employment actions. As
sovereign governments, Indian tribes are exempt from most federal and
state employment laws.2 However, employment actions are frequently
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D., Northwest-
ern University; B.A., M.A., University of Illinois at Chicago. I am grateful to my friends
and colleagues for their encouragement and support, particularly to Michael Limas, Gloria
Valencia-Weber and Judith Royster. I also thank Kenneth Factor for his research
assistance.
1. Because this article concerns the impact of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301-03 (1988 & Supp. II. 1990), on tribal employment, the definition of "Indian tribe"
contained in § 1301 of that Act will be used:
(1) "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as possessing powers of self-
government;
(2) "powers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all of-
ficesbodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed.
Indian Civil Rights Act § 1301. I have also chosen the term "Indian" rather than "Native
American" to differentiate between native peoples affected by the statutes and cases dis-
cussed here and those who are not, such as Native Hawaiians, who are currently pressing
for federal recognition of their sovereign status. The Hawaiian Senate has recently pro-
posed "A Bill for an Act Relating to Hawaiian Sovereignty," S.B. No. 3486, 16th Legis.
(1992), a purpose of which is to "call upon the President and the Congress of the United
States ... to re-recognize and assist the re-establishment of a sovereign indigenous Hawai-
ian government .... " "As an initial step," the bill continues, "redress requires recogni-
tion of indigenous Hawaiian rights of self-determination to a degree at least equal to those
exercised by Indian and Alaskan tribes or nations." S.B. No 3486, at § 3.
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988) ("Title VII"),
expressly excludes Indian tribes from the definition of "employers" who may not discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin. Title VII § 2000e(b); see
also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547-48 (1974); Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d
670 (10th Cir. 1980). The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101-12213
(Supp. 1992) ("ADA") also excludes Indian tribes from its definition of "employer." ADA
§ 1211 1(5)(B). Although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621-34
(1988) ("ADEA"), contains no such exclusion, see ADEA § 630(b), that Act's definition of
"employer" has been construed, on the basis of tribal sovereignty, to exclude Indian tribes
as well. EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989). But see Myrick v. Devils
Lake Sioux Mfg. Corp., 718 F. Supp. 753 (D. N.D. 1989), which reached a different conclu-
sion as to the amenability of tribes to suits alleging violations of Title VII and the ADEA by
nonmember employees. In addition, the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141-
88 (1988), has been held not to apply to Indian tribes. Roberson v. Confederated Tribes,
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brought against Indian tribes under the Indian Civil Rights Act
("ICRA"), 3 which requires tribes, inter alia, to afford equal protection
and due process rights to people in their employ. 4 In the context of
employment, such rights may arise from personnel practices, policies or
procedures. Lawsuits against tribes alleging ICRA violations in employ-
ment actions are becoming more commonplace.
5
However, many ICRA suits are dismissed by tribal courts. While
this is an effective strategy for eliminating tribal liability, it creates other
problems for tribes. With the exception of habeas corpus actions, which
can be heard in federal courts, 6 tribal courts are generally the only fo-
rums available for ICRA claims. 7 In response to ICRA suits against
them in tribal courts, some tribes assert the defense of sovereign immu-
nity. Ironically, use of the sovereign immunity defense raises a number
of potential threats to tribal sovereignty. Aggrieved tribal employees
either find themselves with no forum or one they perceive as biased.
8
Tribal judges criticize the use of the sovereign immunity defense by
103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2749 (1980); Ft. Apache Timber Co., 221 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH)
28,872 (1976). The minimum wage and hour laws mandated by the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988), were held not to apply to Indian tribes in Martin v. Great
Lakes Fish & Wildlife Comm., 61 U.S.L.W. 2262 (D. Wis. Nov. 3, 1992) (application of the
law to tribes "would be a significant intrusion into the internal affairs of the tribes and
their tribal organization and would impinge upon the tribes' rights of self-governance").
However, courts are divided as to whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. § 651 (1988) ("OSHA"), applies to tribes. Compare Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prod-
ucts Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982) (application of OSHA to tribe would infringe
upon tribal sovereignty and right to self-government) with U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1991) (tribe's treaty right
to exclude non-Indians from reservation did not bar application of OSHA to tribe) and
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985) (self-government
exception to federal regulation only applies to intramural matters; therefore OSHA ap-
plies to tribal farm). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1988), has also been held applicable to tribes. Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm
Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1991); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989).
Tribal courts are, of course, free to adopt state statutory or common law into their
jurisprudence. For example, in a wrongful termination case, the Standing Rock Sioux Tri-
bal Court applied the doctrine of "employment at will," as defined by a North Dakota
statute, as well as North Dakota common law, to determine whether a personnel manual
creates a contract in Defender v. Bear King, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6078 (Standing Rock Sioux
Tribal Ct. 1989). Similarly, the Court of Appeals of the Navajo Nation reasoned that the
"American rule" of employment at will governed a wrongful termination action in Davis v.
Navajo Tribe, 4 Nay. Rep. 50 (Ct. App. 1983).
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
4. Id.
5. This article concerns employment suits brought under the ICRA against tribes as
employers. It does not address suits arising under other federal, state or tribal laws
against private, federal or state employers of tribal members; nor does it discuss Indian
preference laws. For a discussion of general rights of Indian employees, see Craig Becker
& Darlene Thomas, Labor Law and the Native American, 8 INDIAN LAW SUPPORT CENTER REP.
1 (1985). The Supreme Court addressed Indian preference laws in Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974). See also Kevin N. Anderson, Indian Employment Preference: Legal Founda-
tions and Limitations, 15 TULSA L.J. 733 (1980).
6. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 56, 70 (1978).
7. Id. at 65 ("[tjribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA").
But see infra text accompanying notes 171-194.
8. One commentator views this problem not only as a problem of inability to vindi-
cate individual rights, but one of legitimacy of the tribal legal system itself:
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tribes. 9 In addition, the failure of tribes to address ICRA issues gener-
ally has provoked repeated efforts by Congress to pass legislation grant-
ing control over tribal courts and review of tribal ICRA decisions by
federal courts;' 0 such federal oversight would further erode tribal sover-
eignty. An additional problem arises from the fact that aggrieved em-
ployees may be treated differently by courts analyzing their ICRA rights,
depending on whether the employees are Indians or non-Indians."I
The focus of this Article is on Indian tribes' treatment of sovereign
immunity, both in their own laws and under the ICRA, and on tribal
court interpretations of these laws. Because employment suits alleging
violations of the ICRA are increasingly appearing on tribal court dock-
ets, the discussion will focus on employment claims. 12 After first
The legitimacy of the system is particularly enhanced if it provides for the
protection of rights and the advancement ofjustice for individuals or groups who
are unable to protect their basic rights and interests through majoritarian politics.
This dilemma involving individual and group rights is particularly acute
when considering the nature of the rights sought to be recognized within tribal
systems. The controversy over the... ICRA... is particularly instructive. In that
controversy, the notion of strong individual rights that could be enforced against
the majority government was alien to the tradition and custom of many tribes
where the group, not the individual, is primary.
[T]he United States Supreme Court... made it clear that tribal courts were
the appropriate forums for adjudication of individual claims concerning such
ICRA individual guarantees as due process and equal protection.
Many tribal courts have not yet arrived at an accommodation of these dictates
and continue to ... use the shield of sovereign immunity. This legal device pre-
vents any resolution of claims involving individual rights on their merits and fur-
ther inhibits the growth of legitimacy. The matter is not easily resolvable ....
Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the Rok of
the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49, 65 (1988).
9. One judge called it a "dinosaur of injustice." O'Brien v. Fort Mojave Tribal Ct.,
11 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6002 (Ft. Mojave Tribal Ct. 1983). See infra text accompanying
notes 160, 202-11. At Sovereignty Symposium IV, sponsored by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, the Oklahoma Indian Affairs Commission and The Sovereignty Symposium, Inc.
and held in Oklahoma City June 10-12, 1991, a session focused on "Indian Civil Rights in
Tribal Courts." The Honorable Arvo Q. Mikkanen, a judge for the Court of Indian Ap-
peals for the Anadarko Area Tribes and for the Sac & Fox Nation-Kickapoo Tribes, ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with tribes' assertion of the sovereign immunity defense in ICRA
claims. Arvo 0. Mikkanen, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts, Sovereignty Symposium IV 599
(1991). Judge Mikkanen is the author of Executive Comm. of the Wichita Tribe v. Bell, 18
Indian L. Rep. 6041 (Ct. Ind. App., Wichita. 1990), which held the tribe to be immune
from a suit alleging due process violations in a termination from employment. Ken
Bellmard, a practitioner, stated in his written remarks that:
The practical effect of the ICRA was to restrict tribal sovereignty just as did the
seven major crimes act. It is inconceivable that the Congress which enacted the
ICRA for the protection of individual liberties would allow the denial of access to
tribal forums and remedies to individuals asserting ICRA protections. Although
a tribal official may in his official capacity for example, fire a tribal employee for a
discriminatory purpose and in violation of the ICRA, does such a firing by an
official acting in an official capacity preclude the aggrieved former employee from
bringing a suit under the ICRA because of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immu-
nity? The answer to this query must be no!
Ken Bellmard, The Doctrine of Tribal Immunity and Application of the Indian Civil Rights Act to
Causes of Action in Tribal Courts: Tribal Sovereign Immunity, Sword or Shield?, Sovereignty Sym-
posium IV 605, 611 (1991).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 222-31.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 98-105.
12. However, issues raised here may be pertinent to other issues arising in tribal
courts under the ICRA as well.
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describing the growth of tribal employment, the Article will discuss gen-
erally how the concepts of tribal sovereignty and the ability to assert the
sovereign immunity defense have been shaped by United States law. It
will then describe how tribes have treated sovereign immunity in their
own laws. Next, the Article will explain the applicability of the ICRA to
tribal employment and focus on tribal courts' treatment of the sovereign
immunity defense in employment claims brought under the ICRA. The
Article will then discuss how the assertion of the sovereign immunity
defense in ICRA claims may lead to further erosion of tribal sovereignty
by the United States Congress.
To prevent such erosion of sovereignty through federal oversight,
tribal governing bodies can address employment disputes in a way that
would satisfy ICRA requirements and ensure equal treatment of all em-
ployees. Fairness in tribal employment actions; in turn, will actually re-
inforce sovereignty by strengthening tribal workforces and hence tribal
economies. First, tribes should implement personnel policies contain-
ing grievance procedures that afford employees equal protection and
due process under tribal law and custom. Economically stronger tribes
can waive sovereign immunity in the limited context of employment, al-
lowing tribal courts to hear employment claims arising under the ICRA.
In order that these claims not prove too onerous, tribes can limit reme-
dies in employment cases to "make-whole" relief such as injunctions,
reinstatement and back pay. As part of the employment agreement, all
employees can be required to agree to utilize tribal forums for the reso-
lution of any employment disputes. Finally, less expensive means of dis-
pute resolution can be explored.
II. TRIBES AS EMPLOYERS
While there are no statistics on the number of people employed in
tribal government and businesses' 3 nor on the number of tribally-
owned businesses throughout the country, a number of sources indi-
rectly indicate the extent of tribal employment. A 1985 directory lists
approximately 5,186 Indian-owned businesses in all fifty states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Puerto Rico, many of which are identified as tri-
bally or inter-tribally owned.14 These businesses provide products and
services in a sweeping range of industries: agriculture, forestry, fishing,
mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, public utilities,
wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, lodging, recre-
ation and amusement, personal and business services, entertainment,
education, health, legal and social services and public administration.
15
13. The Bureau of Indian Affairs publishes estimates of the Indian labor force resid-
ing on or near reservations; the latest report is dated January 1991 (although individual
reports within the compilation are dated December 1991). U.S. Department of the Inte-
rior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian Service Population and Labor Force Estimates (January
1991).
14. LACOURSE COMMUNICATIONS CORP., THE RED PAGES: BUSINESSES ACROSS INDIAN
AMERICA (1985). This directory has not been updated.
15. Id. at 2-18.
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Another source is a recent study of tribal economic development focus-
ing on the business activities of four groups during the late 1980's.' 6
This study describes various businesses developed and operated by the
Passamaquoddies, the Mississippi Band of Choctaws, the Ak-Chin In-
dian Community and the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Reservation. These relatively small tribes 17 generate a significant
number of jobs. For example, in 1988, the Confederated Tribes of the
Warm Springs Reservation, inhabited by 2,300 members of the Wasco,
Warm Springs and Paiute tribes, 18 employed 1,200 people, with approx-
imately half in tribal government. 19 The 5,000-member Mississippi
Choctaw tribe also employed approximately 1,200 people in 1987,20
making it the fifteenth largest employer in Mississippi.2 1 The study also
mentions the business activities of other tribes, including the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma, sixty-percent of whose income is derived from tri-
bal businesses; 2 2 the Eastern Band of Cherokees in North Carolina,
which owns the world's largest mirror manufacturing facility;23 and vari-
ous other tribes that operate resort and tourist industries and joint ven-
ture agreements with United States manufacturers.
2 4
A recent article on tribal economic development cites other exam-
ples "of Indian political power successfully evolving into economic
power." 2 5 The Mescalaro Apache, the Conchiti Pueblo and White
Mountain Apache "have dramatically wrested power over their land and
resources from the federal bureaucracy and moved diligently to gener-
ate employment and tribal wealth from their resources."'2 6 The
Quinault, Lummi, Swinomish and other tribes own and operate fish can-
neries in the Northwest and Alaska. 27 The Blackfeet are "a major player
in the market for writing instruments. ' 2 8 The Oneidas, Gilas and other
tribes own and operate office and industrial parks serving major metro-
politan areas. 2 9 The Warm Springs Reservation "owns and operates a
major sawmill and a large tourist resort."'30 Also, there are over 100
tribes "which operate bingo casinos with seating capacities often in the
16. ROBERT H. WHITE, TRIBAL ASSETS (1990). Another recent book, SHARON
O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS (1989), describes, to a lesser extent,
governmental and economic activities of the Seneca Nation, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
of Oklahoma, the Cheyenne River Sioux, the Isleta Pueblo and the Yakimas.
17. WHITE, supra note 16, at 272. The tribes contain between 500 to 5,000 reservation
inhabitants as compared to as many as 140,000 inhabitants of some tribes.
18. Id. at 189.
19. Id. at 211.
20. Id. at 75.
21. Id. at 57.
22. Id. at 271.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 271-72.
25. John C. Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of Sovereignty, 39
BUFF. L. REV. 495, 499 (1991).
26. Id.
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thousands and jackpots approaching the millions."'' l
As tribal nations develop economically, they will continue to create
more employment opportunities and thus more opportunities for em-
ployment disputes. But economic development is enhanced by a cohe-
sive and loyal workforce. Employee loyalty is earned through use of
personnel policies and practices that employees perceive as fair and nec-
essary to the conduct of the business. Use of such policies will better
enable tribes to diffuse and resolve disputes with their employees while
maintaining good employee relations. Tribes with strong workforces
and sound labor policies will be best equipped to exercise their sover-
eign powers to manage their government and business affairs.
III. TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN NATIONS
Despite the United States' fluctuating policies toward treatment of
individual Indians and tribes,3 2 it has continually recognized Indian
tribes as politically distinct nations possessing inherent sovereign pow-
ers. Tribal sovereignty derives from tribes' status as self-governing na-
tions whose existence predates that of the United States. 33 From the
time of contact, first the European nations, then the colonies and then
the United States government, recognized Indian tribes as nations and
interacted with them through intergovernmental treaties.3 4 The United
States Constitution acknowledges the sovereignty of Indian tribes as
well, and recognizes them on a par with foreign nations and the states as
entities with which Congress may regulate commercial dealings. 35 Also,
the Constitution excludes Indians from population counts for represen-
31. Id.
32. Since its inception, the United States government's policy toward individual Indi-
ans and tribal governments has shifted from government-to-government recognition, to
antagonism and removal from tribal homelands, to self-determination, to assimilation into
mainstream culture and termination of tribal-federal relations and back to self-determina-
tion. Throughout these shifts, tribal sovereignty has continually been eroded. This article
does not discuss overall policies of the United States government toward Indian tribes,
although these shifting policies influenced the development of the tribal sovereignty doc-
trine. For discussions of the sources of federal power over Indian tribes and various poli-
cies assumed in effecting this power, see Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood
Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty 31-134 (1980); Robert N. Clin-
ton et al., American Indian Law 181-310 (1983); Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal
Indian Law 47-228 (1982); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD LYrLE, THE NATIONS WrrmIN:
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984); O'BRIEN, supra note 16,
at 197-275.
Pending legislation "provid[ing] for the development, enhancement, and recognition
of Indian tribal courts" declares that "[t]he Federal Government has a government-to-
government relationship with each federally recognized tribal government." S. 1752,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See infra text accompanying notes 233-39.
33. "Before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were self-governing sovereign
political communities." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
34. The United States government signed the first treaty with the Delaware tribe in
1778. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1832). In 1871, Congress ended
future treaty-making with Indian tribes. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988)).
35. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 3, provides: "The Congress shall have the power... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the In-
dian tribes."
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tation and taxation purposes.3 6
However, Indian tribal nations are "strange sovereigns." 3 7 They
are "unique in the world in that they represent the only aboriginal peo-
ples still practicing a form of self-government in the midst of a wholly
new and modem civilization that has been transported to their lands."'3 8
One commentator refers to the process by which tribes have become
"sovereigns within a sovereign" as "involuntary annexation."13 9 As a re-
sult of such "annexation," the extent of tribal nations' sovereignty has
been limited by acts of the United States Congress and decisions of fed-
eral courts. Another commentator summarized the tribal nations' situa-
tion as follows:
Unlike foreign countries, dealt with at arms length by the fed-
eral government, Indian tribes are subject to the ultimate sov-
ereignty of the federal government: they govern within the
territorial borders of the United States, and their members are
United States citizens. Yet, Indian tribes are "domestic depen-
dent nations," and not states of the Union able to claim rights
against the central government through the traditions and con-
stitutional structures supporting federalism.
40
The United States Supreme Court, in three early cases known as the
Marshall trilogy, established the legal framework for the United States
government's recognition of Indian tribal sovereignty. In the first case,
Johnson v. M'Intosh,4 1 the Court relied on the "discovery doctrine" in
refusing to recognize a tribe's ability to convey lands.42 It reasoned that
a tribe's "rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations," were
"necessarily diminished" through acquisition of their land by European
nations through "discovery" 43 and those nations' subsequent land
grants to the United States. 44 Therefore, the Court concluded, only the
United States government could convey title to land occupied by Indian
tribes.
4 5
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The Fourteenth Amendment repeats the reference to
Indians in its provision concerning apportionment. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 2.
37. NellJessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1984).
38. DELORIA & LrrLE, supra note 32, at 2.
39. "One of the legacies of the colonization process is the fact that Indian tribes,
which began their interaction with the federal government as largely sovereign entities
outside the republic, were increasingly absorbed into the republic, eventually becoming in-
ternal sovereigns of a limited kind." Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work:
An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 411, 417 (emphasis in original).
Professor Pommersheim further argues that there is no basis in the United States Consti-
tution for the notion of limited tribal sovereignty developed by the Supreme Court. On
the latter point, see Newton, supra note 37, at 199 ("The mystique of plenary power has
pervaded federal regulation of Indian affairs from the beginning.").
40. Newton, supra note 37, at 197.
41. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
42. Id. at 574.
43. Id. This is, as one commentator has pointed out, a polite way of describing acqui-
sition by conquest, a word freely used in subsequent cases. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sover-
eigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 671, 692 (1989).
44. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 584-87.
45. Id. at 586.
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Subsequently, when the Cherokees sued for an injunction to pre-
vent the state of Georgia from enforcing its laws within Cherokee terri-
tory, the Court held that Indian tribes were not foreign states entitled to
sue in federal courts under Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion.4 6 Rather, tribes were "domestic dependent nations.., completely
under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States."'4 7 Neverthe-
less, the Court recognized the Cherokee tribe as a "distinct political so-
ciety, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and
governing itself."
4 8
One year later, in the concluding case of the Marshall trilogy,
Worcester v. Georgia,49 the Court established a limit on state power over
tribal nations. The Court heard the petition of whites who had been
prosecuted by the state of Georgia for violating those Georgia laws on
Cherokee land. 50 In striking down statutes extending Georgia's powers
into the Cherokee Nation, the Court stressed the independence of tribal
governments from those of the states. It described Indian nations as
"distinct, independent political communities, ' 5 1 that had placed them-
selves "under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping
[themselves] of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state."
'52
The Court held that Georgia's laws interfered with the relationship be-
tween the federal government and the Cherokee Nation, "a distinct
community, occupying its own territory... in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity
with treaties, and with the acts of congress."5 3 Thus, early on the
United States Supreme Court recognized the status of Indian tribes as
self-governing, sovereign nations subject only to limitations on their
powers imposed by treaties or laws of the United States government.
The principles of tribal sovereignty enunciated in the Cherokee
cases continue to govern Indian law today, despite subsequent federal
limitations on the tribes' ability to govern themselves. 5 4 Federal dimi-
nution of tribal sovereignty has focused primarily on tribal authority
46. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
47. Id. at 17.
48. Id. at 16.
49. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
50. Id. at 520.
51. Id. at 559.
52. Id. at 561.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
[O]ur cases recognize that the Indian tribes have not given up their full sover-
eignty. We have recently said: "Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." The sov-
ereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists
only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But
until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.
Id. at 323 (citations omitted). For a comprehensive discussion of the Cherokee cases and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions involving tribal sovereignty and the relationship be-
tween tribes and the federal and state governments, see Robert G. McCoy, The Doctrine of
Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal, State, and Federal Interests, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
357 (1978). See also Resnick, supra note 43.
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over nonmembers' activities in Indian country. 55 For example, Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have diminished tribal sovereignty by im-
posing federal and state criminal laws within Indian country and
granting federal or state jurisdiction over certain criminal acts commit-
ted there.5 6 Jurisdiction over non-Indians' criminal activities in Indian
country is thus vested exclusively in federal or state courts; 57 neverthe-
less, tribes have retained authority over criminal activities of Indians in
Indian country. 5 8 Likewise, in the context of taxation, even though the
Court has validated a state's ability to "reach into" Indian country to tax
nonmembers, it recognizes tribal sovereign authority to tax activities
and businesses in Indian country.
59
55. The term "Indian country" is defined as land " 'set apart for the use of Indians as
such, under the superintendence of the Government.'" Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. v. Citi-
zen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., I I S. Ct. 905, 910 (1991), (quoting United
States v.John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978)). "Indian country" is also defined at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (1988) as follows:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, in-
cluding rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
Id. This definition, even though it appears in a federal criminal statute, has been applied
generally to civil matters. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2
(1975); see also Sandra Hansen, Survey of Civil jurisdiction in Indian Country 1990, 16 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 319, 324-25 (1991).
56. In 1881, the Supreme Court cut back on Worcester when it held in United States v.
McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881), that the state could prosecute a non-Indian who mur-
dered another non-Indian in Indian country. The General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1988) and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988) extend federal and state
criminal laws into Indian country. In 1885, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1988), giving federal courts jurisdiction over thirteen "major" crimes com-
mitted in Indian country, by Indians or non-Indians. The Supreme Court justified the
Major Crimes Act in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), on the basis of the
"protectorate" relation between tribes and the federal government.
57. Again, relying on the protectorate doctrine, the Court eroded tribal criminal juris-
diction further in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), when it took
away jurisdiction from tribes to prosecute non-Indians for commission of "non-major"
crimes within a tribe's jurisdictional boundaries.
58. In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Court held that tribes could not exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were nonmembers of the tribe. Duro was subse-
quently nullified when Congress restored tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.
Act of Oct. 28, 1991, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988 & Supp. II
1990)). For an account of Congressional correction of Duro, see Nell Jessup Newton, Per-
manent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992).
59. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980) and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), upheld tribal
power to tax non-Indians doing business or performing services on Indian land; in each
case, the Supreme Court held that such power derives solely from a tribe's sovereignty.
The Court characterized the power to tax as "a necessary instrument of self-government
and territorial management" that derives from its "general authority, as sovereign, to con-
trol economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing govern-
mental services." Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
However, in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reser-
vation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), and Washington, the Court held that states can require individ-
ual Indian sellers and tribes, respectively, to collect tax on sales of tobacco products to
nonmembers. Most recently, in Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905, 909 (1991), the Court reached the same conclusion despite the
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Although the Supreme Court has been somewhat more protective
of tribal sovereignty in other kinds of civil cases, 60 the imposition of
federal civil laws such as the ICRA on tribal activities has at the same
time diminished tribal sovereignty. 6 1 The ICRA is generally referred to
as the "Indian Bill of Rights," as it vests rights in individuals and con-
comitant obligations, or limitations, on the part of tribal governments
similar to those enumerated in the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution.6 2 The mere imposition of the ICRA's limitations on
tribes, essentially framed in terms developed in Anglo-American juris-
prudence, conflicts with notions of tribal sovereign authority to fashion
their own governing rules.
6 3
The devastating effects of continued erosion of tribal sovereignty
assertion that Oklahoma is not a Public Law 280 state as were those in Moe and Washington.
In recognition of the principle that tribes possess "sovereign authority over their members
and territories," id. at 910 (citing Cherokee v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831)), the Court rea-
soned that the state's interest in collecting the tax justified the "minimal burden" on the
tribe to collect it and did not interfere with tribal sovereignty. Citizen Band Potawatomi, 111
S. Ct. at 911.
60. Tribal courts generally retain civil jurisdiction over suits resulting from acts of
nonmembers occurring within their jurisdictional boundaries. For example, in Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959), the Court held that an Arizona state court lacked jurisdic-
tion over a collection action against Navajos by a non-Indian doing business on the Navajo
reservation; rather, jurisdiction was proper only in a Navajo tribal court. The Court rea-
soned that allowing state jurisdiction "would undermine the authority of the tribal courts
over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves." Id. Furthermore, in Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985), the Court held that whether jurisdiction exists in tribal courts
must be determined first in the tribal courts, even though the question of tribal jurisdic-
tion is a "federal question" under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This determination is reviewable by
the federal district courts. The Court differentiated between criminal cases, where Con-
gress had expressly conferred jurisdiction on federal courts, and civil cases, where it had
not. Id. at 854-55. Shortly afterward, the Court held in Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9 (1987), that primary jurisdiction in tribal courts could not be defeated by alleg-
ing diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 19-20; see also Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sover-
eignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 329, 329-32 (1989), for a
thorough analysis of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual.
61. The Supreme Court acknowledged this fact in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978). "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers
of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.... Title I of the ICRA...
represents an exercise of that authority." Id. at 56-57.
62. Because of tribes' sovereign status, the United States Constitution does not apply
to them. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896) (Fifth Amendment does not apply
to actions of tribal governments); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
As the Court stated in Santa Clara Pueblo, rights accorded by the ICRA, however, are "simi-
lar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 57. The ICRA requires tribes to afford rights of free exercise of religion,
speech, press, assembly, due process and equal protection; rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures, double jeopardy and self-incrimination; rights against taking with-
out just compensation; and in criminal cases, rights to a speedy trial, confrontation and
securing ofwitnesses, and to counsel at defendant's expense and trial by ajury of six. The
ICRA also prohibits excessive bail and fines, cruel and unusual punishment, imprisonment
over one year per offense, fines in excess of $5,000, bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1992 Supp.) An account of the legislative history of the ICRA
appears in DELORIA & LYrt, supra note 32, at 200-14.
63. See, e.g., Pommersheim, supra note 39, at 438 n. 104 (citing Robert T. Coulter, Fed-
eral Law and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3
COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 49 (1971)). See also Robert Laurence, A Quincentennial Essay on
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 307, 314-15 (1991-92); Robert A. Wil-
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under United States law is poignantly described by the Northern Plains
Intertribal Court of Appeals in a recent employment case brought under
the ICRA against the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe.64 After recount-
ing the history of treaty abrogation and the diminution of tribal sover-
eignty through federal legislation and court decisions, which the court
described as "the worst-case scenarios in Indian law,"' 65 it exhorted
tribes and tribal courts to resist challenges to tribal sovereignty:
Is then tribal sovereignty to be sacrificed on the alter of
sacrificial word play-impliedly diminished by sue and be sued
clauses predicated on doubtful intent, the result of boilerplate
draftmen legalese? Should the courts foster the continuation
of this process of sovereign erosion?
Sovereignty refers to the inherent right and power to gov-
ern. It cannot be argued that a sovereign, using a political and
economic definition can be a sovereign if it has anything less
than total sovereignty. A political entity cannot exist if it has
not the power to protect nor preserve its very existence. It ap-
pears then that much more than Wynde versus the college is at
issue. The necessary political and economic viability of a tribe
must retaliate against the subtle erosion of Native American
institutions.
Tribal sovereignty is the tribe. Its very existence as a polit-
ical entity rests upon the foundation of sovereignty. No less
certainly, than the Anglo system....
If this court is to preserve the tribe as a political, social,
economic entity, a recognition of that corollary must begin with
a careful studied analysis of the impact of the erosion of tribal
sovereignty however minuscule. Erosion of tribal sovereignty
by implication is no less than actual erosion of the tribe itself.
What is the essence of a tribe? Tribal sovereignty!
66
liams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in
the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 276-78 (1989).
Professor Pommersheim discusses the need for American jurisprudence to recognize
and accommodate differences in rules of culturally distinct sovereigns. He defines "sover-
eignty" as consisting of two components: "the recognition of a government's proper
zones of authority free from intrusion by other sovereigns within the society, and the un-
derstanding that within these zones the sovereign may enact substantive rules that are
potentially divergent or 'different' from that of other-even dominant-sovereigns within
the system." Pommersheim, supra note 39, at 421. Pommersheim also discusses the po-
tential for disrupting societies such as Indian tribes that may be held together by "family,
community and cultur[all" relationships as a result of members asserting their individual
rights against the society. Id. at 438; See also Pommersheim, supra note 8, at 65.
See also THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTs AcT, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs REPORT 71
(1991):
The Commission finds that in passing the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 the
United States Congress did not fully take into account the practical application of
many of the ICRA's provisions to a broad and diverse spectrum of tribal govern-
ments, and that it required these procedural protections of tribal governments
without providing the means and resources for their implementation.
Id.
64. Bd. of Trustees of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Community College v. Wynde, 18 IN-
DIAN L. REP. 6033 (N. Plains Intertribal Ct. App. 1990).
65. Id. at 6034-35.
66. Id. at 6035.
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Significantly, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 6 7 the Supreme Court
checked the ICRA's potential erosive effect on tribal sovereignty by
holding that the ICRA did not confer jurisdiction in federal courts ex-
cept in habeas corpus actions.68 In that case Ms. Martinez, a member of
the Santa Clara Pueblo, and her daughter sued the Pueblo and its gover-
nor in federal court alleging a tribal ordinance violated their equal pro-
tection rights under the ICRA.69 The ordinance extended membership
in the Pueblo to children of male members who marry nonmembers but
denied membership to children of female members who marry non-
members; Ms. Martinez had married a Navajo.70 First, the Court held
that the Pueblo, 'but not its governor, was immune from suit under the
ICRA.7 1 It then held that the federal courts lacked subject matter juris-
diction over the Martinez' ICRA claim. 72 In so holding, the Court reit-
erated Worcester's language that "Indian tribes 'are distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in matters
of local self-government" 73 and reinforced the principle of sovereignty
that allows tribes to retain legislative powers over their internal affairs
and the necessary power to enforce those laws. 74 It cited the dual goals
of the ICRA as "strengthening the position of individual tribal members
vis-a-vis the tribe" and "the well-established federal 'policy of furthering
Indian self-government.'-75 In balancing those goals, the Court took
into account the Act's silence with respect to jurisdiction for other than
habeas corpus actions and concluded that "[c]reation of a federal cause of
action for the enforcement of rights created in [the ICRA] . . .plainly
would be at odds with the congressional goal of protecting tribal self-
government."' 76 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the tribes them-
selves could be counted on to assure rights guaranteed by the ICRA:
"Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums
for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal
and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians. Nonjudicial tri-
bal institutions have also been recognized as competent law-applying
bodies."
7 7
Thus, while the United States created new rights for tribal members
and imposed new obligations on the tribes, it left the enforcement of
those rights and obligations to the tribes themselves. But despite Santa
Clara Pueblo's assurance that tribal forums would be available to vindi-
67. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Santa Clara Pueblo is the only Supreme Court case interpreting
the ICRA.
68. Id. at 59.
69. Id. at 51.
70. Id. at 52.
71. Id. at 59. See infra text accompanying notes 91-97.
72. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59.
73. Id. at 55 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)).
74. Id. at 55-56.
75. Id. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
76. Id. at 64. Santa Clara Pueblo has been widely discussed as an example of the ten-
sion between societal values of two different governments; the debate over the validity of
the decision is summarized in Laurence, supra note 63, at 305.
77. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65-66.
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cate ICRA rights, 7 8 such suits actually have been foreclosed in many tri-
bal forums under authority of that part of Santa Clara Pueblo upholding
tribal sovereign immunity.
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
One of the attributes of sovereignty is the sovereign's immunity
from lawsuits for damages filed against it without its consent. 79 Unless
the government has waived its immunity, it is absolutely immune from
suit for its actions. However, officers and agents of the government en-
joy limited immunity for actions taken within the scope of their authority
or official duties; they are not immune from acts taken in their capacity
as individuals or in their official capacity if such acts were outside the
scope of their constitutional or statutory authority.
8 0
Commentators cite the following rationales in support of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity: there can be no legal right against the au-
thority that establishes rights; the sovereign itself "can do no wrong;"
allowing one branch of government to impose a judgment against an-
other would violate separation of powers; lawsuits against a government
would interfere with the government's ability to carry out its official du-
ties and enforcement of judgments would cause economic losses that
could impair or destroy government functions. 8 1 The applicability of
the latter rationales to Indian tribes was articulated by a tribal court
weighing the sovereign immunity question:
[C]ritically important community interests are being protected
by this immunity: Suits against the tribe seeking damages at-
tack the community treasury. This money belongs to all the
people of the Sauk-Suiattle nation. It must be guarded against
the attacks of individuals so that it can be used for the good of
all in the tribal community. Secondly, any suit against the tribe
forces the tribe to expend community monies in legal fees. The
possible amounts that can be expended on this effort would be
great if suits of this nature are not limited. Finally, the entire
community stands to suffer irreparable harm if their leaders,
foreseeing possible liabilities at every action, are unable to ful-
fill the responsibility of their offices.
82
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized and upheld
tribal sovereign immunity from nonconsensual lawsuits in federal and
78. Id. at 65.
79. For a history of the development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see, for
example, James Fleming, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm.
L. REV. 610, 611-15 (1955). The Supreme Court's latest discussion of sovereign immunity
appears in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991), in which it held
that states are immune from suit by Indian tribes.
80. See, e.g., Ponca Tribal Election Bd. v. Snake, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6085, 6091 (Ct.
Ind. App., Ponca 1988); Miller v. Adams, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6034, 6036 (Intertribal Ct.
App. 1982). This article focuses generally on immunity of tribes and tribal entities, not on
immunity of tribal officials.
81. See, e.g., Ralph W. Johnson &James M. Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Indian Tribal
Law, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153, 170-71 (1984).
82. Moses v. Joseph, 2 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-51, A-54 (Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Ct. 1980).
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state courts. 83 Its first clear acknowledgement appeared in United States
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 84 where the Court dismissed a cross-
claim against the United States, which had sued on behalf of the Choc-
taw and Chickasaw Nations, stating, "Indian Nations are exempt from
suit without Congressional authorization," and that tribal immunity
"passed to the United States for their benefit." 85 Subsequently, in
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep 't. of Game of Wash. ,86 vacating the state court's
judgment against the tribe, the Court deemed it "settled" that "[a]bsent
an effective waiver or consent .... a state court may not exercise jurisdic-
tion over a recognized Indian tribe."' 8 7 The Court's most cited discus-
sion of sovereign immunity, however, appears in its interpretation of the
ICRA in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 8 8 which, in addition to determin-
ing that there is no federal jurisdiction for a non-habeas corpus claim, 89
held tribes to be immune from federal suits arising under the ICRA.90
As stated previously, Santa Clara Pueblo involved a suit in federal
court against the Pueblo tribe and its governor alleging that the
Pueblo's membership ordinance violated equal protection rights guar-
anteed by the ICRA.9 1 The Pueblo asserted its sovereign immunity in
defense. 9 2 The Court first discussed its long-standing recognition that
tribes, as sovereigns, are immune from suit unless Congress waived tri-
bal immunity.93 Any such waiver must be express and unequivocal. 94 It
then found no explicit waiver in the text of ICRA.9 5 Moreover, the Act's
provision for federal habeas corpus relief could not be deemed a general
waiver of tribal immunity because the respondent in a habeas suit would
be an individual, not a tribe.96 Therefore, the Court concluded, because
the Act contained no explicit and unequivocal waiver of immunity, "suits
against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity
from suit."
' 9 7
Although Santa Clara Pueblo should have foreclosed subsequent
ICRA suits in federal and state courts, the Tenth Circuit denied a tribal
defense of sovereign immunity and extended federal jurisdiction over an
83. A comprehensive catalog of federal and state court decisions recognizing tribal
sovereign immunity appears in Justice Rice's concurring opinion in Sulcer v. Barrett, 17
Indian L. Rep. 6138, 6139-40 (Sup. Ct. Citizen Band Potawatomi 1990) (Rice, ChiefJ.,
concurring).
84. 309 U.S. 506 (1940). For discussions of the Supreme Court's development of the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, see Frank Pommersheim & Terry Pechota, Tribal
Immunity, Tribal Courts, and the Federal System: Emerging Contours and Frontiers, 31 S.D. L. REv.
553 (1986); Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1058 (1982).
85. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512.
86. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
87. Id. at 172.
88. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
90. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
92. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 53.
93. Id. at 55-59.
94. Id. at 58.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 68.
97. Id. at 59.
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ICRA claim in Dy Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes. 98 The
claim, alleging deprivation of due process rights, was brought against
the tribes by a non-Indian-owned corporation. The plaintiff corporation
had built a lodge on land owned by non-Indians within the reservation,
but the access road crossed an Indian allotment. 99 The tribes' Joint
Business Council directed that the access road be closed.10 0 The plain-
tiff filed suit in the tribal court, which declined jurisdiction because the
council would not consent to the suit.' 0 ' The suit ended up in federal
court, where the district court held the tribes to be immune from suit
under Santa Clara Pueblo. 10 2 The Tenth Circuit reversed, distinguishing
Santa Clara Pueblo as "entirely an internal matter concerning tribal mem-
bers . .. [who] had access to their own elected officials and their tribal
machinery to settle the problem."'10 3 The court was concerned not only
with the unavailability of any remedy for the plaintiffs, but with the fact
that the plaintiffs seeking the remedy were not Indians. 10 4 Citing no
authority, it held that Santa Clara Pueblo's rule that tribes were immune
from suit in federal court under the ICRA did not apply "when the issue
relates to a matter outside of internal tribal affairs and when it concerns
an issue with a non-Indian."' 10 5
Dry Creek Lodge has been criticized by commentators 10 6 and other
circuits have refused to follow it.'° 7 Nevertheless, in the context of em-
ployment, it looms as a potential source for access to federal courts for
non-Indian tribal employees who sue tribal employers under the ICRA.
98. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).




103. Id. at 685.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Pommersheim & Pechota, supra, note 84, at 566-67; Kevin Gover & Rob-
ert Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: The Litigation in Federal Court of Civil
Actions Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 497, 499-503 (1985); Michael
Taylor, Modern Practice in the Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231, 265 (1987).
107. R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985); Snow v. Quinault Indian Nation, 709 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984); ShortBull v. Looking Elk, 677 F.2d 645 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982). The Tenth Circuit limited Dry Creek Lodge in Nero
v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457, 1460 nn.4-5 (10th Cir. 1989) ("the Dry Creek
Lodge exception is to be narrowly construed and thus must involve only egregious circum-
stances that do not involve internal tribal affairs and is applicable only where no tribal
remedy is available"); White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1984); Ji-
carilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1982); Ramey Constr. Co. v.
Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1982). These cases
(except Nero) and others are cited and discussed in Gover & Laurence, supra note 106, at
512-15.
In an employment case, the court for the Western District of Oklahoma, relying on
Santa Clara Pueblo, held that it did not have jurisdiction over an ICRA claim for a non-
Indian tribal employee because of tribal sovereign immunity. Sulcer v. Citizen Band Pota-
watomi Indian Tribe, 19 Indian L. Rep. 3071, 3071 (W.D. Okla. 1992). The court cited
Nero and Williams v. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, 625 F. Supp. 1457, 1458 (D. Nev. 1986)
which stated, "Dry Creek Lodge is not the law of this circuit, nor is it the law of the United
States." Suker, 19 Indian L. Rep. at 3071.
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Some federal and state courts attempt to distinguish between tribes'
"governmental" and "corporate" (or "proprietary") functions for the
purpose of ascertaining immunity. Such distinction could conceivably
open tribes to suits by tribal corporation employees. Most cases arose in
the context of whether a tribal corporation chartered under § 17 of the
1934 Indian Reorganization Act' 0 8 waived sovereign immunity by virtue
of a standard "sue and be sued" clause. Although some courts held that
such clauses waived sovereign immunity,' 0 9 others concluded that im-
munity must be determined on a case-by-case basis."l 0 Because § 17
corporations are usually administered by the tribal council or some
other tribal governmental body, the primary inquiry regarding the ex-
tent of waiver under a "sue and be sued" clause must be whether the
tribe acted through the corporation in its governmental or corporate
capacity."' Other courts have looked merely to the fact that a tribe
acted through a corporation and held that the tribe had waived immu-
nity on that basis. 12 Absent any express waiver, whether a tribe is act-
ing in a governmental or proprietary capacity should make no difference
in determining its immunity.' 13
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court explicitly refused to ab-
rogate the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity or to distinguish be-
tween governmental and proprietary functions for the purpose of
determining immunity. In Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawat-
omi Indian Tribe of Okla.,"14 the State of Oklahoma urged the Court to
"abandon entirely" tribal sovereign immunity."15 Alternatively it ar-
gued that immunity should not attach to tribal businesses, but rather
"should be limited to the tribal courts and the internal affairs of tribal
government, because no purpose is served by insulating tribal busi-
nesses from the authority of the States to administer their laws."" 6 The
Court responded that it would neither abandon the doctrine of tribal
108. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1988). The Indian Reorganization Act sets up two mechanisms
by which tribes could organize politically and economically. Section 16 allows tribes to
adopt constitutions and by-laws, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988). Section 17 allows them to set up
corporations, 25 U.S.C. § 477. All documents have to be approved by the Secretary of the
Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 476. Section 17 charters are standardized and most contain "sue
and be sued" clauses. Pommersheim & Pechota, supra note 84, at 556.
109. Pommersheim & Pechota, supra note 84, at 558.
110. Id
111. See id. at 558-61 (discussing Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977));
Parker Drilling v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Alaska 1978). Sec-
tion 17 corporate charters generally limit the extent ofjudgments against corporations to
"income or chattels specifically pledged or assigned," and immunity has generally been
waived only to that extent. Pommersheim & Pechota, supra note 84, at 560-61.
112. Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104 (Ariz. 1989); Steve E. Dietrich, Com-
ment, Tribal Businesses and the Uncertain Reach of Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Statutory Solution,
67 WASH. L. REV. 113, 124-25 (1992). The Comment also discusses Padilla v. Pueblo of
Acoma, 754 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989), which held the
Pueblo amenable to suit for its off-reservation activity.
113. Pawnee Tribe of Okla. v. Franseen, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6006, 6008 (Ct. Ind. App.
Pawnee 1991).
114. 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991).
115. Id. at 909.
116. Id. at 909-10. The state was attempting to force the tribe to assess and collect tax
on sales of cigarettes at a tribally owned convenience store on trust land.
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immunity nor limit it to apply only to governmental activity.' 17 It justi-
fied this determination by observing that Congress had "consistently re-
iterated its approval of the immunity doctrine" developed in Santa Clara
Pueblo and earlier cases 1 8 by passing acts such as the Indian Financing
Act of 19741 '9 and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assist-
ance Act,' 2 0 which "reflect Congress' desire to promote the 'goal of In-
dian self-government, including its "overriding goal" of encouraging
tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.' " 121 Wholesale elim-
ination of the immunity defense for tribal businesses, the Court rea-
soned, would thwart these goals.
Sovereign tribes may waive immunity and thereby consent to a law-
suit. It has been debated whether a tribe may waive immunity without
congressional approval. 12 2 Despite the Court's statement in United States
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company 123 that tribes are "exempt
from suit without congressional authorization,"' 2 4 courts and commen-
tators conclude that tribes can waive sovereign immunity without con-
gressional approval. 125 Language in Citizen Band Potawatomi buttresses
this conclusion. Citing Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court stated, "[s]uits
against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a
clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation."' 126 Santa Clara
Pueblo had not discussed whether a tribe could waive its immunity and
made no general statements to that effect; it only looked to whether
Congress had waived tribal immunity from suit in ICRA claims. Never-
theless, the insertion of an "or" in Citizen Band Potawatomi's statement
indicates the Court's recognition that, even though Congress can waive
tribal immunity, Indian tribes, as sovereigns, possess the ability to waive
their immunity from suit as they see fit.
V. TREATMENT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN TRIBAL LAWS
Tribes have addressed their sovereign immunity in myriad ways.
12 7
117. Id. at 910.
118. Id.
119. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1988).
120. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988).
121. Citizens Band Potawatomi, III S. Ct. at 910 (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987)).
122. See Pommersheim & Pechota, supra note 84, at 558-64.
123. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
124. Id. at 512.
125. Sulcer v. Barrett, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6138, 6140 (Citizen Band Potawatomi Sup. Ct.
1990) (Rice, ChiefJ., concurring); Gonzales v. Allen, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6121, 6122 (Sho-
shone-Bannock Tr. Ct. 1990) (dictum); see also, Dietrich, supra note 112, at 122;Johnson &
Madden, supra note 81, at 161; Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil Rights Under Tribal Gov-
ernment, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 26 (1979). The exception to tribal ability to waive sover-
eign immunity is with respect to property held in trust by the federal government. See
Hansen, supra note 55, at 328; Johnson & Madden, supra note 81, at 159.
126. Citizens Band Potawatomi, I1 S. Ct. at 909 (emphasis added).
127. Unless otherwise indicated, tribal constitutions and codes cited here were ex-
amined from INDIAN TRIBAL CODES (R. Johnson, ed. 1988) (microfiche collection) and the
files of the National Indian Law Library (NILL) in Boulder, Colorado, during July 1992.
All documents in INDIAN TRIBAL CODES (1988) were examined. At NILL, documents were
selected from a computer search of the words "sovereign," "immunity" and "jurisdic-
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Many state in their tribal codes that immunity is not waived except in
accordance with federal or tribal law and when the waiver is made in
specific language by a resolution of the tribal governing body. 128 Other
tribes include language under a jurisdiction provision stating that tribal
courts have no jurisdiction over suits against the tribe, its officers or em-
ployees unless the tribal governing body has consented.' 29 The Spo-
kane Tribe requires consent to waiver by both the tribe and the United
States.13 0 The Navajo Nation's Sovereign Immunity Act' 3 ' codifies the
principle of sovereign immunity and specifies the circumstances under
which the Nation waives its immunity from suit.13 2 Those circumstances
include, inter alia, when suit is explicitly authorized by federal law or a
tion," as the tables of contents of 143 constitutions and codes in its collection are "on-
line." NILL is in the process of obtaining up-to-date versions from tribes across the coun-
try, but the librarians indicated that this has been difficult. Consequently, some of the
codes and constitutions referred to here may not be current.
Additional citation will refer to the work ofJohnson & Madden, supra note 81, at 161-
63 n.35- 40, who conducted a similar study of tribal treatment of sovereign immunity using
forty tribal codes selected at random from INDIAN TRIBAL CODES (R. Johnson, ed. 1981)
(microfiche collection). I reiterate their warning:
Anyone involved in a sovereign immunity issue on a particular reservation would
do well to make a careful study of the tribal code, constitution, tribal resolutions,
regulations of different committees, corporate charter, corporate minutes, insur-
ance contracts, and other sources ... [and] should examine carefully the entire
official copy . . .and all amendments.
Johnson & Madden, supra note 81, at 162 n.36.
128. E.g., TRIBAL LAWS OF THE BURNS PAIOTE INDIAN RESERVATION ch. V(B) (1979); LAw
AND ORDER CODE OF THE CHEYENNE RIVER Sioux ch. VIII, § 1-8-4 (1978); LAw AND ORDER
CODE OF THE CHIPPEWA-CREE TRIBE OF THE ROCKY BOY'S RESERVATION ch. 3, § 3.3 (1987);
CHOCTAW TRIBAL CODE ch. 5, § 1-5-4 (1981); LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE COEUR
D'ALENE TRIBE OF INDIANS ch. 1, § 1-5.01 (1985); LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE DELAWARE
TRIBE OF BARTLESVILLE, § 1-1-2 (1984); NOOKSACK TRIB. CODE OF LAWS tit. 10,
§ 10.01.110 (1982); TRIB. CODE OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE RESERVATION ch. 3, § 1-3-2
(1987); LAw AND ORDER CODE OF THE ROSEBUD Sioux TRIBE ch. 2, § 4-2-1 (1985); LAw
AND ORDER CODE OF THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UNITAH AND OURAY RESERVATION UTAH
§ 1-8-5 (no date); WARM SPRINGS TRIB. CODE 205.001ff (1988), cited in Gould v. Confeder-
ated Tribes of the Warm Springs Indians, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6052, 6053 (Warm Springs
Tribal Ct. 1990).
129. E.g., LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES ch. A, § 101
(no date); CROW LAw AND ORDER CODE ch. 1, § 1-160 (1977); FORT BELKNAP INDIAN LAW &
ORDER § XII(12.2) (no date); SAULTE STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS LAW AND
ORDER ch. 7, § 7.2 (1980); TRIB. CODE OF THE SISSETON-WAHPETON Sioux TRIBE ch. 33,
§ 33-02-01 (no date), cited in Bd. of Trustees of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Community Col-
lege v. Wynde, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6033, 6036 (N. Plains Intertribal Ct. 1990); STANDING
ROCK SIOUX CODE OF JUSTICE § 1-108 (no date); ZUNI TRIB. CODE ch. 2, § 1-2-6(2); see also
Johnson & Madden, supra note 81, at 162 n.36-38.
130. LAw AND ORDER CODE OF THE SPOKANE TRIBE OF INDIANS-SPOKANE RESERVATION
§ 1-13 (1987).
131. The purpose statement reads as follows:
The purpose and intent of the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act is to balance the
interests of individual parties in obtaining the benefits and just redress to which
they are entitled, under the law and in accordance with the orderly processes of
the Navajo nation government, while at the same time protecting the legitimate
public interest in securing the purposes and benefits of their public funds and
assets, and the ability of their government to function without due interference in
furtherance of the general welfare and the greatest good of all the people.
NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 1, §§ 351-55 (1988).
132. "The Sovereign Immunity Act is nothing more than a reinforcement of the com-
mon law immunity from suit of the Navajo Nation as an independent sovereign." Mac-
Donald v. Navajo Nation, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6003, 6006 (Nay. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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resolution of the Tribal Council, when the claim is expressly covered by
liability insurance or when the claim arises under the Bill of Rights of
the Navajo Nation.
3 3
Some tribes include an immunity provision in specific ordinances or
chapters. For example, the Muckleshoot Tribe includes a sovereign im-
munity provision in its zoning,' 3 4 licensing and revenue,'lS gaming13 6,
housing,' 3 7 traffic,' 3 8 fireworks,' 3 9 tobacco 140 and liquor 14 1 ordi-
nances. The Chehalis juvenile ordinance contains an immunity state-
ment. 14 2 Other tribal codes simply acknowledge tribal immunity in a
general statement.
14 3
Waivers may also be specific to tribal civil rights laws. The Colville
Tribal Civil Rights Act 14 4 waives sovereign immunity of the Colville
Tribes in tribal courts for suits alleging deprivation of rights enumer-
ated in that Act; 14 5 those rights basically parallel the rights afforded by
the ICRA. 146 The only remedies available are declaratory and injunc-
tive, 14 7 unless the claim is covered by insurance, in which case damages
may be awarded for the amount of coverage in accordance with the
terms of the policy.' 4 8 The Law and Order Code of the Fort McDermitt
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe of Oregon and Nevada states that the Tribal
Council may waive immunity in civil contempt proceedings in tribal
courts to enforce equal protection and procedural due process rights. 14 9
The Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act waives immunity for lawsuits alleg-
ing violations of civil rights guaranteed by the Navajo Nation Bill of
Rights. 15o
Tribes also address sovereign immunity in their constitutions.
Some provide for waiver of immunity for actions arising under the tribal
constitution and laws, as well as under the ICRA. For example, the Me-
nominee constitution provides that the tribal legislature generally can-
133. NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 1, § 354 (1988).
134. CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE tit. 7, § 7.01.100 (1977).
135. Id. tit. 8, § 8.09.040.
136. Id. tit. 11, § 11.13.02.
137. Id. tit. 13, § 13.13.030.
138. Id. tit. 15, § 15.09.010.
139. Id. tit. 16, § 16.01.130.
140. Id. tit. 17, § 17.01.070.
141. Id. tit. 18, § 18.01.080.
142. CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS RESERVATION
tit. 12, § 12.10.010 (no date).
143. E.g., GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY CODE tit. I, § 1.327 (no date); PORT GAMBLE
KLALLAM LAW AND ORDER CODE, preamble (1984).
144. LAW AND ORDER CODE FOR THE COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE
RESERVATION tit. 56, §§ 56.01-56.08 (1988).
145. Id. § 56.06.
146. Id § 56.02.
147. Id.
148. Id. § 56.08.
149. LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE FORT MCDERMrrr PAIUTE-SHOSHONE TRIBE OF OR.
AND NEV. ch. 1, §§ 1, 3 (1988).
150. NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE tit. 1, § 354 (1988). The Navajo Nation Bill of Rights ap-
pears at NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE tit. 1, §§ 1-9 (1988).
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not waive the tribe's immunity, 15 1 but it does allow suit against the tribe
in tribal courts "for the purpose of enforcing rights and duties estab-
lished by this Constitution and Bylaws, by the ordinances of the Tribe,
and by the Indian Civil Rights Act .... .152 The constitution of the
Jamestown Klallam Tribe empowers the tribal courts "to review and
overturn tribal legislation and executive actions for violations of this
Constitution or of the [ICRA]."' 5 3 Similar language in the Standing
Rock Sioux tribal constitution extending the power of tribal courts "to
all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution or laws of the
tribe" was held to have waived the immunity of the tribal election com-
mission in a suit protesting the commission's hearings on an election
contest.1
54
Tribal agencies and corporations may be granted limited waivers of
immunity by their respective tribes. 155 A Muckleshoot ordinance ex-
tends the immunity of the tribe to the Muckleshoot Tribal Enterprise, a
governmental agency, 156 but the manager of the Tribal Enterprise, with
the consent of the director of business development and the tribal coun-
cil, can waive immunity in "contract, agreements, or leases ... with re-
gard to certain specific assets of any type or kind in courts with
jurisdiction over such assets."' 15 7 The Articles of Incorporation of the
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribal Development Corporation 58 provide that
the corporation cannot waive or limit the tribal council or business com-
mittee's immunity, but it can consent to be sued in tribal courts by indi-
cating the terms and conditions of the consent in an agreement, contract
or other instrument.1 59 Recovery is limited to the amount of the assets
151. CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF Wis. art. XVIII, § 1
(1977).
152. Id. art. XVIII, § 2. See Johnson & Madden, supra note 78, at 163.
153. CONST. OF THE JAMESTOWN KLALLAM TRIBE OF INDIANS art. VIII (1983).
154. Murphy v. Standing Rock Sioux Election Comm'n, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6069, 6070
(Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Ct. 1990).
155. Tribal corporate charters may be of two types. First, those adopted under § 17,
1934 Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1988); (see supra notes 108 & 111). Sec-
ond, those adopted under a tribes' own authority. See, e.g., Bd. Trustees of the Sisseton-
Wahpeton Community College v. Wynde, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6033, 6037 (N. Plains Inter-
tribal Ct. App. 1990) (Gillette, J., concurring) ("a tribe can charter an entity upon such
terms as the tribe sees fit"). As indicated in the text, most corporate charters drafted by
the tribes themselves carefully designate the extent of waiver.
156. CONST. AND BYLAWS FOR THE MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE tit. 19, § 19.01.010
(1977):
Muckleshoot Tribal Enterprises evolved as a branch of the tribal government
serving as a mechanism for the tribal government to increase opportunities for
members to obtain business training, experience, and employment on the Reser-
vation and on off-Reservation tribal lands, to encourage the continued produc-
tion of Muckleshoot and other Native American crafts, and to establish on-going,
revenue sources which would provide funds for basic tribal government services
and improve the economic, social, educational, health and overall living condi-
tions of Muckleshoot people.
Id.
157. Id. § 19.01.100.
158. ART. OF INCORPORATION OF THE CHEYENNE-ARAPAHO TRIB. DEV. CORP. art. XIII
(1988).
159. Id. art. XIII(D).
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described in the instrument. 1r° The Charter of the Chehalis Indian Tri-
bal Enterprises Construction Company waives the immunity of the com-
pany and its assets but not of the tribe and its assets.) 6 '
When no constitutional or code provision exists, tribal courts have
looked to other tribal documents to determine the extent of tribal im-
munity. For instance, one tribal court found a waiver of immunity in an
insurance policy. 162 In employment cases, courts have examined per-
sonnel manuals. ' 6 3 The Turtle Mountain Court of Appeals found that
the tribe's personnel policies, by requiring due process in termination
proceedings, waived the immunity of the tribe in a lawsuit alleging viola-
tion of the manual's termination procedures.164 On the other hand, the
Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Court held, in the absence of any other statement in
the tribe's law concerning sovereign immunity, that termination provi-
sions of the tribal personnel manual did not waive sovereign immunity
based on the fact that the manual stated that it "shall not, in any way,
waive the sovereign immunity of the ... Tribe."' 65 The court reached
this conclusion despite a provision in the tribal constitution ensuring
civil rights to tribal members. 166 Similarly, the Grand Ronde Tribal
Court held that the provisions of a personnel manual permitting an em-
ployee to appeal his termination of employment to the tribal court did
not waive the tribe's sovereign immunity from a claim for back wages
even though the employee had been found to have been wrongfully ter-
minated and had been reinstated.'
6 7
If no constitutional or code provision or other document speaks to
sovereign immunity, a tribal court may look to its tribe's common law to
determine the existence or extent of immunity. For example, in an em-
ployment termination case, the Fort Mojave Tribal Court rejected the
tribe's defense of sovereign immunity under tribal common law.' 6 8 Af-
ter noting that it was "unaware of any provisions in the Mojave tribal
custom and tradition which would approximate sovereign immunity"
and recounting the history of the defense and the exceptions that had
arisen to it in Anglo-American law, the court termed the defense "a di-
nosaur of injustice" and declined to adopt it into tribal law. 16 9 How-
ever, other tribal courts have held that sovereign immunity exists as part
160. Id.
161. CHARTER OF THE CHEHALIS INDIAN TRIBE ENTERS. CONSTR. CO. ORDINANCE No.
1980-1 art. I, § 1.05.
162. Johnson & Madden, supra note 81, at 167 (citing Mitchell v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes (Flathead Tribal Ct. 1982)).
163. That statements in personnel manuals may bind a tribe has analogues in federal
and state law, under which personnel manuals may create due process and contract rights
in employment. See, e.g., Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1984).
164. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Parisien, I Tribal Ct. Rep. A-95
(Turtle Mountain Ct. App. 1979).
165. Moses v. Joseph, 2 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-51, A-53 (Sauk-Suittle Tribal Ct. 1980).
166. Id. at A-54.
167. Guardipee v. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Comm'n of Ore., 19 In-
dian L. Rep. 6111 (Grand Ronde Tribal Ct. 1992).
168. Id. at 6002.
169. O'Brien v. Fort Mojave Tribal Ct., 11 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6002 (Ft. Mojave Tri-
bal Ct. 1983).
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of tribal law solely by virtue of their tribes' sovereign status. 170
Tribal courts disagree on whether the ICRA itself waives sovereign
immunity of tribes in tribal courts for actions alleging violations of that
Act.171 The arguments on both sides rest on the seemingly inconsistent
language supporting the two holdings of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti-
nez. 172 Those courts holding that the ICRA waives immunity of tribes in
tribal courts focus on Santa Clara Pueblo's dicta that the ICRA is an exer-
cise of Congressional "plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate
the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise pos-
sess"' 7 3 and that "[t]ribal forums are available to vindicate rights cre-
ated by the ICRA, and § 1302 has the substantial and intended effect of
changing the law which these forums are obliged to apply."' 174 The
Cheyenne River Sioux Court of Appeals reasoned that "[i]t is hard to
conceive that this language means anything else but that tribal courts
must entertain causes of action based on the ICRA' 17 5 and denied the
tribe's immunity defense. Similarly, the Turtle Mountain Tribal Court
found this language an "express, unequivocal expression of congres-
sional intent to provide jurisdiction to the tribal court based upon al-
leged violations of an individual's civil rights protected by the
ICRA."1 7 6
However, courts holding that the ICRA does not waive tribal immu-
nity in tribal courts rely on Santa Clara Pueblo's unequivocal holding that
the ICRA contains no express or implied waiver of immunity whatso-
ever; if the ICRA does not waive a tribes' immunity, the courts reason, a
suit cannot be brought against the tribe under the ICRA in any court
unless Congress or the tribe itself has expressly waived immunity.'
77
170. See, e.g., Satiacum v. Sterud, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6013, 6015 (Puyallup Tribal Ct.
1982); Grant v. Grievance Comm. of the Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla., 2 Tribal
Ct. Rep. A-39, A-41 (Ct. Indian Offenses for the Sac and Fox Tribe 1981); Cf MacDonald
v. Navajo Nation, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6003, 6006 (1990) ("The Sovereign Immunity Act is
nothing more than a reinforcement of the common law immunity from suit of the Navajo
Nation as an independent sovereign.").
171. Compare Gonzales v. Allen, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6121, 6122 (Shoshone-Bannock Tri-
bal Ct. 1990) ("[t]he vast majority of both federal and tribal court cases have held that the
Indian Civil Rights Act is not a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity"); with Davis v. Keplin,
18 Indian L. Rep. 6148, 6149 (Turtle Mountain Tribal Ct. 1991) ("the majority of tribal
courts have held that they have jurisdiction to enforce provision of tribal constitutions and
the Indian Civil Rights Act").
172. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77 & 91-97.
173. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
174. Id. at 65.
175. DuPree v. Cheyenne River Hous. Auth., 16 Indian L. Rep. 6106, 6108 (Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Ct. App. 1988).
176. Davis v. Keplin, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6148, 6149 (Turtle Mountain Tribal Ct. 1991).
177. The reluctance of tribal governments to waive sovereign immunity was acknowl-
edged by the United States Civil Rights Commission's findings in its report on the Indian
Civil Rights Act:
The vindication of rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act within tribal
forums is contingent upon the extent to which the tribal government has waived
its immunity from suit; concern about the potential effects of law suits, even for
declaratory or injunctive relief, on the viability of tribal government has made
some tribes reluctant to waive sovereign immunity to any extent, with the result
that plaintiffs' efforts to adjudicate ICRA claims are frustrated.
THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTs AcT, U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 63, at 72.
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For example, in a contract action against the tribe, the Court of Indian
Appeals for the Pawnee Tribe responded to the plaintiff's argument that
the ICRA impliedly waived the tribes' immunity:
As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti-
nez, the Indian Civil Rights Act did not constitute a general
waiver of a tribe's sovereign immunity. Rather, it permitted
only habeas corpus relief in federal court for certain actions
taken by a tribal government. It did not explicitly waive a
tribe's immunity in tribal court actions. Furthermore, we will not
imply such a waiver where none is specifically made in the fed-
eral statutes. '
78
As commentators have pointed out, Santa Clara Pueblo's holding that the
ICRA does not waive tribal immunity was reached "independently of,
and prior to" its statement that tribal courts are available to hear ICRA
claims.' 79 Although the Court's statements about tribal courts appear
inconsistent with its holding that the ICRA does not waive immunity, the
statements did not seem to factor into the court's reasoning in reaching
that holding.
Examination of reported tribal court cases indicates that most
courts have held, in the absence of specific tribal laws addressing the
question, that the ICRA does not waive their tribal immunity.180 Some
tribes' courts have overruled the sovereign immunity defense and as-
sumed jurisdiction over ICRA actions: Cheyenne River Sioux, '8 1 Oglala
Sioux, 1 8 2 and the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewas. 18 3 However,
the following tribal courts have held (or indicated in dictum) that the
ICRA does not waive sovereign immunity: Colville Confederated
Tribes, 184 Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, 18 5
178. Pawnee Tribe of Okla. v. Franseen, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6006, 6008 (Ct. Ind. App.-
Pawnee 1991) (emphasis added); see also Bd. of Trustees of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Com-
munity College v. Wynde, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6033, 6036 (N. Plains Intertribal Ct. App.
1990) (Gillette, J., concurring); Garman v. Fort Belknap Community Council, 11 Indian L.
Rep. 6017 (Ft. Belknap Tribal Ct. 1984) ("tribal self-government must surely embody the
concept that Indian tribes decide for themselves how to implement laws forced upon them
by Congress"); Satiacum v. Sterud, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6014, 6015 ("plaintiff argues that the
Martinez decision represents an explicit waiver of the tribe's immunity where a violation is
alleged under the [ICRA]. This court rejects that argument and holds that a waiver of the
tribe's immunity must be unequivocally expressed.")
179. Gover & Laurence, supra note 106, at 504. See also Pommersheim & Pechota, supra
note 84, at 565 (Supreme Court's statement regarding tribal forums "pushes the camel
through the eye of the needle .... The Court does not say and it seems clear that it did
not consider the implications of what it was saying.").
180. Contra Hansen, supra note 55, at 329; Taylor, supra note 106, at 254-55.
181. Dupree v. Cheyenne River Hous. Auth., 16 Indian L. Rep. 6106, 6106 (Cheyenne
River Sioux Ct. App. 1988) (employment).
182. Oglala Sioux Tribal Personnel Bd. v. Red Shirt, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6052 (Oglala
Sioux Tribal Ct. App. 1983) (employment).
183. Davis v. Keplin, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6148 (Turtle Mountain Tribal Ct. 1991); Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Parisien, 1 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-95 (Turtle Mountain
Ct. App. 1979) (employment).
184. Stone v. Somday, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6039 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1983). In this em-
ployment suit against a tribal official, the court held that the ICRA, as interpreted by Santa
Clara Pueblo, "does not affect the plain language of the tribe's sovereign immunity as a
matter of tribal law." Id. at 6041.
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Fort Belknap Community,' 8 6 Navajo, 187 Southern Ute Tribe,' 8 8 Sho-
shone-Bannock Tribes, 18 9 Pawnee, 190 Puyallup, 191 Sac and Fox, 19 2 Sis-
seton-Wahpeton Sioux,'
9 3 and Standing Rock Sioux. 19 4
VI. ICRA RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION IN TRIBAL
EMPLOYMENT
Pertinent to tribal employment issues is the ICRA's requirement
that an Indian tribe, "in exercising powers of self-government" accord
due process and equal protection rights to "any person within its juris-
diction."' 9 5 It should be noted, however, that the ICRA is not the ex-
clusive source of such rights and obligations. Many tribal
constitutions 1 9 6 contain bills of rights' 9 7 and, as indicated in the preced-
185. Smith v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, 17 Indian L. Rep.
6055 (Warm Springs Tribal Ct. 1990) (employment).
186. Garman v. Fort Belknap Community Council, 11 Indian L. Rep. 6017 (Ft. Belknap
Tribal Ct. 1984).
187. TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Navajo Tribe, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6017, 6018 (Navaho Sup.
Ct. 1988) (breach of contract) (ICRA does not waive sovereign immunity under the "fed-
eral laws or regulations exception" to the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act); Nez v. Brad-
ley, 3 Navajo Reptr. 126 (Ct. App. 1982) (employment).
188. Pinnecoose v. Bd. Comm'rs of the S. Ute Pub. Hous. Auth., 19 Indian L. Rep.
6072 (S.W. Intertribal Ct. App. 1992) (employment).
189. Gonzales v. Allen, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6121 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Ct. 1990).
In rejecting plaintiff's wrongful termination claim for back pay, the court reasoned that:
[t]he vast majority of both federal and tribal court cases have held that ... tribes
may waive sovereign immunity in tribal courts without congressional approval,
but have not held that Congress waived the immunity on behalf of the tribes [in
the ICRA] .... Clearly the tribal council could waive sovereign immunity in this
case, but they haven't.
Id. at 6122 (emphasis in original).
190. Pawnee Tribe of Okla. v. Franseen, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6006 (Ct. Indian App. Paw-
nee 1991) (breach of contract).
191. Satiacum v. Sterud, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6013, 6015 (Puyallup Tribal Ct. 1982)
(election).
192. Grant v. Grievance Comm. of the Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla., 2 Tribal
Ct. Rep. A-39 (1981) (employment).
193. Bd. of Trustees of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Community College v. Wynde, 18 In-
dian L. Rep. 6033 (employment) (distinguishing Miller v. Adams, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6034
(Intertribal Ct. App. 1982)).
194. Defender v. Bear King, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6078, 6079 (Standing Rock Sioux Tribal
Ct. 1989) (dictum) (employment).
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1992 Supp.).
196. The origins of tribal constitutions are discussed in Frank Pommersheim, A Path
Near the Clearing: An Essay on Constitutional Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 393
(1991-92). Many tribal constitutions originated under § 16 of the Indian Reorganization
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988), which provided that a tribe could "organize for its common
welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws," to be ratified by .tribal
election and approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Tribes adopting § 16 constitutions
merely accepted the boilerplate language of the Secretary's model. Pommersheim, supra,
at 395. The model did not contain bills of rights or separation of powers provisions (in-
cluding provisions for an independent judiciary), however. Nevertheless, a number of
tribes did amend their constitutions to add bills of rights prior to the enactment of the
ICRA. Id. at 397. For examples of modern tribal constitution-making, see CLINTON ET AL.,
supra note 32, at 378-79.
In Thorstenson v. Cudmore, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6051 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App.
1991), a breach of contract and fraud suit against a tribal member by non-Indians, the
Cheyenne River Sioux Court of Appeals discussed the inconsistency between the jurisdic-
tion provision of the tribe's § 16 constitution and the tribe's traditional notions of due
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ing section, a number of tribes have codified civil rights laws that grant
tribal members due process and equal protection rights.
19 8
"Due process" and "equal protection" are not foreign to Indian
tribes as these concepts preexisted exposure to Anglo-American law.
The Ponca Court of Indian Appeals explained that notions of due pro-
cess, in the context of tribal law, necessarily arise from traditions, cus-
toms and development of law within the tribe itself:
When analyzing due process claims, it is important to note that
the Indian nations have formulated their own notions of due
process and equal protection in compliance with both aborigi-
nal and modem tribal law. Indian tribes, whose legal traditions
are rooted in more informal traditions and customs, are mark-
edly different from English common law countries, upon which
the United States' notions of due process are founded ....
When entering the arena of due process in the context of an
Indian tribe, courts should not simply rely upon ideas of due
process. The constitution extended jurisdiction in tribal courts over disputes between In-
dians and non-Indians only upon stipulation by both parties. Id. at 6052. The court first
considered the historical context of § 16 constitutions, observing:
The conventional wisdom about constitutions, at least in the American context, is
that they reflect the will of the people and that they were adopted by the demo-
cratic choice of the people or their elected representatives pursuant to wide-rang-
ing public discussion. Whatever the general truth of this proposition in national
and state history, it has little historical validity in the American Indian tribal con-
text, particularly for those tribes who adopted constitutions and bylaws pursuant
to the authorization set forth in the Indian Reorganization Act. . . . It is well
established that these IRA constitutions were prepared in advance by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs--almost in boilerplate fashion without any meaningful input or
discussion at the local tribal level. Therefore it is clear that this "oddity" in Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribal law-which has no comparable analogue in the United
States or any state constitution-does not have its roots in any considered deci-
sion of the Cheyenne River Sioux people, but rather in some gross BIA oversight
or self-imposed (legal) concern to tread cautiously when potential non-Indian in-
terests were involved. Neither of these concerns were authorized by federal stat-
ute and ought not be given the force or respect of law.
Id. at 6053 (emphasis in original). The court then discussed public policy and legal con-
cerns with jurisdiction by stipulation and concluded that the constitutional provision was
not only "extremely hazardous to the jurisdictional health and integrity of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe," but "contravenes fundamental Lakota cultural notions of fair play that
allow people the opportunity to be heard, which includes the right to have 'their day in
court'." Id. at 6054.
197. Tribal constitutions containing bills of rights that include due process and equal
protection provisions include: CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE CHIPPEWA-CREE TRIBE OF THE
ROCKY Boy RESERVATION art. XI; CONST. AND By-LAws OF THE COLO. INDIAN RIVER TRIBES
OF THE COLO. INDIAN RESERVATION OF ARIZ. AND CAL. art. III, § 3; DEL. CONST. art. III;
CONST. OF THE HOH TRIBE art. IX; REVISED CONST. OF THEJICARILLA APACHE TRIBE art. IV;
THE KIOWA INDIAN TRIBE OF OKLA. CONST. AND BY-LAws art. VIII; CONST. FOR THE PUEBLO
OF ISLETA, N.M. art. III; CONST. OF THE STANDING ROCK SIoux TRIBE art. XI. Some tribes'
constitutions incorporate ICRA rights by reference. E.g., CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE
FORT MOJAVE INDIAN TRIBE art. V; LUMMI CODE OF LAWS art. VIII.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 144-50. For example, the Navajo Nation Bill of
Rights provides as follows:
Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are recognized as fundamental individ-
ual rights of all human beings. Equality of rights under the law shall not be de-
nied or abridged by the Navajo Nation on account of sex nor shall any person
within its jurisdiction be denied equal protection in accordance with the laws of
the Navajo Nation, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due pro-
cess of law.
Navajo Tribal Code tit. 1, Sec. 3 (1988).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
process rooted in the Anglo-American system and then attempt
to apply these concepts to tribal governments as if they were
states or the federal government .... One should tread lightly
when analyzing the scope and nature of tribal sovereignty and
not make assumptions based upon a history and legal tradition
that might be entirely foreign to an Indian nation. 19 9
Indeed, United States courts recognize that it is inappropriate to
ascribe the same meaning to "due process" and "equal protection" as
applied to actions of Indian tribes as when applied to actions of entities
covered by the federal or state constitutions.
20 0
Tribal courts have articulated the meaning of due process in their
traditional laws. For example, the Supreme Court of the Oglala Sioux
Tribe, in holding that persons are entitled to a hearing before being
removed from the Pine Ridge reservation, pointed out that the tribe
need not be told by the United States "when to give due process":
Due process is a concept that has always been with us.
Although it is a legal phrase and has legal meaning, due pro-
cess means nothing more than being fair and honest in our
dealings with each other. We are allowed to disagree ....
What must be remembered is that we must allow the other side
the opportunity to be heard.
20
The Citizen Band Potawatomi Supreme Court articulated a similar
definition of due process under its tribal law in a case involving removal
of an elected official from office: "The concept of due process entails
fair treatment under the law, a right to notice and some opportunity to
be heard."
'20 2
While there is no absolute "right" to tribal employment, tribes cre-
ate rights to employment by implementing procedures governing terms
of employment, including procedures for promotions or dismissals.
Such procedures create "property" interests subject to due process.
20 3
For example, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma grants such property
rights in employment in its constitution, which provides that anyone em-
ployed by the Nation for one year or more may not be removed from
employment "except for cause" and is entitled to a hearing on such re-
moval. 20 4 Other tribes have instituted personnel policies and proce-
199. Ponca Tribal Election Bd. v. Snake, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6085, 6088 (Ct. Indian
App., Ponca 1988).
200. See, e.g., Smith v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Or.,
783 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 (1986); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101
(9th Cir. 1976); see also Taylor, supra note 106, at 256 and cases cited therein.
201. Thorstenson v. Cudmore, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6051, 6054 (Cheyenne River Sioux
Ct. App. 1991), discussed in Pommersheim, supra note 39, at 456.
202. Kinslow v. Business Comm. of the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 15 Indian L. Rep. 6007, 6009 (Citizen Band Potawatomi Sup. Ct. 1988).
203. See, e.g., Davis v. Keplin, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6148, 6151 (Turtle Mountain Tribal Ct.
1991); Executive Comm. of the Wichita Tribe v. Bell, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6041, 6042 (Ct.
Indian App., Wichita 1990). These interpretations of due process under tribal law are
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of due process under the
United States Constitution in Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) and subsequent
cases.
204. CoNsT. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLA. art. XII (1986).
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dures in tribal codes or personnel manuals that state appropriate
standards to which employees will be held, define behavior that will war-
rant discipline and set out a procedure under which employees can
grieve adverse decisions.
20 5
No tribal court cases have dealt directly with equal protection issues
in employment cases. Indian tribes may grant preferences in employ-
ment to tribal members, 20 6 and many have enacted tribal employment
rights ordinances asserting the right to prefer tribal members in tribal
employment. 20 7 But as to employment of tribal members, many tribes
have incorporated equal protection into their constitutions and tribal
codes. 20 8 One tribe has characterized its equal protection obligation to
its members as follows:
The Oglala Sioux Tribe is not bound by the Civil Rights Act of
1964, but is bound by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. We
exclude non-members of the Tribe, but we cannot discriminate
among or between our Tribal members. No person in the ser-
vice of the Oglala Sioux Tribe or person seeking admission into
the service shall be appointed, promoted, demoted, removed,
or in any way discriminated against because of his race, creed,
color, sex or because of his political or religious opinions or
affiliations.
20 9
However, ICRA due process and equal protection rights in employ-
ment may not be enforceable against a tribe that raises the sovereign
immunity defense to the ICRA claim.
VII. TREATMENT OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE IN TRIBAL
EMPLOYMENT CASES
As discussed earlier, in most of the employment suits brought
against tribes under the ICRA, tribal courts sustained the tribes' immu-
nity defense. 2 10 Recent tribal court cases illustrate the dilemma faced
by tribal employees who allege violations of employment policies by the
tribe or its agencies and are confronted by the defense of sovereign im-
munity. In Executive Comm. of the Wichita Tribe v. Bell,2 1 1 the plaintiff sued
205. See, e.g., JICARILLA APACHE TRIB. CODE tit. 19, §§ 5-6 (1987); NAVAJO TRIB. CODE
tit. 2, app. (1977); CONST. AND BY-LAws OF THE OGLALA Sioux TRIBE OF THE PINE RIDGE
RESERVATION OF SOUTH DAKOTA art. XIV-XVI (no date).
206. Seegenerally Anderson, supra note 5, at 742-52. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974), the Supreme Court upheld the extension of hiring preferences to Indians in the
Bureau of Indian Affairs under Title VII and the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause. The Court held that Indian preferences did not constitute racial discrimination;
rather, such preferences were based on political affiliation. It cited the goals of the prefer-
ences to include "giv[ing] Indians a greater participation in their own self-government"
and "reduc[ing] the negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect
Indian tribal life." Id. at 541-42.
207. See, e.g., Res. No. 86-21 of the Lummi Indian Business Council (Feb. 4, 1986);
NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 15, ch. 7 (1984-85).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 197-98.
209. CONST. AND By-LAws OF THE OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE OF THE PINE RIDGE RESERVATION
OF SOUTH DAKOTA art. XVII, § 81.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 180-94.
211. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6041 (Ct. Ind. App., Wichita 1990).
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the tribal executive committee for terminating her employment in viola-
tion of the tribe's personnel policy. Although the reported decision
does not mention the ICRA, the court found that the personnel policy
granted "substantive rights" to the plaintiff.21 2 Nevertheless, because
the policy contained no explicit waiver of immunity, the court dismissed
the suit, stating that without such a waiver "remedies may be unavailable
for violations which are properly proven and shown."
'2 13
The existence of an incomplete remedy for a due process violation
was similarly found in Guardipee v. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde
Community of Oregon.2 14 There, a personnel policy that granted employ-
ees the right to appeal their discharges to the tribal court was held not to
have waived the tribe's immunity from suit for back wages even when
the employee was found to have been denied due process and had been
reinstated. 2 15 The court stated that, even though "[a]ppellant will un-
doubtedly assert that the effect of this decision is to deprive him of an
effective remedy to address his improper discharge," it was "not per-
suaded that the lack of certain enforcement remedies against the tribe,
such as an award of money damages, can override the tribe's sovereign
immunity from suit."'2
16
The plaintiff in a wrongful termination suit under the ICRA was
likewise denied a remedy in Pinnecoose v. Board of Commissioners of the
Southern Ute Public Housing Authority. ,217 in which a tribal housing author-
ity was held to be immune from a wrongful termination suit. The plain-
tiff alleged violation of due process and equal protection rights in the
agency's failure to follow its written grievance procedure when terminat-
ing her employment. 2 18 Even though the tribal ordinance establishing
the agency contained a "sue and be sued clause," the court held that the
grievance procedure did not constitute a contract between the plaintiff
and the agency that waived the agency's immunity from suit.21 9 The
court concluded its opinion with the following observation:
It is totally unfortunate that litigants such as the appellant are
met with what seems to be an insurmountable obstacle as that
of 'tribal sovereign immunity.' However, the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity has long been recognized and upheld by
tribal, state and the federal court systems. If, however, there is
a feeling by any party involved that any inequities exist as a
result of this ruling, then the best place to resolve the issue is
with the legislative body of the tribe.2
2 0
Indeed, tribal members can take up the issue of tribal immunity
212. Id. at 6042. The case does not quote the language of the personnel policy on
which plaintiff relied.
213. Id.
214. 19 Indian L. Rep. 6111 (Grand Ronde Tribal Ct. 1992).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 6112.
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from ICRA actions through the tribal legislative process. This would
avoid the risk, as some have predicted, that it will be taken up for them
by the United States Congress, which continually threatens to further
diminish tribal powers by eliminating the sovereign immunity defense
and providing federal review of tribal court decisions.
22 1
VIII. CONGRESSIONAL ArrEMvrS TO ENSURE ICRA ENFORCEMENT
In 1988 and 1989, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced bills to amend
the ICRA to provide for review of tribal court decisions in federal
courts. 2 22 The 1989 version would have reversed Santa Clara Pueblo by
granting jurisdiction to federal district courts over ICRA claims for de-
claratory and equitable relief once the claimant 2 23 has exhausted
"timely and reasonable" tribal court remedies. 22 4 The bill would have
expressly waived tribal sovereign immunity for such claims. 22 5 It fur-
ther would have directed the federal court to adopt the tribal court's
findings, if made, unless the federal court determined that the tribal
court: 1) was not "fully independent" from the tribal legislative or exec-
utive body; 2) acted without authorization; 3) allowed the tribe or its
official to assert the sovereign immunity defense on claims for equitable
relief; 4) did not resolve the factual dispute, or "adequately develop ma-
terial facts"; 5) made findings not "fairly supported by the record" or 6)
"failed to provide a full, fair, and adequate hearing."' 226 If any of these
determinations were made, the federal court would conduct a de novo
trial. 2 2 7 In making such findings on issues of tribal law, the federal court
was to "accord due deference" to the tribal court's interpretation "of
tribal laws and customs."
' 2 2 8
Senator Hatch's motivation for proposing these bills was "to check
the tribal court power and to protect against civil rights abuses, espe-
cially when non-Indians were involved."' 22 9 He apparently believed that
tribal courts were little more than extensions of tribal councils, which, in
his opinion, could not adjudicate fairly. He quoted extensively and ap-
provingly from a federal court opinion describing the Crow Tribal Court
as " 'a sort of "kangaroo court" [that] has made no pretense of due pro-
cess or judicial integrity.' "230 The concern of Hatch and other critics of
221. See, e.g., Pommersheim & Pechota, supra note 84, at 576; Ziontz, supra note 125, at
26; C. L. Stetson, Note, Tribal Sovereignty: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal Sovereignty
146 Years Later, 8 AM. IND. L. REV. 139 (1980).
222. S. 517, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), and S. 2747, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988),
respectively.
223. The claimant could be either an individual or "the Attorney General on behalf of
the United States." S. 517 § 204(b).
224. S. 517 § 204(a)-(b).
225. Id.
226. S. 517 § 204(c).
227. Id.
228. S. 517 § 204(d).
229. Resnick, supra note 43, at 739 (citing 134 CONG. REc. S11654 (August 11, 1988));
Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Mont. 1988),
vacated, 708 F. Supp. 1561 (D. Mont. 1989).
230. Resnick, supra note 43, at 740. Professor Resnick describes Senator Hatch's ex-
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tribal courts is that those tribal courts do not operate in the same man-
ner as the federal and state courts of the United States. Hatch's bills
would have required the tribes' judicial process to "mirror" the federal
one in order to gain validity. 2
3 1
Although the Hatch bill has died, 23 2 a bill sponsored in the 102nd
Congress by Senators Daniel Inouye and John McCain recognized the
problem of enforcement of ICRA rights but addresses it through federal
assistance to enhance tribal courts. 2 33 The Indian Tribal Court Act
would assist tribes in developing and strengthening their judicial sys-
tems. 23 4 The bill's "Federal policy" statements reflect a view of tribal
governments and their court systems as independent of and equal to
their federal and state counterparts. 235 It expressly recognizes "tribal
sovereignty and tribal court authority" and the need to "avoid[ ] en-
croaching on tribal traditions that may be manifested in tribal justice
systems." 23 6 The bill also states that the act is not to be construed to
"encroach upon or diminish in any way the inherent sovereign authority
of tribal governments to enact and enforce tribal laws" nor to "imply
that a tribal court is an instrumentality of the United States."
'2 3 7
Nevertheless, as stated in its declarations and findings, a primary
tensive reference to Little Horn State Bank. That case involved a suit by the bank to obtain
collateral (a forklift) from a defaulting Indian debtor.
231. Id. at 741.
232. The press for federal court review of tribal court decisions is by no means dead.
Professor Newton reports that during the Congressional debates over the correction of
Duro v. Reina, discussed supra, note 58, Senator Slade Gorton resisted, arguing that Duro
was based on constitutional principles and could not be overruled. Senator Gorton also
pressed "his belief that tribal court judgments should be reviewable in federal courts."
Newton, supra note 58, at 115. In order to avoid a filibuster on the Duro legislation, the
conference committee promised Senator Gorton it would hold hearings on federal review
of tribal court decisions. Id. at 116. Those hearings were held on November 20, 1991. Id.
(citing Federal Court Review of Tribal Court Rulings in Actions Arising Under the ICRA and Draft
Bill to Grant Jurisdiction to Federal Courts to Hear Final Actions from Indian Tribal Courts, Before the
Select Comm. for Indian Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991)).
233. The Indian Tribal Court Act, S. 1752, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1991).
234. These efforts are lauded by the United States Civil Rights Commission. U.S. CIVIL
RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 63, at 72.
235. Id.
236. Indian Tribal Court Act, § 3. The bill's "Purposes" section states the following:
(1) The Federal Government shall assist tribal governments by strengthening
tribal court systems and by promoting the recognition of tribal sovereignty and
tribal court authority.
(2) The Federal Government shall fund tribal courts at a level equivalent to
State courts of general jurisdiction performing similar functions in the same or
comparable geographic region.
(3) Federal funding to tribal courts shall be administered in a manner that en-
courages flexibility and innovation by tribal justice systems and avoids encroach-
ing on tribal traditions that may be manifested in tribal justice systems.
(4) Federal funding shall be available to provide support to intertribal appellate
court systems.
(5) The United States shall provide funding for tribal justice systems in a man-
ner that will minimize Federal and administrative costs.
(6) As a matter of comity, full faith and credit shall be extended to the public
acts, records, and proceedings of tribal courts, and tribal courts shall extend full
faith and credit to the public acts, records, and proceedings of Federal and State
courts.
Indian Tribal Court Act § 3.
237. Indian Tribal Court Act § 5.
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motivation behind the bill is to enable individuals to vindicate ICRA
rights. 23 8 To that end, the bill specifies that funds may be used:
[T]o support studies of court rules and procedures, discovery
devices, and evidentiary standards, to identify problems with
the operation of such rules, procedures, devices, and stan-
dards, to devise alternative approaches to better reconcile the require-
ments of due process under title II of... the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968 ... with the need for swift and certain justice, and to test the
utility of those alternative approaches.
23 9
Implicit in this statement, of course, is that there are current deficiencies
in tribal handling of ICRA claims, either through the tribal courts or
administrative forums. Although the proposed bill does not address the
use of the sovereign immunity defense directly, the above language im-
plies that its sponsors intend tribal courts to assume jurisdiction over
ICRA claims. This characterization of the bill's intent is not inconsistent
with the bill's other references to tribal sovereignty. Tribal councils and
courts that have not done so already must therefore face the question of
whether they will continue to assert and uphold the sovereign immunity
defense in ICRA actions.
IX. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES THAT ARE COMPATIBLE WITH TRIBES'
SELF-GOVERNANCE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYEES' ICRA RIGHTS
Economic development is fundamental to the ability of tribal na-
tions to strengthen and maintain tribal sovereignty:
Economic development in the Indian country has been a by-
product of an Indian movement toward sovereignty, and sover-
eignty has meant being able to do what the Indian government
decides to do and thus rendering the decisions of the federal
courts, which had largely ignored the idea of Indian sover-
eignty as providing the Indians with any real political power, as
close to irrelevant in the real world as possible.2
40
238. The bill's "Declarations and Findings" section states:
(1) The Federal Government has a government-to-government relationship
with each federally recognized tribal government.
(2) Tribal governments exercise powers of self-government, requiring the en-
actment of laws and the enforcement of such laws through tribal court forums.
(3) The vindication of rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(25 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.), and other Acts of Congress, within tribal forums can
only by [sic] guaranteed by the provision of adequate resources to carry out the
purposes and intent of that Act.
(4) Such resources are needed to update tribal legal codes, to support probation
and detention needs, to assure a right to counsel, and to increase tribal court
access to legal authorities through computerized and other means, to train tribal
court and tribal governmental personnel on court procedures and on the require-
ments of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, to increase salaries of tribal court
justices and other court personnel, and to retain law clerks.
Indian Tribal Court Act § 2.
239. Indian Tribal Court Act § 204(c)(10) (emphasis added).
240. Mohawk, supra note 25, at 499. See also WHITE, supra note 16, at 275-76 ("Commu-
nities ... which secure a foothold in a real economy, have greater potential for true sover-
eignty now than at any time since their encounter with European immigrants. When they
succeed economically, tribes repossess some of their original power and become sovereign
in reality, not only by decree or legal definition."); Donald Wharton, Tribal Considerations in
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A stable and cohesive tribal workforce is, in turn, key to tribal economic
development. 24 1 It is not in tribes' best economic interests as sover-
eigns to subject their employees to employment practices and policies
that are perceived by employees as unfair or arbitrary. Employees who
perceive they or others have been treated unfairly are not likely to par-
ticipate productively in the workforce or, for that matter, in tribal gov-
ernment as a whole. 24 2 Unfair treatment of tribal employees will deter
outsiders from dealing with the tribe, for fear they will be treated no
better.
24 3
The due process and equal protection provisions of the ICRA, as
interpreted under tribal law and applied to tribal employment, demand
no more than fair treatment of employees by tribal governments.2 4 4 A
starting point is to fashion personnel policies that clearly enunciate stan-
dards of performance and behavior required of employees and include a
procedure by which employees can grieve adverse personnel actions
that comports with tribal due process. In most cases, proper administra-
tion of such a procedure should satisfy tribal due process obligations.
2 45
The Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court explained the advantages of using
a grievance procedure to resolve employment disputes:
There are a number of valid policy reasons why a grievance
process is beneficial to the Fort Hall community. An effective
administrative process should be able to resolve personnel dis-
putes in a timely, inexpensive, and informal manner. The de-
velopment of such expertise within the community would
become a valuable asset in the future for the whole of the
tribe.
2 4 6
Fair treatment also requires a forum for complaints of equal protec-
tion violations and failure to properly administer the grievance proce-
dures, as well as a remedy for rights that have been violated. 24 7 The
Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court also explained the role of tribal courts
in reviewing employee grievances as being limited "to ensur[ing] that
Preparing for Financial Borrowing for Economic and Business Development, 199 (1991) in AMERI-
CAN INDIAN RESOURCES INSTITUTE, SELECTED READINGS ON RESERVATION ECONOMIES ("The
cultural and political survival of America's first nations is increasingly dependent upon
their ability to redevelop the economies long ago destroyed by the invading europeans.").
241. WHITE, supra note 16, at 77 ("The Mississippi band avoided these problems [of
managing federal funds] with clear and consistent financial, personnel and election
policies.").
242. Pommersheim & Pechota, supra note 84, at 577. ("Tribal members who know that
they have a certain remedy if they are not treated within the law will be more apt to partici-
pate in and be less critical of their own tribal government.") See also Mohawk, supra note
25, at 501 (opportunistic behavior of tribal officials "can go a long way to discouraging
Indians from investing their resources in their own businesses and has historically discour-
aged people from supporting the Indian governments.").
243. Mohawk, supra note 25, at 501; Pommersheim & Pechota, supra note 84, at 577;
Wharton, supra note 240, at 201.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
245. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 (1978) ("Non-judicial tribal
institutions have also been recognized as competent law-applying bodies.").
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the process was fairly conducted and that the reviewing board had suffi-
cient evidence to support its decision." 24 8 In order to assure forums
and remedies for such claims, however, tribes must waive sovereign im-
munity in tribal courts. As discussed previously,2 49 tribes may tailor
waivers of immunity to specific contexts and specific forums; accord-
ingly, tribes can waive immunity narrowly in their courts to accommo-
date ICRA employment disputes.
2 50
There are a number of safeguards tribes can employ to assure that
such disputes do not overburden them. First, they can require, as a con-
dition of employment, that all employees submit to tribal procedures
and forums for the resolution of employment disputes. Some tribal
codes contain a consent to jurisdiction clause that is triggered by em-
ployment with the tribe.2 5' Such a condition to the employment con-
tract would obviate the situation that arose in Dry Creek Lodge, where,
because of a lack of a tribal forum, the Tenth Circuit allowed non-Indi-
ans to sue the tribe in federal court. 2 52 Thus, tribes would be assured of
retaining jurisdiction over employment claims against their govern-
ments regardless of whether the employee is a tribal member. Second,
tribes can require that employees exhaust administrative remedies
through grievance procedures as a prerequisite to suit in tribal court.
Again, a number of tribal codes currently require exhaustion as a pre-
requisite to jurisdiction in their courts.2 53 Third, tribes could limit the
remedy available for ICRA violations; in the employment context, such
remedies could be limited to "make-whole" relief in the form declara-
tory judgments, injunctions and back pay for a limited period. 25 4 The
Cheyenne River Sioux Court of Appeals suggested, in a wrongful termi-
nation case brought under the ICRA, that even though tribes are bound
by the ICRA, tribal councils would not be prevented from devising
"modest" remedies "that do not threaten to bankrupt or grind tribal
government to a halt."' 25 5 Finally, the proposed Indian Tribal Courts
Act would allow tribes to satisfy ICRA obligations through use of alter-
248. Id.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 127-61.
250. See Ziontz, supra note 125, at 26, for a discussion of use of limited waivers to meet
the ICRA obligations.
251. See, e.g., STATUTES OF THE NON-REMOVABLE MILLE LACS BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS
ch.3, preamble, § 3; CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE OGLALA Sioux TRIBE OF THE PINE RIDGE
RESERVATION ch. 1, § 1.1 (a).
252. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir.
1980).
253. See, e.g., CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE OGLALA Sioux TRIBE OF THE PINE RIDGE RES-
ERVATION ch. 2, § 20.1(a).
254. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West Supp. 1992)), relief in federal employment discrimi-
nation cases under Title VII was limited to declaratory, injunctive and limited back pay
relief.
255. Dupree v. Cheyenne River Hous. Auth., 16 Indian L. Rep. 6106, 6108-09 (Chey-
enne River Sioux Ct. App. 1988). See also Pommersheim & Pechota, supra note 84, at 578
("there might be a very modest ceiling on money judgments and cautious injunctive guide-
lines which limit the ability to interfere with important governmental functions"); Pom-
mersheim, supra note 8, at 66.
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native dispute resolution. 2 56 Such techniques may be more compatible
than litigation considering tribes' traditional methods of handling dis-
putes. 25 7 Alternative dispute resolution would be particularly appropri-
ate for handling employment disputes that occur during an on-going
employment relationship and that do not involve discharges. 258
Accommodation by tribal nations of their employees' due process
and equal protection rights in employment will gain them much more
than it will cost in terms of sovereignty. For the price of developing fair
personnel policies and procedures and opening their courts to ensure
ICRA rights, tribes will strengthen their sovereign rights in two impor-
tant ways. First, they will have taken an affirmative step to prevent fur-
ther congressional erosion of sovereignty through oversight of ICRA
matters, and, second, they will have gained a more committed and loyal
workforce that will provide a solid foundation for tribal government and
commerce. Tribal nations with strong governments and economies will
be best able to protect their sovereignty.
256. S. 1752, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(c)(3), (13) (1991).
257. See, e.g., Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIz. L. REV.
225 (1989); James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Accommoda-
tion to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89 (1983).
258. Alternative dispute resolution has been used successfully in handling employment
disputes in United States government and industry. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN & ALFRED G.
FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DIsPuTEs WrrIHoUT LITIGATION (1988).
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HUDSON V. MCMILLIAN: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
TAKES ONE STEP FORWARD, Two STEPS BACK
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1960 to 1989, the prison population in federal and state insti-
tutions grew from almost 213,000 to over 675,000 inmates. ' Along with
the growth in numbers, this time period saw significant changes in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence which affected the ability of these
prisoners to file claims alleging Eighth Amendment violations. 2 Histori-
cally, the Supreme Court took the view that the Eighth Amendment ap-
plied only in the context of reviewing the sentencing of prisoners, not
the treatment they received after incarceration. 3 Beginning in 1976 with
Estelle v. Gamble,4 the Court applied the Eighth Amendment to claims
arising from treatment received by incarcerated prisoners. 5 Since Es-
telle, prisoners have directed Eighth Amendment claims at three specific
areas-medical needs, prison conditions and excessive physical force.
Prior to Estelle, no express intent to inflict pain was required for the
Eighth Amendment to be violated. 6 More recently, the Court developed
a two prong test in determining whether a prisoner's Eighth Amend-
ment rights have been violated which requires both an objective and
subjective analysis. The objective analysis asks whether officials inflicted
sufficient harm, and the subjective analysis asks whether officials acted
with a sufficiently culpable mind.
7
In 1990, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that serious
injury was necessary to satisfy the objective component in any claim by a
prisoner alleging excessive force. 8 In Hudson v. McMillian,9 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the use of excessive
physical force against a prisoner constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment when the prisoner does not suffer
serious physical injury.' 0 Hudson defines the standard for all Eighth
Amendment claims of excessive physical force." The Court held that
serious injury is not required to satisfy the objective component of the
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991,
at 193 (111th ed. 1991).
2. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
3. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1005 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
4. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
5. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct.
2321, 2323 (1991).
6. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 328-29 (1986).
7. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324.
8. Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990).
9. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
10. Id. at 997.
11. Id.
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Eighth Amendment analysis. 12 The Court further held the subjective
component requires a determination that prison officials acted mali-
ciously and sadistically rather than in a good faith effort to control the
prisoner. 13 This Comment examines the precedent created by Hudson
and its likely future impact against the background of Eighth Amend-
ment analysis and the evolution of the subjective element. In conclu-
sion, this comment specifically and critically analyzes the heightened
subjective standard established by the Court.
II. BACKGROUND
The drafters of the Eighth Amendment penned its words with the
intent to outlaw torture and other cruel punishments. 14 In Trop v. Dul-
les, 15 the Court stated that the basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is the dignity of man. 16 The Court in Trop said that the
words of the amendment are imprecise and their scope not static; that
instead the words must draw their meaning "from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 17 In
Gregg v. Georgia,18 the Court further directed that measuring punish-
ments against the standard of public decency is not the end of an inquiry
into Eighth Amendment claims; the punishment also cannot be exces-
sive. 19 The Gregg Court defined excessive punishment as that which in-
volves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or punishment
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.
20
In Estelle v. Gamble2 ' the Court first addressed the question of
12. Id. at 999.
13. Id.
14. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). For further background on the Eighth
Amendment, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell and Stevens,JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-22 (1972); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 99-103 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-80 (1910);
Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (detailed analysis of the development of the Eighth Amendment);
Ira P. Robbins, Federalism, State Prison Reform, and Evolving Standards of Human Decency On
Guessing, Stressing, and Redressing Constitutional Rights, 26 KAN. L. REV. 551, 552-55 (1978)
(historical perspective of the Eighth Amendment); Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of
Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838 (1972) (ex-
amining treatment of the amendment by the United States Supreme Court and the ration-
ale for limiting punishments); Note, Constitutional Law--The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635,637 (1966) (historical perspec-
tive of cruel methods of punishment and cruelly excessive punishments); Andre Sansoucy,
Note, Applying The Eighth Amendment To The Use Of Force Against Prison Inmates, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 332, 332-35 (1980) (development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Recent
Case, Constitutional Law--Cruel and Unusual Punishment Provision of Eighth Amendment as Re-
striction Upon State Action Through the Due Process Clause, 34 MINN. L. REV. 134, 135-37 (1949)
(development of the amendment in American history); Recent Development, Constitutional
Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishments-Eighth Amendment Prohibits Excessively Long Sentences, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 638 (1975) (historical perspective of the Eighth Amendment).
15. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
16. Id. at 100 (plurality opinion).
17. Id. at 100-01.
18. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
19. Id. at 173.
20. Id.
21. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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whether the Eighth Amendment applied to prisoners' claims when the
punishment was not part of the sentence.22 The prisoner in Estelle
brought a § 198323 action claiming that prison officials violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by refusing him proper medical care. 24 The
Estelle Court stated that punishments "incompatible with the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" and
punishments involving "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"
are repugnant to the Eighth Amendment. 25 In Estelle, the Court not
only questioned whether prison officials inflicted pain (the objective
test), it also questioned the mind set of the persons inflicting the pain,
thus introducing a subjective test. 26 Estelle stands for the proposition
that the deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners
is incompatible with the standards of decency in society and constitutes
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, thus violating the Eighth
Amendment. 27 Further, the Court in Estelle held that the negligent in-
22. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1006 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), made the Eighth Amendment applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 101-02. Cooper v.
Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964), was the first time the Court recognized that a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could be brought against prison officials. The district court had
dismissed the suit and Cooper appealed in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court reversed
and recognized the cause of action as valid. Cooper was not an Eighth Amendment action,
which is why Estelle is still the first case to address § 1983 actions in the Eighth Amendment
context. A detailed discussion of the relationship between § 1983 actions and the Eighth
Amendment is beyond the scope of this comment. For more information, see MARTIN A.
SCHWARTZ AND JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMs, DEFENSES, AND FEES
§§ 3.8-3.9 (2nd ed., vol. 1, Supp. 1992); Project, Twenty-First Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1989 - 1990, 80 GEO. L.J. 939, 1710
(1992); Note, A Review of Prisoners' Rights Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 U. RICH. L.
REV. 803, 858-80 (1977).
24. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98. The prisoner in Estelle claimed that he injured his back
while working in the prison and received improper medical treatment. Id.
25. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
26. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
27. Id. at 104. The Court ruled that the prisoner's complaint failed to state a claim
against the treating physician and medical director. The Court remanded for a determina-
tion of whether other prison officials displayed deliberate indifference to Gamble's medical
needs. Id. at 108. For more information on prison medical conditions, see Phil Gunby,
Health Care Reforms Still Needed in the Nation's Prisons, 245 JAMA 211 (1981); Wendy Lynn
Adams, Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment?, 27 Am. U. L. REV. 92 (1977) (addressing the federal courts interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment and the standard applied to prisoner's claims of inadequate medical
treatment); Michael Cameron Friedman, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision
of Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921
(1992) (examination of the standard applied to prisoner's claims under the Eighth Amend-
ment); Robert Dvorchak, Medicine Behind Bars: Quality Care Is Elusive, Despite Lawsuits; Hostile
Public, Shortage of Good Doctors and Nurses Worsen Problem, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1989, at 2
(discussion of problems in providing adequate medical care in prisons); Elizabeth Levitan
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fliction of unnecessary and wanton pain provided no cause of action un-
less the prisoner can prove that officials acted with deliberate
indifference. 2 8 The subjective standard, that deliberate indifference
constitutes the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," was applied
specifically in the context of medical needs.
29
In Hutto v. Finney30 the Court addressed the question of whether
prison deprivation claims under § 1983 were valid as Eighth Amend-
ment actions and declared confinement in prison a form of punishment
subject to scrutiny under the amendment.3 ' In Hutto, the prison condi-
tions were so severe, the district court declared them cruel and unusual
and characterized that particular prison as "a dark and evil world com-
pletely alien to the free world."' 32 Because neither party disputed the
district court's finding that the conditions constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, the Court did not address whether the subjective test ap-
plied in the context of deprivation in prison.
3 3
In Rhodes v. Chapman,34 the Court held that placing pairs of prison-
ers in cells measuring sixty-three square feet was not cruel and unusual
punishment.3 5 The Court's analysis focused on the objective test of
whether the deprivations were sufficiently serious to constitute the un-
Spaid, Advocates Urge Better Conditions for Women Inmates, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May
29, 1991, at 9.
28. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
29. Id. at 104. See also Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000. The introduction of the subjective
element probably resulted because Estelle addressed for the first time whether the Eighth
Amendment applied in the context of the treatment of a prisoner after sentencing. Hud-
son, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2323
(1991).
30. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
31. Id. at 685. For further discussion of prison condition claims, seeJames E. Robert-
son, The Constitution in Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights Of Protective Custody Inmates,
56 U. CIN. L. REV. 91 (1987); Deborah A. Montick, Comment, Challenging Cruel and Unusual
Conditions of Prison Confinement: Refining the Totality of Conditions Approach, 26 How. L.J. 227
(1983).
32. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 681. The prison housed convicts in hundred-man barracks.
Armed convicts known as "creepers" crawled along the floor at night stalking their vic-
tims. Seventeen stabbings occurred in one 18-month period. Homosexual rape was so
common that some prisoners spent the night clinging to the bars nearest one of the guard
stations. Officials allowed prisoners in isolation only 1000 calories of food per day,
although the National Academy of Sciences recommended daily allowance was 2700. Iso-
lated prisoners' meals consisted primarily of 4-inch squares of "grue," a substance created
by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs and seasoning into a paste and
baking the mixture in a pan. Most of the guards were simply inmates who had been issued
guns. It was "within the power of a trusty guard to murder another inmate with practical
impunity," because trusties with weapons were authorized to use deadly force against es-
capees. One trustee fired his shotgun into a crowded barracks because the inmates would
not turn off their TV. The main issues addressed by the Supreme Court were whether
prisoners could be kept in isolation for more than 30 days and whether the State of Arkan-
sas was responsible for the attorney's fees of the petitioners. Id. at 681-89. For more
information on the duty to protect inmates from violence, see James E. Robertson, Surviv-
ing Incarceration: Constitutional Protection from Inmate Violence, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 101 (1985-
1986); Catherine A. Greene, Comment, Rape: The Unstated Sentence, 15 PAC. L.J. 899 (1984).
33. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685.
34. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
35. Id. at 352.
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necessary and wanton infliction of pain.3 6 Although the conditions in
Rhodes inflicted pain on the prisoners, the pain was not sufficient for an
Eighth Amendment violation.3 7 The Court declared that absent serious
deprivation, restrictive and harsh conditions are often part of the pen-
alty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.3 8 In
both Hutto and Rhodes, the decisions were based on the "objective" anal-
ysis of whether the deprivations were serious enough to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment,3 9 and no consideration was given to whether
the officials acted with a culpable state of mind.
40
The subjective element of the Estelle decision was not lost, however,
because the Court specifically addressed the subjective element in its
next major Eighth Amendment case: Whitley v. Albers. 4 1 In Whitley, pris-
oners rioted and took a guard hostage. 4 2 While trying to free the guard,
prison officials shot the plaintiff in the leg as he attempted to get back to
his cell.4 3 Whitley addressed the issue of what standard governs a pris-
oner's § 1983 claim that prison officials subjected him to cruel and unu-
sual punishment by shooting him during the course of quelling a prison
riot.4 4 The Whitley Court reaffirmed that the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain upon prisoners is a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.4 5 However, the Court went on to say that what is unnecessary
and wanton must vary according to the context in which the Eighth
Amendment violation is charged. 46 The context in Whitley was the use
of physical force during an effort to quash a prison riot.4 7 In Estelle, the
context was the refusal of medical care. 48 Because of the contextual dif-
ferences, the Whitley Court refused to apply the subjective standard of
deliberate indifference established by the Estelle Court in determining
36. Id. at 347.
37. Id. at 348-49. For further discussion of prison overcrowding, see Debra Boren-
stein, Double-Ceiling at Pontiac: Are Inmates Being Subjected to Cruel and Unusual Punishment Aris-
ing Out of Overcrowded Conditions?, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291 (1984); Robert G. Leger,
Perception of Crowding, Racial Antagonism and Aggression in a Custodial Prison, 16 J. CRIM. JUST.
167 (1988).
38. Hutto, 452 U.S. at 347.
39. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991).
40. Id.
41. 475 U.S. 312 (1986). For a more detailed analysis of Whitley, see Elizabeth A.
Blackburn, Note, Prisoners' Rights: Will They Remain Protected After Whitley?, 16 STETrSON L.
REV. 385 (1986); Melissa Whish Coan, Comment, Whitely [sic] v. Albers: The Supreme
Court's Attempted Synthesis of Eighth Amendment Standards for Prison Officials, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENr 155 (1988); Robert A. West, Comment, Constitutional Law: Quel-
ling a Prison Riot: Cruel and Unusual Punishment or a Necessary Infliction of Pain?, 26 WASHBURN
L.J. 208 (1986).
42. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 314-15.
43. Id. at 316.
44. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 314. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a
Constitutional Right to Personal Security Under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State
Officials in Violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REV. 173
(1987).
45. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
46. Id. at 320.
47. Id.
48. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
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whether the infliction of pain was unnecessary and wanton. 49
In its attempt to establish a standard to apply in the context of a
prison riot, the Whitley Court looked to a Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision:Johnson v. Glick. 50 In Johnson, a prison guard at the Man-
hattan House of Detention for Men beat a prisoner being held on a
felony charge. 5 1 The court of appeals addressed Johnson's excessive
force claim under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than as an Eighth Amendment action. 52 The Second Circuit em-
phasized that constitutional protection is not as extensive as common
law battery claims and that not every push or shove by a guard consti-
tutes excessive force, even if it later seems unnecessary. 53 Johnson estab-
lished a test for determining whether excessive force had been used that
involved four factors: (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the
relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (3) the
extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) whether the force applied was in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or done maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
5 4
The Supreme Court in Whitley adopted the fourth element of the
Second Circuit's Johnson test 55 and held that determining whether offi-
cials inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain in the context of controlling
a prison riot turns on whether they applied force in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.56 Because it found that the prison officials
shot Whitley in a good faith effort to quell the prison riot, the Court
held that the shooting did not meet the standard of malicious and sadis-
tic behavior and therefore did not violate the Eighth Amendment under
the new test.
5 7
In establishing the higher subjective threshold, the Court recog-
nized the pressures facing prison officials in an emergency situation. 58
The new subjective threshold in the context of a prison riot allowed the
Court to ensure that prison officials would have wide-ranging bounda-
ries in which to carry out their responsibilities. 5 9 The practical effect of
49. Whitey, 475 U.S. at 320.
50. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). For further discussion
ofJohnson, see Andre Sansoucy, Note, Applying the Eighth Amendment to the Use of Force Against
Prison Inmates, 60 B.U. L. REV. 332, 335-36 (1980).
51. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1029.
52. Id. at 1031-32. There appear to be two reasons the Johnson court did not address
the Eighth Amendment issue: 1) the court felt that the Eighth Amendment only applied to
the deliberate infliction of punishment by judicial sentences or legislative acts, and 2) the
beating of the prisoner took place before conviction and sentencing, and the court felt that
the Eighth Amendment only applied to claims arising after sentencing and conviction.
The court inJohnson found that the claim was valid because the prisoner had been denied
due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
53. Id. at 1033.
54. Id.
55. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 326.
58. Id. at 320.
59. Id. at 321-22. Justice Marshall dissented and filed an opinion in which Justices
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Whitley was to establish a subjective standard of "malicious and sadistic"
infliction of pain as the test for claims of Eighth Amendment violations
in the context of a prison riot. When adopting the fourth element of the
Johnson test (that is, whether officials applied the force in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline), the Whitley Court suggested that
the first three elements of the test related to the ultimate determination
of the whether the force was malicious and sadistic.60 However, the vast
majority of lower federal courts began to use all four elements of the
Johnson test to determine all excessive force claims, including Eighth
Amendment claims. 6 1
The next major case to address the Eighth Amendment rights of
prisoners was Wilson v. Seiter.6 2 Wilson was another case brought under
section 1983 charging prison officials with cruel and unusual punish-
ment because of deprivations in prison.63 The prisoners in Wilson
brought general complaints of overcrowding, excessive noise, insuffi-
cient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper
ventilation, unclean and inadequate rest rooms and unsanitary dining
facilities and food preparation. 6 4 The Wilson Court followed the prece-
dents of Hutto and Rhodes and described the objective test as a determi-
nation of whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious to constitute
the infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain.6 5 However, Wilson went
beyond the precedents of Hutto and Rhodes, firmly establishing the sub-
jective test as a necessary part of an Eighth Amendment analysis when
applied to prisoners' claims about the treatment they receive after incar-
ceration.6 6 In establishing the importance of the subjective test, the Wil-
son Court broadened Estelle and Whitley by holding that whether a case
was one of conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs or of
restoring official control over a prison riot, courts should inquire into
the prison official's state of mind when it is claimed that the official in-
flicted cruel and unusual punishment. 6 7 The Court went on to state that
if the inflicted pain is not formally administered as punishment ordered
by a statute or sentencing judge, some mental element must be attrib-
uted to the inflicting officer before the punishment can qualify as cruel
Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens joined because they felt the malicious and sadistic stan-
dard would make it too difficult for prisoners injured in riots to successfully bring Eighth
Amendment actions. Id. at 328.
60. Id. at 321. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.lI (1989).
61. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393.
62. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). For a more detailed discussion of Wilson, see Arthur B.
Berger, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: An Unsatisfying Attempt at Resolving the Imbroglio of Eighth
Amendment Prisoners' Rights Standards, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 565; Russell W. Gray, Note, Wil-
son v. Seiter: Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison
Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1339 (1992); Amanda Rubin, Note, Before And After Wilson
v. Seiter: Cases Challenging the Conditions of Confinement in the Ninth Circuit, 22 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 207 (1992).
63. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2322.
64. Id.
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and unusual. 68 Wilson affirmed the context-specific approach to ques-
tions of whether officials inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain69 and
adopted the deliberate indifference standard from Estelle as the subjec-
tive standard in the context of prison confinement claims. 70 Wilson also
left intact the objective test articulated in Hutto and Rhodes.7
In Huguet v. Barnett,72 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals combined
the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment analysis
into a four part test. Under this analysis a prisoner was required to
prove four elements to prevail in an Eighth Amendment claim: (1) a sig-
nificant injury73 which; (2) resulted directly and solely from the use of
force which was clearly excessive; (3) objectively unreasonable; and (4)
an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.74 Proof of all four ele-
ments was mandatory for a successful claim. 75 The court said that the
first three elements of the test embodied the objective part of an Eighth
Amendment analysis and the fourth element embodied the subjective
test.76 This evolution of the objective and subjective tests of the Eighth
Amendment provides the setting for Hudson v. McMillian.
77
III. HUDSON V. MCMILLIAN
In Hudson, the United States Supreme Court held that serious injury
is not required in order to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's objective
test.78 The Court further established that the subjective test in all
Eighth Amendment excessive force claims requires a determination of
whether the prison official acted in good faith or maliciously and sadisti-
cally in inflicting the harm.
7 9
A. Facts and Procedural History
The petitioner, Keith Hudson, was an inmate at the state peniten-
tiary in Angola, Louisiana.8° The respondents, Jack McMillian, Marvin
68. Id. at 2325.
69. Id. at 2326.
70. Id. at 2327.
71. Id. at 2324. See also Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1001 (1992).
72. 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990).
73. The serious injury requirement of the Huguet court's test may follow from looking
at the objective elements of Wilson and Estelle, which required serious deprivations and
serious medical needs respectively. See Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The Johnson court's language in stating that
not every common law battery rises to the level of a constitutional violation may have been
another factor in requiring serious injury. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). For a discussion of constitutional torts, see Theo-
dore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 641 (1987).
74. Huguet, 900 F.2d at 841.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992). See also Martin A. Schwartz, The Prisoner Beating Case, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 21, 1992, at 3.
78. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
79. Id. at 999.
80. Id. at 997.
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Woods and Arthur Mezo, served as corrections security officers at the
Angola facility. 8 ' On October 30, 1983, Hudson and McMillian argued,
so McMillian and Woods placed Hudson in handcuffs and shackles, took
him out of his cell, and walked him toward the penitentiary's "adminis-
trative lockdown" area. 82 On the way there, McMillian punched Hud-
son in the mouth, eyes, chest and stomach while Woods held Hudson in
place and kicked and punched him from behind.8 3 Mezo, the supervisor
on duty, watched the beating but merely told the officers "not to have
too much fun."' 84 As a result of the beating, Hudson suffered minor
bruises and swelling of his face, mouth and lip. 85 The blows also loos-
ened Hudson's teeth and cracked his partial dental plate, rendering it
unusable for several months.
86
Hudson brought a claim under section 198387 alleging that the
beating administered by prison guards violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.8 8 The parties con-
sented to the case being tried before a magistrate,8 9 who found: (1) that
Hudson's injuries were minor; (2) that McMillian and Woods used force
when there was no need to do so; and (3) that Mezo expressly condoned
their actions. 90 The magistrate awarded Hudson damages of $800.91
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 92 The circuit court applied
the test it laid down in Huguet93 and held that inmates alleging the use
of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment must prove:
(1) significant injury, (2) resulting directly and only from the use of force
clearly excessive to the need, (3) the excessiveness of which was objec-
tively unreasonable, and (4) that the action constituted an unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.94 The court's test required that all ele-
ments be met before there could be an Eighth Amendment violation, 9 5
and the court determined that the force used by McMillian and Woods
met all of the elements except for the significant injury element. 96 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the use
of excessive physical force against a prisoner constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. 97
81. Id.
82. Id. Neither the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court gave a defi-
nition of the "administrative lockdown" area or its purpose.




87. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See supra note 23 for full text of the
statute.
88. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997-98.
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988).
90. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998.
91. Id.
92. Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
93. Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990). For background, see supra
notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
94. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015 (citing Huguet, 900 F.2d at 841).
95. Id.
96. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015.
97. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997, 1004.
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B. Holding
1. Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion revisited Whitley and affirmed
the underlying principle that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.9 8 Justice O'Connor
noted, however, that the standard for "unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain" varies according to the context of the alleged constitu-
tional violation, 99 pointing to Estelle and citing the deliberate
indifference standard in medical needs cases as an example of the vari-
ance.10 0 The deliberate indifference standard in Estelle was termed ap-
propriate because the majority felt that the State's responsibility to
provide inmates with medical care did not ordinarily conflict with com-
peting administrative concerns. 10 '
In reviewing Whitley, the Court stated that in the context of a prison
riot, different concerns arise than in the medical needs context. 10 2 In
the riot context, prison officials are concerned with the threat unrest
poses to the inmates, prison workers, administrators and visitors.
1 03
Prison officials must balance these concerns against the harm that in-
mates may suffer if guards use force and then make a decision in haste,
under pressure and often without the opportunity of a second
chance. 104 Because of the different concerns in Whitley's prison riot con-
text, the deliberate indifference standard was rejected and replaced by a
malicious and sadistic standard.
10 5
In a major expansion of the Whitley doctrine, the Court concluded
that the same underlying concerns arise any time a guard must use force
to maintain order, whether in a riot situation or not. 10 6 Whether the
prison disturbance is a riot or lesser disturbance (such as the one that
involved Hudson) prison officials must still balance the need to maintain
order through force against the risk of injury to inmates. 10 7 Both situa-
tions, a riot or lesser disturbance, require officials to act quickly and de-
cisively, therefore, both situations trigger the principle that prison
administrators should be given wide-ranging deference in carrying out
the responsibility of maintaining order in the prison.' 0 8 Because of the
98. Id. at 998 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
99. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
100. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
101. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
105. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21).
106. Id. at 998.
107. Id. at 998-99.
108. Id. at 999 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981) ("a prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left
to the discretion of prison administrators"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)
("Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adop-
tion and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security."). For further discus-
sion ofjudicial deference, see Emily Calhoun, The Supreme Court and The Constitutional Rights
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similarities between riots and lesser disturbances, the Court held that
the new standard by which to judge all claims of excessive force is the
test set forth in Whitley: whether the force is applied in a good-faith ef-
fort to maintain or restore discipline, or applied maliciously and sadisti-
cally to cause harm. 10 9 Citing appellate decisions from the Second,
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Court reasoned that
extending the Whitley standard to all claims of excessive force estab-
lished nothing new for most circuits. 110 After establishing the new stan-
dard for an excessive force claim, the Court determined the role that the
extent of injury plays in the standard.
Under the Whitley test, the extent of injury was simply one factor
that suggests whether prison officials thought force was necessary or
whether the force evidenced an unnecessary and malicious infliction of
pain." '1 The Hudson Court suggested several other factors appropriate
in evaluating whether the force was unnecessary and malicious: (1) the
need for application of the force; (2) the relationship between the need
and the amount of force used; (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response. 1 2 Based on these relevant factors, the Court con-
cluded that the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth
Amendment inquiry, but does not end the analysis."13 Addressing the
respondent's claim that the objective analysis requires a serious injury,
the Court said that the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim
requires asking if the alleged wrongdoing was "harmful enough" to es-
tablish a constitutional violation." 4 The subjective analysis determines
whether the officials acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of
mind." 115
In addressing the objective standard, the Court said that what is
necessary to show harm for purposes of the Eighth Amendment de-
pends on the claim at issue for two reasons. 116 First, the Eighth Amend-
ment should be applied with due regard for differences in the kind of
of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 219 (1977); Peter Keenan, Constitutional
Law: The Supreme Court's Recent Battle Against Judicial Oversight of Prison Affairs, 1989 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 507 (1990); Irene Lambrou, Comment, AIDS Behind Bars: Prison Responses and
Judicial Deference, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 327 (1989).
109. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
110. Id. See Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Leathers, 913
F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990); Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d 700, 703 (6th Cir. 1989);
Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988); Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188
(11 th Cir. 1987). But see Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 130 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting
application of Whitley standard absent "an actual disturbance"); Wyatt v. Delaney, 818 F.2d
21, 23 (8th Cir. 1987) (absent matters involving institutional security a deliberate indiffer-
ence standard should be used).
111. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
112. Id. The Court did not clearly state the role these elements play in determining
whether force was malicious and sadistic. One commentator suggests that these elements
are the proper basis for making that determination. Martin A. Schwartz, The Prisoner Beat-
ing Case, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 1992, at 3.
113. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
114. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991)).
115. Id. (citing Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329).
116. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
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conduct against which the objection is lodged (i.e., physical force, prison
deprivation or medical needs). 1 7 Second, the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment draws its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."18 These two
concerns result in an objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim
that is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of de-
cency. 119 By way of illustration, the Court first reviewed claims directed
at conditions of confinement. 120 Noting that routine discomfort is part
of the penalty that offenders pay for their offenses, only deprivations
which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities do not fit
with contemporary standards of decency.121 Second, the Court made a
similar analysis of medical needs claims. 12 2 It reasoned that society
does not expect prisoners to have unqualified access to health care,
therefore only deliberate indifference to medical needs does not fit with
contemporary standards of decency.
123
In an excessive force context, society's expectations are different. 1
24
Whenever prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm, they violate contemporary standards of decency. ' 2 5 If only serious
injury violated contemporary standards of decency, the Eighth Amend-
ment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how cruel and
inhumane, as long as it resulted in minor injuries. ' 2 6 The Court empha-
sized that doing away with the serious injury requirement did not make
every touch or shove by a prison guard an actionable Eighth Amend-
ment claim. 12 7 The Eighth Amendment excludes from constitutional
recognition the de minimis use of force, provided that the force is not
repugnant to the conscience of mankind. 128 Since Hudson's injuries
were found to be more than de minimis, there was no basis for the dis-
missal of his claim. 1
2 9
The majority then addressed the dissent's argument that by not re-
quiring serious injury, the holding in Wilson was misapplied.130 The ma-
jority distinguished Wilson in two ways: (1) it was not an excessive force
claim, and (2) it did not address the objective analysis of the Eighth
117. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
118. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
119. Id. at 1000.
120. Id.
121. Id..(citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
122. Id. at 1000 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (only deliberate
indifference to medical needs did not fit with contemporary standards of decency)).
123. Id. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
124. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
125. Id. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).
126. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. In Hudson,Justice O'Connor
stated that allowing physical punishments that only resulted in minor injuries "would have
been as unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is today." Hudson, 112
S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102).
127. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973)).
128. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327).
129. Id. at 1001.
130. Id. at 1001. See Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
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Amendment inquiry.'13 Next, the difference in analyzing conditions of
confinement claims and excessive force claims was reemphasized.1
3 2
Justice O'Connor asked:
How could it be otherwise when the constitutional touchstone
is whether punishment is cruel and unusual? To deny, as the
dissent does, the difference between punching a prisoner in the
face and serving him unappetizing food is to ignore the " 'con-
cepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency' "
that animate the Eighth Amendment.'"3
The opinion concluded with a refusal to address the respondent's claim
that an isolated and unauthorized act of violence was not "punishment"
under the Eighth Amendment. 134 This refusal was based on the court
of appeals having left intact the Magistrate's decision that the beating
was not an isolated assault, as there was testimony that McMillian and
Woods had beat another inmate shortly thereafter.' 3 5 The Court re-




Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment. 137 He argued that the justification for the higher stan-
dard of malicious and sadistic in Whitley is that emergency situations,
such as prison riots, necessitate quick decisions and reactions.1 38 Ab-
sent an emergency situation, however, Justice Stevens felt that the less
demanding standard of unnecessary and wanton should be applied.1
3 9
The rationale was that the unnecessary and wanton standard was more
consistent with the principle that courts give due regard to the differ-
ences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion is charged. 1
4 0
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
141
He disagreed with the majority's extension of the malicious and sadistic
131. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1001.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102).
134. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1001. The Court did recognize that other courts have ad-
dressed the issue. See George v. Evans, 633 F.2d 413,416 (5th Cir. 1980) ("a single, unau-
thorized assault by a guard does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment"); Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973) ("although a
spontaneous attack by a guard is 'cruel' and, we hope 'unusual,' it does not fit any ordinary
concept of 'punishment' "). But see Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.
1985) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) ("If a guard decided to supplement a prisoner's
official punishment by beating him, this would be punishment .
135. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
136. Id. at 1002.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Justice Stevens also dis-
sented in Whitley to the establishment of the malicious and sadistic standard. Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 328 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002.
141. Id.
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standard to all allegations of excessive force. 14 2 Justice Blackmun ad-
dressed the respondents' claim that not requiring excessive injury would
cause the courts to be overburdened with prisoners' suits. 143 He rea-
soned that the floodgates would not be opened for several reasons:
(1) prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies under sec-
tion 1983; (2) officials may raise a qualified immunity defense and
(3) district courts may dismiss any complaint found to be frivolous or
malicious. 144 He stated that the burden on the courts is worth bearing
when a prisoner's suit has merit and that the right to file for legal re-
dress in the courts is probably more valuable to a prisoner than to any
other citizen.14 5 Justice Blackmun expressed his opinion that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits "pain," not "injury," and that pain, in its ordi-
nary meaning, surely includes a notion of psychological harm. 14 6 The
Justice concluded by stating that psychological pain that is above de
minimis would surely be actionable in an Eighth Amendment setting. 147
3. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, his first writing for the
court, in which Justice Scalia joined.148 Justice Thomas disagreed with
the majority's decision that a prisoner is not required to prove serious
injury to have an actionable claim under the Eighth Amendment. 149 He
stated that allowing any tortious conduct to rise to the level of a consti-
tutional claim goes far beyond the precedents of the Court.150
Justice Thomas would have affirmed the Fifth Circuit's judgment.
Emphasizing that the magistrate who found the facts in the case consid-
ered Hudson's injuries minor, Justice Thomas appeared shocked that
142. Id. at 1003. Justice Blackmun also dissented in Whitley to the establishment of the
malicious and sadistic standard. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 328.
143. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1003.
144. Id. at 1003-04.
145. Id. Prisoners have a constitutional right to adequate, effective and meaningful
access to courts to challenge violations of constitutional rights. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 824, 828 (1977). See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 355 (1987) (Bren-
nan, J. dissenting):
When prisoners emerge from the shadows to press a constitutional claim, they
invoke no alien set of principles drawn from a distant culture. Rather, they speak
the language of the charter upon which all of us rely to hold official power ac-
countable. They ask us to acknowledge that power exercised in the shadows must
be restrained at least as diligently as power that acts in the sunlight. In reviewing
a prisoner's claim of the infringement of a constitutional fight, we must therefore
begin from the premise that, as members of this society, prisoners retain constitu-
tional rights that limit the exercise of official authority against them.
See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) ("[P]ersons in prison, like other individu-
als, have the right to petition the Government for redress of grievances which, of course,
includes 'access to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints' ") (citing
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,485 (1969));JoHN W. PALMER, CONSTrrrrioNAL RIGHTrS OF
PRISONERS §§ 11.5-11.6 (4th ed. 1991).
146. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1003.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1004. For a scathing critique of Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion see
Stuart Taylor, Jr.,Justice Thomas Strikes Cruel and Unusual Pose, N.J. L.J., March 16, 1992, at
16.




the majority would broadly assert "that any 'unnecessary and wanton'
use of physical force against a prisoner automatically amounts to 'cruel
and unusual' punishment." ' 5 ' In justice Thomas's view: "a use of force
that causes only insignificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may
be tortious, it may be criminal, and it may even be remediable under
other provisions of the Federal Constitution, but it is not 'cruel and unu-
sual punishment.' "1152
Emulating the jurisprudential style favored by Justice Scalia,
Thomas began his analysis with an historical overview of the Eighth
Amendment. 153 Relying heavily on Weems v. United States,154 Thomas
stated that the original intent of the framers was that the Eighth Amend-
ment apply only to statutorily created punishments and criminal sen-
tencing. 155 There is nothing in 185 years of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence-from the adoption of the Amendment in 1791 until the
decision in Estelle-indicating that the Eighth Amendment applied to
deprivations suffered in prison. 15 6 Thomas rationalized that:
Surely prison was not a more congenial place in the early years
of the republic than it is today; nor were our judges and com-
mentators so naive as to be unaware of the often harsh condi-
tions of prison life. Rather, they simply did not conceive of the
Eighth Amendment as protecting inmates from harsh treat-
ment. Thus, historically, the lower courts routinely rejected
prisoner grievances by explaining that the courts had no role in
regulating prison life.1
5 7
He concluded that the Eighth Amendment was originally intended to
apply only to sentences given by judges, not to hardships endured by
prisoners after incarceration. 158
Thomas proceeded to discuss the standards established by the
Court for medical needs claims in Estelle and prison deprivation claims in
Rhodes.159 Justice Thomas stated that Estelle required a prisoner to show
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and that Rhodes re-
quired a prisoner to show serious deprivation to be successful with the
claim.' 60 Justice Thomas reasoned that these two cases show that the
Eighth Amendment only applies to a narrow class of conduct resulting
in serious injury. 1 6 1 He said that the majority turned the Eighth
Amendment inquiry into a strictly subjective test resulting in an unwar-
ranted and unfortunate break with the Court's Eighth Amendment
151. Id. at 1005.
152. Id.
153. Id. For an example of justice Scalia's historical jurisprudential approach, see
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 605 (1990).
154. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
155. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005.
156. Id. at 1005-06.
157. Id. at 1005.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981).
161. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006.
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jurisprudence. 162
Justice Thomas also disagreed with the higher standard of malicious
and sadistic established by the Court for the subjective test. 163 He
noted that most excessive force cases are not situations of prisoner un-
rest that require a prison guard to keep order.164 Justice Thomas stated
that because so many excessive force claims are not prisoner unrest
cases, the use of the force will seldom be accompanied by a malicious
and sadistic mindset. 16 5 Before concluding, Justice Thomas addressed
whether an Eighth Amendment injury always has to be a physical in-
jury. 16 6 He stated that forms of punishment that inflict psychological




The United States Supreme Court's decision in Hudson, which does
not require serious injury for Eighth Amendment claims, provides pris-
oners with more access to the courts because any infliction of pain,
above de minimis, will be the basis for an action. The respondents in
Hudson felt that it would be detrimental to allow prisoners more access
to file constitutionally-based claims because it would overburden the
courts. 168 While the Court's decision may increase case-loads, the po-
tential deterrent effect of closer scrutiny on prisons could cause less un-
necessary force, and actually lead to fewer prisoner suits. Prison
administrators, officials and guards will now have notice that excessive
force suits are easier to file. This should provide motivation for better
supervision and alternative methods of control besides beating prison-
ers. The Court's decision may decrease the amount of unnecessary pain
inflicted on prisoners because any unnecessary pain will be actionable.
The Court's decision also recognizes that rights still exist for pris-
oners. The goal of incarceration in the criminal justice system should be
rehabilitating prisoners and returning to society people who are produc-
tive citizens. The Court previously recognized this goal in Rhodes v.
Chapman, stating that the function of the criminal justice system is "to
punish justly, to deter future crime, and to return imprisoned persons to
society with an improved chance of being useful, law-abiding citi-
zens.' 169 In Pell v. Procunier, the Court acknowledged that incarceration
162. Id. at 1007.
163. Id. at 1008.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1008-10.
167. Id. at 1009.
168. Id. at 1003-04.
169. 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981). See also Ex Parte Lee, 171 P. 958, 959 (Cal. 1918) ("In-
stead of trying to break the will of the offender and make him submissive, the purpose is to
strengthen his will to do right and lessen his temptation to do wrong."); HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LImIrTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36-58 (1968); SOL RUBIN, THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTION 755-64 (2d ed. 1973); 1 CHARLEs E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW § 4 (1978); Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman, The Paradox of Prison Reform: Rehabilita-
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serves a protective function by quarantining criminal offenders for a
given period of time. 170 However, Pell emphasized that most offenders
will return to society, therefore, a paramount objective of the correc-
tions system is the rehabilitation of prisoners. 171 While society punishes
prisoners by incarcerating and stripping them of certain individual
rights, 17 2 prison officers should not force prisoners to also endure un-
necessary, dehumanizing and humiliating pain. 173 Rehabilitation will
not be achieved unless prison officials respect prisoners individual rights
and inherent worth as humans.
It is obvious that, other things being equal, reformative efforts
have the best chance of being successful-without too much
frustration of the interests of retribution and deterrence-if the
conditions of imprisonment are such that the offender not only
knows that he is being "punished" (i.e., he is being deprived of
his liberty and of certain creature comforts), but also knows
that, because his dignity as a man is respected, efforts directed
toward his reformation are genuine and sincere.1
74
The Court correctly concluded that any time prison officials inflict
unnecessary harm on prisoners, society's standards of decency are vio-
lated.' 7 5 The Court's recognition of prisoners' rights, by holding seri-
ous injury is not necessary to bring an Eighth Amendment claim, is a
step in the right direction. Unfortunately, the Court's establishment of
malicious and sadistic as the subjective test for all excessive force claims
moves Eighth Amendment jurisprudence backwards. In Rhodes, the
Court warned itself to proceed cautiously in making an Eighth Amend-
ment judgment because, "unless we reverse it, '[a] decision that a given
punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot be
reversed short of a constitutional amendment,' and thus '[rlevisions can-
not be made in light of further experience.' "176 The Court should have
heeded its own warning and proceeded with care and caution in estab-
lishing malicious and sadistic as the subjective standard for all excessive
tion, Prisoners' Rights, and Violence, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 413 (1984);Jerome Michael &
Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide H, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1264-69,
1318-19 (1937); Herbert Wechsler &Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I,
37 COLUM. L. REV. 701 (1937).
170. 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
171. id.
172. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 215 (8th Cir. 1974)
("[Slegregation from society and loss of one's liberty are the only punishment the law
allows."); seealso RUBIN, supra note 169, at 697-734; 1 ToRcIA, supra note 169, § 21 nn.51-
53.
173. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-
200 (1989) ("when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility
for his safety and general well-being."). For further discussion, see Project, Prisoners'
Rights, 80 GEO. L.J. 1677 (1992); Project, Prisoners' Rights, 79 GEO. L.J. 1253 (1991); Pro-
ject, Prisoners' Rights, 78 GEO. L.J. 1429 (1990).
174. 1 TORCIA, supra note 169, § 4. See also Michael & Wechsler, Homicide II, supra note
169 at 1322.
175. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
176. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 176 (1976)).
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force claims. Malicious and sadistic is too high of a threshold to require
prisoners to prove in all excessive force claims.
The Court justifies the decision by somehow arriving at the conclu-
sion that a prison riot does not differ much from a lesser disturbance.'
77
The Court's reasoning is difficult to understand. The basis of Whitley's
malicious and sadistic standard was the existence of a disturbance that
indisputably posed significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison
staff. 178 Unfortunately, crisis situations inherently involve quick deci-
sions that may prove irresponsible or reckless when reviewed once the
emergency has passed. When an immediate threat to the lives of prison
staff and inmates presents itself officials should be able to make quick
decisions without incurring liability for conduct short of malicious and
sadistic. The situation in Whitley, where prisoners riot and take a prison
guard hostage, provides an appropriate context for the malicious and
sadistic standard to govern. 179 However, situations such as the one in
Hudson do not present the same concerns. Hudson was a handcuffed
prisoner who argued with a guard-he posed no significant risks.' 80
There were no administrative concerns requiring quick decisions in or-
der to protect the lives of the prison staff and inmates. Absent an emer-
gency situation, prison officials should not be allowed latitude to
administer unnecessary pain of any kind. Furthermore, the malicious
and sadistic standard leaves the Eighth Amendment open to abuse by
prison officials. Any testimony from a prison official, whether honest or
fabricated, that a prisoner was menacing or threatening in any way pro-
vides a defense that pain was not inflicted maliciously and sadistically.
The standard will be difficult for a fact finder to apply because the Court
gave no solid guidelines about how to distinguish malicious and sadistic
from a "good faith effort."' 18 1 The majority should have acquiesced to
the opinions of Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun and left the stan-
dard at unnecessary and wanton.'
8 2
Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion leaves one to wonder exactly
what position he takes on applying the Eighth Amendment to prisoner's
claims after incarceration.'18 Applying a strict, historical precedent
based approach, Justice Thomas initially suggests that he believes the
Eighth Amendment should apply only to punishments meted out by
statutes or sentencing judges. 18 4 Next, Justice Thomas hints of a will-
ingness to abide by the Court's decision to apply the Eighth Amendment
to prisoner's claims if the serious injury requirement is kept.' 8 5 The
reader is left to wonder which position Justice Thomas prefers. He de-
177. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998-99.
178. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
179. See supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
180. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997. See supra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
182. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002-04. For further discussion of Justice Stevens's and
Justice Blackmun's opinions, see supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
183. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005-10. See also Taylor, supra note 148 at 16.
184. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
185. Id. at 1006-10.
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fends both positions by holding forth the precedents of the Court and
insisting that precedent unconditionally govern, ' 8 6 however, the Consti-
tution must be applied, not with an eye toward yesterday, but with the
vision of the present.' 8 7 Justice Thomas fails to do this by demonstrat-
ing insensitivity to a prisoner's right to be constitutionally protected
from the deliberate infliction of unnecessary pain. However, his analysis
of Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners in medical needs and
prison condition contexts does support his assertion that the Court's
precedents have required a serious element in those cases to meet the
objective test.' 8 8 This raises the question of whether the "serious" re-
quirement in medical needs and prison condition cases is open for
challenge.
Thomas's main disagreement with the majority hinged on the defi-
nition of "serious injury." In Thomas's view, by definition any punish-
ment that is "diabolic and inhuman" inflicts serious injury. 18 9 He
concluded that the majority opinion requires injuries be physical to be
considered injuries at all, and that there are many types of injury that
leave no physical manifestations. 190 However, this line of analysis
seems to contradict Thomas's critique of the majority for allegedly aban-
doning the "objective standard." Thomas insists that some objective
form of injury is required, but then insists that psychological forms of
injury-which are by definition subjective-need also be included in the
category of Eighth Amendment violative injuries. It becomes quite un-
clear exactly what standard he advocates.
Thomas appears to lose focus of the basic facts of this case: three
prison guards, acting in concert, inflicted a humiliating beating on a
shackled prisoner. This beating was the result of a minor altercation
between prisoner and guard. Although Thomas champions the signifi-
cance of non-physical, psychological injuries as a potential source of
Eighth Amendment transgressions, he failed to consider the potential
psychological impact of the punishment meted out to Hudson. While
the majority may have reached its decision through a rather circuitous
186. Id. at 1005-11.
187. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934):
It is no answer ... to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to
the vision of [the framers'] day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the
statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means
to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook
of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own
refutation.
188. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 ("acts or omissions suffi-
ciently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs")) (citing Wilson,
111 S. Ct. at 2324) ("was the deprivation sufficiently serious?")).
189. Id. at 1009.
190. Id. at 1009. "Many things-beating with a rubber truncheon, water torture, elec-
tric shock, incessant noise, reruns of 'Space 1999'-may cause agony as they occur yet
leave no inflicting injury. The state is not free to inflict such pains without cause just so
long as it is careful to leave no marks" Id. (citing Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
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and unsatisfying path, clearly its result is preferable to the harsh result
which Thomas's opinion would dictate.
The Court's refusal to address whether an isolated incident of vio-
lence against a prisoner is punishment under the Eighth Amendment
leaves doubt as to whether this decision will stand or be extremely nar-
rowed in the future. The Court should have addressed the issue and left
no doubt.19 1 If, at a later date, the Court determines that isolated beat-
ings are not within the Eighth Amendment's definition of punishment,
prisoners will be in a worse position then they were before Hudson. At
that point, their access to the courts will be extremely narrow and the
subjective threshold they will have to prove to be successful in their
claims will likely remain at malicious and sadistic.
V. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Amendment analysis after Hudson still includes both an
objective and a subjective test. Hudson makes it easier for prisoners to
meet the objective test, thus making it easier for them to file suits. Yet
Hudson also makes it harder for prisoners to meet the subjective test,
meaning fewer prisoner's claims will be successful. If the threat of law-
suits has a deterrent effect on prison officials, the decision will provide a
positive change in the criminal justice system. However, the higher sub-
jective threshold of malicious and sadistic will cause fewer claims to be
successful, which means changing the conditions of the current prison
system will be a slow process. The next major issue in Eighth Amend-
ment claims brought by prisoners after incarceration is determining
whether isolated beatings are "punishment" under the Amendment.
Prisoners have had a difficult enough time of proving that prison offi-
cials inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain. Proving the infliction of
malicious and sadistic pain may prove nearly impossible. Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence may have taken one step forward and two
steps back.
Dale E. Butler
191. The Court granted certiorari specifically on the objective issue of whether the
Eighth Amendment is violated by anything less than serious injury. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at
1004 (Thomas,J., dissenting). Since the Court decided to go beyond this issue and estab-
lish a new subjective standard, it should have further clarified whether "isolated beatings"
constituted Eighth Amendment violations.
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HOLMES v. SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP.: A
DISAPPOINTING ATTEMPT TO LIMIT RICO AcTIONS
FOR SECURmES FRAUD
I. INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)'
has emerged as a prominent force in the legal community.2 Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp. 3 was supposed to be the turning point in
RICO litigation-the solution for the questions concerning the scope of
RICO in civil litigation, especially securities fraud. 4 Many lawyers
hoped that the United States Supreme Court would use the case to re-
solve the much-disputed issue of whether a plaintiff had to be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities in order to maintain a RICO action for
securities fraud. In a surprising decision the Court avoided the pur-
chaser-seller question, and instead held that the RICO violation must
constitute a direct, or proximate, cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 5
Holmes's immediate impact on the RICO statute and securities law
appears equivocal. This Comment discusses the ambiguities of the
RICO/securities fraud issue, speculates how the lower courts will inter-
pret Holmes and draws the conclusion that courts should apply the pur-
chaser-seller standing requirements of the federal securities laws when
resolving a case involving RICO and securities fraud.
II. BACKGROUND
A. RICO
Congress initially enacted Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,6 better known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), to assist law enforcement in fighting organ-
ized crime, 7 but the legislature also included explicit language allowing
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
2. Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "'Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases
Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 674 (1990).
3. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
4. See David Tobenkin, Supreme Court Ruling May Rewrite Securities Law, Los ANGELES
Bus. J., Nov. 11, 1991, § 1, at 5; High Court To Weigh Limits Of Securities-Linked RICO Claims,
WALL ST. LETTER, Nov. 11, 1991, at 2 (predicting that the "fate of applicability of the
securities seller/purchaser test under RICO ... will certainly be determined").
5. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322.
6. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
7. In the introduction to the Act, the legislature stated:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
Id. See also Michael N. Glanz, Note, RICO and Securities Fraud A Workable Limitation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1513 (1983).
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for civil actions by persons injured "by reason of" a RICO violation. 8
To constitute a violation, a person involved in an "enterprise" 9 must
participate in a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 0 RICO specifies a
number of predicate offenses that constitute racketeering activity, in-
cluding "fraud in the sale of securities."" Civil remedies for a RICO
violation include treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees.
12
Since the enactment of RICO, commentators have debated the
scope of the predicate offense concerning securities fraud. 1 Legislative
history provides inadequate support for a plausible interpretation.
14
Congress did not include securities fraud as a predicate offense in the
early drafts of RICO, but added it later before enacting the statute.' 5
The current debate centers around whether Congress intended to in-
clude the purchaser-seller standing requirement of Rule 1Ob-5,1 6 or any




Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193418 and Rule
lOb-51 9 are the statutory means by which the Securities and Exchange
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
9. Id. § 1961(4). The term "enterprise" encompasses "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals asso-
ciated in fact although not a legal entity." Id
10. Id § 1961(5). The statute describes a "pattern of racketeering activity" as "at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprison-
ment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id.
11. Id. § 1961(1)(D).
12. Id. § 1964(c).
13. See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets: The
Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 896, 944- 45 (1990); Glanz,
supra note 7, at 1516-17.
14. Thomas W. Alvey, III, Note, Puncturing The RICO Balloon: The Judicial Imposition Of
The lOb-5 Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 41 WASH. U.J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 193, 200 (1992).
See also Andrew P. Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud In The Sale Of Securi-
ties", 18 GA. L. REV. 43, 58 (1983) (recognizing four potential interpretations of "fraud in
the sale of securities").
15. Bridges, supra note 14, at 58-59.
16. See Harvey.L. Pitt et al., Once Again, the Court Fails to Rein in RICO, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 27, 1992, at 31 (stating that the "genesis" of the debate is the purchaser-seller
requirement).
17. Mathews, supra note 13, at 944.
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991). Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
Recently, the Supreme Court limited actions filed under Rule lOb-5 by adopting "the
,one year from discovery, three years from the event' statute of limitations, derived from
other sections of the 1934 Act." Joseph Cachey, Lampf v. Gilbertson: Rule lOb-5's Time
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Commission (SEC) enforces federal laws governing securities fraud.
The important case history of the purchaser-seller requirement began
with Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.20 In Birnbaum, a group of stockhold-
ers sued Newport Steel, its president and the directors of the corpora-
tion for alleged securities fraud. 2 ' The defendants shunned a
potentially profitable merger for the plaintiff-stockholders and instead
sold their own shares to a third company at a substantial premium to the
current market price. 22 In affirming the lower court's dismissal for fail-
ure to state a cause of action, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decided that Congress constructed Rule lOb-5 specifi-
cally for fraud involving the purchase or sale of securities, not for man-
agement's fraudulent supervision of corporate matters.2 3 The court
held that a person who fails to qualify as a purchaser or a seller of securi-
ties may not sustain a securities fraud claim based on Rule lOb-5.
24
Twenty-three years later, the Supreme Court upheld the Birnbaum
rule in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,2 5 a significant decision for
securities fraud. The case involved an offering of securities by a newly
formed corporation, Blue Chip Stamps, to customers of the old Blue
Chip Stamp Co. The plaintiffs, customers who did not purchase stock,
claimed that the prospectus issued prior to the offering discouraged
them from buying shares so that the company could reoffer the stock to
the public at a higher price.2 6 The plaintiffs brought a class action suit
for profits lost in not buying the stock, the price of which increased sub-
sequent to the public offering. 2 7 The Supreme Court applied the Birn-
baum rule and held that only purchasers and sellers of securities have
standing to sue for a violation of Rule lOb-5. 28 The Court grounded its
opinion on legislative history, precedential developments since Birnbaum
and several public policy considerations.2 9 The policy factors looked at
by the Court included the consequences that lawsuits would have on the
defendant's daily business activities, the ability of plaintiffs to use
groundless claims to enhance the settlement value of their case and fact
issues that hinged on oral testimony, further reducing the chances of
settlement.3 0 The Court expressed deep concern about the potential
for "vexatious litigation" 3' and perceived that the benefit of preventing
frivolous suits outweighed the undesirable effects of excluding those
Has Come, 69 DENv. U. L. REV. 135 (analyzing the split in the circuits regarding the proper
statute of limitations and the Court's resolution of the earlier uncertainties).
20. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
21. Id. at 462.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 464.
24. Id. at 463. This holding became known as the Birnbaum rule. See Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
25. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
26. Id. at 726.
27. Id. at 727.
28. Id. at 754-55.
29. Glen E. Mercer, Note, Violation of Rule lOb-5 As a Predicate Act Under Civil RICO, 51
LA. L. REV. 1111, 1112-14 (1991).
30. Id. at 1114.
31. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739-45.
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persons actually damaged by a Rule lOb-5 violation.3 2
The number of securities fraud cases involving RICO soared in the
mid-1980's 33 as frustrated investors who failed to meet the purchaser-
seller requirement in Rule lOb-5 began using RICO as a tool to avoid
the standing limitation. The broad language used in the statute3 4 and
the liberal interpretation that the courts exercised 35 contributed signifi-
cantly to the move to RICO. As plaintiffs began combining RICO with
securities fraud actions, the judicial system experienced difficulties sort-
ing out the differences in the securities laws and RICO. The privilege to
bring suit under Rule lOb-5 arises from an implied cause of action de-
veloped by the courts. 3 6 Birnbaum further limited the implied right to
purchasers and sellers of securities. 3 7 Yet, the provisions of the above
securities laws did not appear in the language of RICO, 38 although the
SEC had initiated federal laws governing securities fraud long before
Congress ever considered RICO.3 9 Confusion determining the stand-
ing requirement needed to bring a RICO claim in a securities action
results from this omission.
C. Standing
A plaintiff suing under RICO has standing to sue only if an injury
has occurred as a result of conduct prohibited by the statute. 40 The
confusion over whether the standing requirements of the securities laws
apply to a RICO action based on securities fraud resulted in divided
courts and ambiguous law. 4 1 In International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 42 a
corporation sued the two individuals who initially started the business,
claiming that the two falsified information in a prospectus and caused
the corporation to suffer losses. 4 3 The Fourth Circuit asserted that the
32. Id at 743. Much of the disagreement concerning the purchaser-seller issue results
from excluded plaintiffs, such as an owner of a security who does not sell because of the
fraudulent behavior. Thus, even if a distressed investor exists, he is unable to sue because
of the purchaser-seller limitation. Linda Greenhouse, Court Limits Agency on Stock-Fraud
Suits, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 25, 1992, at C2.
33. Alvey, supra note 14, at 194-95.
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (RICO "shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes.").
35. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (asserting that the lan-
guage of RICO should not be limited); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497
(1985) ("RICO is to be read broadly.").
36. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (investors con-
vinced to sell stock for much less than actual value sustained a cause of action under the
securities laws because "the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not
sufficient to negative what the general law implies.").
37. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
38. Alvey, supra note 14, at 204.
39. Congress enacted the securities laws in 1933 and 1934 and RICO in 1970.
40. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
41. Mathews, supra note 13, at 947; Mercer, supra note 29, at 1121 (asserting that it is
"equally plausible that Congress meant to retain the Birnbaum rule [in RICO] as it is that
Congress meant to overturn it").
42. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
43. Id. at 150.
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purchaser-seller standing requirement applies to RICO claims based on
securities fraud.4 4 The court held that because the corporation and its
officers and directors were not purchasers or sellers of stock, all lacked
standing to sue.4 5 Because Congress did not explicitly state any limita-
tion, the court followed the precedent established in securities fraud ac-
tions,4 6 the Birnbaum rule.
4 7
The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co. 48
lies in direct contrast to the holding in International Data Bank. Warner
was a customer of ESM Government Securities and a principal in two
banks that were also ESM customers. He sued the company's auditors,
claiming they filed false and misleading reports regarding the financial
condition of ESM. 4 9 Although Warner could not maintain an action
under the federal securities laws, the court stated that he need not meet
the purchaser-seller requirement to sustain a RICO claim based on se-
curities fraud. 50 The court simply stated that a plaintiff "need only al-
lege injuries personally sustained as a result of conduct violative of the
federal RICO statute."'' l The Ninth Circuit added to the disarray
among the circuits by omitting the purchaser-seller limitation in Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 52 the precursor to the instant case. 53
III. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts
Congress established the Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion (SIPC), a nonprofit private corporation, 54 following the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970.55 The SIPC is comprised of broker-
dealers required to become members upon registration with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. 56 In establishing the SIPC, Congress
provided the agency, inter alia, with the authority to seek the liquidation
of a broker-dealer's business to meet customers' obligations when the
level of its assets indicated a failure or a threat of failure. 57
In 1981, the SIPC began liquidation proceedings against two bro-
ker-dealers. The SIPC claimed that the broker-dealers had insufficient
assets to meet the obligations of their customers and that it disbursed
over $13 million to cover the shortage. 58 Subsequently, the SIPC filed
44. Id. at 151.
45. Id. at 151-53.
46. Id. at 152.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
48. 828 F.2d 1528 (11 h Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 1529.
50. Id. at 1530.
51. Id.
52. 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
53. Id. at 1467.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(1) (1988).
55. Id. §§ 78aaa-78111.
56. Id. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A).
57. Id. § 78eee.
58. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1315 (1992).
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suit against Holmes and 75 other defendants, claiming that they em-
ployed the broker-dealers in a scheme to inflate the price of the shares
of several companies and create the misconception that a stable market
existed for the stocks. 59 The discovery of the scheme caused a dramatic
decline in the price of the shares of these companies, and the stock
owned in the proprietary accounts of the two broker-dealers sustained
huge losses.6 ° The SIPC claimed that the defendants violated Section
10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule lOb-5, the mail and
wire fraud statutes6 ' and the federal RICO laws.
62
B. Lower Courts
The SIPC filed the original lawsuit in 1983 in district court in Cali-
fornia.63 The first two appellate court decisions involving these parties
concerned different procedural matters.64 In the third decision, the dis-
trict court held the SIPC did not have proper standing to bring a RICO
claim and defendant's actions were not the proximate cause of the losses
sustained, so the SIPC appealed.6 5 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that the
purchaser-seller limitation in Rule lob-5 does not apply to RICO claims
based on securities fraud.6 6 The court of appeals decided that the lower
court erred in granting summary judgment on the proximate cause issue
because a fact question remained as to whether a causal connection ex-
isted between the defendant's actions and the broker-dealers' losses.
6 7
C. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on only one issue: whether
the SIPC has the right to bring a securities fraud action under RICO.
6 8
In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court reversed and remanded the
decision of the court of appeals. The Court held the SIPC failed to state
a claim because the alleged actions by the defendant were not a proxi-
mate cause of the SIPC's losses.6 9 The majority refused to address the
question of whether RICO required a party to be a purchaser or seller in
order to bring a claim based on securities fraud. 70 Instead, it found
59. Id.
60. Id
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
62. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1315.
63. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 587 F. Supp. 1358 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
64. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1986)
(reversing lower court decision to dismiss SIPC's lOb-5 claim); Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985) (reversing the district court's decision
to dismiss four defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue).
65. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir.
1990).
66. Id. at 1467.
67. Id. at 1468-69.
68. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1316 (1992).




a discussion of the problem unnecessary and not relevant to the
decision.
7 1
In determining that RICO requires proximate cause to sustain an
action, the majority focused on specific language in the RICO statute:
"[any person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola-
tion" 7 2 may bring an action. Relying on statutory history, 73 Souter con-
cluded that Congress fashioned § 1964(c) of RICO after Section 4 of the
Clayton Act,74 which itself imitated language from Section 7 of the Sher-
man Act.75 Souter stated that courts repeatedly interpreted the Sher-
man Act as requiring proximate causation and the Supreme Court
previously held that the Clayton Act required proof of proximate
cause. 76 The Court therefore found by analogy that RICO also requires
proximate cause.
7 7
Souter relied on several policy initiatives to justify his use of proxi-
mate cause. First, the further removed an injury is from the violation,
the harder to trace particular damages back to the infraction. 78 Second,
to avoid multiple recoveries, courts would be forced to develop intricate
rules for the apportionment of damages among differently injured plain-
tiffs. 79 Third, plaintiffs injured directly will bring private lawsuits and
avoid those problems faced by remotely injured parties, thus reducing
the societal demand for deterrence of the violations. 80
The Court refused to address the purchaser-seller issue despite urg-
ing by appellant Holmes and dissension among the lower courts. 8 ' Sou-
ter found the instant case untimely for a settlement of the issue
8 2
because the lower courts could have used proximate cause to decide the
conflicting cases.8 3 Furthermore, none of the cases involved parties
who failed to qualify as a purchaser or seller because of reliance on a
broker's advice, as occurred in Blue Chip Stamps.
8 4
D. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Stevens, addressed
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1316 (citing 18 U.S.C § 1964(c) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
73. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assoc.,
Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
74. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
75. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
76. For a discussion of the enactment of § 4 of the Clayton Act based on language
from § 7 of the Sherman Act, see Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
77. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317-18.
78. Id. at 1318.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 40-52.
82. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322. "[O]ur discussion of the issue would be unnecessary to
the resolution of this case. Nor do we think that leaving this question unanswered will
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the question on which the Court granted certiorari. The Justices con-
cluded that a plaintiff can sustain a RICO action based on securities
fraud without meeting the purchaser-seller requirement. 85 O'Connor
argued for a strict reading of the statement in the RICO statute author-
izing "any person" to sue and determined that courts should not impose
the purchaser-seller requirement of Rule lOb-5 in a RICO action. 86 In
her opinion, Congress chose to institute a private right of action for
plaintiffs without requiring a purchase or sale of securities and the Court
should not impede the intentions of Congress.
8 7
As to the majority's use of causation to decide the case, O'Connor
seemed satisfied with the assertion that proximate cause emerged as an
element of the question before the Court.8 8 In her opinion, however,
the requirement of a proximate connection between the injury or harm
and the defendant's conduct should not prevent one who lacks pur-
chaser-seller standing from bringing a civil RICO action.
8 9
E. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia agreed with Justice O'Connor that the purchaser-
seller requirement should not apply to civil RICO actions based on se-
curities fraud, but he surmised that "[t]he ultimate question here is stat-
utory standing .... ."90 Courts must first determine if the "nexus"
between the plaintiff's harm and the defendant's conduct supports a
RICO cause of action. 9 1 The question of proximate cause only factors
into the standing equation because, without express directions other-
wise from a legislature, courts always consider proximate cause in decid-
ing questions of recovery.
9 2
In Justice Scalia's opinion, the purchaser-seller requirement falls
under another element of statutory standing, the "zone-of-interest"
test.9 3 This test ascertains if the plaintiff falls within the category of per-
sons served by the particular rule. 94 Courts should apply this test, along
with the proximate cause test, in determining whether a plaintiff has
standing to sue.9 5 Similar to Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia theorized
that the Court should not imply any limitation into RICO because Con-
gress created the statute and elected not to limit the rights of civil RICO
plaintiffs. 96
85. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1323. "Insofar as 'any' encompasses 'all', the words 'any person' cannot
reasonably be read to mean only purchasers and sellers of securities." Id. (citation
ommitted).
87. Id. at 1327.
88. Id. at 1322.
89. Id. at 1324.
90. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1327 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. "Life is too short to pursue every human act to its most remote conse-
quences." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1328.
94. Id.
95. Id.




Aside from the fact that the Court sidestepped the most important
issue-standing-it made an appropriate decision in denying the SIPC
relief because of a lack of causation. As Justice Souter noted, courts
generally utilize proximate cause "to limit a person's responsibility for
the consequences of that person's own acts."' 97 Assuming Holmes actu-
ally committed the alleged acts, the broker-dealers' collapse could be
attributed to many other possible factors, making it impossible to im-
pute full responsibility to Holmes. 98 Other possible causes included the
failure of the broker-dealers to diversify assets, poor supervision of the
business and weak market conditions.
99
By requiring that a proximate relationship exist between a defend-
ant's violation and the plaintiff's injuries, the Court tightened a fixture
of RICO.' 0 0 For the first time, the Court restricted the breadth of
RICO,' 0 ' despite contrary language in both the statute 10 2 and prior
Supreme Court cases. 10 3 However, because the Court dodged the ques-
tion upon which it granted certiorari, two approaches to interpreting
Holmes emerged. A lower court may adopt either approach, depending
on its Circuit's rule on the purchaser-seller issue prior to the decision.
A. The Purchaser-Seller Limitation Does Not Apply To RICO Actions Based
On Securities Fraud
Courts may interpret the concurring opinions in Holmes as the fu-
ture of the law,' 0 4 given the 5-4 split on the purchaser-seller issue. 0 5
Courts could choose not to apply the purchaser-seller requirement and
instead follow Souter's lead by using proximate cause as the sole basis
for deciding RICO actions. This interpretation supports the argument
that, while courts have implied a cause of action under Rule lOb-5,10 6
97. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318.
98. Id. at 1320.
99. Id.
100. See Pitt, supra note 16, at 31 (stating that the Court "pronounced a black-letter
legal requirement that had, prior to the grant of certiorari, already been thought to have
been well-established in RICO jurisprudence.").
101. Edward Brodsky, RICO - Limitation And Expansion, N.Y. L. J., Apr. 8, 1992, at 3.
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (RICO "shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes.").
103. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (asserting that the lan-
guage of RICO should not be limited); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497
(1985) ("RICO is to be read broadly.").
104. Brodsky, supra note 101, at 3. See also Greenhouse, supra, note 32, at C2 ("With
four Justices already on record, it is likely the Court will resolve the issue in favor of
investors.").
105. Andrew Leigh, Supreme Court Ruling Has Weakened RICO-Maybe, INVESTOR's Bus.
DAILY, Mar. 27, 1992, at 8.
106. The first case to find an implied private right of action under Rule lOb-5 was
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (Investors convinced to
sell stock for much less than actual value sustained a cause of action under the securities
laws because "the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient
to negative what the general law implies."). The Supreme Court later endorsed the hold-
ing in Kardom. See Superintendent of Insurance of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
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Congress expressly provided for a private cause of action under RICO
and courts are compelled to abide by the legislature's explicit direc-
tions. 10 7 Thus, the onus stays with Congress, and not the courts, to im-
pose a purchaser-seller limitation for RICO actions,10 8 a situation
favored by both O'Connor 0 9 and Scalia. I 10
Based on their earlier rulings favoring the liberal approach to
RICO,"'1 the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits will likely favor the concur-
rences' approach to the purchaser-seller issue. Both courts relied heav-
ily on the textual argument that RICO, on its face, does not contain any
standing requirement as provided for by Rule lOb-5." t 2 Thus, until
Congress explicitly adds a standing clause specifically for securities
fraud actions, these courts are apt to hold on to their prior convictions
until expressly directed otherwise.
Such an interpretation implies substantial consequences, opening
the door to a multitude of plaintiffs kept out of the courts by the pur-
chaser-seller limitation.11 3 Permitting indirectly injured plaintiffs to sue
would create "massive and complex damages litigation [which] not only
burdens the courts, but also undermines the effectiveness of treble-dam-
ages suits." 1 14 Disastrous effects on the securities industry could mate-
rialize, as persons and businesses involved in proxy matters and other
nontrading activities suddenly become subject to tremendous liabil-
ity.' 1 5 For instance, a person who refrained from buying stock due to
fraudulent negative information currently does not have a claim under
the securities laws for failure to meet the standing requirement. 16
However, under the broad interpretation of RICO, a multitude of suits
U.S. 6, 13 (1971); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54
(1972).
107. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748 (1975). The Court
stated:
[I]f Congress had legislated the elements of a private cause of action for damages,
the duty of the Judicial Branch would be to administer the law which Congress
enacted; the Judiciary may not circumscribe a right which Congress has conferred
because of any disagreement it might have with Congress about the wisdom of
creating so expansive a liability.
Id.
108. Pitt, supra note 16, at 31.
109. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1322 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1327 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990);
Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1987).
112. Vigman, 908 F.2d at 1466; Warner, 828 F.2d at 1530.
113. Tobenkin, supra note 4, at 5 (quoting Jack Samet, Holmes' attorney) ("The whole
idea that a person must be a purchaser of a stock to sue would be moot.").
114. Associated General Contractors of Ca., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983). Apportionment raises the overall costs of recovery
by creating complex issues in determining each plaintiffs damages. In addition, dividing
the damages among a larger number of plaintiffs diminishes the benefits to each plaintiff,
possibly reducing the incentive to sue. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745
(1977).
115. Geoffrey A. Campbell, Justices Say Investor Protection Agency Can't Win Tiple Damages




would appear featuring plaintiffs who claim they would have bought se-
curities but abstained."17 In addition, from a public policy standpoint,
this approach appears "somewhat out of kilter with the current mood in
Washington," 18 which favors legal reform designed to reduce frivolous
litigation. '19
The courts' endorsement of this approach should come as no sur-
prise to persons who followed the development of the RICO statute.
Beginning in the early 1980's, people speculated that RICO would even-
tually work in favor of the securities fraud plaintiff.'12 0 Those favoring
this view of Holmes would argue Congress could easily see RICO has
emerged as a well-used tool in securities fraud actions and would have
made changes in the law if necessary. ' 2 ' Therefore, claim the advocates
of RICO, Congress inherently favors the liberal approach and the courts
should not attempt to restrict RICO in favor of a narrow approach.1
22
B. Proximate Cause Is Required In Addition To The Purchaser-Seller
Limitation
The lower courts may interpret the Court's decision to mean that a
person who was not a purchaser or seller of securities cannot fulfill the
proximate cause requirement.' 23 Thus, until Congress explicitly states
otherwise, the standing requirements firmly established for securities
fraud actions under Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule lOb-5 continue to apply to RICO cases as well. Even though
the majority did not specifically address the purchaser-seller issue, they
"strongly hinted their commitment" to the rule, 12 4 asserting that
problems with allowing indirectly injured plaintiffs to bring causes of
action would burden the judicial system.' 2 5 The Fourth Circuit will
probably favor this approach, based on its 1987 opinion in International
Data Bank v. Zepkin,' 26 in which it interpreted Congress's actions (or lack
thereof) relating to the purchaser-seller issue to mean the approval of
117. Id.
118. Pitt, supra note 16, at 31.
119. Id. The authors added, "This approach eschews uniformity and predictability
under the law and runs counter to the growing consensus of the American public and its
leaders that efforts should be made to control litigation, not to encourage the filing of even
more suits." Id. at 33.
120. See Bridges, supra note 14, at 45 ("Private RICO may be for the eighties what rule
lOb-5 was for the seventies."); Jeffrey G. Macintosh, Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organi-
zations Act: Powerful New Tool Of The Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 KAN. L. REV. 7, 12 (1982)
("there is some support that RICO may relax at least one of the substantive limitations to
an action under rule lOb-5-that the plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller of
securities.").
121. Brodsky, supra note 101, at 3.
122. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor claimed that Congress expressly cre-
ated the right for nonpurchasers and nonsellers to sue. Holmes v. Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1327 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981)).
123. Leigh, supra note 105, at 8 (referring to comments by Jack Samet, attorney for
Holmes).
124. Campbell, supra note 115, at 5.
125. Holmes 112 S. Ct. at 1321 (1992).
126. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
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the retention of Rule lOb-5's requirements. 12 7 The court stated that
Congress "did not write the RICO statute in a vacuum." 128 By not tak-
ing explicit action, the court found that the legislature indicated a will-
ingness to retain the requirements of the federal securities laws in
RICO. 129
This interpretation of Holmes agrees with the legal community's
view of RICO and securities fraud13 0 and constitutes the most sensible
approach to a confusing situation for several reasons. First, an adoption
of this narrow ruling by the lower courts would certainly reduce the
fears of "vexatious litigation" that cause so much anxiety.' 3 ' A narrow
interpretation of the statute prevents securities plaintiffs from alleging
non-securities fraud RICO offenses to secure a place in the courtroom.
Second, placing limits on which persons can bring a RICO securities
fraud action would help define the securities industry's potential liabil-
ity' 3 2 and redirect conventional securities fraud actions away from
RICO to the appropriate controlling securities laws. In fact, a move-
ment exists to eliminate securities fraud completely as a cause of action
under RICO.13 3 Finally, Congress designed RICO as "an aggressive in-
itiative to supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fight-
ing crime,"_1 3 4 not as an unrestricted panacea for plaintiffs and a means
for skirting federal securities laws.
The jury is still out in terms of how this case will influence the legal
community.' 3 5 No clear answer exists as to which parties this decision
will affect the most.' 3 6 On one hand, the Court narrowed RICO by
firmly establishing proximate cause as a requirement, while on the other
hand it conceivably broadened the rule by not enforcing the purchaser-
seller limitation for securities fraud actions. 13 7 If future decisions elimi-
nate the purchaser-seller requirement as a result of Holmes, the net effect
127. Id. at 152.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Edward F. Brodsky, RICO And The Securities Laws, N.Y. L. J., June 12,
1991, at 7 (purchaser-seller requirement should not be eliminated); Pitt, supra note 16, at
33 (controlling litigation is the consensus in America).
131. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-45 (1975).
132. Campbell, supra note 115, at 5.
133. Getzendanner, supra note 2, at 684 (arguing that "there is simply no general need
to encourage litigation for securities fraud."). The Securities and Exchange Commission
proposed that Congress revise RICO to eliminate lawsuits based on violations of securities
fraud. See Pitt, supra note 16, at 31.
134. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985). However, the dissent
argues that RICO essentially eradicated the precedent that developed over time. Justice
Marshall claimed that the securities law precedent "is now an endangered species because
plaintiffs can avoid the limitations of the securities laws merely by alleging violations of
other predicate acts." Id. at 505 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. Jed S. Rakoff, The Supreme Court's Scolding Of RICO, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 2, 1992, at 29
(explaining that the decision will simply "muddy the waters" and create uncertainty in the
interpretation of proximate cause).
136. Leigh, supra note 105, at 8 (claiming that interpretations of the ruling depend on
one's allegiance).
137. Pitt, supra note 16, at 33.
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will be a limitation on plaintiffs' chances of recovery but an increase in
the number of persons entitled to bring a cause of action.
C. Standing Under the Purchaser-Seller Limitation
When the Supreme Court announced that it granted certiorari in
Holmes, the financial and legal communities believed the case would fi-
nally resolve the RICO issue.13 8 The potential implications arising out
of the decision created substantial interest among followers of securities
law. Prior to the Court's decision, one commentator surmised that an
affirmance of the court of appeals would set an alarming precedent for
averting the standing limitations needed to bring RICO actions based
on other violations,' 3 9 resulting in an increase in the number of frivo-
lous lawsuits filed by plaintiffs far removed from the actual transac-
tion. 140  Proponents of the statute looked forward to a broad
interpretation enabling those with no claims under the securities laws to
access RICO. 141
Instead, neither party came away satisfied with the outcome, for the
Court dodged the question that people most wanted answered. Even
Souter himself recognized the lower courts demanded "much-needed
guidance."' 142 Unless the lower courts can discover a way to use this
opinion to develop a compromise solution, the judicial system must wait
for another RICO/securities fraud case to appear and hope the Court
does not again drop the ball.
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting the RICO statute, Congress included "fraud in the sale
of securities" as a predicate offense with a meager amount of support
and reasoning. Thus, courts interpreting RICO in securities fraud ac-
tions had little guidance as to whether the purchaser-seller standing lim-
itation previously implied by the courts in a Rule lOb-5 action also
applied to RICO. The ensuing confusion resulted in conflicting deci-
sions among the federal circuits.
In Holmes, the SIPC attempted to recover monies paid to customers
of two failed brokerage firms by bringing RICO charges against the de-
fendant. Rather than decide the issue of whether the SIPC had standing
to allege a RICO action, the Court held the actions by the defendant
were not the proximate cause of the losses of the SIPC. The question of
whether the purchaser-seller requirement applies to RICO remains un-
answered. Thus, the federal courts may continue to interpret the issue
138. See supra text accompanying note 4.
139. Brodsky, RICO And The Securities Laws, supra note 130, at 7. The author summa-
rized the arguments on both sides and concluded that the purchaser-seller requirement
should not be eliminated.
140. Tobenkin, supra note 4, at 5 (referring to Holmes's attorney, who said that "law-
yers may increasingly use the RICO law in securities violation cases far removed from the
organized crime activities RICO was designed to fight against").
141. Brodsky, RICO And The Securities Laws, supra note 130, at 7.
142. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1322 (1992).
1993]
426 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:2
in the same manner as they did prior to Holmes, with some applying the
purchaser-seller standing requirement to RICO cases, and others ignor-
ing the standing requirement required by the securities laws.
In order to remain in harmony with Section l0b of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5, RICO needs to adopt the pur-
chaser-seller requirement used by the federal securities laws in fraud ac-
tions. Limiting the number of potential plaintiffs will prevent frivolous
RICO lawsuits and will constrain securities fraud actions to those that
meet the criteria of the securities laws. By not addressing the purchaser-
seller requirement, the Supreme Court avoided the most important is-
sue in Holmes, and provided no direction for the divided lower courts. If
potential defendants hoped for Holmes to clarify the liability picture,
their wishes went unfulfilled, and they must wait for the next RICO case
for another opportunity.
